Tuesday, November 25, 2008
Khalid Aziz
What was projected to occur within the next few weeks in my last article has come to pass already; the drones for the first time attacked a target inside the district of Bannu and there are reports of more flights now over Kohat. Soon Robocop (as I call the drones) will be seen over Jamrud in Khyber Agency and Peshawar. The war is entering the Pakistani mainland with bewildering speed. The Pakistani leadership has been so deluged with constant bad news that it has become somnolent, instead of dealing with the situation with alertness.
Both Ahmed Rashid and Barnett R Rubin think that the US is trying to pressure Pakistan to change its policies. Is the new pattern of drone attacks yet another move to shift Pakistan's policy into some other direction? Secondly, experts on counter-insurgency claim that without legitimacy the war against the militancy cannot be won. In this context the drone attacks by the US challenge Pakistan's authority to deal with its own people and thus damages its image. Thirdly, and more seriously, the drone attacks shift the tactical centre of gravity of security operations into the districts. Once this happens it will attract the insurgents into the districts and open new fronts; the military will have to be pulled back from FATA to deal with the problem. In a very Dr Strangelove sense it will lead to the withdrawal of troops from the tribal areas, confirming the statement by Ahmed Rashid and Rubin that "Many in Pakistan believe that (Washington) has deceived (Islamabad) into conniving with it to bring about (Pakistan's) own destruction…" However, to my mind this is not the case; there is a simpler explanation.
The Bush administration has never reviewed its goals in Pakistan and Afghanistan since the November 2001 operations in Afghanistan. Thus, it has been following separate policies in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and there is a lack of policy convergence. Furthermore, I think that the US policy as seen in Pakistan shows that it is based more on anti-terrorism than a counter-insurgency approach. Anti-terrorism places reliance upon military action and depends on force, while counter-insurgency provides a larger framework and is aimed at winning the population though different means. The drones are the foremost weapon in the arsenal of anti-terrorism and thus cannot help win an insurgency war.
However, as pointed out earlier, the US wants a shift in Pakistan's policy which is to stop it from helping the Taliban in Balochistan, an accusation which appears with frequent regularity in the literature printed by US think tanks. This is a difficult shift and one which is linked to finding a regional solution for addressing Pakistan's security concerns with India. As long as Pakistan continues to fear an Indian encirclement through Afghanistan, it will continue to maintain some form of links to the Taliban. In a manner, Pakistan is buying insurance. Thus, it will not be possible to achieve peace and stabilisation in Afghanistan unless the Pakistan-India dispute on Kashmir is out of the way. Furthermore, the growing friendship between the US and India creates further suspicion against the real US design in Pakistan.
Every four years the Asia Foundation, an independent international think tank, publishes a set of recommendations for the incoming US administration. In its 2008 publication regarding "America's Role in Asia," it has offered some thoughtful recommendations, many of which deserve consideration by policymakers in the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan. I discuss here one of these.
According to it, if the US wishes to solve the problems facing it, it must engage the Pushtun people who number about 42 million. There are about 27 million living in Pakistan and about 15 million in Afghanistan. Without cooperation of the Pushtun tribes, it concludes, the US will not have peace. Secondly, most US anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan are in Pushtun areas. The drone attacks create more Pushtun enemies because of the collateral deaths. Unless the US wins the friendship of these people there will never be complete peace. Furthermore, the Pushtuns have integrated into the trans-national Al Qaeda network and have thus become a formidable mass of warriors who follow a religious flag of convenience.
Many Pushtun intellectuals believe, wrongly, I think, that the Pushtun has been a peaceful rustic who has been transformed into a fighting machine by the Afghan jihad. They fail to understand the basic cultural and religious drivers within Pushtun society. The US has no problems with the Tajik or Uzbek or other ethnic groups inside Afghanistan. However, with the Pushtuns the US faces a unique cultural difficulty. The problem is that the Pushtun is prone to religious extremism and readily accepts membership into millenarian movements to resist reform of a centralising state which externalises Pushtun governance and politics; he cannot live with the transfer of his management to a larger entity like a modernising state. This is because he fears that his social conduct, "Pushtunwali," will be endangered and he will lose his identity. For a Pushtun, whether he is supporting Mulla Umar in Afghanistan, Fazalullah in Swat, Maulvi Faqir in Bajaur or Baithullah in Waziristan – he is fighting a war to preserve his identity.
On the other hand, the US believes deeply in civic values of freedom and democracy almost like religion; to the US, Pushtun resistance doesn't make sense! However, this Gordian knot of social misunderstanding between America and the Pushtun cannot be cut by drone attacks or "kinetic operations" alone. A fundamental shift of approach is needed which is based on befriending the Pushtun. The killing of Pashtuns must stop. If one examines history there have been many Pushtun revolts in the past and they have arisen when the Pushtun felt that his identity was under attack – and whenever that happened he has looked for a religious leader to lead him because his own social setup is so affected by jealousies that he would not follow a secular leader who might rule him tomorrow.
Therefore, the US must forge a policy which focuses on strengthening the Pushtun social structure. However, while doing so the US must realise how deeply the Pushtun issue divides both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In an effort to prevent Pushtun ethnic nationalism from undermining the Pakistani state, US leaders have promoted religious radicalism in the tribal areas. On the other hand, US interest lies in reducing the support of the Pushtuns for religious extremism reflected in the presence of Al Qaeda safe havens in FATA. It is thus clear that the interests of the US and Pakistan will not converge without a solution of the Durand Line issue with Afghanistan.
Three recommendations arise out of this discussion. Firstly, the US must adopt a counter-insurgency approach based on winning the friendship of the Pushtuns. Secondly, it must assist in the solution of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan and, thirdly, it should help in resolving the Durand Line dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The writer is a former chief secretary of NWFP and heads the Regional Institute of Policy Research. Email: azizkhalid@gmail.com (The News)
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Showing posts with label Khalid Aziz. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Khalid Aziz. Show all posts
Tuesday, 25 November 2008
Tuesday, 18 November 2008
Robocop meets Baitullah Mehsud. success will be achieved in Afghanistan if that country is managed as a tribal & traditional state - By Khalid Aziz.
Tuesday, November 18, 2008
During the past week or so, militants have carried out serious attacks in Peshawar and nearby Jamrud in Khyber agency. It included the unfortunate murder of development worker Stephen Vance, the kidnapping of an Iranian diplomat, a botched kidnapping of two journalists one of them Japanese, a suicide attack at the gates of the stadium where an inter-provincial sports competition was being held. There were other offences in the rural areas close to Peshawar. Clearly the militants aim to break the will of the government and force it to negotiate with them. They want to end operations which are going on in Bajaur and to stop new ones that have been launched in Mohmand Agency. The operation in Bajaur has been extended because the military has unexpectedly run up against resistance from well located tunnels reminiscent of Vietnam.
A serious attack was launched on a NATO convoy by a 400-strong Wazir and Mehsud contingent loyal to Baitullah Mehsud which was stationed at Jamrud. Last Sunday they hijacked 13 NATO trailers, although most were retrieved after the use of helicopter gunships. This force of militants belonging to South Waziristan is operating 270 miles away from its tribal homeland and indicates a level of sophistication which had not been seen before.
After the US failed to obtain Pakistan's support for the sending US Special Forces into the tribal areas, it has increased the use of UAVs for attacking militants. Many of the drone strikes are now taking place 30 miles deep into Pakistani territory. This brings a new set of worries. In a sense, what we are witnessing is a contest between technology and the ingenuity of the militants. The drone in many ways represents Robocop, who is a fictional character in a movie of the same name. He is a cyborg having the brain of a dead policeman implanted in his metal body, which incorporates a multitude of weapon systems. His programme is designed to fight crime and to achieve public trust, protect the innocent and uphold the law. In my analogy, the drone is Robocop pitted against the militants in the form of Baitullah Mehsud. In this sense the fighting in Pakistan and Afghanistan depicts a battle between a sophisticated military on one hand and the less sophisticated militant on the other. The US does have the advantage of technology, but the drones have not increased public trust. As a matter of fact, Pakistanis have condemned the drone attacks because they have killed many innocent people. Secondly, drones violate Pakistan's sovereignty and, as such, lowers its authority in the public mind.
As I said in an earlier article, the main reason leading to the creation of militants lie in the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Unless that issue is settled, there will be Arabs who would contest US hegemony and fuel the conflagration in this region. Apparently there is little chance of a reduction in the near future of the number of Arabs seeking refuge in the loosely administered FATA. The impact of the Robocop strategy is mainly negative. It weakens Pakistan's legitimacy and makes it harder to win the battle for hearts and minds. On the other hand, the militants damage their own cause when they use suicide bombings, which have the same alienating impact. Thus, both the strategies fail the legitimacy test that is so important for success.
However, a new danger is looming, and that is the increasing penetration of the drones into Pakistan. Since they follow militants fleeing the tribal areas because of increased US surveillance into NWFP districts, will the drones now also engage targets in the urban areas of the province? Will there be drone flights over Bannu or Peshawar too in the next few weeks? If so, they will have serious repercussions which may lead to agitations that could, in turn, destabilise the government. They could cause chaos and increase support for the militants. One must therefore define the limits to the use of drones and their other implications. This example clearly shows the type of difficulties that the war on terrorism has unleashed mainly I believe because of the inability to think through the implication of measures adopted to deal with the crisis in Pakistan.
Another important element taken for granted, and one which needs reconsideration, is the administration of Afghanistan as a democracy. Afghanistan remains an under-developed society where nationhood is not complete yet. In many ways we in Pakistan suffer from the same type of problems. Both countries are moving from a traditional political base towards modernity. Both face a large number of challenges. Pakistan's advantage lies in its more developed institutional framework, its greater urbanisation, larger technological base and its military; Afghanistan suffers deficits in all these areas. Secondly, Afghans have always tried to remain insular. Since the crowning of Ahmed Shah in 1747 as the first Afghan ruler and the country's progress towards modernity under Amir Abdur Rehman, the first king of modern Afghanistan, we find a constant tussle between a centralising "monarchy" and the tradition-driven countryside, especially in the Pakhtun areas that make up the largest ethnic group of people in Afghanistan. Clearly there is a need to recognise that Afghanistan is basically a tribal union where the conflict between tradition and modernity is unresolved even today. Karzai is seen by the Afghans as a foreign- supported moderniser while the Taliban are identified as nationalists standing for the traditional system. It must be underlined that many of the discontented Pakhtuns in FATA and Afghanistan are not willing to forego their freedom for peace or development.
Secondly, Afghanistan (much like Pakistan) has remained a rentier state where consent was obtained by transferring money to regional elites. For example, revolts occurred when King Amanullah tried to tax people and modernise the Afghan state. History teaches that Afghanistan needs rents to remain stable. In 1894 Amir Abdur Rehman received an annual subsidy of ?1.8 million from the British. This amount was given to prevent him from siding with the Russians. He used the money to strengthen his rule by building an effective army and collecting taxes. This trend of obtaining funds from foreign countries has continued throughout Afghan history. During Sardar Daud's rule before the Soviet invasion in December 1979, almost 80 percent of Afghanistan's funds came from the US and the USSR.
In view of the discussion above the following recommendations if implemented will improve the security situation. Firstly, the bands of outside tribesmen present in other Agencies must be forced to return. Secondly, Pakistan should perform the interdiction of foreigners itself, however difficult that may be. Otherwise the drones will destabilise this country. The US needs to formulate a Pakhtun policy since its actions cause region wide repercussions. Secondly, it should accept that success will be achieved in Afghanistan if that country is managed as a tribal and traditional state. (The News)
The writer is a former chief secretary of NWFP and heads the Regional Institute of Policy Research. Email: azizkhalid@gmail.com
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During the past week or so, militants have carried out serious attacks in Peshawar and nearby Jamrud in Khyber agency. It included the unfortunate murder of development worker Stephen Vance, the kidnapping of an Iranian diplomat, a botched kidnapping of two journalists one of them Japanese, a suicide attack at the gates of the stadium where an inter-provincial sports competition was being held. There were other offences in the rural areas close to Peshawar. Clearly the militants aim to break the will of the government and force it to negotiate with them. They want to end operations which are going on in Bajaur and to stop new ones that have been launched in Mohmand Agency. The operation in Bajaur has been extended because the military has unexpectedly run up against resistance from well located tunnels reminiscent of Vietnam.
A serious attack was launched on a NATO convoy by a 400-strong Wazir and Mehsud contingent loyal to Baitullah Mehsud which was stationed at Jamrud. Last Sunday they hijacked 13 NATO trailers, although most were retrieved after the use of helicopter gunships. This force of militants belonging to South Waziristan is operating 270 miles away from its tribal homeland and indicates a level of sophistication which had not been seen before.
After the US failed to obtain Pakistan's support for the sending US Special Forces into the tribal areas, it has increased the use of UAVs for attacking militants. Many of the drone strikes are now taking place 30 miles deep into Pakistani territory. This brings a new set of worries. In a sense, what we are witnessing is a contest between technology and the ingenuity of the militants. The drone in many ways represents Robocop, who is a fictional character in a movie of the same name. He is a cyborg having the brain of a dead policeman implanted in his metal body, which incorporates a multitude of weapon systems. His programme is designed to fight crime and to achieve public trust, protect the innocent and uphold the law. In my analogy, the drone is Robocop pitted against the militants in the form of Baitullah Mehsud. In this sense the fighting in Pakistan and Afghanistan depicts a battle between a sophisticated military on one hand and the less sophisticated militant on the other. The US does have the advantage of technology, but the drones have not increased public trust. As a matter of fact, Pakistanis have condemned the drone attacks because they have killed many innocent people. Secondly, drones violate Pakistan's sovereignty and, as such, lowers its authority in the public mind.
As I said in an earlier article, the main reason leading to the creation of militants lie in the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Unless that issue is settled, there will be Arabs who would contest US hegemony and fuel the conflagration in this region. Apparently there is little chance of a reduction in the near future of the number of Arabs seeking refuge in the loosely administered FATA. The impact of the Robocop strategy is mainly negative. It weakens Pakistan's legitimacy and makes it harder to win the battle for hearts and minds. On the other hand, the militants damage their own cause when they use suicide bombings, which have the same alienating impact. Thus, both the strategies fail the legitimacy test that is so important for success.
However, a new danger is looming, and that is the increasing penetration of the drones into Pakistan. Since they follow militants fleeing the tribal areas because of increased US surveillance into NWFP districts, will the drones now also engage targets in the urban areas of the province? Will there be drone flights over Bannu or Peshawar too in the next few weeks? If so, they will have serious repercussions which may lead to agitations that could, in turn, destabilise the government. They could cause chaos and increase support for the militants. One must therefore define the limits to the use of drones and their other implications. This example clearly shows the type of difficulties that the war on terrorism has unleashed mainly I believe because of the inability to think through the implication of measures adopted to deal with the crisis in Pakistan.
Another important element taken for granted, and one which needs reconsideration, is the administration of Afghanistan as a democracy. Afghanistan remains an under-developed society where nationhood is not complete yet. In many ways we in Pakistan suffer from the same type of problems. Both countries are moving from a traditional political base towards modernity. Both face a large number of challenges. Pakistan's advantage lies in its more developed institutional framework, its greater urbanisation, larger technological base and its military; Afghanistan suffers deficits in all these areas. Secondly, Afghans have always tried to remain insular. Since the crowning of Ahmed Shah in 1747 as the first Afghan ruler and the country's progress towards modernity under Amir Abdur Rehman, the first king of modern Afghanistan, we find a constant tussle between a centralising "monarchy" and the tradition-driven countryside, especially in the Pakhtun areas that make up the largest ethnic group of people in Afghanistan. Clearly there is a need to recognise that Afghanistan is basically a tribal union where the conflict between tradition and modernity is unresolved even today. Karzai is seen by the Afghans as a foreign- supported moderniser while the Taliban are identified as nationalists standing for the traditional system. It must be underlined that many of the discontented Pakhtuns in FATA and Afghanistan are not willing to forego their freedom for peace or development.
Secondly, Afghanistan (much like Pakistan) has remained a rentier state where consent was obtained by transferring money to regional elites. For example, revolts occurred when King Amanullah tried to tax people and modernise the Afghan state. History teaches that Afghanistan needs rents to remain stable. In 1894 Amir Abdur Rehman received an annual subsidy of ?1.8 million from the British. This amount was given to prevent him from siding with the Russians. He used the money to strengthen his rule by building an effective army and collecting taxes. This trend of obtaining funds from foreign countries has continued throughout Afghan history. During Sardar Daud's rule before the Soviet invasion in December 1979, almost 80 percent of Afghanistan's funds came from the US and the USSR.
In view of the discussion above the following recommendations if implemented will improve the security situation. Firstly, the bands of outside tribesmen present in other Agencies must be forced to return. Secondly, Pakistan should perform the interdiction of foreigners itself, however difficult that may be. Otherwise the drones will destabilise this country. The US needs to formulate a Pakhtun policy since its actions cause region wide repercussions. Secondly, it should accept that success will be achieved in Afghanistan if that country is managed as a tribal and traditional state. (The News)
The writer is a former chief secretary of NWFP and heads the Regional Institute of Policy Research. Email: azizkhalid@gmail.com
Read more...
Tuesday, 4 November 2008
Need for review of US anti-terror policy in Pakistan
Tuesday, November 04, 2008
Khalid Aziz
Since September there have been 19 missile attacks on suspected terrorists by the US, most of them in Waziristan. They have led to the deaths of some foreign fighters; at the same time they have killed numerous innocent persons. As a result there is a widening wave of revulsion against US policies and Pakistan's support for them.
We are living in a world where truth, rationality and logic are swept aside for the sake of expediency and temporary advantage. Michael Chertoff the powerful czar of US Homeland Security made a significant recommendation in London the other day. He pleaded for the sanctification of a new principle of international law involving the acceptance of the right to attack another country if it was "harbouring a potential terrorist threat." US defence secretary Robert Gates had commented a few days ago that the US would hold countries that permit sanctuary to terrorists fully accountable for actions. These two statements taken together mean that the US is formulating a doctrine that permits the launching of pre-emptive strike against non-state fighters living within the jurisdiction of another state. In the case of Pakistan this doctrine is already under implementation in FATA. Such a policy needs revision. It is counterproductive for both the US and Pakistan since it plays into the hands of the militants.
The doctrine of pre-emptive strike against another country which has declared its hostile intent to attack another is well known in the Middle Eastern context with regard to Egypt-Israeli conflicts of the past. Such a doctrine may make sense in inter-state relations where regular military forces keep a watch on one another. However, serious anomalies arise in its implementation when the doctrine of pre-emptive strike is cut-and-pasted into the poorly defined, amorphous world of non-state warriors and their organisations. A UAV strike may kill some terrorists, but is not a policy which "dries the pond that breeds the mosquitoes." Such attacks create ill will against the US and Pakistan; it weakens the response against terrorism in the long run.
After debating the war on terrorism the National Assembly passed a resolution on Oct 22 that condemned US UAV attacks on FATA as a violation of Pakistani sovereignty. On the other hand, the US argues that if Pakistani is unable to prevent the misuse of its territory by the militants who launch such attacks against their forces from Waziristan, the US is within its rights to take unilateral action for protecting itself. Such a stance has wider implications. For instance, although the US accuses Pakistan of not doing enough for the removal of terrorist safe havens, it overlooks two aspects about Waziristan. Firstly, this region has always remained a "soft" area which has not been actively administered. It thus allows non-state actors to congregate and challenge the state. This was frequently the case during British rule and has been so since then. Secondly Waziristan apparently has become a pen for corralling Arab terrorists and then eliminating them. Such a conclusion cannot be ignored if we examine the identities of those killed and understand some of the reasons which force these people to take the Waziristan trail.
Most UAV targets have been people who are the creation of political dissent within their own countries and became engaged in resistance due to repression. This is evident in the case of those killed, whether the militant was from Afghanistan, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Palestine, Pakistan, the Central Asian states or China. Most of those who have died have fallen on the wrong side of their respective governments and were subsequently recruited by terrorist organisations and trained as fighters to change the status quo. As Tariq Ali rightly points out, this situation generated new forces and leaders like Muqtada as-Sadr, Ismail Haniya, Hassan Nasrallah or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who organise their people in Baghdad, Gaza, Jenin, Beirut, Sidon and Tehran and I would add Waziristan. The Americans, on the other hand, support the existing order and become associated with repression, and this makes the US a target for the terrorists. Apparently the main reason for generating a demand for safe havens in Waziristan would lie not in Pakistan but within the dynamics of the implementation of US foreign policy in the Muslim world, especially in Palestine. It would seem that as long as the US policy remains on its present course in the Middle East, the ranks of the terrorists will not be depleted; militants will continue to enter Waziristan.
On the other hand there is absolutely everything wrong with the militants' slogan that the present war is aimed at destroying Islam or that it is a Christian crusade. This is at best a mobilising slogan for Islamists everywhere. Islam is too strong and too spatially indeterminate to be destroyed. The reason why I say this is that like most universal religions--Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism--they are not anchored within a destroyable entity like a state. These religions are universal and have been fused into ethical and national identities that are diverse and spread worldwide. Waging a war against a universal religion today is like fighting the air we breathe. That is why I believe that the present war is not directed against Islam, nor could it cause harm to the religion if it were indeed against Islam. The conclusion that can safely be derived is that Islam is not in danger in Pakistan. Therefore, all those who say that they are fighting for Islam are making this statement to mislead people for reasons of personal power.
However, the same cannot be said of states. They can be weakened and become soft and ineffective because of faulty policies. The example of Congo, Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia are before us. Life in such states is pure hell for its citizens. They are also highly destabilising to the rest of the world. Thus the militants fighting Pakistan are not defending Islam but are weakening a Muslim state. If Madeleine Albright, the former US secretary of state, doesn't want Pakistan to be an "international migraine," then policy changes need to be made both by Pakistan and the US. For the latter it is essential to change its policy in the Muslim world and harmonise them with the aspirations of the majority. The framework for doing so already exists within the US Agenda for Democracy which any new US administration can pursue more aggressively.
In the short term we must prevail upon the US not to weaken the Pakistani state through its unilateral actions. The US must ask Pakistan to enforce its writ within FATA. However, the US should help in providing capacity to Pakistan to deal with its problems. It is thus essential that the US anti-terrorism strategy should be reviewed in consultation with Pakistan. Otherwise the situation will continue to worsen. (The News)
The writer is a former chief secretary of NWFP and heads the Regional Institute of Policy Research. Email: azizkhalid @gmail.com
Read more...
Khalid Aziz
Since September there have been 19 missile attacks on suspected terrorists by the US, most of them in Waziristan. They have led to the deaths of some foreign fighters; at the same time they have killed numerous innocent persons. As a result there is a widening wave of revulsion against US policies and Pakistan's support for them.
We are living in a world where truth, rationality and logic are swept aside for the sake of expediency and temporary advantage. Michael Chertoff the powerful czar of US Homeland Security made a significant recommendation in London the other day. He pleaded for the sanctification of a new principle of international law involving the acceptance of the right to attack another country if it was "harbouring a potential terrorist threat." US defence secretary Robert Gates had commented a few days ago that the US would hold countries that permit sanctuary to terrorists fully accountable for actions. These two statements taken together mean that the US is formulating a doctrine that permits the launching of pre-emptive strike against non-state fighters living within the jurisdiction of another state. In the case of Pakistan this doctrine is already under implementation in FATA. Such a policy needs revision. It is counterproductive for both the US and Pakistan since it plays into the hands of the militants.
The doctrine of pre-emptive strike against another country which has declared its hostile intent to attack another is well known in the Middle Eastern context with regard to Egypt-Israeli conflicts of the past. Such a doctrine may make sense in inter-state relations where regular military forces keep a watch on one another. However, serious anomalies arise in its implementation when the doctrine of pre-emptive strike is cut-and-pasted into the poorly defined, amorphous world of non-state warriors and their organisations. A UAV strike may kill some terrorists, but is not a policy which "dries the pond that breeds the mosquitoes." Such attacks create ill will against the US and Pakistan; it weakens the response against terrorism in the long run.
After debating the war on terrorism the National Assembly passed a resolution on Oct 22 that condemned US UAV attacks on FATA as a violation of Pakistani sovereignty. On the other hand, the US argues that if Pakistani is unable to prevent the misuse of its territory by the militants who launch such attacks against their forces from Waziristan, the US is within its rights to take unilateral action for protecting itself. Such a stance has wider implications. For instance, although the US accuses Pakistan of not doing enough for the removal of terrorist safe havens, it overlooks two aspects about Waziristan. Firstly, this region has always remained a "soft" area which has not been actively administered. It thus allows non-state actors to congregate and challenge the state. This was frequently the case during British rule and has been so since then. Secondly Waziristan apparently has become a pen for corralling Arab terrorists and then eliminating them. Such a conclusion cannot be ignored if we examine the identities of those killed and understand some of the reasons which force these people to take the Waziristan trail.
Most UAV targets have been people who are the creation of political dissent within their own countries and became engaged in resistance due to repression. This is evident in the case of those killed, whether the militant was from Afghanistan, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Palestine, Pakistan, the Central Asian states or China. Most of those who have died have fallen on the wrong side of their respective governments and were subsequently recruited by terrorist organisations and trained as fighters to change the status quo. As Tariq Ali rightly points out, this situation generated new forces and leaders like Muqtada as-Sadr, Ismail Haniya, Hassan Nasrallah or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who organise their people in Baghdad, Gaza, Jenin, Beirut, Sidon and Tehran and I would add Waziristan. The Americans, on the other hand, support the existing order and become associated with repression, and this makes the US a target for the terrorists. Apparently the main reason for generating a demand for safe havens in Waziristan would lie not in Pakistan but within the dynamics of the implementation of US foreign policy in the Muslim world, especially in Palestine. It would seem that as long as the US policy remains on its present course in the Middle East, the ranks of the terrorists will not be depleted; militants will continue to enter Waziristan.
On the other hand there is absolutely everything wrong with the militants' slogan that the present war is aimed at destroying Islam or that it is a Christian crusade. This is at best a mobilising slogan for Islamists everywhere. Islam is too strong and too spatially indeterminate to be destroyed. The reason why I say this is that like most universal religions--Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism--they are not anchored within a destroyable entity like a state. These religions are universal and have been fused into ethical and national identities that are diverse and spread worldwide. Waging a war against a universal religion today is like fighting the air we breathe. That is why I believe that the present war is not directed against Islam, nor could it cause harm to the religion if it were indeed against Islam. The conclusion that can safely be derived is that Islam is not in danger in Pakistan. Therefore, all those who say that they are fighting for Islam are making this statement to mislead people for reasons of personal power.
However, the same cannot be said of states. They can be weakened and become soft and ineffective because of faulty policies. The example of Congo, Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia are before us. Life in such states is pure hell for its citizens. They are also highly destabilising to the rest of the world. Thus the militants fighting Pakistan are not defending Islam but are weakening a Muslim state. If Madeleine Albright, the former US secretary of state, doesn't want Pakistan to be an "international migraine," then policy changes need to be made both by Pakistan and the US. For the latter it is essential to change its policy in the Muslim world and harmonise them with the aspirations of the majority. The framework for doing so already exists within the US Agenda for Democracy which any new US administration can pursue more aggressively.
In the short term we must prevail upon the US not to weaken the Pakistani state through its unilateral actions. The US must ask Pakistan to enforce its writ within FATA. However, the US should help in providing capacity to Pakistan to deal with its problems. It is thus essential that the US anti-terrorism strategy should be reviewed in consultation with Pakistan. Otherwise the situation will continue to worsen. (The News)
The writer is a former chief secretary of NWFP and heads the Regional Institute of Policy Research. Email: azizkhalid @gmail.com
Read more...
Tuesday, 28 October 2008
Listen Hamid Gul: The controversial Pakistani policy of creating strategic depth in Afghanistan has now become a noose around our neck.
Hope and fear in NWFP
Tuesday, October 28, 2008
Khalid Aziz
FATA and the NWFP are in the midst of "interesting times." According to the Chinese such periods are unstable and bring a whirlpool of difficulties. Pakistan has entered a sinkhole of problems and will need adroit handling to prevent a further slide.
When Pakistan joined the war on terrorism in 2001 it conceived an impractical game plan of trying to play two contradictions against each other. Gen Musharraf had prevailed on the US to accept a policy of more lenient handling of the Afghan Taliban by military and intelligence operations inside Pakistan, compared to a more coercive treatment of foreigners and al-Qaeda. This policy was implemented by Gen Musharraf to keep intact the goodwill of the Pakhtun political forces in Afghanistan as an asset to balance the increasing influence of India, as well to avert the ethnic backlash of the Pakhtuns in FATA and the NWFP in sympathy for Afghan Pakhtuns.
As the US pressure increased on the Afghan Taliban inside Afghanistan they needed to create a new centre of gravity to prevent their movement from falling apart. Pakistan's duality regarding the Taliban came in handy and they turned the Pakistani strategy on its head and entered the political and military space in FATA, the NWFP and Balochistan from 2002. This was the period when many Taliban who fled the war in Afghanistan found refuge inside Pakistan. Pakistani ambivalence in dealing with this problem within its territory has come in for a lot of criticism from the US; this soft policy has been considered collusive and used as a proof of secret dealings between the militants and Pakistani intelligence services.
The controversial Pakistani policy of creating strategic depth in Afghanistan has now become a noose around our neck. The giving of refuge to the Afghan militants in FATA allowed them to quickly recruit a following amongst marginalised Pakhtuns who inhabited these isolated regions and they were quickly radicalised. The presence of Afghan Taliban elements in FATA permitted an easy resurrection of their militant ideology. Training camps were established in the isolated region outside the control of the military. Gradually militant bands began to launch raids into Afghanistan. However, owing to the tribalism prevalent in the region it did not permit such bands to make a major difference in the pattern of the overall fighting inside Afghanistan. The reason for this is plain; FATA warriors could not venture further than about an hour's distance from the Durand Line. This limit on their area of operation was forced by the aerial and artillery reaction by NATO or US forces; it normally took about an hour for the Western reaction to occur and that was the limit of the depth of operations from FATA. After 2007 the region opposite Waziristan was thickly populated by Afghan intelligence that quickly reported incursions, reducing attacks from this source. Previously the contribution of violence by FATA tribesmen could not be more than five percent of the total insurgent attacks inside Afghanistan. However, the availability of a bolt hole for escaping Afghan Taliban leaders to Pakistani territory remains an area of criticism.
Where Pakistan was hurt most by its policy of ambivalence was the radicalisation of the NWFP's population, especially in Malakand and some other parts of the province. It has been suggested that the MMA government, which ruled the NWFP from 2002 to 2007, was complicit. It is true that during this period there was a reduction of violence in the NWFP, but not in FATA. Apparently, FATA was chosen as the centre of fighting to divert charges of collusion against the MMA government.
The increased level of violence in FATA and the NWFP has created a security crisis, as well as a humanitarian one, with a large displacement of people from the area of operations. Local populations condemn both the government and the militants for their miseries. Such discontent will generate future challenges and needs to be handled immediately within a framework of assistance, protection and early return to original locations. However, this can only happen after stability has been assured in the disturbed regions.
At the macro level the economy is generating another set of challenges that include increase in prices, inflation and rising unemployment in the NWFP. Apparently the worsening of this triad will add to the ranks of the discontented that may join the militants. This view of Pakistan's economic woes suggests that Pakistan's friends must loosen up their purse strings to assist, or prepare to spend on more fighting which would then become a never-ending litany of death and destruction.
If one remained fixed within this narrative one would think that nothing good was happening in Pakistan. That's not true. The resolution passed by Parliament regarding terrorism is truly remarkable. This for the first time provides a basis for the long-term strategising of efforts against terrorism. Secondly, through the resolution the Pakistani people have given their consent to a definite policy of dealing with terrorism in a holistic manner. Thirdly, the government has accepted the sanctity of Afghan territory and has thus condemned the provision of safe havens within Pakistani territory.
It is now for the government to use this opportunity to create strategies and supporting legislation to make the resolution meaningful. A resolution is not law and thus not binding. But it provides a direction to the government. If Pakistan now fails to build on the principles laid down by the resolution the fault will lie with the government. While Pakistan has been trying in the National Assembly to get to grips with the problems related to terrorism, the US policy related to drone attacks is a cause of concern and creates a lot of ill will against the US – each attack reduces the good will for the US. The drone attack near Miranshah only six hours after the passage of the resolution clearly challenged the principle laid in paragraph four of the resolution that condemns violation of Pakistan's sovereignty. This attack is not a good sign and the US must reconsider its drones policy, because it is not winning the Americans any friends. It also embarrasses an ally which has begun to shape events in a better manner than before.
As Gen Petraeus takes over at the end of October, Pakistani security establishment needs to game-plan the strategy of "surge" which would very likely be brought into play by the US in Afghanistan and perhaps in FATA. Higher casualties and displacement of large numbers of people has been a by-product of the surge in Iraq. It is not the best policy for this region. A surge in diplomatic handling of the militants will bring higher dividends and greater stability. Militancy cannot be ended but can definitely be brought to a minimal level. Thus, the situation in Pakistan shows areas of hope. But at the same time there are other areas of concern that create fear in the mind; there is therefore a need for prudence and careful planning in the days to come. (The News)
The writer is a former chief secretary of NWFP and heads the Regional Institute of Policy Research. Email: azizkhalid@gmail.com
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Tuesday, October 28, 2008
Khalid Aziz
FATA and the NWFP are in the midst of "interesting times." According to the Chinese such periods are unstable and bring a whirlpool of difficulties. Pakistan has entered a sinkhole of problems and will need adroit handling to prevent a further slide.
When Pakistan joined the war on terrorism in 2001 it conceived an impractical game plan of trying to play two contradictions against each other. Gen Musharraf had prevailed on the US to accept a policy of more lenient handling of the Afghan Taliban by military and intelligence operations inside Pakistan, compared to a more coercive treatment of foreigners and al-Qaeda. This policy was implemented by Gen Musharraf to keep intact the goodwill of the Pakhtun political forces in Afghanistan as an asset to balance the increasing influence of India, as well to avert the ethnic backlash of the Pakhtuns in FATA and the NWFP in sympathy for Afghan Pakhtuns.
As the US pressure increased on the Afghan Taliban inside Afghanistan they needed to create a new centre of gravity to prevent their movement from falling apart. Pakistan's duality regarding the Taliban came in handy and they turned the Pakistani strategy on its head and entered the political and military space in FATA, the NWFP and Balochistan from 2002. This was the period when many Taliban who fled the war in Afghanistan found refuge inside Pakistan. Pakistani ambivalence in dealing with this problem within its territory has come in for a lot of criticism from the US; this soft policy has been considered collusive and used as a proof of secret dealings between the militants and Pakistani intelligence services.
The controversial Pakistani policy of creating strategic depth in Afghanistan has now become a noose around our neck. The giving of refuge to the Afghan militants in FATA allowed them to quickly recruit a following amongst marginalised Pakhtuns who inhabited these isolated regions and they were quickly radicalised. The presence of Afghan Taliban elements in FATA permitted an easy resurrection of their militant ideology. Training camps were established in the isolated region outside the control of the military. Gradually militant bands began to launch raids into Afghanistan. However, owing to the tribalism prevalent in the region it did not permit such bands to make a major difference in the pattern of the overall fighting inside Afghanistan. The reason for this is plain; FATA warriors could not venture further than about an hour's distance from the Durand Line. This limit on their area of operation was forced by the aerial and artillery reaction by NATO or US forces; it normally took about an hour for the Western reaction to occur and that was the limit of the depth of operations from FATA. After 2007 the region opposite Waziristan was thickly populated by Afghan intelligence that quickly reported incursions, reducing attacks from this source. Previously the contribution of violence by FATA tribesmen could not be more than five percent of the total insurgent attacks inside Afghanistan. However, the availability of a bolt hole for escaping Afghan Taliban leaders to Pakistani territory remains an area of criticism.
Where Pakistan was hurt most by its policy of ambivalence was the radicalisation of the NWFP's population, especially in Malakand and some other parts of the province. It has been suggested that the MMA government, which ruled the NWFP from 2002 to 2007, was complicit. It is true that during this period there was a reduction of violence in the NWFP, but not in FATA. Apparently, FATA was chosen as the centre of fighting to divert charges of collusion against the MMA government.
The increased level of violence in FATA and the NWFP has created a security crisis, as well as a humanitarian one, with a large displacement of people from the area of operations. Local populations condemn both the government and the militants for their miseries. Such discontent will generate future challenges and needs to be handled immediately within a framework of assistance, protection and early return to original locations. However, this can only happen after stability has been assured in the disturbed regions.
At the macro level the economy is generating another set of challenges that include increase in prices, inflation and rising unemployment in the NWFP. Apparently the worsening of this triad will add to the ranks of the discontented that may join the militants. This view of Pakistan's economic woes suggests that Pakistan's friends must loosen up their purse strings to assist, or prepare to spend on more fighting which would then become a never-ending litany of death and destruction.
If one remained fixed within this narrative one would think that nothing good was happening in Pakistan. That's not true. The resolution passed by Parliament regarding terrorism is truly remarkable. This for the first time provides a basis for the long-term strategising of efforts against terrorism. Secondly, through the resolution the Pakistani people have given their consent to a definite policy of dealing with terrorism in a holistic manner. Thirdly, the government has accepted the sanctity of Afghan territory and has thus condemned the provision of safe havens within Pakistani territory.
It is now for the government to use this opportunity to create strategies and supporting legislation to make the resolution meaningful. A resolution is not law and thus not binding. But it provides a direction to the government. If Pakistan now fails to build on the principles laid down by the resolution the fault will lie with the government. While Pakistan has been trying in the National Assembly to get to grips with the problems related to terrorism, the US policy related to drone attacks is a cause of concern and creates a lot of ill will against the US – each attack reduces the good will for the US. The drone attack near Miranshah only six hours after the passage of the resolution clearly challenged the principle laid in paragraph four of the resolution that condemns violation of Pakistan's sovereignty. This attack is not a good sign and the US must reconsider its drones policy, because it is not winning the Americans any friends. It also embarrasses an ally which has begun to shape events in a better manner than before.
As Gen Petraeus takes over at the end of October, Pakistani security establishment needs to game-plan the strategy of "surge" which would very likely be brought into play by the US in Afghanistan and perhaps in FATA. Higher casualties and displacement of large numbers of people has been a by-product of the surge in Iraq. It is not the best policy for this region. A surge in diplomatic handling of the militants will bring higher dividends and greater stability. Militancy cannot be ended but can definitely be brought to a minimal level. Thus, the situation in Pakistan shows areas of hope. But at the same time there are other areas of concern that create fear in the mind; there is therefore a need for prudence and careful planning in the days to come. (The News)
The writer is a former chief secretary of NWFP and heads the Regional Institute of Policy Research. Email: azizkhalid@gmail.com
Read more...
Tuesday, 23 September 2008
Significance of the Marriott bombing - By Khalid Aziz
Tuesday, September 23, 2008
by Khalid Aziz
The writer is a former chief secretary of NWFP and heads the Regional Institute of Policy Research
The suicide attack on the Marriott has brought into question Pakistan's participation in the war on terrorism. In a sense the attack was the consequence of the flawed policies which permitted our territories to be used as a place of refuge by the multinational militants who fled Afghanistan after the US attacked and destroyed the Taliban government in Kabul in November 2001.
From January 2008, Pakistan began to confront the militancy in FATA more vigorously. This new military trend was heralded with the launching of operation "Zalzala," against Baitullah Mahsud and his group. This operation was in the nature of collective punishment in which homes and property worth a considerable amount were destroyed, including the main market in Kotkai Razgai.
After the Mahsud operation the insurgency situation in parts of FATA and the NWFP has aggravated considerably. The operation in Bajaur has developed into a small war and the level of violence there is greater than in past confrontations. There are a considerable number of internally displaced persons generated by this new violence. More than 300,000 people have fled from the battle zones to other parts of Pakistan. Due to the increase in collateral deaths the number of motivated tribesmen seeking revenge by joining the ranks of suicide bombers has also increased. This is probably the cause of the Marriott bombing.
On the other hand Pakistan and its ally, the US, have differences over strategy. Pakistanis are upset by the violation of its sovereignty by the US. However, it is for consideration whether we should criticize others when the militants have already usurped Pakistani sovereignty over large tracts of territory south of Kohat; it barely exists in Waziristan. Obviously the loss of control over territory means that the militants have not only obtained control over people and resources but also have the space to plan and prepare operations in Pakistan.
It is now generally acknowledged that the militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan have mastered the art of communication operations. These aim to shift the perception of Pakistanis and Islamists around the world in their favour. The Marriott bombing is in the nature of an announcement that aims to challenge official Pakistani claims of ascendency in Bajaur and Swat. It is a statement telling the Pakistani political elite that the war and the cooperation with US will cost it dear.
Let us examine some of the other aspects of the Marriott bombing. This hotel is located within a security zone, which includes national institutions like the Supreme Court, the Prime Minister's Office and Parliament. On the day of the bombing the new Pakistani president was making his inaugural address to Parliament and the assembly was packed with Pakistan's civil, military and intellectual elite. One can conclude with a high degree of certainty that the target of the suicide raid was the National Assembly. If the attempt had succeeded the loss to Pakistan would have been great. It is surmised that the failure of the militants to penetrate the security around the Parliament forced them to divert to a secondary target, which happened to be the unfortunate hotel. A more successful militant attack would obviously have spread chaos and disorder causing destabilisation in Pakistan.
Secondly, the attack copied a strategy followed by Al Qaeda in Iraq in the Samarra bombing. That bombing was aimed at causing a Shia-Sunni war, which would have destroyed Iraq. A similar effect would have occurred in Pakistan had the National Assembly been hit. Is there a link between the Marriott bomber and the transnational militants fighting in Khost, Paktika and Paktia provinces of Afghanistan? The existence of such a connection cannot be over ruled.
What are the likely consequences of this tragedy? First, it is clear that its impact on Pakistani people will be one of revulsion and hatred against the militants; this is the sentiment which prevails in FATA when collateral deaths are caused by Pakistani or US attacks. The sufferers are infused with hatred and wish revenge. The families of those who suffered in this attack must feel the same way. Although the militants carried out a strategic information attack but the effect on their cause is negative. It will build the resolve of Pakistanis to support their government more.
What other messages can one get from the Marriott tragedy? First, we must implement a "zero tolerance" policy on militancy of any kind. It is extremely dangerous to believe that we would benefit from distinguishing between good and bad terrorists, as Gen Musharraf did. Gen Musharraf allowed safe refuge in Waziristan to militants who fled from Afghanistan after the US attack in November 2001. By doing so Musharraf endangered Pakistan's national security. By permitting such war-hardened radicals to fraternise with Pakistani tribes permitted the establishment of a very dangerous type of social networking. It is this association which has spread the virus of militancy throughout FATA and the NWFP and could soon infect other parts of Pakistan. The Jamia Hafsa episode is yet another example of the radical type of networking reaching critical mass right in the heart of Islamabad. American political scientist Paul E Petersen has remarked that "people don't get pushed into rebellion by their ideology. They get pulled in by their social network." If Pakistan wants to move away from this self-created calamity then it needs to transform itself and reject association with proxy warriors of any kind, irrespective of any strategic advantage that they may provide.
If social networking is at the heart of terrorism then the Marriott bombing is a call to put into practice a whole range of policies to counter the anti-Pakistan social networks. It would mean the mobilisation of communities in FATA and the NWFP to protect themselves against the militants. Techniques and plans for such an approach exist and need to be examined for implementation. If one can re-occupy the national space in an average Pakistani's heart, then one could say that the country has achieved the threshold for success. One of the central principles of this approach is to address effectively the everyday problems of a poor Pakistan. In order to do so the leadership will have to become more responsive to the needs of the average Pakistani.
Furthermore, we need to re-examine our security policies related to Afghanistan, FATA and the US. One of the problems of this war is that the operations in Afghanistan are planned by the US military, the CIA and NATO. While there can be coordination between the US military, NATO and Pakistan, the same cannot be said for the CIA, which is a law unto itself. Otherwise, how else can one explain the embarrassment of the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee during his recent meeting with Pakistani authorities? At the very moment Admiral Mullen was making a commitment to the Pakistani leadership that US attacks on the country would cease, US Predators were attacking Waziristan. To end this confusion it is essential for the US to have a single commander in Afghanistan who is in charge of both overt and covert operations. Pakistan must remain in the information loop if we want to win the war on terrorism.
Pakistan needs to carry out a security overview of lapses that occurred during the Marriott bombing. Security was woefully poor and badly compromised. It is time that we emphasised the protection of the people of Pakistan. Only then will we succeed in meeting this challenge.
Email: azizkhalid @gmail.com (The News)
Read more...
by Khalid Aziz
The writer is a former chief secretary of NWFP and heads the Regional Institute of Policy Research
The suicide attack on the Marriott has brought into question Pakistan's participation in the war on terrorism. In a sense the attack was the consequence of the flawed policies which permitted our territories to be used as a place of refuge by the multinational militants who fled Afghanistan after the US attacked and destroyed the Taliban government in Kabul in November 2001.
From January 2008, Pakistan began to confront the militancy in FATA more vigorously. This new military trend was heralded with the launching of operation "Zalzala," against Baitullah Mahsud and his group. This operation was in the nature of collective punishment in which homes and property worth a considerable amount were destroyed, including the main market in Kotkai Razgai.
After the Mahsud operation the insurgency situation in parts of FATA and the NWFP has aggravated considerably. The operation in Bajaur has developed into a small war and the level of violence there is greater than in past confrontations. There are a considerable number of internally displaced persons generated by this new violence. More than 300,000 people have fled from the battle zones to other parts of Pakistan. Due to the increase in collateral deaths the number of motivated tribesmen seeking revenge by joining the ranks of suicide bombers has also increased. This is probably the cause of the Marriott bombing.
On the other hand Pakistan and its ally, the US, have differences over strategy. Pakistanis are upset by the violation of its sovereignty by the US. However, it is for consideration whether we should criticize others when the militants have already usurped Pakistani sovereignty over large tracts of territory south of Kohat; it barely exists in Waziristan. Obviously the loss of control over territory means that the militants have not only obtained control over people and resources but also have the space to plan and prepare operations in Pakistan.
It is now generally acknowledged that the militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan have mastered the art of communication operations. These aim to shift the perception of Pakistanis and Islamists around the world in their favour. The Marriott bombing is in the nature of an announcement that aims to challenge official Pakistani claims of ascendency in Bajaur and Swat. It is a statement telling the Pakistani political elite that the war and the cooperation with US will cost it dear.
Let us examine some of the other aspects of the Marriott bombing. This hotel is located within a security zone, which includes national institutions like the Supreme Court, the Prime Minister's Office and Parliament. On the day of the bombing the new Pakistani president was making his inaugural address to Parliament and the assembly was packed with Pakistan's civil, military and intellectual elite. One can conclude with a high degree of certainty that the target of the suicide raid was the National Assembly. If the attempt had succeeded the loss to Pakistan would have been great. It is surmised that the failure of the militants to penetrate the security around the Parliament forced them to divert to a secondary target, which happened to be the unfortunate hotel. A more successful militant attack would obviously have spread chaos and disorder causing destabilisation in Pakistan.
Secondly, the attack copied a strategy followed by Al Qaeda in Iraq in the Samarra bombing. That bombing was aimed at causing a Shia-Sunni war, which would have destroyed Iraq. A similar effect would have occurred in Pakistan had the National Assembly been hit. Is there a link between the Marriott bomber and the transnational militants fighting in Khost, Paktika and Paktia provinces of Afghanistan? The existence of such a connection cannot be over ruled.
What are the likely consequences of this tragedy? First, it is clear that its impact on Pakistani people will be one of revulsion and hatred against the militants; this is the sentiment which prevails in FATA when collateral deaths are caused by Pakistani or US attacks. The sufferers are infused with hatred and wish revenge. The families of those who suffered in this attack must feel the same way. Although the militants carried out a strategic information attack but the effect on their cause is negative. It will build the resolve of Pakistanis to support their government more.
What other messages can one get from the Marriott tragedy? First, we must implement a "zero tolerance" policy on militancy of any kind. It is extremely dangerous to believe that we would benefit from distinguishing between good and bad terrorists, as Gen Musharraf did. Gen Musharraf allowed safe refuge in Waziristan to militants who fled from Afghanistan after the US attack in November 2001. By doing so Musharraf endangered Pakistan's national security. By permitting such war-hardened radicals to fraternise with Pakistani tribes permitted the establishment of a very dangerous type of social networking. It is this association which has spread the virus of militancy throughout FATA and the NWFP and could soon infect other parts of Pakistan. The Jamia Hafsa episode is yet another example of the radical type of networking reaching critical mass right in the heart of Islamabad. American political scientist Paul E Petersen has remarked that "people don't get pushed into rebellion by their ideology. They get pulled in by their social network." If Pakistan wants to move away from this self-created calamity then it needs to transform itself and reject association with proxy warriors of any kind, irrespective of any strategic advantage that they may provide.
If social networking is at the heart of terrorism then the Marriott bombing is a call to put into practice a whole range of policies to counter the anti-Pakistan social networks. It would mean the mobilisation of communities in FATA and the NWFP to protect themselves against the militants. Techniques and plans for such an approach exist and need to be examined for implementation. If one can re-occupy the national space in an average Pakistani's heart, then one could say that the country has achieved the threshold for success. One of the central principles of this approach is to address effectively the everyday problems of a poor Pakistan. In order to do so the leadership will have to become more responsive to the needs of the average Pakistani.
Furthermore, we need to re-examine our security policies related to Afghanistan, FATA and the US. One of the problems of this war is that the operations in Afghanistan are planned by the US military, the CIA and NATO. While there can be coordination between the US military, NATO and Pakistan, the same cannot be said for the CIA, which is a law unto itself. Otherwise, how else can one explain the embarrassment of the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee during his recent meeting with Pakistani authorities? At the very moment Admiral Mullen was making a commitment to the Pakistani leadership that US attacks on the country would cease, US Predators were attacking Waziristan. To end this confusion it is essential for the US to have a single commander in Afghanistan who is in charge of both overt and covert operations. Pakistan must remain in the information loop if we want to win the war on terrorism.
Pakistan needs to carry out a security overview of lapses that occurred during the Marriott bombing. Security was woefully poor and badly compromised. It is time that we emphasised the protection of the people of Pakistan. Only then will we succeed in meeting this challenge.
Email: azizkhalid @gmail.com (The News)
Read more...
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