The ‘Ghairat Brigade’ and the hyper-nationalism

By Kamran Shafi
Tuesday, 10 Nov, 2009

...Meanwhile back at the ranch, what is now increasingly known as the ‘Ghairat Brigade’ proceeds apace with its denunciation of the elected government in particular and politicians in general. The Internet is inundated with stories about the corruption of all politicians; the inefficiency of the only government in Pakistan which seems to be doing a half-decent job — the Punjab government; and of the selling down the river of Pakistan, its nuclear assets, its sovereignty et al, by the ‘bloody civilians’. Scenarios predicting the imminent fall of the government, followed by the wrapping up of the whole shoot are doing the rounds of the drawing rooms of the rich and the famous, what I call the Beautiful People.

Yet, just look at the shenanigans of the newest godfather of the ‘Ghairat Brigade’: “I said to the Americans, ‘Give us the Predators.’ It was refused. I told the Americans, ‘Then just say publicly that you’re giving them to us. You keep on firing them but put Pakistan Air Force markings on them.’ That, too, was denied” — Gen (retd) Pervez Musharraf, former chief of the army staff, Pakistan Army, in a most recent interview with Seymour Hersh of the New Yorker. I ask you!

Where is the ‘Ghairat Lobby’ now when Musharraf’s subterfuge to trick the Pakistani nation has been made public: whilst going all the way with the Americans in allowing the drone attacks, asking them to camouflage their drones in PAF colours. Yet his acolytes have the gall to put the blame for drone attacks entirely on the present lot?

The Commando has also had (one of his) comeuppance(s), however. Asked if he had met any senior Obama administration official, he said, “I did not ask for a meeting because I was afraid of being told no.” Well, serves him right.

What else can I say but that sense should be knocked into the knuckleheaded, actually venal and dishonest establishment and its paid hacks by the lay people of this country who are up to here with being fed the worst tripe for the past 60-plus years; who are at the end of their tether with the sickening and ever shrill crescendo of blame and accusations and the strictest censure of politicians, and only politicians.

Case in point, a move in the Senate of Pakistan initiated by Senator-for-Life Wasim Sajjad: “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law and treaty, and undertaking or conditionalities agreed with any foreign country, the president of Pakistan shall certify in January each year on behalf of the government of Pakistan to each house of parliament that the sovereignty and honour of Pakistan have not been compromised in any manner whatsoever, that no compromise has been made on security (sic) or effectiveness of the nuclear programme of Pakistan; that no understanding has been reached with any foreign country for interference in the change of command or promotions in the Pakistan armed forces or in the structure or role of the security forces of Pakistan; and that no conditionalities have been accepted from any source.”

He also said that the KLA (Kerry Lugar act) raised many concerns and caused serious worries in almost all civil and military circles’. Er, is this Senator Waseem Sajjad the same person who allegedly carried the army’s message to the Supreme Court these many years ago? I ask you, again!

To end, might I refer to friend Cyril Almeida’s question of last week: “Can our politicians ever make it work?” Yes, yes, yes, Cyril, provided our democracy gets the time it takes to grow and flower and prosper, to which endeavour all of us must be party by saying with one voice: “No matter what, never another army take-over!!” Otherwise we are lost.

PS May I one more time say to the leaders of Pakistan’s largest parties, President Asif Ali Zardari and Mian Nawaz Sharif: stay together and defeat the anti-democratic forces, or get ‘sorted out’ one by one. Particularly to Asif Zardari may I say yet again, “You don’t need four months to get rid of the 17th Amendment. All it takes is two days!! Do it!”

kshafi1@yahoo.co.uk (Source

Tail-piece:
Rejecting hyper-nationalists
Tuesday, November 10, 2009 (The News)
Mosharraf Zaidi

No one doubts that Pakistan has enemies. No one has legitimately made an argument that any country is particularly interested in Pakistan for noble or selfless reasons. And no one that can be taken seriously can defend politicians and their enablers as they slavishly tout talking points that have no basis in the South Asian Muslim narrative around which mainstream Pakistan’s values and ethos are constructed.

The hyper-nationalist discourse that seeks to locate Pakistan’s problems in Zionism, Indian spies, or American development assistance, however, is not nationalist at all. How can anybody, who really cares for Pakistan, be so wickedly unaware of the potential dangers of targeting foreign correspondents? How can anybody that cares for Pakistan continually attempt to inject Pakistanis with the heroin of blaming ‘the other’? How can anybody that cares for Pakistan so consistently defy and deny any attempt to inspect and assess the damage that Pakistan does to itself? How can anybody that cares about Pakistan surgically delegitimise questions about the accountability of mercenaries hired to protect diplomats?

When Pakistanis that love their country read the hyper-nationalist press in Pakistan, or watch pundits spew irrational and unsubstantiated allegations on television, they need to resist embracing the warm comfort of blaming ‘the other’. The overwhelmingly vast majority of Pakistan’s problems are a direct consequence of decisions made by Pakistani individuals, groups and organisations. The dangers of allowing conspiracy theories to go unchallenged are not just intellectual. Daniel Pearl lost his life because of a delusional, conspiratorial and escapist culture among extremists. Pakistanis, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, should have nothing but contempt for this culture. It certainly must not be allowed to expand its influence. And being rational about the threats Pakistan faces does not mean you are being unpatriotic. Quite the opposite.

Resistance to hyper-nationalism must begin with rejecting it, and end with registering that rejection in writing. Write a letter to every newspaper and television channel and raise your voice. The depth and seriousness of Pakistan’s fragile middle class voice rests on it. We cannot allow this voice to be hijacked by the hyper-nationalists that concoct malicious and dangerous lies to appeal to our patriotism. www.mosharrafzaidi.com (Source)

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A perspective on anti-Americanism found in Pakistan today

Smokers’ Corner: Bogey nation

Nadeem F. Paracha
Sunday, 25 Oct, 2009 (Dawn Blog)

Anti-Americanism today is an obligatory part of populist rhetoric.— Photo from File

Recently the monthly Herald published the results of an elaborate survey that it undertook to determine the extent of anti-Americanism in Pakistan. The findings suggest nothing that we do not already know. The percentages in this case hold only an academic interest.

Though anti-Americanism during the Cold War (1949-89) was mostly the ideological vocation of pro-Soviet leftists, today (some twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union), one can safely suggest that America is experiencing its most detested hour. It hasn’t been hated across the board so much and so instantly as it is today, thanks mainly to the many arrogant misdeeds of the Bush administration and its utter deficiency in the art and skill of empathetic and prudent diplomacy.

However, the anti-Americanism virus — at least in most Muslim countries — today is such that the critique that comes with it is largely rhetorical, and, at times, rather obsessive-compulsive. The recent ‘debate’ that took place in Pakistan’s electronic media on the Kerry-Lugar Bill is a vivid example of this trend, in which, it was quite clear that certain politicians, TV talk show hosts and their audiences among the country’s ever growing chattering classes, who were quick to attack the Bill, hadn’t even read the document! Their single cue in this respect was the Pakistan Army’s concerns about certain conditions mentioned in the aid bill, and off they went on a rampage.

More interesting however will be to trace the history and evolution of anti-Americanism in Pakistan. According to a research paper written by Dr Talukder Muniruzaman in 1971 on the politics of young Pakistanis, a majority of Pakistanis viewed America positively and admiringly in the 1950s. The paper also suggests that right up till Pakistan’s 1965 war with India, most Pakistanis saw America as a friend, especially in the context of the Soviet Union’s close ties with India.

According to a lengthy paper (published by Chicago University in 1983) on the ideological orientation of Pakistan’s university students (by Kiren Aziz and Peter McDonough), anti-Americanism among most Pakistanis remained somewhat low even during the celebrated movement (in 1967-68) against the Ayub Khan dictatorship; in spite of the fact that the movement was largely led by leftist students and politicians.

The paper further suggests that anti-Americanism in the 1970s that was ripe among many Arab countries due to the United States’ single-minded support for Israel, started to finally make its way into Pakistani society during the Z. A. Bhutto regime (1972-77); especially when Bhutto started to expand his ‘Islamic Socialism’ doctrine at the international level by striking firm relations with various radical Muslim states and Arab countries. The build-up to this was the otherwise sympathetic Richard Nixon administration’s failure to militarily help its Asian ally during the 1971 war with India.

In spite of this, America remained Pakistan’s leading aid donor. According to Lubna Rafique’s 1994 paper, ‘Benazir & British Press,’ it was only in the last year of Z. A. Bhutto’s regime (1977), that he started to allude to moving out of the ‘American camp,’ calling the US a ‘white elephant.’ He also went on to accuse the Jimmy Carter administration of financing right-wing parties’ agitation against him in 1977.

Throughout the Ziaul Haq dictatorship in the 1980s, anti-Americanism remained a much polarised affair in Pakistan. Most political-religious parties and their supporters, and the industrial class that supported Zia, were either openly pro-America or ambiguous on the subject. This was due to the fact that Zia was an Islamist military dictator who was backed by the Ronald Regan administration with military hardware and dollars during the West’s war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and against ‘communism in the region’. On the other hand, anti-Americanism became rampant among those opposing Zia.

Though by the late 1980s the intensity of anti-Americanism had grown (compared to the preceding decades), it never became violent. In fact, some would suggest that in the 1990s as America largely divorced itself from the region after the end of the Afghan civil war, anti-Americanism actually receded, and Pakistanis got busy tackling the bitter pitfalls of the war in the shape of bloody ethnic and sectarian strife.

Anti-Americanism returned to the fore like never before after the tragic 9/11 episode in 2001. According to veteran defence analyst, Hassan Askari, this strain of anti-Americanism is an emotional response of most Pakistanis to the confusion that set in after 9/11. In other words, this version of anti-Americanism has very little to do with a more academic or concrete understanding of both international and home-grown terrorism. The post-9/11 confusion and emotionalism in Pakistan is given vent and an ‘intellectual tilt’ by Islamist apologists of all shapes and sizes pointing fingers at ‘outside forces’ for the blood that is being shed by home-grown fanatics, is only too visible.

Whereas there was a prominent streak of individualism and romantic rebellion associated with the anti-Americanism of Pakistani leftists during the Cold War, nothing of the sort can be said about the widespread anti-Americanism found in Pakistan today. The present-day phenomenon has become an obligatory part of populist rhetoric in which American involvement is blamed for everything — from terrorist attacks, to the energy crises, to perhaps even the break of dengue fever.

Ridiculous, really. (Source: Dawn Blog)

.....

The futility of hating

Tuesday, October 27, 2009 Mosharraf Zaidi We know that Pakistanis are not alone in the world, when it comes to being more than a little miffed about how their country is treated by the United States. The hullabaloo over why there is so much anti-Americanism in Pakistan, however, is a bit mystifying. The implicit insistence that high levels of anti-Americanism in Pakistan are unacceptable seems to reek of hubris. US officials, both bureaucrats (like Ambassador Ann Paterson) and politicians (like Congressman Howard Berman) have grown increasingly testy in recent weeks, trying to perfume the world-famous love letter of the American people to Pakistan (formerly known as the Kerry Lugar Bill). If the incredulity of Americans trying to convince Pakistanis that their country is Uncle Sam's little love-muffin seems a little ridiculous, it's because it is. Only committed Orientalists would insist that a country of nearly 180 million be starry-eyed about America's thus-far unproven, newfound wisdom about Pakistani democracy. Proconsul Dick Holbrook should get over it. And so should Howie Berman. Pakistanis aren't the only ones that don't trust the US government. Nevertheless, Pakistan would be best served by some introspection on the whole anti-American routine. The sad truth is that "Go America Go" and anti-American narrative in Pakistan is a microcosm of the quality and texture of public discourse in Pakistan--irrational, without evidence, and oftentimes, downright malicious and ill-intentioned. It seems Pakistani mistrust of the United States is rooted in the US drone strikes to take out Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders hiding out in Pakistani territory. That is understandable, given the high number of innocent Pakistanis killed by these strikes, and the brazen absence of any contrition or remorse on the part of the US government. but anti-Americanism has always existed among some segments in Pakistan, but it has never been quite so universal, or quite so pronounced, as it has been in the last two months. No doubt, Pakistanis should be proud to be proud, and should reserve the right to like or dislike countries on the basis of how they perceive those countries treat Pakistan. However Pakistanis should also be smart while they're being proud. If anti-American rhetoric is masking other more important and more urgent problems--dare we say, Pakistani problems--then the rhetoric is poisonous and need to be shunned. Anti-Americanism in Pakistan has two dimensions, in particular, that make it a rather poisonous instrument in the public discourse. The first is that anti-Americanism is itself marked by incompetence, and in turn masks Pakistani incompetence. The second is that anti-Americanism easily displaces responsibility for Pakistani problems, from Pakistan's leaders, to the abstraction of the American beast. In short, the second dimension is about accountability, and how anti-Americanism prevents such accountability. Two of the most recent big-ticket stories in the country amply demonstrate the competence problem in Pakistan's anti-American odyssey. The Blackwater controversy and the Kerry Lugar Bill both demonstrated the failure of Pakistani public discourse to produce viable and defensible positions, and thereby losing the opportunity to engage audiences in the United States that might actually be amenable to Pakistanis' concerns, and who might have actually enabled a true dialogue between Pakistanis and Americans at large. In the case of the Blackwater controversy, the national public discourse was aimed at a demonisation of the United States, rather than a serious examination of what was actually taking place in terms of the presence of private US security contractors in Pakistan. The controversy failed to ever truly define, what, if any, laws were broken, or, indeed, what moral or ethical problem the presence of private security contractors presented for Pakistan. Is there a fair public policy debate to be had in Pakistan, on the legitimacy and legality of private security contractors from another country working in Pakistan? Most definitely. But the manner in which the issue has been discussed thus far has done two things. First, it has turned off and alienated rational Pakistanis who seek evidence before unleashing nationalist tirades against another country. Second, it has largely de-legitimised the entire subject matter altogether--once a topic is coloured with an irrational taint, it is difficult to have a substantive discussion about it, even if the data and evidence to conduct the discussion is in place. With this being the ambient quality of Pakistani national discourse, it should not surprise anyone that Pakistanis collectively adopt anti-Americanism as an instrument of debate. Engaging in a serious and substantive debate about the role of non-state actors in Pakistan would require a basic level of effort invested in understanding the dimensions of government and the extent to which the state is receding. Blaming Americans for wanting to turn Islamabad into Baghdad, on the other hand, is both a sexier hook for dining room conversation, and perhaps more importantly, an easy way out for those responsible for running the country. Which brings us to the second dimension of anti-Americanism: the impunity that it enables Pakistani leaders to operate with. Having Uncle Sam to beat with a baseball bat every time Pakistani leaders need a scapegoat, is ultra-convenient. Even this government, which is otherwise so deeply immersed in building all kinds of bridges with the US, keeps Finance Minister Shaukat Tarin close at hand to deliver verbal smack-downs about the price Pakistan is paying in the war on terror, and its urgent and immediate need for a US federal bailout. The entire range of political parties, including the military, have banked on anti-Americanism, not because of hatred for America, but because any deconstruction of Pakistan's problems would illustrate how deeply culpable Pakistan's leaders--political and military--have been, and how completely disconnected from most of Pakistan's domestic problems America truly is. Pakistan's fiscal crunch is a function of spending too much money on the wrong things (war and debt-servicing), and not extracting enough money from the right people (feudal land owners, and desi rogue speculators of the Karachi Stock Exchange). Pakistan's mosque and madrasa problem is a function of leaving the job of faith leadership to the most underprivileged, and sending all the nice-smelling lucky kids to Wisconsin, Waterloo, Worcester and Wollongong. Pakistan's education problem is a function of the use of teachers' jobs as political spoils. Pakistan's healthcare problem is a function of not treating doctors with the respect and dignity they deserve, and treating patients like cattle. Pakistan's most serious problems are not the products of America's desire to devour Pakistani sovereignty. They are a product of Pakistani sovereignty not knowing what to do with itself, and how and why. Hating on America won't solve that problem. The writer advises governments, donors and NGOs on public policy. He can be reached through his website www.mosharrafzaidi.com (The News)

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Opportunistic politics of Pakistan Army over the Kerry-Lugar Bill

Gratuitous advice, opportunistic politics

Saturday, October 10, 2009 Gibran Peshimam The Army's public statement openly questioning the intentions and policies of the civilian government in regards to the lucrative Kerry-Lugar Bill, while not surprising, is disappointing because it comes so early in yet another era of democratic revivalism. The bells of conspiracy and subterfuge are ringing again; the gyre, as Yeats would put it, is turning and widening. We are spellbound listening to the catchy chorus of political opportunists cashing in on the controversy. They smell blood. We know this tune – the opportunist sonata. It is the one that, laced with cacophonies of "national interest" slogans, crescendos in interventionism and upheaval. This impasse is an indication of yet another democratic civilian government being unable to take policy decisions autonomously as well as the continued unwillingness of the establishment to let go, even if only for the time being – as is usually the case every decade or so. What is even more disappointing is that there has been rabid support for the army's "concerns," rather than condemnation. In other countries, even India, an army chief would have been dismissed for something like this. Whether or not the army high command was consulted is inconsequential because in a pure democratic setup, a civilian government is not bound to consult the army at all. So what if contentious clauses were, as is being alleged, inserted in the Kerry-Lugar Bill through a conspiracy by a few civilians to tame the army's influence, or to control their funding? That we are giving the Army's 'concern' so much importance is essentially a reflection of a contradiction that Pakistan has struggled with since inception. Whether we admit it or not, the deeply-embedded nationalist psyche of the country dictates that the armed forces are the definitive authority in protecting the identity, and hence the very existence, of Pakistan. Questioning this authority has always been anathema, which is why the armed forces get away with almost anything: they are equated with our sovereignty and ultimately with our independence. Questioning the army, more importantly its top brass, has for too long been equated with questioning our sovereignty. Yet, intervention -- direct and indirect -- by the armed forces is also cited by politicians and intellectuals as the main hurdle to political development democratic sustainability. Today in Pakistan, many are championing Gen Kayani for something that is the polar opposite of what he was praised for only a few months ago – i.e., non-interference. The same people – in the media, political circles and civil society – who were rabid critics of the army's intervention in politics and policy-making just a few months ago, are now its reservations to put pressure on the current government regarding the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Medically, Pakistan would be called schizophrenic. When it really matters, no one seems to remember army intervention is a problem, not a solution; this is why the marching boots are cheered into the capital every once in a while, only to be sent packing a decade later. It should be no surprise that the Army has opposed the Kerry-Lugar Bill on the grounds that it was not consulted. The armed forces have historically been the principal figure, and indeed the principal beneficiary, when it comes to relations with America. The civilians have never been given a chance to work with US largesse – possibly because this is exactly when they can actually make democracy work. When the US and Pakistan's relations were on a high in the late 50s and 60s, the early stages of the cold war, Pakistan went through its "Golden Era of Capitalism" – under Ayub Khan. Pakistan's military government got into America's good books in exchange for modelling policies along free-market capitalist lines instead of being protectionist like India. By doing this, we were giving their ideology preference and credibility over local, independent economic models that China and the rest of Asia were following. We are economically non-existent in the global sphere today. When Washington went on a spending spree in the 80s, Pakistan was under Gen Zia and his regime received tons of money and aid in exchange for fighting a proxy war against the Soviets. Also, where was the army's concern for sovereignty when the military handed over hundreds of its nationals to the US for interrogation in Guantanamo Bay after 9/11? Moral of the tale? Aid with strings was fine as long as the khakis had a direct say in it and there was a soldier in the Presidency. If today the US is supporting Pakistan financially under a civilian setup, in the same way, why shouldn't it be allowed? Shouldn't we at least give it a try? Or does the army fear that the civilians might just make this work – which will be a huge step to break away from the vicious cycle of military interventionism? This is not about how corrupt Asif Ali Zaradri is or is not. He is a nonentity in the larger quest for democracy. This is about defending those who follow him – i.e., in becoming democratically elected leaders of Pakistan. Nor is this about aid or the Kerry-Lugar Bill; this is about civilians' right to stand up for themselves and determine their own policies without the army's godfathering – however well-intentioned it may be. If we argue that the problem lies with a controversial president, then we should be ready to have all our future leaders walk the tight rope of army support, shaken publicly by a mere ISPR press statement. The army is an important institution that has its own place – but that place is not in the realm of policy-making. Otherwise, we should forget civilian sovereignty, and instead equate sovereignty with only the military's right to dictate policy shifts – something that will see us stay put, on edge, for another 62 years. The time to set the ground for a paradigm shift is now. The smallest signs of interventionism must be nipped in the bud. Be warned: Kerry-Lugar today, a whole lot more tomorrow. The writer is city editor of The News, Karachi. Email: gibran.peshimam@ gmail.com Pak Army consulted on aid bill: Berman WASHINGTON: The Kerry-Lugar bill outlines a joint strategy that was drawn up with help from Pakistan’s military, Democratic Representative Howard Berman, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said on Thursday. He said members of Pakistan’s military had been familiar with provisions of the measure as it worked its way through the US House and Senate. “I’ve been in touch with them (the military) through this whole process. I’ve spoken with Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Pervez Kayani. It’s a common strategy,” he said. “This joint strategy is that we want to assist their efforts to take on the counterinsurgency, to disband terrorist groups within Pakistan, to protect their nuclear facilities from proliferation,” Berman said. Berman said that since April, both the government of Pakistan and the military “have shown a strong willingness to take on key elements of the insurgency, and with some success”. Berman said Pakistani critics were manufacturing a crisis over $7.5 billion in US aid for political reasons. “This is a created crisis, by people who either haven’t read the bill or don’t want to describe it accurately, and whose goal is either to destabilise the (Pakistani) government, or challenge some of the military’s priorities,” he said. Berman is the House sponsor of the legislation that was drafted with Senate sponsors Democrat John Kerry and Republican Richard Lugar. It has no strings attached on development aid, but stipulates conditions for security aid, saying Islamabad must show commitment to fighting terrorism and dismantling nuclear networks. reuters (Daily Times) Pakistan's 'other-people's-money' problem Saturday, October 10, 2009 Mosharraf Zaidi The Kerry-Lugar Bill is about giving Pakistan money. For the Americans, the legislation may have evolved into becoming an instrument of democratisation, an instrument of imperialism, or an instrument of development--and it may even be possible that it is all three, or none of the three. But for Pakistan, the bill has always been about one thing: money. The debate and discourse it is stimulating today is peripheral to that central issue, and it conceals the realities of the incentives that drive the Pakistani elite's behaviour. Military, feudal or capitalist, the elite have always had a serious thing for other people's money. The Pakistani military loves other people's money. It has sustained a reputation as an important investment for American power by perpetuating its role as a frontline force that acts as a guardian against evil things, for example, Communism throughout the Cold War, peaking in the 80s and then the lull in business from 1989 onwards, followed by the swinging 90s. And then in 2001 came the violent extremism of Al Qaeda. The Pakistani capitalist loves other people's money. The country's capitalist elite has always sided with the almighty dollar. Not the almighty rupee, but the almighty dollar. And capitalist Pakistan is as knee-deep in elite patronage politics as the PPP is. While recent indicators may suggest that the PML-N has turned a corner -- with its unequivocal support for the lawyers movement -- its history is no secret. Moreover, Nawaz Sharif's genesis as a political entity during the Zia years is not a solitary tale of the military's patronage of big business-cum-big politics. Dozens of heavy-weight politicians that inhabit all versions of the PMLs today (particularly those of the PM- Q) owe their monetary and political fortunes to favourable notifications emerging from the corridors of power during the military regimes of Ayub, Zia and Musharraf. The Pakistani feudal loves other people's money. It has cemented a reputation as an important investment for American power by perpetuating its role as a victim of the Pakistani military. But strangely, feudal Pakistan has always been a willing and able partner of the military in all its campaigns against democracy, and the predictable and stable civilian institutions that should underpin it. The feudal centrifuge of Pakistani politics, the PPP, has shed blood in service of democracy, but its record is far from pristine. It has been enabled by and has been an enabler of the military's power plays throughout history. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto rose to prominence as a trusted stud of Field Marshall Ayub Khan. So while his heroism for standing up to Zia's deception and having the courage to live and die by the sword can never be questioned, his political genesis has an unquestionable khaki shade. More recently, while Shaheed Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto perpetuated the Bhutto family's legacy of making the ultimate sacrifices for their politics, her return to Pakistan was negotiated with Pakistan's military. May God rest her soul in peace, but she too left a khaki tint on the proud red, black and white flag of the PPP's now largely feudal colours. Within this political culture -- a culture in which other people's money is a fundamental and existential element of strategy, tactics and operations -- the Pakistani elite have been operating in synchronicity with their attendant political conditions. The military elite, personified by the Corps Commanders meeting at the General Head Quarters (GHQ) on Wednesday, struck first and struck hard, playing to public sentiment and "standing up" for Pakistan. This was a perfect pill for the military. It has been desperately seeking to re-establish its credibility, its legitimacy as a major centre of political power in Pakistan, and by extension its political bona fides. It is understandable that it would seek these things, having had its image dragged through the mud by the fag-end of the Musharraf years, as he alienated and antagonised millions with his bullying of the Chief Justice, and his contempt for civilian institutions. The capitalist elite, guided by crony capitalism, is a two-faced monster. It is personified by the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) on one hand, and by the opposition parties on the other. The KSE element helped sway the market downward, signaling to investors everywhere that Pakistan is such a sorry stack of cards that it will collapse into a Taliban hell, if the US taxpayers don't send that $1.5 billion -- public outcry be damned. The political opposition element helped to ratchet up the temperature, in lock-step with the military elite, mind you. Tellingly, none have had the gall to reject the money -- only the conditions. The feudal elite, personified by the obduracy of the president and the audacity of the foreign minister, has chosen to cheerlead for the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Much anger and hysteria is focused on Husain Haqqani but the ambassador, despite his considerable supernatural powers, is not the cause of the PPP's addiction to other people's money. Other people's money is part of the very DNA of feudal politics in this country. How else will the PPP pay for the public sector's expenditures? Expenditure that the PPP itself has caused to grow through opaque vote-getting schemes (like the Income Support Programme being run by that vaunted economist, Farzana Raja). Expenditure, for which concurrent domestic revenues will never be raised -- because doing so would entail taxing the only group left in the country that doesn't get taxed through the nose -- the feudal elite. And what kind of feudals would tax themselves? Feudal, military or capitalist, the Pakistani elite love other people's money. The country's perennial indebtedness and unquenchable appetite for other people's money however, is not inevitable. Contrary to the conventional wisdom peddled by Citibank salesman pretending to be economists, and World Bank economists, pretending to be human -- Pakistan can survive without bailouts. Reduced public sector expenditure, increased revenue mobilisation and a government held accountable at the local, provincial and federal level are not just mantras -- they matter. Their absence, systemic to an elite patronage system of governance, is the reason Pakistan seems to be aid dependent. But it is not. On October 28, 2008 (almost exactly a year ago), I argued that Pakistan must default in order to break out of a cycle that sustains the elite's largesse to itself. Sadly, instead of forcing the Pakistani state to confront administrative, structural and strategic demons, the international community's response to the Pakistani elite's poker-faced bluff has been to raise the stakes. Pakistan's elite have already won this round, once again. The Kerry-Lugar Bill discourse in Pakistan is characterised by patriotism and greed or both, but it is not guided by reason. No one, neither the military nor the capitalist elite have questioned Pakistan's seemingly limitless appetite for financial assistance, which is the basis for the formulation of the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Instead, there is elite consensus around the need for other people's money. The only disagreement is about how to cash in. The writer advises governments, donors and NGOs on public policy. He can be reached through his website www.mosharrafzaidi.com (The News)

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Kerry-Lugar Bill - Is it good or bad for Pakistan?

We may be entering a ‘new phase’ in relations between the US and Pakistan with the passage of the bill, but the paeans to ‘fundamental change’ don’t jibe with reality. –Photo by AP

Kerry-Lugar Bill: the fruition of 62 years

Wednesday, September 30, 2009 Mosharraf Zaidi $1.5 billion a year does not measure up well against the per capita assistance that Uncle Sam has provided for countries like Jordan, Georgia, Egypt and Israel. Nevertheless, America's friendship with Pakistan is entering a new and exciting phase. The Kerry-Lugar Bill signals a dramatic shift in how American power seeks to engage with Pakistanis. While even moderate Democrats in Washington DC are alarmed by how many Cold War bunnies President Obama has in his diplomatic arsenal, it is also true that the Obama people have a fundamentally different worldview than the one that motivated the actions of the Cheney-Rumsfeld cabal of the Christian Taliban. Rest assured, the era in which that gang of neocon torturers and war-profiteers was allowed to sleep serenely in beds that Gen Musharraf and his enablers made for them is over. Reading the Kerry-Lugar Bill exposes several pleasant realities. Its analysis of Pakistan's development challenges is succinct, to the point and reasonably comprehensive. The depth of analysis in the bill indicates genuine American interest in serious Pakistani issues. Moreover, given the lamentable efforts of Pakistani governments to document its own development priorities (who can forget the PRSP fiascos?), the bill represents a very good summary of the country's development challenges. Finally, to the abiding credit of American democratic institutions, the Kerry-Lugar Bill is a well-crafted document that makes no secrets of its motivations. Section 3 of the bill is titled Findings, and is a list of the issues that motivate the bill. There are a total of 12 findings. Findings 1 and 2 are platitudinous expressions of the US-Pakistan friendship, and the $15 billion that the US government invested in the Gen Musharraf regime. Finding 3 recognises the importance of the February 18, 2008, election. Findings 4 through 9 focus on Al Qaeda, the Taliban and FATA. Findings 10 and 11 contain statistics about poverty and the economy in Pakistan. Finally, Finding 12 recognises the IDPs crisis caused by the May 8 Swat offensive. Nine of the twelve findings specifically refer to the Taliban, Al Qaeda, security, terrorism and/or FATA. Only one finding mentions the word poverty. This is not an accident. The Kerry-Lugar Bill is an American legislative measure designed to pursue American interests. The bill's three main sections further clarify the purpose and method that will define the engagement of American power with Pakistan. The first is focused on Pakistan's traditional development challenges, titled, "Democratic, Economic and Development Assistance for Pakistan" and has up to $1.5 billion associated with it. The second is titled "Security Assistance for Pakistan" and does not specify how much money is available, but does define a new era in US-Pakistan military relations. Most importantly this section delinks American support for Pakistani national security from the military, and places the control of any support provided with democratically elected civilian governments. This is a marked departure from the laissez faire rental agreements made by American governments and the Pakistani military under Musharraf with the Bushies, and under Zia, with the Bushies' ancestors in the Reagan White House. The final section, and the one of most interest from a purely development perspective, is titled "Strategy, Accountability, Monitoring and Other Provisions". This section details a complex set of planning, reporting, auditing and accounting documents that are designed to ensure that Pakistan uses the money it is given in accordance with the wishes of the US Congress -- a fine and noble cause given that it is their money. The Kerry-Lugar Bill's rather detailed set of accountability instruments will, however, if American bureaucrats are not careful, paralyse the mobility of almost all of the $1.5 billion a year. The Kerry-Lugar Bill calls for the production of at least three major, macro-level strategic documents that will double as budgeted work-plans, to be presented to relevant committees of the US parliament. The secretary of state must produce a Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report within 45 days of the bill's passage, and a Security-Related Assistance Plan Report within 180 days of the bill's passage. The US president must produce a Comprehensive Regional Strategy Report for submission to the relevant committees within 180 days of the passage of the bill. This last document, the regional strategy, seems to have been inspired by the president's book titled "The Audacity of Hope", seeking as it does, ways by which not only Pakistan, but Afghanistan and India too can be made more secure, through the Kerry-Lugar Bill assistance money. Six months after the secretary of state's Pakistan Assistance Strategy, Madam Secretary, or her predecessor, in concert with the secretary of defence, will be required to submit the first Semi-Annual Monitoring Report. Every six months thereafter, they will be required to produce one of these reports. If they ever make it to the public domain, these will be chart toppers at Amazon and on the New York Times' best sellers' lists. The semi-annual reports will not only detail expenditure and achievements, but will also include an evaluation of efforts by the government of Pakistan to "disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda, the Taliban", "eliminate safe havens", close "Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorist camps", "cease all support for terrorist groups", "prevent attacks into neighbouring countries", and "close madressahs linked to the Taliban". It gets better. In addition to evaluating Pakistan's performance along these lines, the report will also describe Pakistan's anti-proliferation efforts, assess whether US assistance is enabling Pakistan to spend more on nukes, and finally, assess the extent of civilian government control over the military, including "oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders". It may be an understatement to suggest that these requisite documents will exact a heavy toll on an already-stretched US bureaucracy in Pakistan. What is more worrying is that each new diplomat will require several individuals to help protect his or her life. Those 'protectors' will not be from among the Islamabad Traffic Police. They will be drawn from a pool of private contractors, hired through the State Department's Worldwide Personal Protective Services (WPPS) contracting vehicle. The WPPS, as anyone who has read Jeremy Scahill's exceptional book about Blackwater will know, is a bit of a problem. The hullabaloo over Blackwater's presence in Pakistan is not a conspiracy theory. It is a very legitimate concern about the use of mercenaries that are immune from the law. Blackwater may or may not be present in Pakistan -- but its ilk, most definitely are. Among these, DynCorp's presence here has already been verified, thanks to the now infamous Pakistani sub-contractor named Inter-Risk. Other mercenary companies, such as Triple Canopy, Xe, and Richard Armitage's CACI will eventually be deployed in Pakistan because protecting an army of bureaucrats will require several armies of mercenaries. Of course, a lot of this is a reflection of the Pakistani state's failure to protect guests when they visit this country. Over the last eight years American diplomats have been bombed (Karachi and Islamabad), ambassadors have been killed (Czech Republic at the Marriott), and journalists and engineers beheaded on camera (Danny Pearl and Piotr Stanczak). The Kerry-Lugar Bill is a bitter pill that Pakistan's strong and resilient people must swallow because they have repeatedly been failed by both their military dictators and their civilian megalomaniacs. True proof of the very different planet that the Pakistani elite inhabit drips from Farahnaz Ispahani's pen in a lionisation of her government published in the Huffington Post on Saturday, and this paper, just yesterday. Says Ms Ispahani, "Pakistan stands perhaps in the strongest diplomatic position in its sixty-two year history". How's that for a punch-line? The writer advises governments, donors and NGOs on public policy. He can be reached through his website www.mosharrafzaidi.com (The News) Deciphering the US aid bill By Cyril Almeida Friday, 02 Oct, 2009 Never let the facts get in the way of a good debate. That pretty much sums up the approach to the Kerry-Lugar/Berman bill, officially, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, now approved by Congress. How angry are some of the critics? Very angry; frothing-at-the-mouth angry. A PPP government has once again sold the country, its sovereignty, its very soul to the Yanks. And going by some of the wildest claims, there doesn’t seem to be a shortage of patriots lining up to water the tree of liberty here with their blood. Pakistan will be saved. The conspiracy to destroy us will be defeated. Right. About the facts. What appears to have sent the bill’s Pakistani opponents into convulsions is this: Sec 203: limitations on certain assistance. Specifically, paragraph (c) of sec 203, entitled ‘certification,’ which lists three subjects the secretary of state has to certify to Congress that Pakistan is cooperating on, committed to and eschewing from. I’ll get to those conditions in a bit, but first the pesky fact that the ‘nattering nabobs of negativism’ here have missed. (Tip of the hat to William Safire, The New York Times man who passed away this week and who probably had little clue that his brilliance was being lapped up in faraway Pakistan.) The certification limitation applies to two things: security-related assistance and major defence transfers, both defined in sec 2, ‘definitions,’ if anyone is interested. The certification does not apply to the democratic, economic and development assistance. So Pakistanis are supposed to be angry that the Americans have put conditions on selling guns to Pakistan, but not on democratic, economic and development assistance? Of course not. Which is why the chest-thumping uber-nationalists here have ignored the point and pretended that the conditions are applicable to the full amount of the aid. Remember, never let the facts get in the way of a good debate. Now, to the other side, Pakistani and American officials, also prone to exaggerating the effect of the bill. We may be entering a ‘new phase’ in relations between the US and Pakistan with the passage of the bill, but the paeans to ‘fundamental change’ sung particularly by Pakistani officials don’t jibe with reality. Pakistan is a tactical ally of the US, not a strategic partner; that has been the reality since 9/11 and that continues to be the reality even after the passage of the Enhanced Partnership Act. The language of the bill tells its own story. From sec 3: findings: ‘(1) The people of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the United States share a long history of friendship and comity, and the interests of both nations are well-served by strengthening and deepening this friendship’ (emphasis added). And from the same section: ‘(4) Pakistan is a major non-Nato ally of the United States and has been a valuable partner in the battle against al Qaeda and the Taliban, but much more remains to be accomplished by both nations’ (emphasis added). Hardly stirring stuff. Next, the limitations on security-related assistance and arms transfers. First, the secretary of state must certify that ‘the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks.’ Yes, the earlier direct reference to A.Q. Khan has been deleted and semantically it could be argued that he is any case no longer ‘associated’ with nuclear proliferation networks. But that isn’t the point. The point is that the language reveals once again the true nature of Pak-US relations: we are a tactical ally, not a strategic partner. To get an idea of the language Congress uses for strategic partners, consider the certification requirement in the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act passed by the previous Congress: ‘the President shall certify to Congress that entry into force and implementation of the Agreement … (does not in any way) assist, encourage, or induce India to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.’ Yes, the bill stipulates that legal requirements of the Henry J. Hyde Act of 2006 and Atomic Energy Act of 1954 are not overridden and the Hyde Act places additional requirements on India that the US president must certify, but those do not imply that India is involved in nuclear weapons proliferation, which the Kerry-Lugar/Berman bill does. The difference isn’t something to be sneezed at. We are and are set to remain a tactical ally, not a strategic partner, of the US. The second condition applies to Pakistan’s ‘sustained commitment to … and significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups.’ Again, in broad strokes the condition is not very controversial because it is in line with Pakistan’s publicly declared policy against militancy. But here’s the rub: the details contain implicit references to India. After specifically requiring that Pakistan move towards ceasing support for any groups that launch attacks against US or coalition forces inside Afghanistan, the condition also mentions ‘the territory or people of neighbouring countries.’ Then it goes on to refer to the Lashkar-i-Taiba, its headquarters in Muridke and the Jaish-i-Mohammad. Connecting the dots isn’t very difficult. Frankly, the conditions themselves are arguably what the state should be doing in any case; we need to be rid of the curse of militancy and we need to do it for our own good. But in the present context, it matters who is asking us to do it and why. From a hard-nosed, realpolitik perspective — and you cannot ignore that in statecraft — the references amount to Indian security concerns inserting themselves into an American bill meant to provide democratic, economic and development assistance to Pakistan. So even if you ignore, and you should, the most outrageous bile of the bill’s critics, the more subtle point is reinforced: we remain a tactical ally of the US, not a strategic partner. Going forward, what that really calls for is a serious, measured, thoughtful debate about our approach to the US specifically and our grand, national security and national military strategies generally. But don’t bet on that happening. Remember, we don’t let the facts get in the way of a good debate. cyril.a@gmail.com (Dawn)

Making use of aid

Dissenting note Friday, October 02, 2009 Dr Masooda Bano The US House of Representatives has reached a consensus to continue to direct US aid flows to Pakistan by approving a five-year support package of 1.5 million per annum going to 2014. The good news is that this money is meant to be primarily used for education and infrastructure. Any external support aimed at improving Pakistan's education sector is, of course, always welcome. The issue, however, is to ensure that the aid is actually spent on the selected sector. The aid utilisation trends in Pakistan have historically been far from impressive. Outright corruption and mismanagement have often resulted in development aid being largely misspent. Since the Sept 11 attacks, the problem has grown: since the donors are now channelling aid to Pakistan in a bid to curtail militancy they have started to use aid as a leverage to make the government agree to counter-militancy measures rather than ensuring that it is actually spent on the relevant sector. If these new approved funds from the US are to make any contribution to the Pakistan's education sector, this trend for sure has to be checked. Aid in general is a controversial subject in development literature. While there are clearly arguments for the developed world enjoying the comforts of a good life to try to contribute towards improving living conditions for millions in the poor countries, the practice is not that easy. Aid is hardly ever given for purely altruistic reasons. Political and strategic interests of the donors always play a critical role in the amount of aid that they channel to any country. These political and strategic interests also determine which actors they fund within the chosen countries. Of course, there are differences among donors where some bilateral donors are known to be less political than others but the US is not one of them. In any case, the increased security concerns in Pakistan has meant that more western donors have felt their security interests links to Pakistan, and as a result have been increasing their aid portfolios for Pakistan. The education sector has also greatly benefited in paper from these increased aid flows. However, in practice it is very difficult to see how this aid has made any difference to the Pakistani state education system. There is clearly something amiss with the way aid is being utilised in Pakistan, especially in the education sector. The answer to this is not difficult either. The problem is because donors have increased their aid flows to Pakistan due to concerns about militancy, they become less concerned about ensuring that the government actually spends the money on the education sector. Rather, they prefer to use this aid money to negotiate other anti-militancy measures with the government. Thus, as long as the Pakistani government agrees to carrying out the next round of military operations or any such counter-militancy measures, the donors feel less pressured to actually ensure that the aid money meant for education or other sectors is actually being used for that purpose. The primary concern of the donors remains to keep the Pakistani government involved because the donors are desperate to stay engaged with Pakistan for the counter-militancy programmes. They therefore don't want to pressure the government to deliver on the social-sector front too much as they might end up offending certain parties and then being told to withdraw their portfolios. Seen from the Pakistani perspective this is a very advantageous position. The fact that the donor is keen to stay engaged with a country is a good thing as it gives Pakistani government a lot of negotiating power. However, this could only be a strength provided the government at the Pakistani end was sincere in utilising the aid money for the right purposes. Pakistan's tragedy is that even the present government is no different than the Musharraf government when it comes to ensuring efficient utilisation of aid funds. There are no signs that the corruption under this government is checked or that the government has special commitment to reforming education sector. In such circumstances additional aid to education sector in Pakistan will only help make the people at the top comfortable rather than actually improving the conditions of the Pakistani schools. However, what is important to remember is that these choices are in Pakistan's own hands. If only the leadership of the time was to think of the long-term individual and collective interest rather than pursuing short-sighted gains, increased aid flows to Pakistan could become a blessing. The writer is a research fellow at the Oxford University. Email: mb294@hotmail.com (The News)

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Mosharraf Zaidi: Counter-terrorism through the civil service

The attack on the Lahore police training facility yesterday, which as of the time of this article's writing had not ended, should wake Pakistan up. There is an existential monster that Pakistanis are unable to acknowledge because of the weakness of their Muslim faith. This weakness is exacerbated by the average Pakistani Muslim's dependence on unholy mullahs whose money-ing by General Zia, radical Saudis, and the joint efforts of the CIA and the ISI is now proving to be the single gravest threat to the sustainability of Pakistan as an operational entity.

The ostrich-like reaction to terrorism is driven by the average Pakistani's inability to debate the mullah, and an unwillingness to invest the effort and time required to tame that mullah. Abandoned and let loose by the "shurafa" that once were able to tame the mullah, and to speak his language, the mullah's new master--the comfort of Land Cruisers and bottled water--has no scruples.

In the long run, Pakistan cannot be saved until Pakistan's Muslims take back the mosque. This is not a call to start performing qawwalis in mosques. The faux religiosity of hashish-smoking rock-and-rollers pretending to be holier than thou is as much of a scam as the faux religiosity of mullahs insisting that they are the gatekeepers of Paradise. You cannot win the culture wars against orthodoxy with pseudo-Sufism, any more than the Dixie Chicks can win the culture wars against Mike Huckabee and the righteous American right. You can however beat the orthodoxy with the language of faith. There is, quite simply, no basis in Sharia for any of the violence that has been spawned, financed and executed by the monsters that the world's best intelligence agencies--whatever country they may be from--helped incubate. To expect those same agencies to somehow know how to conquer a monster to which they are beholden is ridiculous.

But how are Pakistan's Muslims supposed to take back the mosque when they are scared of going to them? This is the twisted core objective of the terrorists, to completely monopolise religion, and to use that space to pursue their real agenda. And what is their real agenda?

Watching video of Sufi Mohammed make his way from Swat to Peshawar in a jeep marked with the number plate "TSNM - 1" was instructive. The spectacle was only marginally comical. It provided the strangest of insights into Pakistan. The TSNM just wants the piece of pie that it has watched young ACs, DCs, DCOs, SSPs, MNAs, MPAs, DPOs and, yes, even NGOs enjoy to the fullest. It wants the full fruits of state protocol. It wants the flashing lights at the head of the convoy. It wants that the road should clear and traffic should split, in a manner reminiscent of the Prophet Moses parting the River Nile by the grace and kind mercy of the Good Lord. The TSMN just wants the same goodies that the Brahmin bureaucrats, cops and politicians have enjoyed from the comfort of their air-conditioned offices and cars for a long, long time. So we should really call what has happened in Swat, for what it really is. It's the Brahminsation of the shudra mullah. And that explains the outrage of the wannabe-elite bureaucrats at Pakistan's deteriorating security situation. At its heart beats insecurity. The shudras are trying to take away their black Corollas, their multiple mobile phones, and their vast caches of cash, lying at the bottom of the rent-seeking pyramid.

How do these merchants of fear and slaughter earn the legitimacy to demand and win such concessions, both from the people and from the state?

Largely on the back of the illegitimacy of those that have been enjoying state privilege and protocol. It does not take a genius for a local mullah to point the finger and demonise a twenty-something assistant commissioner, who is more enamoured by his Blackberry than the problems his "subjects" face, never attends the mosque, except Fridays, and is so genuinely sure of himself that he can't look the common folk in the eye. It does not take much to delegitimise an MPA whose road scheme only benefits the village he is from, and the farmland that belongs to his father. It does not take much to delegitimise a police official who is seen to be corrupt and in cahoots with troublesome patwaris. The rot at the bottom is gently and carefully nurtured by the top of the local administrative structures in this country.

Local administration is in fact a great example of the myopia that plagues Pakistan's bureaucrats. The real battle over decentralisation, tragically, is that retired one-time DCs and commissioners are so enamoured with their lifetimes of administrative failure that they want their heirs (both genetic and cadre-based) to retain magistracy powers. It is an unmitigated disgrace that crusty old retired bureaucrats somehow burrow their way into the right ear of political leaders to pursue the narrowest of personal agendas.

The separation of magisterial powers from the administrative functions of the district coordination officer (DCO) is a cause of searing pain for the District Management Group (DMG). It is the one thing Gen Musharraf did that was truly intolerable for the DMG and their predecessor CSP cadres. The General's demolition job on the Constitution does not bother a strapping young DMG lad as much as the taking away of judicial powers that were once vested in the twenty-something boy. This self-centred ethos of the Pakistani civil service, personified by the DMG, but shared across all occupational groups, is ripping the heart out of the state's capacity to deal with the demonic attacks on this country's people, such as the one in Lahore yesterday.

This is not to suggest that the bureaucracy is in any way not capable of doing its job. Quite the contrary, in fact. Even after the 1974 Bhutto reforms and their devastating effects on the perception of the civil services as a viable career option for Pakistan's best and brightest young people, civil servants tend to be tremendously resourceful individuals. Indeed, at the individual level, it is usually hard to find really mediocre people occupying really important civil-service positions. And perhaps that's just the problem. A Darwinian process of elimination pushes the best people to the top, or it flushes the best people right out of the system. Out of the system, trained civil servants end up serving the narrow interests of whichever donor is willing to pay them the most money. Within the system, the best civil servants spend 20 hours a day serving the strange and sometimes sordid needs of political masters who don't deserve to sit at the same table as some of their officers, to say nothing of ordering them around. By the time a capable, gold-plated, honest civil servant gets to a position where he can make a real difference, fatigue, cynicism and the competition for good officers between provinces, departments, ministries and the donors conspire to render them useful only in the narrow realm of administrative efficiency.

As bad as Pakistan's bureaucracy has behaved over the years, the irony is that it is the last line of defence for this country. If the terrorists are able to demoralise, demonise and destabilise the civil service backbone of this country, there will be little but the courage of ordinary citizens standing in the way of the Taliban. While the Taliban will be devastated at discovering just how much the Pakistani people possess of that elusive thing we call courage, we should expect more of our political leaders and their leveraging of civil servants.

President Asif Ali Zardari has once again fallen for his advisers' flights of fancy, proposing an 80,000-strong national force to counter terrorism. This is a divergent tactic that must stop. Pakistan doesn't need new structures. It needs the strengthening of structures that exist. There are, after all, capable and honest officers out there, from Azam Suleman Khan, to Tariq Khosa, to Suleman Ghani, to Fazalur Rehman, to Kaleem Imam. It is unbelievable that there aren't more of the same kind of civil servants out there. There are. Politicians need to stop playing games and start finding and investing in these officers. Time is running out.


The writer is an independent political economist www.mosharrafzaidi.com

Tuesday, March 31, 2009 (The News)
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Mosharraf Zaidi: The never-ending march

In September last year, I wrote that the heroic nature of the chief justice's courage, and the lawyers' movement that it spawned could only be transformational if it inspired political action that was rooted in the same principles, and blessed with the same righteous spine as the movement itself.

Some will mistake the Nawaz League and the Imran Khan League (not to mention the sad and fading Jamaat-e-Islami) as having been the core of such political action. Others will make the even greater mistake of associating the heart of the movement that has ostensibly met with success as being a victory of Pakistan's opposition political parties.

The truth is that the political parties, whether it was the PPP and the ANP in 2007, or the PML-N and the Great Khan's Tehreek-e-Insaf in 2009 were leveraging a people's movement that was at its core and its periphery a product of the single most impressive and successful social mobilisation effort in Pakistan's history.

The primary reason the lawyers' movement has met with success in its quest to reinstate the chief justice is that the movement was in the right, it had an infinite supply of moral capital. The movement's moral superiority was too much to resist. Even the pathetic and cancerous cynicism of the PPP extremists who last week were suggesting that the lawyers' movement was a right-wing conspiracy, never laid a finger on the morality of the movement. Many have unkind things to say about the chief justice's person, but nobody ever argued that he did not deserve to be the chief justice. His sacking was a moral wrong, and it was a wrong that violated not only the constitution, or Ali Ahmed Kurd's sensibilities, it was a wrong that violated this nation so utterly and so brazenly that it created a wildfire of public opinion that was favourable to the reinstatement of Chaudhry Iftikhar as the chief justice -- all other factors notwithstanding.

Purists will be outraged, but it is probably true, that for all its momentum, its moral uprightness, its discipline and its peaceful nature, the movement has benefitted from the endorsement of the Sharif family. Pakistan's only real political dynasty after the assassination of Shaheed Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto invested itself heavily in the movement, and both the movement and the family have benefitted to varying degrees. So too have the otherwise politically irrelevant Jamaat -- adding a hint of aggression wherever they were present in the long march, and demonstrating how truly out of touch the middle class right wing in this country really is.

The political action that will enable the movement to be truly transformational however is not the kind that the current political spectrum is capable of producing. That kind of political action will only be undertaken by the young men and women who poured million of rupees in unearned High Court fees into the movement, poured millions of man-hours planning and arranging the long march, poured their hearts, minds, souls and bodies into the single-point agenda of restoring the chief justice. Those young men and women -- lawyers, students, and activists -- are un-invested in Pakistani politics and therefore, strangely apolitical. Pakistan's transformation into a country where the high morals of a courageous and heroic chief justice leads to a court, prosecution and police system that protects the weak and punishes the guilty depends on political action by these young men and women.

As a social, economic and political collective, this cohort of young men and women, represents the new Pakistan. They are urban, educated, sophisticated, principled and at their core, middle class. Their distance from mainstream politics is not a sign of their disability to engage with realpolitik, but in fact a symbol of their rejection of politics that is motivated by patronage, depends on family, and exploits ethnicity and religion in the worst ways possible. This is the Pakistani You Tube generation, and they are fundamentally incapable of "becoming like them" -- which is why they will stay out of politics. And this will be death for the higher goals and aspirations of the movement.

One of the principal motivating factors for many young people to join the movement was the simple premise that if the highest judge in the land can be summarily thrown out of his office, manhandled by the police, incarcerated in his home and be slime-balled by the PML-Q's image goons, then forget the little people, the villagers, the fishermen, and farmers -- even the BMW and Blackberry crowd is not safe. Indeed nobody is.

This law-of-jungle aura surrounding the chief's dismissal was a warning for Pakistan to awaken from its slumber and to stand up and say: "No you can't". By the morning of March 16, outside the chief justice's house, left was marching with right, right was dancing with left, and the soft chewy centre of Pakistan was awash in the feeling that their country is not entirely without a pulse. That the realm of the possible in this country is as wide, wild and wonderful as anywhere else, and that there is some reward for moral uprightness here.

That feeling is priceless in a country that is still overrun by security, economic, social and political problems. None of its problems are small. Each one is existential and each one requires an intergenerational effort. There is ultimately only one kind of politician that can resolve these challenges. It is the kind of politician that exists on the periphery of the PPP and the PML-N -- like Sherry Rehman (a lot more heroic now than ever before) who finally demonstrated who she really was with her resignation -- an act of unprecedented moral clarity and coherence, and like Ahsan Iqbal, who demonstrates every time he speaks, that this country is perfectly capable of producing articulate and believable spokespersons.

But Sherry and Ahsan -- God bless them both -- are not going to overhaul their respective political parties. The next major leader in the PPP will not be someone with a mind and tongue as golden as Ms Rehman's. It will be a Bhutto. The next major leader in the PML-N will not be someone with an Ivy League degree, and an aura of mard-e-momin, it will be someone with the last name Sharif.

Which is why Pakistan's young lawyers, students and activists have a responsibility to keep walking on, and on, and on, and on. And at some point during this longest of marches, each one of them will have to engage politically with this country in a uniquely moral way -- never compromising on principles, never giving in to illegitimate authority, and always speaking truth to each other and to power. When they do engage, they will find a lot of heartbreak and very little joy. On average, 53 in 60 of them will be co-opted by the irresistible pull of the state and the pomp and circumstance it rewards to those that choose to "dance".

They will find that the project of transforming Pakistan is a long and thankless job, where even the chief justice will make critical mistakes (like ordering the Election Commission to merge its clean voters' list with the 2002 list). They will find that the American government just doesn't get it, as Richard Holbrooke demonstrated so vividly on Pakistan's Subh-e-Nau, by praising President Zardari's 'statesmanship'. They will find that reforming the justice sector beyond new buildings for courts and cars for judges requires decades of intense nitpicking and technical excellence. Most of all they will find that victories are few, and far apart, and will often be stolen right from under their noses. And that fighting back for them is a moral responsibility not to be shirked.

But the Pakistani elite should make no mistake, and Pakistan's British and American friends, both knee-deep in Pakistan's problems, should stop making mistakes. There is a new, uncompromising, and un-purchasable player on the scene. It will take months, if not years, to mature fully. But this player has begun its long and never-ending march to rebuilding the dysfunctional Pakistani state. And it all began when an ordinary judge showed extraordinary courage, and said: "No you can't". (The News,
Tuesday, March 17, 2009).

The writer is an independent political economist.

www.mosharrafzaidi.com
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Asinine and anodyne in '09?: The industry of conspiracy theory in Pakistan

Asinine and anodyne in '09?
Wednesday, December 31, 2008
Mosharraf Zaidi

The writer is an independent political economist

One measure of character is the ability to take responsibility for one's own fate and actions. No matter how many detractors and enemies may exist, any human enterprise--a business, an idea, or a country--must be able to ward off adversity in order to survive and thrive. A linear approach to problem solving, in short, is a useful tool to have. This is why the propensity of Pakistanis to explain their country's failures through conspiracy theories, and the propensity of Pakistan's friends to do the same is the most alarming of indicators.

Traditionally, the conspiracy theory of choice, for all calamities, is RAW. Whenever the US is providing vast sums of aid and assistance to the country, RAW is joined in its infamy in Pakistan, by the CIA. Where there is smoke, there is a cigarette, and so for every mention of the CIA, a generous dollop of Mossad references is also necessary. Like maple syrup over a pancake, British MI6 too is all over Pakistan. Since 1998 there is no doubt what the grand prize in the little game is: Pakistan's gold-plated, diamond-encrusted bling-bling nukes. What were they after before 1998? Since Pakistan didn't have nukes, one possibility may be that they were after our women. Whatever they were after, they've always been hard at work trying to contaminate the Land of the Pure.

In the last few years, traditional conspiracy theories to explain away the Pakistani state's difficulties are now supported by a spectrum of new ones. Pakistanis have now discovered that in fact its not only RAW, CIA, Mossad or MI6 that are trying to destroy Pakistan from within. It is also the ISI--even if inadvertently. Good or bad, whatever happens in Pakistan can now be traced to a heat-seeking ISI agent. It is they who are behind everything in Pakistan. Every politician is owned by them, every bureaucrat works for them. Every fancy license plate is a product of ISI largesse. Every profit-turning business is a beneficiary of a contract for phantom goods and services. Every mullah donates money, every burqa sold contributes revenue. New mosques are built by the ISI, but so are new malls, new parking lots and new soda fountains. Left to the right, north or south, up or down the ISI seems to have joined the ranks of RAW and CIA as the owners of the remote control that manages Pakistan's central nervous system, its skeleton, its muscles, its very heart and soul.

So on we go, on this merry-go-round of a national obsession with passing the buck to the invisible hand of seemingly divine structures. Cleanliness may be next to godliness, but who needs a shower and soap, when you have intelligence agencies? In 2009, it seems that spying is the new Lux. Spy work is next to godliness. Omni-potent gangs of secretive evil geniuses plotting the demise of all things Pakistan. The line begins in Langley, Virginia and ends at ISI headquarters in Islamabad.

If you are progressive and liberal, the ISI has ruined Pakistan's E Street drive to development and secularism. The ISI-Taliban-LeT nexus has driven nine-inch-nails into the Quaid's secular dream. If you tilt more to the right, the RAW-CIA-Mossad-MI6 quadrant has destroyed Pakistan's drive to keep the dream of the ummah alive. The kaafirs are plotting to derail Pakistan from the siraat-e-mustaqeem trail.

Conspiracy theories that blame intelligence agencies (local or foreign) for the breathtaking and oft-unbelievable life and times of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan exist because of intellectual laziness. It is easier to weave stories where the dots don't all connect, than it is to painstakingly make the linear connections required to understand a fascinating, resilient, creative, but deeply dysfunctional state. Audiences at home and abroad are more easily and cheaply titillated by a narrative that involves cloaks and daggers than they would be by new institutional economics, identity politics and random walks.

The habitual blaming of American and Israeli organizations for cancers that are deeply ensconced within the body politic and society of Muslims is not endemic just to Pakistan, but in fact to the global Muslim community. It is a tired and pathetic tactic, and it fails to conceal the deep crises of faith, gender, literacy and integrity that plague the Muslim experience all over the world.

Intelligence agencies exist to operate in secrecy. Contrary to their protestations, they almost surely behave outside the law at times. But the overwhelming evidence in Pakistan suggests that intelligence agencies--foreign or national--can only have made a marginal contribution to the rot.

For example, in the 2008 election, it surely could not have been an intelligence agency that forced the Election Commission of Pakistan to use the discredited 2002 voters' list. No intelligence agency stopped government from investing in power plants and the energy sector. It is not any intelligence agency that is stopping Pakistan from addressing climate change. Spy masters from India did not initiate the practise of establishing ghost schools, nor of hiring political pets as primary school teachers. The CIA is not stopping the federal government from reforming the BPS system of grading in government. Nor did Mossad force the Punjab or NWFP to dispense with the DCO system without conducting a credible analysis of the costs and benefits of a return to the colonial commissioner system. The MI6 does not kill mothers during childbirth, and the ISI does not cause gastrointestinal epidemics because of contaminated water. Spies aren't the ones that let the Securities and Exchange Commission slip from capable hands in 2004 to a revolving door of leadership ever since. No intelligence agency will be responsible for letting the current State Bank governor leave without any attempt to retain her, and no intelligence agency will be responsible when an incompetent sycophant is named to replace her.

Of course, the spies have been central to the conduct of overt and proxy wars in the South Asian region for donkey's years. That's what they do. They should certainly be scrutinized and held to account for their behaviour. Pakistanis however need to take enormous care in dumping their entire load of dirty laundry onto RAW, or the CIA, or Mossad, or MI6, or even the ISI.

There would never have been any possibility of Lashkar-e Taiba-training camps in Pakistan if the country enjoyed a 100 per cent literacy and school enrolment rate. There would be no recruitment pool for the Taliban if the economy generated enough jobs for the willing and able. Friday sermons would not be a source of fear and loathing across the country if Islam was treated with the respect any faith deserves, rather than as a political football for mullahs and heretics to kick around for personal and interest group gain. There would be no link between Pakistani citizens and domestic problems in the UK or India if Pakistani public policy reflected even a nominal degree of sensitivity to the ethos and aspirations of all of its citizens. And no RAW, CIA, Mossad, MI6 or ISI agent would represent a threat to Pakistan if Pakistan didn't represent such a major threat to itself. In 2009, Pakistan must dump the asinine and the anodyne. Ordinary Pakistanis must take responsibility to build an ordinary and functional Pakistan. (The News)

www.mosharrafzaidi.com

Also read:

Munir Attaullah: Conspiracy. Will anyone tell me who these terrorists are?

"RAW Totay": The conspiracy theory parrots. The supporters of Sipah-e-Sahaba and Taliban remember Lal Masjid and shed crocodile tears....

Everyone at fault, except us. Why is it that everything that goes against us becomes a conspiracy?

International conspiracies against Pakistan - an eye opener for conspiracy theorists

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Urdu ka janazah hay zara dhoom se nikle... By Mosharraf Zaidi

Urdu kay aakhree lamhay

Tuesday, December 23, 2008 Mosharraf Zaidi The glorious tales of wit, spirituality and love from Urdu's golden age are sometimes so heavily infused with South Asian Latin (better known as Persian) that my generation of English-as-a-first-language Pakistanis are completely out of our depth when Grandpa or old-school uncles are in their element. Urdu has been sliding out of the national consciousness for so long now, that attempts to resuscitate it are perhaps too little, too late. After all, if this is what we wanted to do with Urdu, why did we treat the brothers from the Bay of Bengal with such unadulterated wrath when they asked the simple question, "Can we please conduct business in a language we are comfortable with?" Back in the day, everyone from the Quaid to the UP and Punjab nawaabs were deeply committed to ensuring national unity, even if it meant pursuing a linguistic apartheid. This passion for Urdu, more than anything else, ended any chance of a successful union of the two grand wings of South Asian Islam's political mainstreams. Stanley Wolpert quotes the Great Leader as having once said something to the effect that Urdu is Pakistan's national language, and anyone who felt or thought otherwise was an enemy of the state. So that was that for East Pakistan, the intellectual jewel of the South Asian Muslim experience. The residual post-1971 Pakistan not only lost that jewel, it clearly also lost its lust for Urdu. It is nearly 40 years since the legitimate aspirations of Bangla-speaking Pakistanis were achieved through the independence of Bangladesh. It made sense to assume that the birth of Bangladesh should have been the beginning of the golden age of Urdu. What has happened to Urdu instead is a gut wrenchingly tragic story that will end in the ultimate death of the language. Three symptoms are particularly worrying for Urdu. The first has to do with the increasing invisibility of Urdu in symbols and instruments of the state. The second is the emergence of Roman Urdu. The third is the absence of a standardized and widely adhered to natural Urdu script. Starting with the formulation of laws in the country, to the oath taken by the president of the country, to the rather disturbing unconfirmed rumour about a judge insisting that all citizens appearing in his courtroom need to speak English--Urdu is increasingly invisible in matters of the state. The range of its invisibility is both at times gravely depressing and at times, just downright hilarious. When Islamabad's Capital Development Authority (CDA), the bureaucratic dictatorship that runs the capital, installed shiny new bus shelters all across the city this summer, it did so in some cases at locations where a bus or van has never been, and will never be. The real rub however was the signs on the blank advertisement spaces on the bus shelters. The exact words were, "Use this Bus Shelter. PLEASE DON'T ABUSE IT!" It does not take the intelligence of Dr Abdus Salam to unscientifically conclude that an overwhelming majority of Islamabad's patrons of public transport may not be able to digest the catchy and sophisticated English-language message. The absence of Urdu is not always funny however. When President Asif Ali Zardari took his oath of office with President Hamid Karzai in attendance, the contrast between a nation with a coherent identity and one without it could not have been clearer. The president of a country of 172 million took his oath in English, a language that (conservatively) more than 100 million of his citizens can neither speak, nor read, nor understand. Afghanistan has many, many problems--but one problem it does not have is linguistic confusion. Afghans speak Dari and Pashto without shame, and for the most part with much pride. We can tell that the slide of Urdu has reached epic proportions when the distribution of state patronage through politicians and their families begins to be disbursed in standardized templates that are in English. The recent cyber-hullabaloo about a letter from the prime minister's sister asking government officials to treat people's request favourably is an overblown reaction to one of the building blocks of "real" Pakistan--patronage, or "sifarish". There is nothing scandalous about this. The scandal is that the infamous letter of "sifarish" letter is in English, and in utterly poor English at that. The irony could not be deeper. Here is a letter bearer (spelt "barer" in the actual template) who clearly does not know the English language. The letter he "bares" has been typed by a person who is clearly not comfortable typing the English language. The letter has been endorsed by someone to whom English is not natural or native. Most importantly, the letter is addressed to an employee of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (the same republic that was torn asunder to retain the supreme status of Urdu as the national language). And of course, the person it is addressed to is most likely also less than comfortable with the English language. If this letter of "sifarish" had instead been delivered through a phone call, the conversation would most certainly have been in Urdu. Yet it is clear why the letter was in English--a langree, loolee English, at that. For a high-ranking public official to send someone a letter in Urdu would have made the "barer", the sender, and the recipient all feel like they were part of something way below the level of a Prime Minister. This brings us to the second major sign of Urdu's imminent death, the emergence of Roman Urdu. From the perspective of the English-as-a-first-language crowd, this has been a brilliant way to conceal the inadequacy of our Persian-script writing abilities. Most importantly, the takeover of Pakistan's multinationals by the yuppie, English-as-a-first-language types allowed this slender minority to infuse the popular culture with a virtually new language where it could plug the gap between its own incompetence in the Urdu language, and the majority of Pakistanis who are equally incompetent in the English language. The imprint of this strange nexus between the burger minority and the bun kabab and daal roti majority is most visible in the fake American accents splattered all over the electronic media. The most painful element of Roman Urdu is how Roman Urdu is spoken. Its pronunciation is a tragicomedy: perfectly local boys and girls raised by hard working, decent Pakistani parents have decided all of a sudden to forget to roll their R's, and inexplicably elongate their vowels. Since it is the 21st century, it is only appropriate that underpinning the cultural avalanche that is killing the Urdu language, is the third major symptom of Urdu's imminent death: technology. Despite valiant individual efforts from stalwarts like Dr Sarmad Hussain of the Centre for Research in Urdu Language Processing, and Dr Attash Durrani, of the Centre for Excellence for Urdu Informatics, there is no single agreed-on standard for the use of a natural Urdu script in information and communication technologies. Several agreements have taken place in meetings since 2000--when this problem emerged as a major challenge. But such meetings and agreements have never resulted in a widely used or standardized script. The greatest proof is always in the pudding. The Jang and Nawai Waqt websites both use image files, rather than normal script to post their Urdu content on the Web. Websites that use Urdu script, such as the BBC Urdu site (itself a reality that is dripping with irony), and others like Google's Urdu page, and the Iqbal Academy's website use an unnatural script that looks more like Arabic. The natural Urdu script (that Jang uses for example) is called Nastaliq--and in 2008, there is still no standardized and widely used Nastaliq script. Urdu is not important because it is a unifier. History has taught us that in fact Urdu may not be much of a unifier at all, but it is a functional least common denominator. In a country of 172 million that desperately needs common denomination (and functionality), that's important. There are less women, minorities, children or the disabled in Pakistan than there are citizens who cannot read, write or speak English. The tangible truth is that language is the greatest instrument of social exclusion in Pakistan. There can be no democracy in Pakistan without the rescue of the Urdu language, beginning with its patronization by symbols and instruments of the state. (The News) The writer enjoys the resplendence of irony entailed in a call to save Urdu, in English. He can be reached through his website at www.mosharrafzaidi.com

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