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30 November 2009

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Showing posts with label USA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label USA. Show all posts

Thursday, 19 November 2009

Where are all the KLB bashers?


Ibrahim Sajid Malick

Do you wonder why have the Pakistani pundits stopped complaining about imperialist tyranny and exposing the onerous conditions of Kerry-Lugar Bill? Why all of a sudden KLB is a non-issue? I was curious and I spend last several days in Washington DC trying to understand how Obama administration managed the PR fiasco.

Conversations with several insiders and subject matter experts point to a set of meetings on October 19th in Islamabad. General David Petraeus and US Senator John Kerry reached Islamabad on Sunday (October 18th). It was reported in local media that the meetings were about Waziristan operations but in reality talks with top Pakistani General were limited to the $7.5 billion dollar aid package. “They wanted to understand how this aid package violates Pakistan’s sovereignty. And, they wanted to hear it from the horses mouth,” said a diplomatic source.

Gen. Patreause and Sen. Kerry were sent to Pakistan after US President Barack Obama signed a record 7.5 billion dollar package tripling non-military aid to the nuclear-armed Muslim nation to boost its campaign against a virulent Islamist insurgency. Although the Zaradari government defended the package, Pakistan’s powerful military sparked a domestic showdown, expressing grave reservations about conditions that hinge some of the funds on efforts to battle Islamist extremism. The bill prevents the funding from being used for nuclear proliferation, to support militants or to attack neighboring countries — namely India — and calls for a cut-off in aid if Pakistan fails to crack down on extremists.

United States Central Command chief Gen David Petraeus and Chairman Senate Foreign Affairs committee Senator John Kerry on Monday October 19th held separate meetings with the Pakistan Chief of Army Staff Gen Ashraf Kayani and the outcome of those meetings were an immediate yanking of the anti-KLB campaign from Pakistani private TV channels. When Central Command chief Gen David Petraeus went to the GHQ he categorically told Gen Kayani to halt anti-KLB campaign. “Gen. Kayani was told in absolutely clear terms that the Obama administration will not tolerate another Honduras,” said a source very close to this conversation.

It is interesting that three of my sources mentioned Honduras while talking about the possible outcome of anti-KLB campaign in Pakistan.

On June 28th Honduran soldiers roused democratically elected President Manuel Zelaya from his bed at gunpoint and flew him to Costa Rica. The coup d’etat was the first in Central America in over a quarter century. The coup, led by the Honduran Gen. Romeo Vasquez, was condemned by the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, the Organization of American States and all of Honduras’ immediate national neighbors.

The Obama administration initially did not legally classify Zelaya’s ouster as a coup, which would automatically trigger a suspension of aid. However the administration subsequently suspended military cooperation with the country. Honduran controversy has been extremely embarrassing for the Obama administration which had come to power on the rhetoric that America should seize supporting tyrants and military dictators.

In Pakistan, Zardari administration was portrayed by the media as too deferential to the United States. Pakistani journalists who unconditionally support their Army started the campaign against KLB and coalesced anti-Western politicians, and Muslim fundamentalists — implausibly claiming that Pakistan’s sovereignty was undermined and the country could end up as a U.S. neo-colony. Some of it is untrue!

To begin with, Pakistan has been an American neo-colony for last six decades and most of that time it was under a military dictorship. And, most importantly Pakistan has been an American satellite state because of it’s army. Pakistan’s military operates on the U.S. financial and technological assistance and it will receive even more support in the near future as it targets Taliban strongholds. Therefore conditions placed by the U.S. Congress on $7.5 billion in economic aid to Pakistan over the next five years should not have been of major consequence to Pakistani generals.

Sen. Kerry brought the carrot while Gen. Patreus had the stick. Gen. Kayani was assured that his military will get monies and equipment that he has asked for but if he pulled a fast one, the Obama administration would at once severe its ties with Pakistan army.

Sen. Kerry’s meeting was held earlier in the day and Gen. Patreaus arrived at the GHQ in the afternoon. General Kayani counseled his peers and advisors and by the end of October 19th and it was decided that Kerry-Lugar Bill will not be publicly condemned. Five Pakistani journalists were contacted the very same night and told not beat the dead horse.

It is undoubtedly true that Pakistani government is too deferential to the Americans. Not that I condone it but this is not new. Bone of contention here was the ‘non-military’ aid. This aid package was historic because it earmarked monies for health, education, infrastructure and civil society. Pakistan army felt left-out. Although Pakistan army has backed out of KLB but democratic government is still hanging on the balance. NRO, food security, energy crisis all loom over Zardari’s head.

Pakistani media is packed with stories of corruption – same TV anchors who had become Hugo Chavez of Pakistan on army’s behest opposing Kerry-Lugar bill have now launched vociferous campaign against Zaradri government exposing corruption of ruling politicians. Not a single anchor has ever asked what happened to corrupt Generals. Why are corrupt army officials beyond criticism?

From trafficking heroin to grabbing precious land; from taking kick-back on purchase of equipment (sub-marines included) Pakistan army has looted everything we have ever had. Why then, I wonder, Pakistanis only discuss civilian corruption? Managing PR fiasco was easy for the Obama administration. They had to remind the source of opposition of an old proverb: you can’t bite the hand that feeds you. Pakistani Generals understood and complied.


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Thursday, 12 November 2009

Is there an Al Qaeda - NATO connection?


The al Qaeda connection?


NWFP was hit by another terrorist attack on Tuesday afternoon when a suicide bomber blew up his car in Charsadda bazaar. More than 30 people were killed and nearly 100 others injured, including several women and children. It was the third suicide bombing since Saturday in the battle-ridden province. Suicide attacks have become a routine occurrence during the past few weeks all over Pakistan, especially in NWFP. A spate of terror attacks in recent days is obviously a backlash against the military operation in South Waziristan against the militants. According to a Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) spokesman, the militants have retreated from various areas in South Waziristan as part of their war strategy and its fighters will launch a guerrilla war once the Pakistani military enters deep into all areas of South Waziristan. If the Taliban have actually managed to retreat from South Waziristan, they have either gone to North Waziristan or crossed the border into Afghanistan. When the Pakistan army was deployed for the first time since independence in FATA in 2004, the US and Pakistan agreed upon a hammer and anvil strategy whereby the US-led NATO forces were playing the role of the hammer in Afghanistan while the Pakistani forces played the role of the anvil in our tribal areas. The roles have reversed now. Successive military operations against the local Taliban have crippled their organisation, which is why they could now be crossing the border to safeguard their interests. The alarming factor is that the ‘anvil’ is nowhere to be seen as the NATO forces have vacated more than half a dozen key security checkposts on the Afghan side of the Pak-Afghan border opposite South Waziristan. In these trying times when Pakistan is in the midst of a civil war, the international community needs to come forward and help it. Instead, the NATO forces are leaving the door open for the TTP to cross over to the Afghan side without any repercussions. This would obviously undermine the military operation.

The Afghan Taliban, on the other hand, have strongly denied any association with the TTP’s campaign, strategy or tactics. Afghan Taliban commander Abdul Mannan condemned suicide bombing and termed it un-Islamic and wrong to target innocent people in blasts. He said the Afghan Taliban leaders have not crossed the border and are not hiding in Pakistan, but are targeting coalition and NATO forces from Afghan soil. With these remarks coming from the Afghan Taliban, it seems as if there is some other force helping the local Taliban and from the pattern of suicide bombings, it could well be the al Qaeda network. It is quite apparent that the TTP is getting massive funding from some source and proper training to carry out successive terror attacks all over Pakistan. The al Qaeda leadership has on a number of occasions declared war against the state of Pakistan, which makes it all the more probable that this global terror network could be supporting the TTP in its fight against the state of Pakistan.

The military is trying to eliminate the militants from the tribal region but it seems as if the country does not have enough funds for the purpose. This can be gauged from Interior Minister Rehman Malik’s statement that the government is now using development funds for the capacity building of law-enforcement agencies in a bid to improve security. If al Qaeda is actually helping the local Taliban, it is not only alarming for our country but for the whole world. Fighting the militants on this scale requires heavy-duty finances; it is time the international community, especially the US, rises to the occasion and helps Pakistan in this common cause. Peace and stability in this region, once achieved, will translate into peace all over the world. Source

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Monday, 9 November 2009

Attention Talibanic media-wallahs: Musharraf, and not Zardari, gave US insight into Pak nuclear command and control structure



US seeking to secure Pak nukes in case of ‘crisis’

WASHINGTON: The US has been negotiating highly sensitive understandings with the Pakistani military about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, investigative journalist Seymour Hersh reported in the latest issue of The New Yorker magazine.

The journalist wrote that during meetings with current and former officials in Washington and Pakistan, he was told that the agreements would allow specially trained American units to provide added security for the Pakistani arsenal in case of a crisis. At the same time, the Pakistani military would be given money to equip and train Pakistani soldiers and improve their housing and facilities, says the report.

The principal fear was that “extremists inside the military might stage a coup, take control of some nuclear assets, or even divert a warhead”, notes Hersh.

The report says that the arrangement serves as a safeguard in case of a quickly escalating confrontation with India, but also makes the weapons vulnerable during shipment and reassembly.

Meanwhile, former president Pervez Musharraf acknowledged that his government had given US State Department non-proliferation experts insight into the command-and-control of the Pakistani arsenal and its on-site safety and security procedures, says the report.

US Embassy spokesman Larry Schwartz did not confirm or deny the report, but noted Hillary Clinton had recently said the US had confidence in Pakistan’s ability to protect its nuclear programmes and material. afp

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\11\09\story_9-11-2009_pg1_1

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Saturday, 7 November 2009

The high cost of ‘ghairat’


By Irfan Husain
Saturday, 07 Nov, 2009

JUDGING from the heated bombast that passes for informed debate on our airwaves, it would appear that ghairat, or honour, is a virtue restricted to those who permanently inhabit our TV studios.

People like Imran Khan have been frothing at the mouth against the Kerry-Lugar act, insisting that we reject the $7.5bn, five-year aid package (extendable to 10 years). Our cricketing hero was holding forth on an Urdu channel the other evening, claiming that we could easily raise this amount by cutting expenditure and recovering money stashed abroad by corrupt elements.




According to him, we should not sell our ghairat so cheaply, and learn to stand on our own feet. But no such objections are ever raised when the IMF or the World Bank impose strict conditionalities on how their loans are to be spent. For years, we have accepted, often under duress, tough fiscal measures as part of these loan packages. And here we are, getting an outright grant of $1.5bn a year without any strings, and we are screaming like infants being forced to swallow a draught of bitter medicine.

Here’s sobering news for those who think it would be a simple matter to get this kind of money for the social sector: nearly 90 per cent of the non-development federal budget is spent on subsidies, defence and debt servicing, leaving around 10 per cent for administrative costs and the social sector. And if Imran Khan thinks crooks are going to queue up to return their ill-gotten wealth, he has a higher opinion of them than I do.

This is the kind of muddled, ill-informed thinking that marked our media’s interaction with Hillary Clinton recently. Watching the American secretary of state talking to some of the leading lights of our private TV networks, I was struck by how angry they all looked. Ms Clinton, on the other hand, was relaxed and articulate. She reminded me of a patient adult, gently chiding and cajoling a bunch of sulking teenagers.

One well-known anchor with an Urdu channel, his face contorted with rage, virtually shouted at her: ‘Do you know how many bases the United States has in this country?’ Smilingly, Ms Clinton countered: ‘Do you know how many billions of dollars the United States has given Pakistan?’And this is the bottom line. As both Ms Clinton and Senator John Kerry have said, if Pakistan doesn’t want the money, nobody is forcing it down our throats. But it seems that we want the money and keep our ghairat at the same time. For a country that has been surviving on external assistance for decades, the sudden realisation that we should stand on our own feet is odd.

Nawaz Sharif, rejecting the Kerry-Lugar act, asked how long we would go around with a begging bowl. I recall his ‘kashkol tor do’ (‘break the begging bowl’) campaign when he was in power in the 1990s. Thousands of ordinary Pakistanis (including my late mother, much to my chagrin) responded and sent personal savings to support this initiative. Nobody knows what happened to this money, but it certainly did not help in ending our aid dependency.

Interestingly, all those demanding that we reject the offer of American assistance are sleek and well-fed. In this entire long-winded debate, I have not heard anybody say one word about the illiteracy, poverty and disease the aid package is meant to reduce.

Critics have said that in the past, such initiatives did not make any difference, and things have not improved as a result of foreign aid. We forget that with our population growing as fast as it has in the past, we have created our own problems. The reality is that today, there are four times more Pakistanis than lived here in 1947. Without any foreign assistance, there would have been widespread starvation.

It is certainly true that huge amounts have been frittered away on useless projects, while much of this assistance has ended up in the personal accounts of politicians, bureaucrats and generals. Hence the American insistence on monitoring how money disbursed under the KLA is actually spent.

This entire bad-tempered discussion reveals the intensity of anti-Americanism that has been whipped up by a large section of the media. Virtually no anchor in Urdu chat shows challenges a panellist and asks him or her for proof for the most outlandish assertions. So widespread have these perceptions of American ill intentions become that a friend’s driver casually said the other day that the Americans were arming the Taliban. When I asked him why Washington would arm the foe that was killing US soldiers, he had no reply beyond ‘I read it in a newspaper.’

We have been so blinded by our rage against America that we forget that currently there is a clear convergence of interests between their goals and ours. Both countries want peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan; and both are fighting the forces of darkness. So while our approach and tactics may differ, we need to get along well enough to coordinate the fight more effectively.

In the real world, you do not have to love your allies to conduct a successful military campaign. In the Second World War, the Soviet Union fought with the US and Britain to defeat Hitler. Nazi Germany was the common foe, and the threat it posed brought the communists into the anti-fascist alliance. Clearly, there was no love lost between the USSR and the West, but common interests drew them together.

Critics of the act assert that this assistance is being offered in America’s self-interest, making it sound like an accusation that proves Washington’s bad faith. Actually, all countries act in their own self-interest. In this case, the American Congress and the administration are convinced that in order to stabilise Pakistan, it is necessary to address the many social and economic problems we are struggling with. And without a viable Pakistan, Afghanistan cannot be fixed. Hence the Kerry-Lugar act.

Who in Pakistan can possibly close his eyes to the reality of the situation we face today? Unless power generation is enhanced quickly, the economy will soon collapse completely. Parents are often forced to send their children to madressahs because there are not enough schools. Here they are often brainwashed into joining the terrorists who are threatening to destroy the state.

Large sums are needed to overcome these and other challenges. But money alone won’t solve these problems: political will and a consensus are needed. What we don’t need are mindless slogans of ‘go America go!’

http://www.dawn.com.pk/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/columnists/the-high-cost-of-ghairat-719

A comment:

By hypocrite (pkpolitics)

Mirror Mirror who is uglier than I

I dont particpate in election process and yet I cry for democracy,
When I participate in elections I vote on thebasis of ethinicty, sect, language or pressure,
I want to develop the country yet appoint my incapable and corrupt cronies as ministers,
I believe in justice and onlyfor others,
I dont pay taxes though I am billionaire,
I believe in every human being equal and I make my servant stand for me in queue as I have many servants,
I dont follow traffic rules as I have big SUV,
I have my kids get education outside Pakistan and I want to improve eductaion standard in Pakistan,
My family gets treated outsuide Pakistan and I want to provide helath care to all Pakistanis,
I spend my vacations outside Pakistan and want foreigners to visit Pakistan as a toursim spot,
I vowed to defend my country and kill my own brethern,
I live in palaces and promise to provide shelter to all pakistanis,
I believe in idelogy and dont mind if my party kills any one who opposes my party,
I am follower of religion yet run after plots, ministries and money,
What I thik or believe is correct and everything else is wrong,
I want aid from whatever means but dont want to follow conditions for fair disbursement of aid,
I want multiple year visa or USA citizenship but I believe that USA is our enemy,
I am part of each government but I cannot take blame for non development of country
I am part of each opposition but cannot take blame for non development of the country
When I want to play I want to be the captain and everyone to follow my dictatorship but I dont want to play under anyother captain,
I believe in one for all and all for one yet when my friends are in distress I run away,

No one is uglier thanI as I am the ONLY hypocrite


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Monday, 2 November 2009

Pakistan-USA ties: From Liaqat Ali Khan to Asif Zardari

Life before Kerry-Lugar —Haider Nizamani

Popular sentiment has always been wary of American influence in Pakistan. Successive governments while framing their relations with the US have tried to placate public mood by invoking notions such as ‘augmenting national defence’ to accepting the ground realities of power politics

Why are TV pundits and commentators in the print media so worked up about President Asif Zardari allegedly throwing the country in America’s lap? President Zardari stands accused in this media trial of selling out to the United States and compromising national security by accepting the $1.5 billion a year US aid package popularly known as the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Before judging President Zardari, let us look at the last sixty years and see if he is any different from earlier rulers of Pakistan.

Zardari and his team have much in common with their predecessors when it comes to leaning on American crutches instead of hanging on to the notion of national sovereignty. In fact, this behaviour dates all way the back to Liaquat Ali Khan, the country’s first prime minister.

Ayesha Jalal, in her meticulously researched book The State of Martial Rule, writes that Pakistan requested a $2 billion loan from the US in October 1947, and Pakistani officials “admitted that the new state’s internal political situation depended upon its ties with Britain and the US.” It was the Americans who turned down Pakistan’s request.

“If your country will guarantee our territorial integrity, I will not keep my army at all.” These are not words of Asif Zardari but of Liaquat Ali Khan, speaking in response to an American journalist’s question in Washington DC in 1950. Pakistan was so far down on the priority list of the Americans that they didn’t seriously entertain our first prime minister’s offer to disband the military.

By the mid-1950s, the Pakistani ruling elite’s efforts to woo the Americans finally bore fruit when Pakistan became one of the founding members of US-sponsored regional military pacts like the Baghdad Pact and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO). Jalal is not off the mark in saying that by this time “the Americans had gained a toehold in the administrative operations of the Pakistani state.”

Pakistani sovereignty was a colander with such big holes that American U-2 spy planes flew from our country to carry out espionage missions in Soviet airspace in the 1950s. The US was allowed to open an espionage field office in Badaber, on the outskirts of Peshawar, in 1959. And this was happening under the watchful eye of Ayub Khan who, ironically, titled his book about Pakistan-US ties Friend not Masters. How Pakistani rulers were flaunting the sovereignty of the country became public knowledge when the Soviets downed a U-2 and captured its pilot, Gary Powers, alive.

From 1979 onward, General Zia-ul Haq scaled new heights in compromising the country’s sovereignty when he allowed Pakistan to be used as a base for proxy war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

By the 1990s, the political class of Pakistan was operating on the principle that the road to Islamabad goes through Washington. Benazir Bhutto never made any bones about her enchantment with American power while in our out of power.

Nawaz Sharif, whose party has become flag-bearer of national honour these days, rushed to Washington in July 1999 to sign a document that was tantamount to Pakistani surrender in the Kargil war. The myth of sovereignty was patently broken when Pervez Musharraf and Nawaz Sharif signed a deal brokered by the Saudis and the Americans facilitating Sharif’s exit from the country with his extended family. Musharraf is on record quoting a threatening phone call from Anthony Zinni, an American official under the Bush administration assigned to handle Pakistan, as the reason for abandoning the Taliban and embracing American ‘war of terror’.

Thus far I have only listed some signposts of Pakistan’s bartered and battered sovereignty in the realm of high politics. But the ongoing chest-beating about compromised sovereignty hardly mentions how international lending agencies have been telling managers of the Pakistani state to run it. Custodians of sovereignty will be well-advised to click the Pakistan link on the World Bank’s website. From the port in Karachi to education in the Northern Areas and irrigation in the Punjab, the World Bank has a say in all of the above. The World Bank proudly claims that it is expertise, more than money, imparted to these countries that truly matters.

Bargaining was the name of the game, as is nowadays, between Pakistan and America. Pakistan seldom got the amounts and ammunitions it asked for. The Americans were periodically dissatisfied with what Pakistan delivered in return of the US military and civilian aid.

If the country’s first prime minister was ready to disband the national armed forces only if Washington had provided a security guarantee, then why this hue and cry over sovereignty this time?

There are number of reasons. First, popular sentiment has always been wary of American influence in Pakistan. Successive governments while framing their relations with the US have tried to placate the public mood by invoking notions such as ‘augmenting national defence’ to accepting the ground realities of power politics.

Second, the urban middle classes of Pakistan love to hate Asif Zardari. He being at the helm of the state affairs and kowtowing to the Americans only adds fuel to the anti-Zardari sentiment of the middle classes. Third, the Pakistan People’s Party has never been a huge favourite of the civil-military bureaucracy. It could never establish an amicable wavelength with what is popularly termed the ‘Establishment’ in Pakistan.

Lastly, the above reasons combined find their explosive expression in 24/7 news channels where commentators and anchors never seem to tire of talking in ahistoric terms about US-Pakistan relations. The reason PPP leaders appear defensive on television is not because their party is the first to let the Americans interfere in Pakistani affairs. They are feeble on screen because they don’t have the guts to admit that Pakistani sovereignty was not an America-proof jar they inherited. There are sixty-year-old holes in it and they are likely to remain irrespective of the wishful assertions of TV anchors.

The writer is a lecturer in political science at the University of British Columbia. He can be reached at hnizamani@hotmail.com


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Friday, 30 October 2009

Slaughterhouse in mad house - Taliban in Pakistan


Pagal khanay mein zabah khana - by Mohammed Hanif

پاگل خانےمیں ذبح خانہ

’تو پھر کیا تمام پنجابی طالبان، وزیرستان ہجرت کر جائیں گے یا ایک چھوٹی سے خلافت ملتان اور رحیم یار خان کے بیچ میں بھی قائم ہو گی‘

گذشتہ ہفتے ایک غیر صحافی دوست نے سوال پوچھا کہ آخر پاکستانی طالبان کے سیاسی مقاصد کیا ہیں۔ میں نے اسکو سنی سنائی باتیں بتائیں لیکن اسے کیا یقین آنا تھا مجھے خود اپنے جواب پر یقین نہیں آیا۔ تب سے میں ہر صحافی، دانش ور سے پوچھتا ہوں، ادارتی صفحے کھنگالتا ہوں اور جو جواب ملتے ہیں اس سے میرے ذہن میں مزید سوال اٹھتے ہیں۔ اب تک ملنے والے جوابات اور میرے سوال در سوال کچھ یوں ہیں۔ جواب پہلے ہے سوال بعد میں۔

ج: پاکستانی طالبان، افغانستان کے طالبان کے ساتھ مل کر امریکی فوجوں کی واپسی چاہتے ہیں اور یہ چاہتے ہیں کہ پاکستان قبائلی علاقوں میں مداخلت نہ کرے تاکہ وہ اپنے قبائلی رسم و رواج اور شریعت کے مطابق زندگی گزار سکیں۔

س: تو پھر کیا تمام پنجابی طالبان وزیرستان ہجرت کر جائیں گے یا ایک چھوٹی سے خلافت ملتان اور رحیم یار خان کے بیچ میں بھی قائم ہوگی؟

ج: پاکستانی طالبان کا کوئی وجود نہیں یہ صرف قبائلی انتظام ہے۔ خون کا بدلہ خون۔ پاکستانی فوج نے ان پر چڑھائی کی۔ وہ صرف بدلہ لے رہے ہیں۔

س: اگر یہ صرف قبائلی انتقام ہے تو گزشتہ دہائی میں شیعوں سے اور اس سے پہلے قادیانیوں سے کون سا انتقام لیا جا رہا تھا؟

ج: یہ تحریک اس عالمی اسلامی نشاۃ الثانیہ کا حصہ ہے جو نو گیارہ کے بعد شروع ہوئی۔ یہ تحریک اس وقت تک جاری رہے گی جب تک مسلمانوں کا ازلی دشمن امریکہ گھٹنے نہیں ٹیک دیتا۔

س: اس عالمی تحریک کے پوسٹر بوائے اسامہ بن لادن ہیں اور گیارہ نو سے پہلے ان کا سیاسی مشن تھا سعودی عرب میں اسلامی نظام کا نفاذ۔ سعودی عرب میں اسلامی نظام کا نفاذ؟ ہمیں تو بچپن سے پڑھایا گیا تھا کہ سعودی عرب وہ واحد جگہ ہے جہاں اسلامی نظام موجود ہے۔ تو اب کیا مقصد ہے؟ کیلیفورنیا میں اسلامی نظام کا قیام؟ اور کیا یہ عظیم مقصد پشاور کے معصوم بچوں کو زندہ جلائے بغیر حاصل کیا جاسکتا ہے؟

ج: آپ واقعی توقع رکھتے ہیں کہ قبائلی پٹھان کسی سیاسی منشور پر عمل کر رہے ہیں؟ یہ سوال ہی لغو ہے۔

’میڈیا میں اور مسجدوں میں انکا دفاع کرنے والے کس کے ایجنٹ ہیں‘

س: الیاس کشمیری، ڈاکٹر عقیل، حاجی اسحٰق، اکرم لاہوری، مولانا مسعود اظہر نہ تو قبائلی ہیں نہ پٹھان۔ یہ سب پاکستان میں کبھی کسی ایجنسی، کبھی کسی مذہبی جماعت کے ہیرو بھی رہے ہیں۔ تو کیا یہ سب لوگ بھی طالبان کے ساتھ تعلق بنانے کے بعد پٹھان ہو گئے ہیں؟ کیا ان سادہ دلوں کا بھی کوئی سیاسی منشور نہیں ہے۔ اور کیا اس نامنشور پر عمل کے لیے ضروری ہے کہ غریبوں کے بچے بارود اور کیلوں سے بھری جیکٹیں پہنا کر اڑادیے جائے؟

ج: یہ سب امریکہ، اسرائیل اور بھارت کے ایجنٹ ہیں۔

س: سب کے سب؟ اور میڈیا میں اور مسجدوں میں انکا دفاع کرنے والے کس کے ایجنٹ ہیں؟

ج: یہ ملک ایک پاگل خانہ ہے۔مصری عالم سید قطب کے پیروکاروں کے ذہن میں آیا کہ اس پاگل خانے کے بیچ ایک ذبح خانہ قائم کر دیا جائے تو سارے پاگل اپنے کام چھوڑ کر یا تو تالیاں بجائیں گے، یا روئیں گے، یا خون میں ہاتھ دھو کر اپنے چہروں پر ملیں گے۔گوشت کے لوتھڑے بھنبھوڑیں گے، ڈر کے سجدوں میں گر جائیں گے، ذبح خانے میں سجدوں میں جھکی گردنیں کاٹی جائیں گی، پرانی قبروں سے ڈھانچے نکال کر انہیں چوراہوں پر پھانسی دی جائے گی۔ چھوٹے بچوں کو چھوٹی قبروں میں دفنا کر اللہ کی رضا قرار دیا جائے گا۔ ذبح خانہ تکبیر کے نعروں سے گونجے گا۔ اور یوں سارے پاگل سید قطب کے خواب کی تعبیر پائیں گے اور بخشے جائیں یا نہ جائیں پاگل خانے کی پاگل زندگی سے نجات ضرور پائیں گے۔

س: آمین ثم آمین

War and politics

Reality check

Friday, October 30, 2009
Shafqat Mahmood

Their claim of fighting for Islam was always a sham. That they are barbarous animals has been exposed by the bombing of innocent people in Peshawar. This is not the first time and it will not be the last. They will stop at nothing to get what they really want; power to lord it over you, and tell you how to live your life.

Is this slaughter of poor men, women and children happening because they hate the United States? Were they cutting throats and whipping women in Swat because of the drone attacks? Are these the kind of people who can be talked to, as Imran Khan, Rustam Shah Mohmand and others would have us believe?

They tell us that we the people of Pakistan are being targeted because our governments, past and present, collaborated with the US in fighting the Al Qaeda and Taliban. Let us for a moment accept their logic. How will they explain that these groups had already created cadres, prepared suicide squads, armed themselves and were ready to take on the Pakistani state?

Did this occur because of US-Pakistan partnership after 9/11 or was this happening anyway? The Sufi Mohammads of this world were on the warpath much before September 2001 as were the Punjab-based radical sectarian outfits. Their power and organisation was growing and they were all prepared to assert themselves whether or not the US-Pakistan collaboration took place.

The American presence in Afghanistan has of course added to the problem. After it was occupied, Al Qaeda and other radical groups shifted to Pakistani border regions, adding their money, leadership and skills to the growing strength of local groups. Drone attacks and the overbearing American attitude did not help either. But to say that the terrorism we face today is only because of Pakistan-US collaboration is delusional.

The US could indeed help us to fight this home-grown insurgency better by making its attitude towards Pakistan clearer. It is not just a question of giving us money and arms, although given the state of our economy and the militancy challenge it is not something to sneer at. It could go further by giving greater respect to our sovereignty and not appear to assist our adversaries.

Unwelcome drone attacks are just one aspect of it. The growing footprint of US advisors and security personnel on the ground in Islamabad and other parts of the country is disturbing for the Pakistani people. Some of them have even been caught roaming the capital with arms and others allegedly stopped close to our nuclear installation in Kahuta. Such stories fuel the already high levels of anti-Americanism in the country.

The US attitude in Afghanistan is also giving rise to misgivings. It is allowing Indian presence there to enlarge rapidly. The opening of new consulates is just one part of it. Indian civil institutions and private contractors in every field are also a growing presence. If the US wants to win hearts and minds in Pakistan, it has to show greater sensitivity to our concerns.

The Americans also need to clarify their attitude towards known anti-Pakistan figures, such as Brahmdagh Bugti and others, who are being given refuge in Afghanistan. There is sufficient evidence, according to Pakistan government, of Indian meddling in Balochistan. By giving refuge to the so-called Baloch nationalists, the Americans appear to be colluding with them.

It is in this context that the conditions attached to the Kerry-Lugar Bill raised so many doubts in Pakistan. If there had been no worries regarding American intentions, some of the intemperate language may have been tolerated given the larger framework of support contained in it. But the feeling that Americans are not playing straight, led to the strong response in the country. (The News)

(Ayaz Khan)

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Wednesday, 28 October 2009

Frankenstein’s Monster and General Zia-ul-Haq's jihadis



This site has moved to http://criticalppp.com/archives/1562, click this link if you are not redirected
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Sunday, 25 October 2009

A perspective on anti-Americanism found in Pakistan today


Smokers’ Corner: Bogey nation
Nadeem F. Paracha
Sunday, 25 Oct, 2009 (Dawn Blog)
Anti-Americanism today is an obligatory part of populist rhetoric.— Photo from File
Recently the monthly Herald published the results of an elaborate survey that it undertook to determine the extent of anti-Americanism in Pakistan. The findings suggest nothing that we do not already know. The percentages in this case hold only an academic interest.

Though anti-Americanism during the Cold War (1949-89) was mostly the ideological vocation of pro-Soviet leftists, today (some twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union), one can safely suggest that America is experiencing its most detested hour. It hasn’t been hated across the board so much and so instantly as it is today, thanks mainly to the many arrogant misdeeds of the Bush administration and its utter deficiency in the art and skill of empathetic and prudent diplomacy.

However, the anti-Americanism virus — at least in most Muslim countries — today is such that the critique that comes with it is largely rhetorical, and, at times, rather obsessive-compulsive. The recent ‘debate’ that took place in Pakistan’s electronic media on the Kerry-Lugar Bill is a vivid example of this trend, in which, it was quite clear that certain politicians, TV talk show hosts and their audiences among the country’s ever growing chattering classes, who were quick to attack the Bill, hadn’t even read the document! Their single cue in this respect was the Pakistan Army’s concerns about certain conditions mentioned in the aid bill, and off they went on a rampage.

More interesting however will be to trace the history and evolution of anti-Americanism in Pakistan. According to a research paper written by Dr Talukder Muniruzaman in 1971 on the politics of young Pakistanis, a majority of Pakistanis viewed America positively and admiringly in the 1950s. The paper also suggests that right up till Pakistan’s 1965 war with India, most Pakistanis saw America as a friend, especially in the context of the Soviet Union’s close ties with India.

According to a lengthy paper (published by Chicago University in 1983) on the ideological orientation of Pakistan’s university students (by Kiren Aziz and Peter McDonough), anti-Americanism among most Pakistanis remained somewhat low even during the celebrated movement (in 1967-68) against the Ayub Khan dictatorship; in spite of the fact that the movement was largely led by leftist students and politicians.

The paper further suggests that anti-Americanism in the 1970s that was ripe among many Arab countries due to the United States’ single-minded support for Israel, started to finally make its way into Pakistani society during the Z. A. Bhutto regime (1972-77); especially when Bhutto started to expand his ‘Islamic Socialism’ doctrine at the international level by striking firm relations with various radical Muslim states and Arab countries. The build-up to this was the otherwise sympathetic Richard Nixon administration’s failure to militarily help its Asian ally during the 1971 war with India.

In spite of this, America remained Pakistan’s leading aid donor. According to Lubna Rafique’s 1994 paper, ‘Benazir & British Press,’ it was only in the last year of Z. A. Bhutto’s regime (1977), that he started to allude to moving out of the ‘American camp,’ calling the US a ‘white elephant.’ He also went on to accuse the Jimmy Carter administration of financing right-wing parties’ agitation against him in 1977.

Throughout the Ziaul Haq dictatorship in the 1980s, anti-Americanism remained a much polarised affair in Pakistan. Most political-religious parties and their supporters, and the industrial class that supported Zia, were either openly pro-America or ambiguous on the subject. This was due to the fact that Zia was an Islamist military dictator who was backed by the Ronald Regan administration with military hardware and dollars during the West’s war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and against ‘communism in the region’. On the other hand, anti-Americanism became rampant among those opposing Zia.

Though by the late 1980s the intensity of anti-Americanism had grown (compared to the preceding decades), it never became violent. In fact, some would suggest that in the 1990s as America largely divorced itself from the region after the end of the Afghan civil war, anti-Americanism actually receded, and Pakistanis got busy tackling the bitter pitfalls of the war in the shape of bloody ethnic and sectarian strife.

Anti-Americanism returned to the fore like never before after the tragic 9/11 episode in 2001. According to veteran defence analyst, Hassan Askari, this strain of anti-Americanism is an emotional response of most Pakistanis to the confusion that set in after 9/11. In other words, this version of anti-Americanism has very little to do with a more academic or concrete understanding of both international and home-grown terrorism. The post-9/11 confusion and emotionalism in Pakistan is given vent and an ‘intellectual tilt’ by Islamist apologists of all shapes and sizes pointing fingers at ‘outside forces’ for the blood that is being shed by home-grown fanatics, is only too visible.

Whereas there was a prominent streak of individualism and romantic rebellion associated with the anti-Americanism of Pakistani leftists during the Cold War, nothing of the sort can be said about the widespread anti-Americanism found in Pakistan today. The present-day phenomenon has become an obligatory part of populist rhetoric in which American involvement is blamed for everything — from terrorist attacks, to the energy crises, to perhaps even the break of dengue fever.

Ridiculous, really. (Source: Dawn Blog)
.....
The futility of hating
Tuesday, October 27, 2009
Mosharraf Zaidi

We know that Pakistanis are not alone in the world, when it comes to being more than a little miffed about how their country is treated by the United States. The hullabaloo over why there is so much anti-Americanism in Pakistan, however, is a bit mystifying. The implicit insistence that high levels of anti-Americanism in Pakistan are unacceptable seems to reek of hubris. US officials, both bureaucrats (like Ambassador Ann Paterson) and politicians (like Congressman Howard Berman) have grown increasingly testy in recent weeks, trying to perfume the world-famous love letter of the American people to Pakistan (formerly known as the Kerry Lugar Bill). If the incredulity of Americans trying to convince Pakistanis that their country is Uncle Sam's little love-muffin seems a little ridiculous, it's because it is. Only committed Orientalists would insist that a country of nearly 180 million be starry-eyed about America's thus-far unproven, newfound wisdom about Pakistani democracy. Proconsul Dick Holbrook should get over it. And so should Howie Berman. Pakistanis aren't the only ones that don't trust the US government.

Nevertheless, Pakistan would be best served by some introspection on the whole anti-American routine. The sad truth is that "Go America Go" and anti-American narrative in Pakistan is a microcosm of the quality and texture of public discourse in Pakistan--irrational, without evidence, and oftentimes, downright malicious and ill-intentioned.

It seems Pakistani mistrust of the United States is rooted in the US drone strikes to take out Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders hiding out in Pakistani territory. That is understandable, given the high number of innocent Pakistanis killed by these strikes, and the brazen absence of any contrition or remorse on the part of the US government. but anti-Americanism has always existed among some segments in Pakistan, but it has never been quite so universal, or quite so pronounced, as it has been in the last two months.

No doubt, Pakistanis should be proud to be proud, and should reserve the right to like or dislike countries on the basis of how they perceive those countries treat Pakistan. However Pakistanis should also be smart while they're being proud. If anti-American rhetoric is masking other more important and more urgent problems--dare we say, Pakistani problems--then the rhetoric is poisonous and need to be shunned.

Anti-Americanism in Pakistan has two dimensions, in particular, that make it a rather poisonous instrument in the public discourse. The first is that anti-Americanism is itself marked by incompetence, and in turn masks Pakistani incompetence. The second is that anti-Americanism easily displaces responsibility for Pakistani problems, from Pakistan's leaders, to the abstraction of the American beast. In short, the second dimension is about accountability, and how anti-Americanism prevents such accountability.

Two of the most recent big-ticket stories in the country amply demonstrate the competence problem in Pakistan's anti-American odyssey. The Blackwater controversy and the Kerry Lugar Bill both demonstrated the failure of Pakistani public discourse to produce viable and defensible positions, and thereby losing the opportunity to engage audiences in the United States that might actually be amenable to Pakistanis' concerns, and who might have actually enabled a true dialogue between Pakistanis and Americans at large.

In the case of the Blackwater controversy, the national public discourse was aimed at a demonisation of the United States, rather than a serious examination of what was actually taking place in terms of the presence of private US security contractors in Pakistan. The controversy failed to ever truly define, what, if any, laws were broken, or, indeed, what moral or ethical problem the presence of private security contractors presented for Pakistan.

Is there a fair public policy debate to be had in Pakistan, on the legitimacy and legality of private security contractors from another country working in Pakistan? Most definitely. But the manner in which the issue has been discussed thus far has done two things. First, it has turned off and alienated rational Pakistanis who seek evidence before unleashing nationalist tirades against another country. Second, it has largely de-legitimised the entire subject matter altogether--once a topic is coloured with an irrational taint, it is difficult to have a substantive discussion about it, even if the data and evidence to conduct the discussion is in place.

With this being the ambient quality of Pakistani national discourse, it should not surprise anyone that Pakistanis collectively adopt anti-Americanism as an instrument of debate. Engaging in a serious and substantive debate about the role of non-state actors in Pakistan would require a basic level of effort invested in understanding the dimensions of government and the extent to which the state is receding. Blaming Americans for wanting to turn Islamabad into Baghdad, on the other hand, is both a sexier hook for dining room conversation, and perhaps more importantly, an easy way out for those responsible for running the country.

Which brings us to the second dimension of anti-Americanism: the impunity that it enables Pakistani leaders to operate with. Having Uncle Sam to beat with a baseball bat every time Pakistani leaders need a scapegoat, is ultra-convenient. Even this government, which is otherwise so deeply immersed in building all kinds of bridges with the US, keeps Finance Minister Shaukat Tarin close at hand to deliver verbal smack-downs about the price Pakistan is paying in the war on terror, and its urgent and immediate need for a US federal bailout. The entire range of political parties, including the military, have banked on anti-Americanism, not because of hatred for America, but because any deconstruction of Pakistan's problems would illustrate how deeply culpable Pakistan's leaders--political and military--have been, and how completely disconnected from most of Pakistan's domestic problems America truly is.

Pakistan's fiscal crunch is a function of spending too much money on the wrong things (war and debt-servicing), and not extracting enough money from the right people (feudal land owners, and desi rogue speculators of the Karachi Stock Exchange). Pakistan's mosque and madrasa problem is a function of leaving the job of faith leadership to the most underprivileged, and sending all the nice-smelling lucky kids to Wisconsin, Waterloo, Worcester and Wollongong. Pakistan's education problem is a function of the use of teachers' jobs as political spoils. Pakistan's healthcare problem is a function of not treating doctors with the respect and dignity they deserve, and treating patients like cattle. Pakistan's most serious problems are not the products of America's desire to devour Pakistani sovereignty. They are a product of Pakistani sovereignty not knowing what to do with itself, and how and why. Hating on America won't solve that problem.



The writer advises governments, donors and NGOs on public policy. He can be reached through his website www.mosharrafzaidi.com (The News)

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Friday, 23 October 2009

7 Months, 10 Days in Taliban's Captivity: Story of David Rohde

Here is a five-part series offering a first-person account by David Rohde of his seven months as a captive of the Taliban in Pakistan. Mr. Rohde, a New York Times reporter, was kidnapped with two Afghan colleagues on Nov. 10, 2008, as they traveled to an interview with a Taliban commander outside of Kabul, Afghanistan.

The articles are based on Mr. Rohde’s recollections and, where possible, records kept by his family and colleagues. For safety reasons, certain names and details have been withheld.


7 Months, 10 Days in Captivity

Inside the Islamic Emirate

‘You Have Atomic Bombs, but We Have Suicide Bombers.’

A Drone Strike and Dwindling Hope

A Rope and a Prayer

Epilogue



A comment:

By humayun, vancouver, Washington, October 22nd, 2009

Several hundred comments – covering the entire spectrum from appreciative to trivial – have been made on Mr. Rohde’s series. The large number of comments shows the high degree of interest in understanding and defeating the Taliban. Personally, I greatly admire this remarkable and brave first-person account of a very rare event. I am glad Mr. Rohde, that you are safe with your wife, family, and friends.

Mr. Rohde’s observations and interactions with his captors are truly enlightening. It help understand the actual workings of the terrorists’ mind. This remarkable series show that the Taliban have well established infrastructure, communication and support networks that effectively fulfill their needs and are carried out in full view of the Pakistani army. This is contrary to the media’s image portraying them as bands of thugs that can be taken out by the Pakistani army. One of the more remarkable observations in the series describes how the terrorists motivate, recruit and retain dedicated foot soldiers. This is essential for any effective strategy to defeat this highly motivated and vicious enemy.

What stands out from Mr. Rohde’s observations is the obvious brain washing and continued isolation of the Taliban from the rest of the world. The frequent exposure of his captors to the propaganda videos, outright rejection of alternate ideas in spite of access to the Internet and satellite phones, condemnation of non-Muslims who are considered unclean, concepts of apostasy, etc. – all justified as part of the Islamic faith – should serve as eye openers for us all. Sadly, the terrorists and radicals propagate convoluted and wrong concepts of jihad and sharia based on selective and misrepresented reading of Qur’an – the Islamic scripture. Unfortunately, their misrepresentations are accepted by the Muslim world who, while rejecting specific acts of terror against Muslims, sympathizes with the Taliban when their atrocities are directed towards non-Muslims. This sympathy generates support amongst the “regular folks’ who have a higher propensity towards becoming radicalized.

Any successful strategy to defeat the Taliban must aim at breaking the unholy link between the Islamic scripture and the terrorists’ flawed concepts. This must come from the Muslims themselves who have allowed the political clergy to propagate such views unchallenged. I view these as the most important lessons from Mr. Rohde’s series.

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Wednesday, 14 October 2009

Bullying ‘bloody civilians’ over the Kerry-Lugar Bill



Bullying ‘bloody civilians’
By Kamran Shafi
Tuesday, 13 Oct, 2009 (Dawn)
Our Rommels and Guderians are not about to alight from their top of the line BMWs and Mercedes and climb into Suzuki Mehrans. –File Photo
I have read the complete text of the Kerry-Lugar Bill four times. I find nothing in it that impinges on Pakistan’s sovereignty, which went out the window with the Pakistan Army’s first steps towards forming a symbiotic, but completely inferior, relationship with the United States military.

I give below verbatim (parenthesis mine) an exact copy, but slightly abbreviated, of a Top Secret but now declassified (vide NND 959417 14/1/93) letter written by Gen Mohammad Ayub Khan, C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, to Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon [sic], Washington D.C. (Please read athttp://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/pakistan/ayubkhan27sept1955.htm)

‘General Headquarters
Rawalpindi
[Pakistan]
27th Sep ‘55.
D.O. No. 7/36/C-in-C.

My dear Admiral Radford,
Considering that you have been such a good friend, I thought you would be interested to know how the affairs of military aid stand looked at from our angle … which to say the least is gloomy.

2. In early 1954, we were informed that Meyer’s Mission was coming out to Pakistan to negotiate details of military aid with us. In order to prepare our appreciation and plan for presentation to this Mission, we made several approaches to Pentagon [sic] to give us an indication of the scope of the aid. On failing to get any reply we prepared our case on the following basis.
In the event of major aggression against Pakistan, determine the forces required to:-
(a) Defend it.
(b) Launch a counter-offensive from it.
The result of appreciation on the above basis gave us an estimate of the additional effort to be put in by USA. [sic] after deducting our maximum effort on one or both scores, depending on how far America was prepared to go. It was not till the end of our briefing we were told [sic] that … the Mission had come out to find out our deficiencies in nuts and bolts and no more.

3. Then came our meeting in Washington in October ‘54. On it [sic] we were told
that America would be prepared to complete one ½ Division of our Armour and four Divisions of Infantry, and as we were spending the maximum we could on Armed Forces, apart from weapons etc required our additional
internal expense [salaries, staff cars?] would also be covered for these Formations. The programme was to take three years to complete. Thereafter our dealings began with the USMAAG.

4 .Now that the target was set, I thought the things will move smoothly so long as a sound working arrangement was evolved between the American Staff and our Staff. So, I issued a directive to my staff that they will work in close collaboration with the Americans, who were also asked to work more or less on a joint staff basis with our fellows. Unfortunately I failed to obtain American cooperation on this with the result that when our staff presented our requirements list it was objected to on the ground that our Divisional strength was in excess of theirs, which could not be supported. In any case no more than 40,000 additional men could be catered for. Our figure was 56,000 men. When asked for the working of the figure of 40,000 men, no satisfactory answer could be given.

5. Thereupon the whole thing was put in the melting pot and our staff went to work again. We reduced our establishments to remain within 40,000 men additional permissible limit with the following effect:-
(a) Reducing of officer strength by 20per cent.
(b) Reduction of JCO and OR strength by 10per cent.
(c) Conversion of A/Tk units to Fd Arty Units.
(d) Conversion of two 5.5’ gun units to 155 mm How units.
(e) Non-activation of certain units.
(f) Deletion of expansion in Schools & Centers [sic].

6. Our requirements based on above [sic] were then worked out and submitted to USMAAG and presumably accepted by the Department of the Army, who allotted certain amount of funds for internal use for the fiscal year 1954-55. Incidentally the allotment for a certain set of accommodation [!] estimated to cost 16.64 crores [sic] rupees was 7.40 crores and so on. Meanwhile, the whole of Pakistan Army [sic] in general and especially the five ½ Divisions earmarked for completion are being churned up and re-organised to conform as far as practicable to American establishments.

7. Then came the bomb-shell in the form of the message from the Head of the USMAAG … shorn of its verbiage it reads that as far as the Army is concerned the ceiling of military aid is 75.5 million dollars and that all talk of balancing five ½ Division [sic] is revoked.

8. Forgive me for being frank, but I would be failing in my duty if I did not tell you that our people are completely frustrated. They think they have been given an enormous amount of work unnecessarily and that they have been let down. They are in a mood not to accept an American word however solemnly given. This is sad in that it does not augur well for our future good relationship which was one of the things I had been hoping to develop.

9. What the political repercussions be [sic] when this news gets known, and after all you cannot conceal facts indefinitely in a Democracy [this is really rich coming from the grand-daddy of coups d’état in the Land of the Pure!], I do not know. But one thing I do know that [sic] this government will come under tremendous pressure and fire from within and without.
Hope you are in very good health.
With best wishes,
Yours sincerely,
M.A. Khan’

So, gentlemen, why the discourteous, nay rebellious reaction to the Kerry-Lugar bill? Bullying the ‘bloody civilians,’ eh? After all your great forebear even gave out the TO&E (table of organisation and equipment) of the Pakistan Army in such detail? Surely the bit about the secretary of state certifying ever so often that the bloody civilians in Pakistan ‘exercise effective control of the military…’!?

I can only appeal to President Obama not to change a single word in the bill except ‘or the reallocation of Pakistan’s financial resources that would otherwise be spent for programmes and activities unrelated to its nuclear weapons programme.’

For that is our money. Otherwise tell ‘em to take it or leave it. Our Rommels and Guderians are not about to alight from their top of the line BMWs and Mercedes and climb into Suzuki Mehrans.

kshafi1@yahoo.co.uk

....
Sovereignty or
self-perpetuation?

Thursday, October 15, 2009
Fayyaz Ali Khan

Amazingly, the people of Pakistan are being convinced to reject a US financial assistance bill which, for the first time in our history intends to help the people and bar the government from diverting these funds to the military, which many view as being the main hindrance to democracy in the country.

Why do we call it dictation when the bill bars the government from diverting these funds to the military? Isn't it a fact that so far whatever foreign aid has been given to Pakistan, most of it has been consumed by the military establishment? Is it not a fact that the sons of all the previous dictators, who all belonged to the middle or lower middle classes of our society, are today some of the richest in this country? I think we have "eaten enough grass" and the time has come to inject some nutrients in to the drained veins of the hapless masses.

Why is it being portrayed as meddling in our internal affairs when the bill, under the heading, purpose of assistance, says, "to help strengthen the institutions of democratic governance and promote control of military institutions by a democratically elected civilian government"? Or when it states, under limitations on certain assistance, "the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes in Pakistan"? Is it not what our Constitution says? Or are we forgetting Chaudhry Shujaat's famous utterances that it takes only one jeep and a truck to bring about regime change in this country?

Why are we raising a ruckus over the Americans asking us not to get involved in nuclear proliferation or to stop supporting networks involved in proliferation activities given that it has been proven that certain Pakistani individuals were indeed involved in such activities? Also, what is so wrong with the certification requirement in the bill that the government of Pakistan prevent Al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, from operating within the territory of Pakistan? That this also include the prevention of cross-border attacks in to neighbouring countries, the closure of terrorist training camps in FATA, and the dismantling of terrorism infrastructure in other parts of the country? If we oppose the bill what signal are sending to the rest of the world? That we are involved in nuclear proliferation and are abetting terrorism overseas?

In fact it would be fair to say that most of the anti-KL bill critics are advocating the adoption of a position that runs counter to our national interest. Also, it would be equally fair to assume that most of the critics will not have read the bill in its entirety and are also unaware of the fact that the certification clauses included in it are usual for most aid bills that the US legislature passes.

Since we say that we are responsible nation and not involved in proliferation activities or that we provide help to terrorist groups operating from our soil to carry out attacks in other countries, there should be little reason for us to oppose Kerry-Lugar. Besides, let us not forget that during the Afghan war, in return for US funding, we were supposed to cap our nuclear programme and that the US president then too was required to certify every year that this was being done. And despite that we managed to develop our nuclear deterrence.

We are projecting ourselves as a nation whose policies, instead of interests, are governed by emotions. Also, in this emotional frenzy, we fail to see that for a change – and this is perhaps a first – the aid that we receive will not go towards purchasing tanks or warplanes but towards addressing poverty, towards building schools, hospitals, improving access to clean drinking water, and on socio-economic development in general.

It is good to see parliament and the civil society debate and discuss our relationship with the US vis-à-vis the conditions attached to Kerry-Lugar. Having said that, it needs to be pointed out that the majority of criticism of the bill is coming from quarters who are known to be supporters, beneficiaries and perpetuators of the rule of the men in khaki. Since the birth of our country, our sovereignty has been time and again breached from within and not outside. I wish the Americans had translated the bill into Urdu and other regional languages so that the people could read it for themselves and see that for a change we are getting foreign aid with strings whose objective seems to be to foster socio-economic development.



The writer is a development consultant based in Peshawar. Email: fayyazalikhan@ yahoo.com (The News)

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Text of the Kerry Lugar Bill


Senators Kerry and Lugar, the architects of the controversial bill.— Photo from File

S. 1707

One Hundred Eleventh Congress of the United States of America

AT THE FIRST SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, the sixth day of January, two thousand and nine

An Act to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 to promote an enhanced strategic partnership with Pakistan and its people, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of Americain Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009.’

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Definitions.

Sec. 3. Findings.

Sec. 4. Statement of principles.

TITLE I—DEMOCRATIC, ECONOMIC, AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN

Sec. 101. Authorization of assistance.

Sec. 102. Authorization of appropriations.

Sec. 103. Auditing.

TITLE II—SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN

Sec. 201. Purposes of assistance.

Sec. 202. Authorization of assistance.

Sec. 203. Limitations on certain assistance.

Sec. 204. Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund.

Sec. 205. Requirements for civilian control of certain assistance.

TITLE III—STRATEGY, ACCOUNTABILITY, MONITORING, AND OTHER

PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Strategy Reports.

Sec. 302. Monitoring Reports.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means the Committees on Appropriations

and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) COUNTERINSURGENCY.—The term ‘counterinsurgency’ means efforts to defeat organized movements that seek to overthrow the duly constituted Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan through violent means.

(3) COUNTERTERRORISM.—The term ‘counterterrorism’ means efforts to combat al Qaeda and other foreign terrorist

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organizations that are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 USC. 1189), or other individuals and entities

engaged in terrorist activity or support for such activity.

(4) FATA.—The term ‘FATA’ means the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.

(5) FRONTIER CRIMES REGULATION.—The term ‘Frontier Crimes Regulation’ means the Frontier Crimes Regulation, codified under British law in 1901, and applicable to the FATA.

(6) IMPACT EVALUATION RESEARCH.—The term ‘impact evaluation research’ means the application of research methods and statistical analysis to measure the extent to which change in a population-based outcome can be attributed to program intervention instead of other environmental factors.

(7) MAJOR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT.—The term ‘major defense equipment’ has the meaning given the term in section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC. 2794(6)).

(8) NWFP.—The term ‘NWFP’ means the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, which has Peshawar as its provincial capital.

(9) OPERATIONS RESEARCH.—The term ‘operations research’ means the application of social science research methods, statistical analysis, and other appropriate scientific methods to judge, compare, and improve policies and program outcomes, from the earliest stages of defining and designing programs through their development and implementation, with the objective of the rapid dissemination of conclusions and concrete impact on programming.

(10) SECURITY FORCES OF PAKISTAN.—The term ‘security forces of Pakistan’ means the military and intelligence services of the Government of Pakistan, including the Armed Forces, Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, Intelligence Bureau, police forces, levies, Frontier Corps, and Frontier Constabulary.

(11) SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE.—The term ‘security related assistance’—

(A) means—

(i) grant assistance to carry out section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC. 2763); and (ii) assistance under chapter two of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 USC. 2311 et. seq); but

(B) does not include—

(i) assistance authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available under any provision of law that is funded from accounts within budget function 050 (National Defense); and (ii) amounts appropriated or otherwise available to the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111–32).

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) The people of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the United States share a long history of friendship and comity, and the interests of both nations are well-served by strengthening and deepening this friendship.

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(2) Since 2001, the United States has contributed more than $15,000,000,000 to Pakistan, of which more than $10,000,000,000 has been security-related assistance and direct payments.

(3) With the free and fair election of February 18, 2008, Pakistan returned to civilian rule, reversing years of political tension and mounting popular concern over military rule and Pakistan’s own democratic reform and political development.

(4) Pakistan is a major non-NATO ally of the United States and has been a valuable partner in the battle against al Qaeda and the Taliban, but much more remains to be accomplished by both nations.

(5) The struggle against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and affiliated terrorist groups has led to the deaths of several thousand Pakistani civilians and members of the security forces ofPakistan over the past seven years.

(6) Despite killing or capturing hundreds of al Qaeda operatives and other terrorists—including major al Qaeda leaders, such as Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Abu Faraj al-Libi—the FATA, parts of the NWFP, Quetta in Balochistan, and Muridke in Punjab remain a sanctuary for al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Terikh-e Taliban and affiliated groups from which these groups organize terrorist actions against Pakistan and other countries.

(7) The security forces of Pakistan have struggled to contain a Taliban-backed insurgency, recently taking direct action against those who threaten Pakistan’s security and stability, including military operations in the FATA and the NWFP.

(8) On March 27, 2009, President Obama noted, ‘Multiple intelligence estimates have warned that al Qaeda is actively planning attacks on the United States homeland from its safehaven in Pakistan..’

(9) According to a Government Accountability Office report (GAO–08–622), ‘since 2003, the [A]dministration’s national security strategies and Congress have recognized that a comprehensive plan that includes all elements of national power— diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support—was needed to address the terrorist threat emanating from the FATA’ and that such a strategy was also mandated by section 7102(b)(3) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–458; 22 USC. 2656f note) and section 2042(b)(2) of the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law 110–53; 22 USC. 2375 note).

(10) During 2008 and 2009, the people of Pakistan have been especially hard hit by rising food and commodity prices and severe energy shortages, with 2⁄3 of the population living on less than $2 a day and 1⁄5 of the population living below the poverty line according to the United Nations Development Program.

(11) Economic growth is a fundamental foundation for human security and national stability in Pakistan, a country with more than 175,000,000 people, an annual population growth rate of two per cent, and a ranking of 136 out of 177 countries in the United Nations Human Development Index.

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(12) The 2009 Pakistani military offensive in the NWFP and the FATA displaced millions of residents in one of the gravest humanitarian crises Pakistan has faced, and despite the heroic efforts of Pakistanis to respond to the needs of the displaced millions and facilitate the return of many, it has highlighted the need for Pakistan to develop an effective national counterinsurgency strategy.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES.

Congress declares that the relationship between the United States and Pakistan should be based on the following principles:

(1) Pakistan is a critical friend and ally to the United States, both in times of strife and in times of peace, andthe two countries share many common goals, including combating terrorism and violent radicalism, solidifying democracy and rule of law in Pakistan, and promoting the social and economic development of Pakistan.

(2) United States assistance to Pakistan is intended to supplement, not supplant,Pakistan’s own efforts in building a stable, secure, and prosperous Pakistan.

(3) The United States requires a balanced, integrated, countrywide strategy for Pakistanthat provides assistance throughout the country and does not disproportionately focus on security-related assistance or one particular area or province.

(4) The United States supports Pakistan’s struggle against extremist elements and recognizes the profound sacrifice made by Pakistan in the fight against terrorism, including the loss of more than 1,900 soldiers and police since 2001 in combat with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist and terrorist groups.

(5) The United States intends to work with the Government of Pakistan—

(A) to build mutual trust and confidence by actively and consistently pursuing a sustained, long-term, multifaceted relationship between the two countries, devoted to strengthening the mutual security, stability, and prosperity of both countries;

(B) to support the people of Pakistan and their democratic government in their efforts to consolidate democracy, including strengthening Pakistan’s parliament, helping Pakistan reestablish an independent and transparent judicial system, and working to extend the rule of law in all areas in Pakistan;

(C) to promote sustainable long-term development and infrastructure projects, including in healthcare, education, water management, and energy programs, in all areas of Pakistan, that are sustained and supported by each successive democratic government in Pakistan;

(D) to ensure that all the people of Pakistan, including those living in areas governed by the Frontier Crimes Regulation, have access to public, modernized education and vocational training to enable them to provide for themselves, for their families, and for a more prosperous future for their children;

(E) to support the strengthening of core curricula and the quality of schools across Pakistan, including madrassas, in order to improve the prospects for Pakistani children’s futures and eliminate incitements to violence and intolerance;

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(F) to encourage and promote public-private partnerships in Pakistan in order to bolster ongoing development efforts and strengthen economic prospects, especially with respect to opportunities to build civic responsibility and professional skills of the people of Pakistan, including support for institutions of higher learning with international accreditation;

(G) to expand people-to-people engagement between the two countries, through increased educational, technical, and cultural exchanges and other methods;

(H) to encourage the development of local analytical capacity to measure program effectiveness and progress on an integrated basis, especially across the areas of United States assistance and payments to Pakistan, and increase accountability for how such assistance and payments are being spent;

(I) to assist Pakistan’s efforts to improve counterterrorism financing and anti-money laundering regulatory structure in order to achieve international standards and encourage Pakistan to apply for ‘Financial Action Task Force’ observer status and adhere to the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism;

(J) to strengthen Pakistan’s counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategy to help prevent any territory of Pakistan from being used as a base or conduit for terrorist attacks in Pakistan or elsewhere;

(K) to strengthen Pakistan’s efforts to develop strong and effective law enforcement and national defense forces under civilian leadership;

(L) to achieve full cooperation in matters of counter proliferation of nuclear materials and related networks;

(M) to strengthen Pakistan’s efforts to gain control of its under-governed areas and address the threat posed by any person or group that conducts violence, sabotage, or other terrorist activities in Pakistan or its neighboring countries; and

(N) to explore means to consult with and utilize the relevant expertise and skills of the Pakistani-American community.

TITLE I—DEMOCRATIC, ECONOMIC, AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized to provide assistance to Pakistan—

(1) to support the consolidation of democratic institutions;

(2) to support the expansion of rule of law, build the capacity of government institutions, and promote respect for internationally-recognized human rights;

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(3) to promote economic freedoms and sustainable economic development;

(4) to support investment in people, including those displaced in on-going counterinsurgency operations; and

(5) to strengthen public diplomacy.

(b) ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED.—Activities that may be supported by assistance under subsection (a) include the following:

(1) To support democratic institutions in Pakistan in order to strengthen civilian rule and long-term stability, including assistance such as—

(A) support for efforts to strengthen Pakistan’s institutions, including the capacity of the National Parliament of Pakistan, such as enhancing the capacity of committees to oversee government activities, including national security issues, enhancing the ability of members of parliament to respond to constituents, and supporting of parliamentary leadership;

(B) support for voter education and civil society training as well as appropriate support for political party capacity building and responsiveness to the needs of all the people of Pakistan; and

(C) support for strengthening the capacity of the civilian Government of Pakistan to carry out its responsibilities at the national, provincial, and local levels.

(2) To support Pakistan’s efforts to expand rule of law, build the capacity, transparency, and trust in government institutions, and promote internationally recognized human rights, including ssistance such as—

(A) supporting the establishment of frameworks that promote government transparency and criminalize corruption in both the government and private sector;

(B) support for police professionalization, including training regarding use of force, human rights, and community policing;

(C) support for independent, efficient, and effective judicial and criminal justice systems, such as case management, training, and efforts to enhance the rule of law to all areas inPakistan;

(D) support for the implementation of legal and political reforms in the FATA;

(E) support to counter the narcotics trade;

(F) support for internationally recognized human rights, including strengthening civil society and nongovernmental organizations working in the area of internationally recognized human rights, as well as organizations that focus on protection of women and girls, promotion of freedom of religion and religious tolerance, and protection of ethnic or religious minorities; and

(G) support for promotion of a responsible, capable, and independent media.

(3) To support economic freedom and economic development in Pakistan, including—

(A) programs that support sustainable economic growth, including in rural areas, and the sustainable management of natural resources through investments in water resource management systems;

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(B) expansion of agricultural and rural development, such as farm-to-market roads, systems to prevent spoilage and waste, and other small-scale infrastructure improvements;

(C) investments in energy, including energy generation and cross-border infrastructure projects with Afghanistan;

(D) employment generation, including increasing investment in infrastructure projects, including construction of roads and the continued development of a national aviation industry and aviation infrastructure, as well as support for small and medium enterprises;

(E) worker rights, including the right to form labor unions and legally enforce provisions safeguarding the rights of workers and local community stakeholders;

(F) access to microfinance for small business establishment and income generation, particularly for women; and

(G) countering radicalization by providing economic, social, educational, and vocational opportunities and lifeskills training to at-risk youth.

(4) To support investments in people, particularly women and children, including—

(A) promoting modern, public primary and secondary education and vocational and technical training, including programs to assist in the development of modern, nationwide school curriculums for public, private, and religious schools; support for the proper oversight of all educational institutions, including religious schools, as required by Pakistani law; initiatives to enhance access to education and vocational and technical training for women and girls and to increase women’s literacy, with a special emphasis on helping girls stay in school; and construction and maintenance of libraries and public schools;

(B) programs relating to higher education to ensure a breadth and consistency of Pakistani graduates, including through public-private partnerships;

(C) improving quality public health to eliminate diseases such as hepatitis and to reduce maternal and under five mortality rates;

(D) building capacity for nongovernmental and civil society organizations, particularly organizations with demonstrated experience in delivering services to the people of Pakistan, particularly to women, children, and other vulnerable populations; and

(E) support for refugees and internally displaced persons and long-term development in regions of Pakistan where internal conflict has caused large-scale displacement.

(5) To strengthen public diplomacy to combat militant extremism and promote a better understanding of the United States, including—

(A) encouraging civil society, respected scholars, and other leaders to speak out against militancy and violence;

and

(B) expanded exchange activities under the Fulbright Program, the International Visitor Leadership Program, the Youth Exchange and Study Program, and related programs administered by the Department of State designed to promote mutual understanding and interfaith dialogue and expand sister institution programs between United States and Pakistani schools and universities.

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(c) ADDITIONAL AND RELATED ACTIVITIES.—

(1) AVAILABILITY OF AMOUNTS FOR PAKISTANI POLICE PROFESSIONALIZATION, EQUIPPING, AND TRAINING.—Not less than $150,000,000 of the amounts appropriated for fiscal year 2010 pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under section 102 should be made available for assistance to Pakistan under this section for police professionalization, equipping, and training.

(2) AVAILABILITY OF AMOUNTS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.—Up to $10,000,000 of the amounts appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to the authorization of appropriations

under section 102 may be made available for administrative expenses of civilian departments and agencies of the United States Government in connection with the provision of assistance under this section. Such amounts shall be in addition to amounts otherwise available for such purposes.

(3) UTILIZING PAKISTANI ORGANIZATIONS.—The President is encouraged, as appropriate, to utilize Pakistani firms and community and local nongovernmental organizations in Pakistan, including through host country contracts, and to work with local leaders to provide assistance under this section.

(4) USE OF DIRECT EXPENDITURES.—Amounts appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under section 102 or otherwise made available to carry out this section shall be utilized to the maximum extent possible as direct expenditures for projects and programs, subject to existing reporting and notification requirements.

(5) CHIEF OF MISSION FUND.—Of the amounts appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under section 102, up to $5,000,000 may be used by the Secretary of State to establish a fund for use by the Chief of Mission in Pakistan to provide assistance to Pakistan under this title or the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 USC. 2151 et seq.) to address urgent needs or opportunities, consistent with the purposes of this section, or for purposes of humanitarian relief. The fund established pursuant to this paragraph may be referred to as the ‘Chief of Mission Fund.’

(6) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(A) the United States should provide robust assistance to the people of Pakistan who have been displaced as a result of ongoing conflict and violence in Pakistan and support international efforts to coordinate assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons in Pakistan, including by providing support to international and nongovernmental organizations for this purpose;

(B) the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development should support the development objectives of the Refugee Affected and Host Areas (RAHA) Initiative in Pakistan to address livelihoods, health, education, infrastructure development, and environmental restoration in identified parts of the country where Afghan refugees have lived; and

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(C) the United States should have a coordinated, strategic communications strategy to engage the people of Pakistan and to help ensure the success of the measures authorized by this title.

(d) NOTIFICATION.—For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees not later than 15 days before obligating any assistance under this section as budgetary support to the Government of Pakistan or any element of the Government of Pakistan and shall include in such notification a description of the purpose and conditions attached to any such budgetary support.

SEC. 102. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the President, for the purposes of providing assistance to Pakistan under this title and to provide assistance to Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 USC. 2151 et seq.), up to $1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014.

(b) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Of the amounts appropriated in each fiscal year pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in subsection (a)—

(A) none of the amounts appropriated for assistance to Pakistan may be made available after the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act unless the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report has been submitted to the appropriate congressional committees pursuant to section 301(a); and

(B) not more than $750,000,000 may be made available for assistance to Pakistan unless the President’s Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan submits to the appropriate congressional committees during such fiscal year—

(i) a certification that assistance provided to Pakistan under this title or the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to date has made or is making reasonable progress toward achieving the principal objectives of United States assistance to Pakistan contained in the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report; and (ii) a memorandum explaining the reasons justifying the certification described in clause (i).

(2) MAKER OF CERTIFICATION.—In the event of a vacancy in, or the termination of, the position of the President’s Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the certification

and memorandum described under paragraph (1)(B) may be made by the Secretary of State.

(c) WAIVER.—The Secretary of State may waive the limitations in subsection (b) if the Secretary determines, and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees, that it is in the national security interests of the United States to do so.

(d) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FUNDS.— It is the sense of Congress that, subject to an improving political and economic climate in Pakistan, there should be authorized to be appropriated up to $1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2015 through 2019 for the purpose of providing assistance to Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

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SEC. 103. AUDITING.

(a) ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED.—The Inspector General of the Department of State, the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development, and the inspectors general of other Federal departments and agencies (other than the Inspector General of the Department of Defense) carrying out programs, projects, and activities using amounts appropriated to carry out this title shall audit, investigate, and oversee the obligation and expenditure of such amounts.

(b) AUTHORIZATION FOR IN-COUNTRY PRESENCE.—The Inspector General of the Department of State and the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development, after consultation with the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, are authorized to establish field offices in Pakistan with sufficient staff from each of the Offices of the Inspector General, respectively, to carry out subsection (a).

(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 102 for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014, up to $30,000,000 for each fiscal year is authorized to be made available to carry out this section.

(2) RELATION TO OTHER AVAILABLE FUNDS.—Amounts made available under paragraph (1) are in addition to amounts otherwise available for such purposes.

TITLE II—SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN

SEC. 201. PURPOSES OF ASSISTANCE.

The purposes of assistance under this title are—

(1) to support Pakistan’s paramount national security need to fight and win the ongoing counterinsurgency within its borders in accordance with its national security interests;

(2) to work with the Government of Pakistan to improve Pakistan’s border security and control and help prevent any Pakistani territory from being used as a base or conduit for terrorist attacks in Pakistan, or elsewhere;

(3) to work in close cooperation with the Government of Pakistan to coordinate action against extremist and terrorist targets; and

(4) to help strengthen the institutions of democratic governance and promote control of military institutions by a democratically elected civilian government.

SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE.

(a) INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014 for assistance under chapter five of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 USC. 2347 et seq.; relating to international military education and training) for Pakistan, including expanded international military education and training (commonly known as ‘E–IMET’).

(2) USE OF FUNDS.—It is the sense of Congress that a substantial amount of funds made available to carry out this subsection for a fiscal year should be used to pay for courses of study and training in counterinsurgency and civil-military relations.

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(b) FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING PROGRAM.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014 for grant assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC. 2763; relating to the Foreign Military Financing program) for the purchase of defense articles, defense services, and military education and training for Pakistan.

(2) USE OF FUNDS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—A significant portion of the amount made available to carry out this subsection for a fiscal year shall be for the purchase of defense articles, defense services, and military education and training for activities relating to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in Pakistan.

(B) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that a significant majority of funds made available to carry out this subsection for a fiscal year should be used for the purpose described in subparagraph (A).

(3) ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY.—Except as provided in sections three and 102 of the Arms Export Control Act, the second section 620J of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as added by Public Law 110–161), and any provision of an Act making appropriations for the Department of State, foreign operations, and related programs that restricts assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree, and except as otherwise provided in this title, amounts authorized to be made available to carry out paragraph (2) for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 are authorized to be made available notwithstanding any other provision of law.

(4) DEFINITIONS.—In this section, the terms ‘defense articles,’ ‘defense services,’ and ‘military education and training’ have the meaning given such terms in section 644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 USC. 2403).

(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should facilitate Pakistan’s establishment of a program to provide reconstruction assistance, including through Pakistan’s military as appropriate, in areas damaged by combat operations.

(d) EXCHANGE PROGRAM BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OF PAKISTAN AND CERTAIN OTHER COUNTRIES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is authorized to establish an exchange program between—

(A) military and civilian personnel of Pakistan; and

(B)(i) military and civilian personnel of countries determined by the Secretary of State to be in the process of consolidating and strengthening a democratic form of government; or (ii) military and civilian personnel of North Atlantic Treaty Organization member countries, in order to foster greater mutual respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian rule of the military.

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(2) ELEMENTS OF PROGRAM.—The program authorized under paragraph (1) may include conferences, seminars, exchanges, and other events, distribution of publications and reimbursements of expenses of foreign military personnel participating in the program, including transportation, translation and administrative expenses.

(3) ROLE OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section for a fiscal year are authorized to be made available for nongovernmental organizations to facilitate the implementation of the program authorized under paragraph (1).

(4) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014 to carry out the program established by this subsection.

SEC. 203. LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN ASSISTANCE.

(a) LIMITATION ON SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE.—For fiscal years 2011 through 2014, no security-related assistance may be provided to Pakistan in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.

(b) LIMITATION ON ARMS TRANSFERS.—For fiscal years 2012 through 2014, no letter of offer to sell major defense equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC. 2751 et seq.) and no license to export major defense equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to such Act in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection

(c) for such fiscal year.

(c) CERTIFICATION.—The certification required by this subsection is a certification by the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, to the appropriate congressional committees that—

(1) the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks;

(2) the Government of Pakistan during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups, consistent with the purposes of assistance described in section 201, including taking into account the extent to which the Government of Pakistan has made progress on matters such as—

(A) ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighboring countries;

(B) preventing al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan, including carrying out cross-border attacks into neighboring countries, closing terrorist camps in the FATA, dismantling

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terrorist bases of operations in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets; and

(C) strengthening counterterrorism and anti-money laundering laws; and

(3) the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.

(d) CERTAIN PAYMENTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), none of the funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, or any amounts appropriated to the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111–32), may be obligated or expended to make payments relating to—

(A) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK–D–YAD signed between the Governments of theUnited States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006;

(B) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK–D–NAP signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006; and

(C) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK–D–SAF signed between the Governments of theUnited States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006.

(2) EXCEPTION.—Funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 may be used for construction and related activities carried out pursuant to the Letters of Offer and Acceptance described in paragraph (1).

(e) WAIVER.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may waive the limitations contained in subsections (a), (b), and (d) for a fiscal year if the Secretary of State determines that is important to the national security interests of the United States to do so.

(2) PRIOR NOTICE OF WAIVER.—The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may not exercise the authority of paragraph (1) until seven days after the Secretary of State provides to the appropriate congressional committees a written notice of the intent to issue to waiver and the reasons therefor. The notice may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.

(f) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

SEC. 204. PAKISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITY FUND.

(a) FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010.—

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(1) IN GENERAL.—For fiscal year 2010, the Department of State’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111–32), hereinafter in this section referred to as the ‘Fund,’ shall consist of the following:

(A) Amounts appropriated to carry out this subsection (which may not include any amounts appropriated to carry out title I of this Act).

(B) Amounts otherwise available to the Secretary of State to carry out this subsection.

(2) PURPOSES OF FUND.—Amounts in the Fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year are authorized to be used by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, to build and maintain the counterinsurgency capability of Pakistan under the same terms and conditions (except as otherwise provided in this subsection) that are applicable to amounts made available under the Fund for fiscal year 2009.

(3) TRANSFER AUTHORITY.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is authorized to transfer amounts in the Fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year to the Department of Defense’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111–32) and such amounts may be transferred back to the Fund if the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determines that such amounts are not needed for the purposes for which initially transferred.

(B) TREATMENT OF TRANSFERRED FUNDS.—Subject to subsections (d) and (e) of section 203, transfers from the Fund under the authority of subparagraph (A) shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes and for the same time period as amounts in the Department of Defense’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund.

(C) RELATION TO OTHER AUTHORITIES.—The authority to provide assistance under this subsection is in addition to any other authority to provide assistance to foreign countries.

(D) NOTIFICATION.—The Secretary of State shall, not less than 15 days prior to making transfers from the Fund under subparagraph (A), notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing of the details of any such transfer.

(b) SUBMISSION OF NOTIFICATIONS.—Any notification required by this section may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.

(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—

(1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

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SEC. 205. REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVILIAN CONTROL OF CERTAIN

ASSISTANCE.

(a) REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, any direct cash security-related assistance or non-assistance payments by the United States to the Government of Pakistan may only be provided or made to civilian authorities of a civilian government ofPakistan.

(2) DOCUMENTATION.—For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall ensure that civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan have received a copy of final documentation provided to the United States related to non-assistance payments provided or made to the Government of Pakistan.

(b) WAIVER.—

(1) SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to security-related assistance described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 150 (International Affairs) if the Secretary of State certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.

(2) NON-ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS.—The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to non-assistance payments described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 050 (National Defense) if the Secretary of Defense certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.

(c) APPLICATION TO CERTAIN ACTIVITIES.—Nothing in this section shall apply with respect to—

(1) any activities subject to reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 USC. 413 et seq.);

(2) any assistance to promote democratic elections or public participation in democratic processes;

(3) any assistance or payments if the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that subsequent to the termination of assistance or payments a democratically elected government has taken office;

(4) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 1208 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108–375; 118 Stat. 2086), as amended;

(5) any payments made pursuant to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; and

(6) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 943 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110–417; 122 Stat. 4578).

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(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—

(1) the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations

of the Senate; and

(2) the term ‘civilian government of Pakistan’ does not include any government of Pakistanwhose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree.

TITLE III—STRATEGY, ACCOUNTABILITY, MONITORING, AND OTHER PROVISIONS

SEC. 301. STRATEGY REPORTS.

(a) PAKISTAN ASSISTANCE STRATEGY REPORT.—Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing United States policy and strategy with respect to assistance to Pakistan under this Act. The report shall include the following:

(1) A description of the principal objectives of United States assistance to Pakistan to be provided under title I of this Act.

(2) A general description of the specific programs, projects, and activities designed to achieve the purposes of section 101 and the respective funding levels for such programs, projects, and activities for fiscal years 2010 through 2014.

(3) A plan for program monitoring, operations research, and impact evaluation research for assistance authorized under title I of this Act.

(4) A description of the role to be played by Pakistani national, regional, and local officials and members of Pakistani civil society and local private sector, civic, religious, and tribal leaders in helping to identify and implement programs and projects for which assistance is to be provided under this Act, and of consultations with such representatives in developing the strategy.

(5) A description of the steps taken, or to be taken, to ensure assistance provided under this Act is not awarded to individuals or entities affiliated with terrorist organizations.

(6) A projection of the levels of assistance to be provided to Pakistan under this Act, broken down into the following categories as described in the annual ‘Report on the Criteria and Methodology for Determining the Eligibility of Candidate Countries for Millennium Challenge Account Assistance’:

(A) Civil liberties.

(B) Political rights.

(C) Voice and accountability.

(D) Government effectiveness.

(E) Rule of law.

(F) Control of corruption.

(G) Immunization rates.

(H) Public expenditure on health.

(I) Girls’ primary education completion rate.

(J) Public expenditure on primary education.

(K) Natural resource management.

(L) Business start-up.

(M) Land rights and access.

(N) Trade policy.

(O) Regulatory quality.

(P) Inflation control.

(Q) Fiscal policy.

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(7) An analysis for the suitable replacement for existing Pakistani helicopters, including recommendations for sustainment and training.

(b) COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL STRATEGY REPORT.—

(1) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the achievement of United States national security goals to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan requires the development of a comprehensive plan that utilizes all elements of national power, including in coordination and cooperation with other concerned governments, and that it is critical to Pakistan’s long-term prosperity and security to strengthen regional relationships among India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

(2) COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY.—The President shall develop a comprehensive interagency regional security strategy to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan, including by working with the Government of Pakistan and other relevant governments and organizations in the region and elsewhere, as appropriate, to best implement effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts in and near the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the FATA, the NWFP, parts of Balochistan, and parts of Punjab.

(3) REPORT.—

(A) IN GENERAL.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the comprehensive regional security strategy required under paragraph (2).

(B) CONTENTS.— The report shall include a copy of the comprehensive regional security strategy, including specifications of goals, and proposed timelines and budgets for implementation of the strategy.

(C) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this paragraph, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—

(i) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(ii) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(c) SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for the proposed use of amounts authorized for security related assistance for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014. Such plan shall include an assessment of how the use of such amounts complements or otherwise is related to amounts described in section 204.

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SEC. 302. MONITORING REPORTS.

(a) SEMI-ANNUAL MONITORING REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), and every 180 days thereafter through September 30, 2014, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the assistance provided under this Act during the preceding 180-day period. The report shall include—

(1) a description of all assistance by program, project, and activity, as well as by geographic area, provided pursuant to title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, including the amount of assistance provided for each program or project, and with respect to the first report a description of all amounts made available for assistance to Pakistan during fiscal year 2009, including a description of each program, project, and activity for which funds were made available;

(2) a list of persons or entities from the United States or other countries that have received funds in excess of $100,000 to conduct projects under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, which may be included in a classified annex, if necessary to avoid a security risk, and a justification for the classification;

(3) with respect to the plan described in section 301(a)(3), updates to such plan and a description of best practices to improve the impact of the assistance authorized under title I of this Act;

(4) an assessment of the effectiveness of assistance provided under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report in achieving desired objectives and outcomes as guided by the plan described in section 301(a)(3), and as updated pursuant to paragraph (3) of this subsection, including a systematic, qualitative, and where possible, quantitative basis for assessing whether desired outcomes are achieved and a timeline for completion of each project and program;

(5) a description of any shortfall in United States financial, physical, technical, or human resources that hinder the effective use and monitoring of such funds;

(6) a description of any negative impact, including the absorptive capacity of the region for which the resources are intended, of United States bilateral or multilateral assistance and recommendations for modification of funding, if any;

(7) any incidents or reports of waste, fraud, and abuse of expenditures under title I of this Act;

(8) the amount of funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to section 102 that were used during the reporting period for administrative expenses or for audits and program reviews pursuant to the authority under sections 101(c)(2) and 103;

(9) a description of the expenditures made from any Chief of Mission Fund established pursuant to section 101(c)(5) during the period covered by the report, the purposes for which such expenditures were made, and a list of the recipients of any expenditures from the Chief of Mission Fund in excess of $100,000;

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(10) an accounting of assistance provided to Pakistan under title I of this Act, broken down into the categories set forth in section 301(a)(6);

(11) an evaluation of efforts undertaken by the Government of Pakistan to—

(A) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist and terrorist groups in the FATA and settled areas;

(B) eliminate the safe havens of such forces in Pakistan;

(C) close terrorist camps, including those of Lashkare- Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed;

(D) cease all support for extremist and terrorist groups;

(E) prevent attacks into neighboring countries;

(F) increase oversight over curriculum in madrassas, including closing madrassas with direct links to the Taliban or other extremist and terrorist groups; and

(G) improve counterterrorism financing and anti-money laundering laws, apply for observer status for the Financial Action Task Force, and take steps to adhere to the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism;

(12) a detailed description of Pakistan’s efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise;

(13) an assessment of whether assistance provided to Pakistan has directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, whether by the diversion of United States assistance or the reallocation of Pakistan’s financial resources that would otherwise be spent for programs and activities unrelated to its nuclear weapons program;

(14) a detailed description of the extent to which funds obligated and expended pursuant to section 202(b) meet the requirements of such section; and

(15) an assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration.

(b) GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORTS.—

(1) PAKISTAN ASSISTANCE STRATEGY REPORT.— Not later than one year after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains—

(A) a review of, and comments addressing, the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report;

(B) recommendations relating to any additional actions the Comptroller General believes could help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of United States efforts to meet the objectives of this Act;

(C) a detailed description of the expenditures made by Pakistan pursuant to grant assistance under section

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23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC. 2763; relating to the Foreign Military Financing program); and

(D) an assessment of the impact of the assistance on the security and stability ofPakistan.

(2) CERTIFICATION REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date on which the President makes the certification described in section 203(c) for a fiscal year, the Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct an independent analysis of the certification described in such section and shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing the results of the independent analysis.

(c) SUBMISSION.—The Secretary of State may submit the reports required by this section in conjunction with other reports relating to Pakistan required under other provisions of law, including sections 1116 and 1117 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111–32; 123 Stat. 1906 and 1907).

(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—

(1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate. (Dawn, 14 Oct 2009)


....
US note dilutes some conditions in Kerry-Lugar bill
By Anwar Iqbal
Wednesday, 14 Oct, 2009
Senator John Kerry (left), accompanied by FM Qureshi (center) and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Rep. Howard Berman (right), explained that the bill has nothing to do with drone attacks or private security companies. - AP photo

WASHINGTON: The requirement for an effective civilian control over promotions and strategic planning in the Pakistani military is not mentioned in a new joint explanatory statement of the US Congress issued on Wednesday.

‘There is no intent to, and nothing in this act in any way suggests that there should be, any US role in micromanaging internal Pakistani affairs, including the promotion of Pakistani military officers or the internal operations of the Pakistani military,’ said an explanatory note attached to the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009.

The explanatory note also dilutes the requirement that needed Pakistan to interrogate any Pakistani national involved in nuclear proliferation and to allow US officials access to such a person.

A new clause included in the explanatory note now ‘reflects our understanding that cooperative effort currently being undertaken by the governments of Pakistan and the United States to combat proliferation will continue.’

Section 302 of the act Congress passed late last month required the Secretary of State to submit annual reports to appropriate congressional committees to justify the continuation of security and military assistance to Pakistan. A failure to issue such a report could cause the aid to be discontinued.

There’s no such requirement for economic assistance. The secretary’s report shall include an assessment of the extent to which the Pakistan government exercises effective civilian control of the military.

This report should also include ‘a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration,’ said the original document.

Pakistani diplomats, however, explained to the media on Wednesday that while the above clause could not be deleted from the bill, the explanatory statement would make it ineffective. The administration will no longer be asked to issue such a report.

Missing from the explanatory note are words like ‘civilian executive leaders and parliament’ exercising the power of ‘oversight and approval’ and the requirement that the military will not get involved in civil administration.

The explanatory note also states that even the remaining requirement can be ‘waived if the determination is made by the Secretary of State in the interest of (US) national security that this was necessary to continue’ military assistance to Pakistan.

Interestingly, the requirement for ‘effective civilian control’ over the military was also absent from the original Senate version of the Kerry-Lugar bill.

The earlier bill said that the US intended to work with the government of Pakistan to ensure that Pakistan had strong and effective law-enforcement and national defence forces, under civilian leadership, with sufficient and appropriate security equipment and training to effectively defend Pakistan against internal and external threats.

In this clause, there was no mention of civilian control over chain of command or the process of promotion in the Pakistan army or any thing else hair-raising about the armed forces.

The explanatory note was issued jointly by the US House of Representatives and the Senate, clarifying their intent behind the aid to Pakistan bill.

The statement stresses that the US neither seeks to micromanage Pakistani affairs nor impinge on its sovereignty.

Senator John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Congressman Howard Berman, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, read out part of the statement inside Capitol Hill, standing beside Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi.

‘This document today is I think a historic document, a step forward in our relationship,’ Qureshi told a joint news conference with Senator Kerry and Congressman Berman.

'I am going back to Pakistan to tell my parliament and conclude the debate on the note that our relationship can move forward , we will deepen it and we will strengthen it,’ he said.

Senator Kerry and Congressman Berman reaffirmed their resolve to forge a long-term relationship with Pakistan, adding that the legislation, now being called as Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act, manifests the American commitment to economic uplift of the Pakistani people.

‘There is nothing in this bill that impinges on Pakistani sovereignty, period,’ said Senator Kerry.

The joint statement says that the reports envisioned in Section 302 are not binding on Pakistan, and require only the provision of information by the executive branch to the US Congress, in furtherance of the proposed legislation’s stated purpose of strengthening civilian institutions and the democratically-elected government of Pakistan.

The final text of the legislation reflects an agreement reached by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

‘The purpose of this explanatory statement is to facilitate accurate interpretation of the text and to ensure faithful implementation of its provisions in accordance with the intentions of the legislation,’ said Senator Kerry.

The core intent of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act is to demonstrate the American people’s long-term commitment to the people of Pakistan, he added.

Senator Kerry and Congressman Berman said that the United States valued its friendship with the Pakistani people and honoured the great sacrifices made by Pakistani security forces in the fight against extremism, and the legislation reflected the goals shared by the two governments.

The joint statement emphasised that the legislation ‘does not seek in any way to compromise Pakistan’s sovereignty, impinge on Pakistan’s national security interests, or micromanage any aspect of Pakistani military or civilian operations’.

There are no conditions on Pakistan attached to the authorisation of $7.5 billion in non-military aid.
The only requirements on this funding are financial accountability measures that Congress is imposing on the US executive branch, to ensure that this assistance supports programmes that most benefit the Pakistani people.

President Barack Obama has till midnight Friday to sign the Kerry-Lugar bill and he will sign it before that, according to White House spokesman Robert Gibbs. (Dawn)

KLB: a closer reading
By I.A. Rehman
Thursday, 15 Oct, 2009 (Dawn)–File photo

The Kerry-Lugar bill (KLB) on US aid to Pakistan has sparked angry debates in parliament and outside. Unfortunately common citizens are facing difficulties in understanding much of what has been said in denunciation of the proposed measure.

The main points made by knowledgeable (and some not so knowledgeable) commentators and patriotic and democratic persons (and some who are known to be neither patriotic nor democratic) are: that the bill aims at curtailing Pakistan’s sovereign rights, that it requires Pakistan to act contrary to its national interest, and that it attaches to aid humiliating conditions.

Since most of the critics have not referred precisely to the offensive parts of the KLB text it should be appropriate to briefly state the conditions listed in it.

Financial assistance to Pakistan will not be released unless the US president certifies that:

— Pakistan continues to cooperate with the US in efforts to curb unauthorised sale/distribution of nuclear weapons/information;

— The Government of Pakistan remains committed to the fight against terrorism;

— The government, including the military and intelligence agencies, are ceasing support to terrorists/militants operating in Afghanistan or ‘against the territory or people of neighbouring countries’.

— The Government of Pakistan is preventing terrorist groups from carrying out cross-border attacks, is dismantling terrorists’ bases in the country, and strengthening counter-terrorism and anti-money-laundering laws.

— The security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial process in the country. (If interference is not material or substantial certification might not be withheld.)

In addition, the secretary of state is required to submit to Congress committees monitoring reports evaluating Pakistan’s effort to (a) ‘disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other extremist and terrorist groups in Fata and settled areas; (b) eliminate the safe havens for such forces in Pakistan; (c) close terrorist camps, including those of Lashkar-i-Taiba and Jaish-i-Mohammad; (d) cease all support for extremist and terrorist groups; (e) prevent attacks into neighbouring countries; (f) increase oversight over curriculum in madressahs, including madressahs with direct links to the Taliban or the extremist and terrorists’ groups; and (g) improve counter-terrorism and anti-money laundering laws’.

The monitoring reports include ‘an assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration’.

It is clear that the bill does not order Pakistan as to what it should or should not do. The Government of Pakistan is free to fight Al Qaeda and the Taliban or not to do so, it is free to eliminate terrorist camps and organisations or not to do so, and it may or may not allow cross-border attacks from its soil. The only condition/restriction envisaged in the bill curtails the US government’s authority to offer Pakistan financial aid.

However, the authors of the bill have assumed that it is in the interest of both Pakistan and the US to fight terrorists, to ensure that Pakistan’s territory is not used to train militants, to offer them safe havens, and to launch terrorist attacks in neighbouring countries. There certainly are people in Pakistan that repel these assumptions, but at the same time there are many who endorse these assumptions. Which of these two groups carries the day is Pakistan’s internal matter. The KLB does not challenge this formulation; it merely says that if Pakistan does not endorse these premises it should not expect the US to give it aid.

The question whether any strings can be attached to aid is not relevant. It is too late for a habitual client such as Pakistan to ask its patrons to go on giving aid even if the recipient party acts in violation of the former’s interest. The Commonwealth suspended Pakistan’s membership when the military overthrew the civilian government. Respect for democratic governance is now a condition for the Commonwealth’s membership. Does that imply an attack on the members’ sovereign rights? Democratic-minded people in Pakistan have consistently reprimanded the West for giving aid to dictators. Did the demand for denying support to Gen Zia compromise national dignity?

Similarly, the authors of the bill have apparently assumed that in a democratic state the civilian leaders in government and parliament should oversee military budget, strategic planning and promotions. They may be wrong in entertaining such ideas about Pakistan and in that case their minds could be disabused by our denial experts.

Incidentally, all diplomatic missions as well as representatives of UN agencies and international lenders monitor the situation in Pakistan more or less along the lines suggested in the bill. Pakistani defenders of national honour may well be aware that foreign governments base their policies towards Pakistan on such reports. One suspects Pakistani diplomats are also supposed to write similar reports. Pakistanis have seen no attacks on their sovereignty and honour in texts such as the following: ‘The Government of Pakistan will … take such action as may be mutually agreed upon [by the US and Pakistan] to eliminate causes of international tension; make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world; take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defence capacities; and take appropriate steps to ensure the effective utilisation of the economic and military assistance provided by the United States.’ (Article 5, Pakistan – United States Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, 1954).

We are aware of the provisions for the US president’s certification of Pakistan’s good conduct under the Symington Amendment and the troubles Gen Zia had in persuading White House, through Charlie Wilson, to be untruthful to the Congress. So long as such matters, including the gifting of a Pakistani field marshal’s uniform to the Congressman from Texas, are kept secret national honour is not compromised.

Perhaps the most serious lapse made by the Kerry-Lugar draftsmen is the use of the word ‘ceasing’ in relation to the monitoring of Pakistani agencies’ support to terrorist outfits because it assumes that such support has been extended in the past. There might have been no trouble if the US president had been asked only to certify that Pakistan is not supporting terrorists. Perhaps the Americans cannot help relying overmuch on their information channels. Or as Oscar Wilde observed somewhere that if someone speaks the truth, sooner or later, he will be found out. It seems both Pakistan and the US have been found out.


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