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Never let the facts get in the way of a good debate. That pretty much sums up the approach to the Kerry-Lugar/Berman bill, officially, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, now approved by Congress.
How angry are some of the critics? Very angry; frothing-at-the-mouth angry. A PPP government has once again sold the country, its sovereignty, its very soul to the Yanks. And going by some of the wildest claims, there doesn’t seem to be a shortage of patriots lining up to water the tree of liberty here with their blood. Pakistan will be saved. The conspiracy to destroy us will be defeated.
Right. About the facts. What appears to have sent the bill’s Pakistani opponents into convulsions is this: Sec 203: limitations on certain assistance. Specifically, paragraph (c) of sec 203, entitled ‘certification,’ which lists three subjects the secretary of state has to certify to Congress that Pakistan is cooperating on, committed to and eschewing from.
I’ll get to those conditions in a bit, but first the pesky fact that the ‘nattering nabobs of negativism’ here have missed. (Tip of the hat to William Safire, The New York Times man who passed away this week and who probably had little clue that his brilliance was being lapped up in faraway Pakistan.)
The certification limitation applies to two things: security-related assistance and major defence transfers, both defined in sec 2, ‘definitions,’ if anyone is interested. The certification does not apply to the democratic, economic and development assistance.
So Pakistanis are supposed to be angry that the Americans have put conditions on selling guns to Pakistan, but not on democratic, economic and development assistance? Of course not. Which is why the chest-thumping uber-nationalists here have ignored the point and pretended that the conditions are applicable to the full amount of the aid. Remember, never let the facts get in the way of a good debate.
Now, to the other side, Pakistani and American officials, also prone to exaggerating the effect of the bill. We may be entering a ‘new phase’ in relations between the US and Pakistan with the passage of the bill, but the paeans to ‘fundamental change’ sung particularly by Pakistani officials don’t jibe with reality.
Pakistan is a tactical ally of the US, not a strategic partner; that has been the reality since 9/11 and that continues to be the reality even after the passage of the Enhanced Partnership Act.
The language of the bill tells its own story. From sec 3: findings: ‘(1) The people of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the United States share a long history of friendship and comity, and the interests of both nations are well-served by strengthening and deepening this friendship’ (emphasis added). And from the same section: ‘(4) Pakistan is a major non-Nato ally of the United States and has been a valuable partner in the battle against al Qaeda and the Taliban, but much more remains to be accomplished by both nations’ (emphasis added). Hardly stirring stuff.
Next, the limitations on security-related assistance and arms transfers. First, the secretary of state must certify that ‘the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks.’
Yes, the earlier direct reference to A.Q. Khan has been deleted and semantically it could be argued that he is any case no longer ‘associated’ with nuclear proliferation networks. But that isn’t the point. The point is that the language reveals once again the true nature of Pak-US relations: we are a tactical ally, not a strategic partner.
To get an idea of the language Congress uses for strategic partners, consider the certification requirement in the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act passed by the previous Congress: ‘the President shall certify to Congress that entry into force and implementation of the Agreement … (does not in any way) assist, encourage, or induce India to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.’
Yes, the bill stipulates that legal requirements of the Henry J. Hyde Act of 2006 and Atomic Energy Act of 1954 are not overridden and the Hyde Act places additional requirements on India that the US president must certify, but those do not imply that India is involved in nuclear weapons proliferation, which the Kerry-Lugar/Berman bill does. The difference isn’t something to be sneezed at. We are and are set to remain a tactical ally, not a strategic partner, of the US.
The second condition applies to Pakistan’s ‘sustained commitment to … and significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups.’ Again, in broad strokes the condition is not very controversial because it is in line with Pakistan’s publicly declared policy against militancy.
But here’s the rub: the details contain implicit references to India. After specifically requiring that Pakistan move towards ceasing support for any groups that launch attacks against US or coalition forces inside Afghanistan, the condition also mentions ‘the territory or people of neighbouring countries.’ Then it goes on to refer to the Lashkar-i-Taiba, its headquarters in Muridke and the Jaish-i-Mohammad. Connecting the dots isn’t very difficult.
Frankly, the conditions themselves are arguably what the state should be doing in any case; we need to be rid of the curse of militancy and we need to do it for our own good. But in the present context, it matters who is asking us to do it and why.
From a hard-nosed, realpolitik perspective — and you cannot ignore that in statecraft — the references amount to Indian security concerns inserting themselves into an American bill meant to provide democratic, economic and development assistance to Pakistan.
So even if you ignore, and you should, the most outrageous bile of the bill’s critics, the more subtle point is reinforced: we remain a tactical ally of the US, not a strategic partner.
Going forward, what that really calls for is a serious, measured, thoughtful debate about our approach to the US specifically and our grand, national security and national military strategies generally. But don’t bet on that happening. Remember, we don’t let the facts get in the way of a good debate.
cyril.a@gmail.com (Dawn)
The current debate in the electronic and print media on the 1992 security operation, first in rural Sindh and the then in Karachi, is not a non-partisan, fact-based study. The debate is highly polemical and divisive, which could undermine interactions among the political parties
