Wednesday, February 04, 2009
Nasim Zehra
The writer is an Islamabad-based security analyst
Speaking in Washington to a conference sponsored by the Reserve Officers Association on Monday, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen said, "I never talk about Afghanistan without mentioning Pakistan."
Mullen emphasized two key issues:
One, that "establishing good governance is the lead issue for Afghanistan." Two, that policy discussions on Afghanistan policy discussions must include ample consideration of extremist forces being able to set up shop in neighbouring Pakistan. Mullen's general focus was on the possible resources crunch that may hit US military operations in these times of recession.
For Pakistan Mullen's views on Afghanistan are significant.
Mullen, like many others in the Obama administration, are emphasising both the significance and the need to defeat the insurgency. The expectation from Pakistan is that it will help in ensuring the defeat of the Taliban. How realistic this expectation is and what kind of policy is likely to at least initiate a viable political and security-enforcement process in Afghanistan are key questions for
Pakistan--which has suffered greatly because of its own policies and the policies of other countries in this country.
In addition to the deployment of 30,000 additional US troops in Afghanistan the appointment of General Eikenberry as ambassador to Afghanistan is also on the cards. Eikenberry, completed his 18-month command in Afghanistan in 2007, is familiar with that country's complex problems and knows the players in Afghanistan.
Significantly, if Eikenberry's appointment goes through, the Obama administration will have four influential voices on Afghanistan, men with military orientation. The others are General David Petraeus, head of the Central Command, General David McKiernan, the top commander in Afghanistan, and General James Jones, a retired Marine Corps officer who is Obama's national security adviser.
To signal the importance that Afghanistan holds for the Obama administration Ambassador Holbrooke will shortly be arriving in Pakistan. As Holbrooke arrives what is it that Pakistan is planning to tell him? How does Pakistan view the situation, what is Pakistan's advice to Washington? Perhaps Pakistan must present its comprehensive position to Holbrooke. As Pakistan works on improving its relations with Kabul and also communicates its concerns to Washington perhaps the bulk of its views on Afghanistan have already been shared with Kabul and Washington. But the Holbrooke visit warrants a comprehensive recall. Such a policy-based recall must include the following eight points.
One, the key trigger for Pakistan's own expanding and complex FATA problem lies in the continued war in Afghanistan. The problem is Afghanistan, not FATA. A near, not absolute, historical analogy could be FATA being for the Afghans today what Cambodia was for the Vietnamese. The Americans must not misread the situation today. Another Vietnam neither can the Americans afford nor can our already volatile region.
Two, unless a genuine political reconciliation effort is initiated in Afghanistan there will never be peace in Afghanistan. Taliban have to be the key interlocutors for whoever governs from Kabul. Many senior officials, including generals from NATO countries, have repeatedly maintained that there is no military solution to Afghanistan's problems. It is for this reason alone that Washington's NATO allies have been reluctant to send additional forces to Afghanistan and to provide transport helicopters, military trainers and other support personnel. Only recently has the US defence secretary Robert Gates openly criticised the NATO allies for not delivering on their promises.
Three, making Karzai the fall guy for a failed policy will not help, but removing the flaws in Washington's Afghan policy will. The key flaw has been Washington's objective to seek the political death of the Taliban either by military defeat or by surrender. Eight years of this policy has brought death and destruction to the Afghan people. No less has this brought about the expanding military control and political influence of the Taliban.
Four, US drone attacks on Pakistani territory causing the death of innocent Pakistanis must stop. These attacks have continued to compromise Pakistan's own effort to deal with the source of an acute internal security crisis. For example, Pakistan's own effort to deal with terrorism is weakened as US drone attacks strengthen the ranks of the lethally angry and armed militias and criminals.
Five, to aid Pakistan in tracking and fighting militants operating within Pakistani territory and from keeping its Pakistan-Afghan border secure against movement of foreign militants, Washington should provide Pakistan the military means that Pakistani forces have repeatedly requested to ensure effective intelligence gathering, night-time vision and aerial mobility. It is evidently Washington's lack of trust in its key non-ISAF military partner that has prevented the Americans from providing this equipment to Pakistani. In some respects the distrust is reminiscent of the mid-eighties when Pakistan, as a key partner in the CIA- funded war, wanted to purchase AWACS from the US. While the US military recommended the sales the State Department opposed it on the plea that Pakistan would use them against India. Maybe an accurate assessment. However, what is absolutely true today is that greater trust among these non-NATO allies is an absolute must if the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is to improve.
Six, the mini-jirga process must be viewed as an integral part of resolving the Afghan crisis. The jirga process, to be led by Kabul and Islamabad, should get the full backing of all the foreign players in Afghanistan.
Seven, to deal with the continuing crisis of governance there must be a multiple increase in US expenditure on development activities in Afghanistan. According to recent reports for every 100 million dollars being spent on military activities in Afghanistan only seven million dollars is being spent on development.
Eight, Afghan refugees must return to Afghanistan. The unbearable pressure of almost three million refugees on Pakistan, a country already reeling under resource constraints and new challenges of security, must end. The international community has to be more supportive and appreciative of Pakistan's Afghan refugee problem.
Pakistan must present its position clearly and cogently. Unless Washington recasts its Afghan policy in a politico-military cast there will be no end to war in Afghanistan. Endless war in Afghanistan also means continued warring and destabilisation in the bordering regions within Pakistan. In the decade of the eighties the primary roots of Afghanistan lay in its neighbourhood, including Pakistan, and in distant capitals including Washington, London and Riyadh, where policies for defeating the "evil Soviets" were being prepared and bankrolled. The Soviet invasion was rolled back and the Soviet Union was broke up, but the huge costs involved included a warring Afghanistan, a security nightmare in many parts of Pakistan, including the NWFP, the rise of trans-national, militarised and violent militias using religion, the emergence of suicide bombers, the rise of political extremism, and so on.
Pakistan fully partnered, and indeed authored, the anti-Soviet war of the eighties. Its fallout on Pakistan leaves no doubt in the minds of Pakistanis that that policy was a very costly blunder committed by military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq. Agha Shahi, Pakistan's illustrious foreign minister at that time, had warned the general against an "embrace" with the Americans over Afghanistan. Shahi's famous words were, "Only a handshake with the American not an embrace." But Pakistan's ruling generals were then evidently confident that they could manage an "embrace" on their own terms. From Pakistan's blunder of the eighties onwards our policymakers should have learnt the virtue of wisdom and of realism in policymaking. Now is the time for them to invoke that virtue.
Ambassador Holbrooke should be told that unless a holistic politico-military and development approach to resolving the Afghan problem is adopted, his efforts to initiate a regional peace process in Afghanistan will not succeed. More importantly for Pakistan, it cannot afford a scenario of continued war in Afghanistan. The positive outcome of Pakistan's participation in the US and ISAF effort in Afghanistan will depend largely on the extent to which the US will incorporate the above eight points in its Afghan strategy. (The News)
Email: nasimzehra@hotmail.com
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Showing posts with label Karzai. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Karzai. Show all posts
Wednesday, 4 February 2009
Wednesday, 19 November 2008
Seven years in Afghanistan — Article by Hamid Karzai
If we can all work together — Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the United States, and our allies — I see a possibility of moving beyond the days when a government thinks it needs extremism as an instrument of policy. When all governments in the region reject extremism, there will be no place for extremists, and terrorism will wither away
We began a journey in Afghanistan seven years ago with the war that ousted the Taliban from power. Much has been accomplished along the way, for Afghanistan and for the world.
In less than 45 days in 2001, we Afghans were freed from the menace of terrorism and the Taliban. Back then, Afghanistan’s people held great hopes for an immediately wonderful future.
Some of those hopes were fulfilled. Our children are back in school. Roughly 85 percent of Afghans now have access to some health care, up from 9 percent before 2001. Child mortality — among the worst in the world in 2001 — has dropped by 25 percent. Democracy, a free press, economic gains, and better livelihoods — all of that is there.
But, sadly, we are still fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda. What is it that we have not done right that makes us — and the rest of the world — less secure?
After the liberation in 2001, the international community concentrated on Afghanistan alone as the place to fight extremism and terrorism, while we Afghans argued that our country is not the right place to fight. The war on terrorism cannot be fought in Afghan villages. Instead, a regional approach was and is needed. It must be concentrated on the sanctuaries of those who train, equip, and motivate the extremists and send them out to hurt us all.
But we were not heard. Regardless of whether that was the result of a lack of knowledge or a lack of will, events have proven us right. Unfortunately, for the past two years, Pakistan has been suffering as much or perhaps more than Afghanistan has suffered. Almost the entire tribal belt along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border is suffering.
Just as schools were burned in Afghanistan from 2004 onwards, for the past year schools — especially for girls — have been burned there, leaving 80,000 children without facilities. Bridges have been blown up, soldiers and police killed. Bombs have exploded from Karachi to Lahore to Islamabad. The violence has spread to India as well, with bombings in Gujarat, Bangalore, and Delhi.
So the problem is regional, and it concerns institutional support for extremism that incites terrorism. Unless we collectively address the roots of the problem by ending that support, as well as financial support for radicalism in all forms, we will not defeat terrorism.
This has not been properly understood in the West, which has been fighting the symptoms of terrorism, but has failed to attack its underlying causes. Fortunately, today I see signs of recognition of this malaise. And the democratic change in Pakistan is good news for the Afghans, the Pakistani people, and, by extension, many others around the world.
Pakistan’s new president, Asif Ali Zardari, has suffered from terrorism as we have suffered. His wife, Benazir Bhutto, was killed by terrorists. I visited Pakistan for President Zardari’s inauguration, and for the first time I saw a dim ray of hope. If we can all work together — Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the United States, and our allies — I see a possibility of moving beyond the days when a government thinks it needs extremism as an instrument of policy. When all governments in the region reject extremism, there will be no place for extremists, and terrorism will wither away.
But this also requires helping those people who out of desperation have fallen prey to extremist forces. Last year, I pardoned a 14 year-old boy from the Pakistan tribal area in Waziristan who had come to Afghanistan to blow himself up as a suicide bomber. Only utter hopelessness can drive so young a man to such an act. We must rescue these people by giving them a better future, which only more education and new opportunities can bring.
Desperation and poverty are the tools used by evil forces to raise their terrorist cadres. But that environment will not change if political will is lacking, and if there is no action by the US and the governments of the region to get our economies to create jobs that offer hope.
Moreover, in order to deny terrorists institutional support, we must bring institutional strength to Afghanistan. We must enable Afghans to look after themselves and defend their country, to have a future in Afghanistan, to have hope of raising their children in Afghanistan.
Recently, I spoke to an Afghan man very close to me. He has a son who works in the Afghan Foreign Office. That young man was born in the US but returned to Afghanistan four years ago. The father asked, “Do you think I should take my son back to the US?” I said, “Why? Let him live here, let him work here, let him be an Afghan.” He said, “Yes, but will he have a future?”
A viable future means security as well as bread. We have started to bring hope by educating young Afghans, but we have not yet succeeded in bringing them a secure life, free from the danger of bombs and aerial bombardment. Only when that happens will Afghanistan be secure. And if the two other conditions are fulfilled — removal of political backing for radicalism and help for the desperate — we will have a safer life not only in Afghanistan, but in Pakistan, India, and the rest of the world. —DT-PS
Hamid Karzai is the President of Afghanistan (Daily Times)
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We began a journey in Afghanistan seven years ago with the war that ousted the Taliban from power. Much has been accomplished along the way, for Afghanistan and for the world.
In less than 45 days in 2001, we Afghans were freed from the menace of terrorism and the Taliban. Back then, Afghanistan’s people held great hopes for an immediately wonderful future.
Some of those hopes were fulfilled. Our children are back in school. Roughly 85 percent of Afghans now have access to some health care, up from 9 percent before 2001. Child mortality — among the worst in the world in 2001 — has dropped by 25 percent. Democracy, a free press, economic gains, and better livelihoods — all of that is there.
But, sadly, we are still fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda. What is it that we have not done right that makes us — and the rest of the world — less secure?
After the liberation in 2001, the international community concentrated on Afghanistan alone as the place to fight extremism and terrorism, while we Afghans argued that our country is not the right place to fight. The war on terrorism cannot be fought in Afghan villages. Instead, a regional approach was and is needed. It must be concentrated on the sanctuaries of those who train, equip, and motivate the extremists and send them out to hurt us all.
But we were not heard. Regardless of whether that was the result of a lack of knowledge or a lack of will, events have proven us right. Unfortunately, for the past two years, Pakistan has been suffering as much or perhaps more than Afghanistan has suffered. Almost the entire tribal belt along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border is suffering.
Just as schools were burned in Afghanistan from 2004 onwards, for the past year schools — especially for girls — have been burned there, leaving 80,000 children without facilities. Bridges have been blown up, soldiers and police killed. Bombs have exploded from Karachi to Lahore to Islamabad. The violence has spread to India as well, with bombings in Gujarat, Bangalore, and Delhi.
So the problem is regional, and it concerns institutional support for extremism that incites terrorism. Unless we collectively address the roots of the problem by ending that support, as well as financial support for radicalism in all forms, we will not defeat terrorism.
This has not been properly understood in the West, which has been fighting the symptoms of terrorism, but has failed to attack its underlying causes. Fortunately, today I see signs of recognition of this malaise. And the democratic change in Pakistan is good news for the Afghans, the Pakistani people, and, by extension, many others around the world.
Pakistan’s new president, Asif Ali Zardari, has suffered from terrorism as we have suffered. His wife, Benazir Bhutto, was killed by terrorists. I visited Pakistan for President Zardari’s inauguration, and for the first time I saw a dim ray of hope. If we can all work together — Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the United States, and our allies — I see a possibility of moving beyond the days when a government thinks it needs extremism as an instrument of policy. When all governments in the region reject extremism, there will be no place for extremists, and terrorism will wither away.
But this also requires helping those people who out of desperation have fallen prey to extremist forces. Last year, I pardoned a 14 year-old boy from the Pakistan tribal area in Waziristan who had come to Afghanistan to blow himself up as a suicide bomber. Only utter hopelessness can drive so young a man to such an act. We must rescue these people by giving them a better future, which only more education and new opportunities can bring.
Desperation and poverty are the tools used by evil forces to raise their terrorist cadres. But that environment will not change if political will is lacking, and if there is no action by the US and the governments of the region to get our economies to create jobs that offer hope.
Moreover, in order to deny terrorists institutional support, we must bring institutional strength to Afghanistan. We must enable Afghans to look after themselves and defend their country, to have a future in Afghanistan, to have hope of raising their children in Afghanistan.
Recently, I spoke to an Afghan man very close to me. He has a son who works in the Afghan Foreign Office. That young man was born in the US but returned to Afghanistan four years ago. The father asked, “Do you think I should take my son back to the US?” I said, “Why? Let him live here, let him work here, let him be an Afghan.” He said, “Yes, but will he have a future?”
A viable future means security as well as bread. We have started to bring hope by educating young Afghans, but we have not yet succeeded in bringing them a secure life, free from the danger of bombs and aerial bombardment. Only when that happens will Afghanistan be secure. And if the two other conditions are fulfilled — removal of political backing for radicalism and help for the desperate — we will have a safer life not only in Afghanistan, but in Pakistan, India, and the rest of the world. —DT-PS
Hamid Karzai is the President of Afghanistan (Daily Times)
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Wednesday, 15 October 2008
The war on terror and the war on drugs (What is Nato doing in Afghanistan? Ensuring that the Taliban get due share in the drug business.
The war on drugs
By Jerome Starkey
NATO and the US are ramping up the war on drugs in Afghanistan. American ground forces are set to help guard poppy eradication teams for the first time later this year, while Nato’s defence ministers agreed to let their 50,000-strong force target heroin laboratories and smuggling networks.
Until now, going after drug lords and their labs was down to a small and secretive band of Afghan commandos, known as Taskforce 333, and their mentors from Britain’s Special Boat Service. Eradicating poppy fields was the job of specially trained, but poorly resourced, police left to protect themselves from angry farmers. All that is set to change.
Afghanistan is by far and away the world’s leading producer of opium. Opium is made from poppies, and it is used to make heroin. Heroin from Afghanistan is smuggled through Pakistan, Russia, Iran and Turkey until it ends up on Europe’s streets.
In 2008, in Afghanistan, 157,000 hectares (610 square miles) were given over to growing poppies and they produced 7,700 tonnes of opium. Production has soared to such an extent in recent years that supply is outstripping demand. Global demand is only about 4,000 tonnes of opium per year, which has meant the price of opium has dropped. In Helmand alone, where most of Britain’s 8,000 troops are based, 103,000 hectares were devoted to poppy crops. If the province was a country, it would be the world’s biggest opium producer.
In 2007, the UN calculated that Afghan opium farmers made about $1bn from their poppy harvests. The total export value was $4bn n or 53 per cent of Afghanistan’s GDP.
There was a 19 per cent drop in cultivation from 2007 to 2008, but bumper yields meant opium production only fell by six per cent. Only 3.5 per cent of the country’s poppy fields were eradicated in 2008. High wheat prices and low opium prices are also a factor in persuading some farmers to switch to licit crops.
In Helmand, one of the most volatile parts of Afghanistan, production rose by one per cent as farmers invested opium profits in reclaiming tracts of desert with expensive irrigation schemes. Opium production was actually at its lowest in 2001. The Taliban launched a highly effective counter-narcotics campaign during their last year in power. They used a policy of summary execution to scare farmers into not planting opium. Many analysts attribute their loss of popular support in the south, which contributed to their defeat by US-led forces in late 2001, to this policy.
The Taliban control huge swaths of Afghanistan’s countryside, where most of the poppies are grown. They tax the farmers 10 per cent of the farm gate value of their crops. Antonio Maria Costa, head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, said the Taliban made about 50 million pounds from opium in 2007.
They also extort protection money from the drugs smugglers, for guarding convoys and laboratories where opium is processed into heroin. The UN and Nato believe the insurgents get roughly 60 per cent of their annual income from drugs. The Taliban and the drug smugglers also share a vested interest in undermining President Hamid Karzai’s government, and fighting the international forces, which have both vowed to try and wipe out the opium trade.
The vast sums of drugs money sloshing around Afghanistan’s economy mean it is all too easy for the opium barons to buy off corrupt officials.
When an Afghan counter-narcotics chief found nine tonnes of opium in a former Helmand governor’s compound, he was told not to burn it by Kabul — but he claims he ignored the order.
President Karzai’s brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, is widely rumoured to be involved in the drugs trade — an allegation he denies. The New York Times claimed US investigators found evidence that he had ordered a local security official to release an “enormous cache of heroin” discovered in a tractor trailer in 2004. Privately, Western security officials admit they suspect that a number of government ministers are drug dealers.
— © The Independent
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By Jerome Starkey
NATO and the US are ramping up the war on drugs in Afghanistan. American ground forces are set to help guard poppy eradication teams for the first time later this year, while Nato’s defence ministers agreed to let their 50,000-strong force target heroin laboratories and smuggling networks.
Until now, going after drug lords and their labs was down to a small and secretive band of Afghan commandos, known as Taskforce 333, and their mentors from Britain’s Special Boat Service. Eradicating poppy fields was the job of specially trained, but poorly resourced, police left to protect themselves from angry farmers. All that is set to change.
Afghanistan is by far and away the world’s leading producer of opium. Opium is made from poppies, and it is used to make heroin. Heroin from Afghanistan is smuggled through Pakistan, Russia, Iran and Turkey until it ends up on Europe’s streets.
In 2008, in Afghanistan, 157,000 hectares (610 square miles) were given over to growing poppies and they produced 7,700 tonnes of opium. Production has soared to such an extent in recent years that supply is outstripping demand. Global demand is only about 4,000 tonnes of opium per year, which has meant the price of opium has dropped. In Helmand alone, where most of Britain’s 8,000 troops are based, 103,000 hectares were devoted to poppy crops. If the province was a country, it would be the world’s biggest opium producer.
In 2007, the UN calculated that Afghan opium farmers made about $1bn from their poppy harvests. The total export value was $4bn n or 53 per cent of Afghanistan’s GDP.
There was a 19 per cent drop in cultivation from 2007 to 2008, but bumper yields meant opium production only fell by six per cent. Only 3.5 per cent of the country’s poppy fields were eradicated in 2008. High wheat prices and low opium prices are also a factor in persuading some farmers to switch to licit crops.
In Helmand, one of the most volatile parts of Afghanistan, production rose by one per cent as farmers invested opium profits in reclaiming tracts of desert with expensive irrigation schemes. Opium production was actually at its lowest in 2001. The Taliban launched a highly effective counter-narcotics campaign during their last year in power. They used a policy of summary execution to scare farmers into not planting opium. Many analysts attribute their loss of popular support in the south, which contributed to their defeat by US-led forces in late 2001, to this policy.
The Taliban control huge swaths of Afghanistan’s countryside, where most of the poppies are grown. They tax the farmers 10 per cent of the farm gate value of their crops. Antonio Maria Costa, head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, said the Taliban made about 50 million pounds from opium in 2007.
They also extort protection money from the drugs smugglers, for guarding convoys and laboratories where opium is processed into heroin. The UN and Nato believe the insurgents get roughly 60 per cent of their annual income from drugs. The Taliban and the drug smugglers also share a vested interest in undermining President Hamid Karzai’s government, and fighting the international forces, which have both vowed to try and wipe out the opium trade.
The vast sums of drugs money sloshing around Afghanistan’s economy mean it is all too easy for the opium barons to buy off corrupt officials.
When an Afghan counter-narcotics chief found nine tonnes of opium in a former Helmand governor’s compound, he was told not to burn it by Kabul — but he claims he ignored the order.
President Karzai’s brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, is widely rumoured to be involved in the drugs trade — an allegation he denies. The New York Times claimed US investigators found evidence that he had ordered a local security official to release an “enormous cache of heroin” discovered in a tractor trailer in 2004. Privately, Western security officials admit they suspect that a number of government ministers are drug dealers.
— © The Independent
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Saturday, 4 October 2008
Hamid Karzai’s appeal to the Taliban leader Mullah Umar that he should “return home” under guarantees of safety and “help bring peace to Afghanistan"
What should one make of Afghan president Hamid Karzai’s appeal to the Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Umar that he should “return home” under guarantees of safety and “help bring peace to Afghanistan”? President Karzai says he has been “sending messages to the Saudi Arabian king requesting him, as a world Muslim leader, to help us bring peace in Afghanistan”. On the other hand, Mullah Umar seems least inclined to return home to Mr Karzai’s embrace. His latest statement is that he can engage in negotiations to give the NATO-ISAF forces “safe passage” out of Afghanistan.
What was the intent of the Karzai statement? On the face of it the appeal looks like a non-starter, but becomes meaningful because General David McKiernan, the commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) supports it with the observation that “the solution in Afghanistan will ultimately be a political one”. Has he supported the Karzai initiative because he senses some tribal opposition in Afghanistan and Pakistan to the attacks mounted by the Taliban elements? He has also pointedly sent for more troops for what he said is an increasingly “tough fight” in eastern and southern Afghanistan.
Has the war against terrorism reached the “tipping point” in Afghanistan? Not at all, if you look at the casualty figures on the NATO-ISAF side. In fact the year 2008 has been declared “the bloodiest so far in Afghanistan for the NATO and US since the Taliban were removed from government in 2001”. Senior defence officials in the UK admit that “the Taliban are proving more resilient than expected”. As far as the British troops are concerned, “British forces are now being killed in Afghanistan at a faster rate than during the invasion of Iraq”. Britain has 7,800 troops, stationed mainly in Helmand Province, while the US has some 33,000 troops in Afghanistan in total, with 13,000 of those serving as part of the NATO-led coalition.
The only encouraging sign for President Karzai would be the casualty rate of the Taliban in Bajaur where the Pakistan army is executing a successful operation to win back territory lost to foreign and local terrorists. Mullah Umar seemed to be under some pressure when he appealed recently to the Taliban that they should not destroy schools and not target women and children. Is the Karzai message telling Mullah Umar: “Look, you are getting a drubbing in Pakistan, why not come home and be my partner in bringing peace to Afghanistan?”
On the other hand, there are reasons why Mullah Umar and President Karzai are an explosive mix and will not sup together on anything. In fact, there is a vendetta between the two Pashtuns which will end only after one of them is killed. Mr Karzai lived in Quetta starting 1983 and fell foul of the Taliban in 1999 when Mullah Umar had his father assassinated in Quetta. Mr Karzai thinks the ISI had a hand in it. He was in the Mujaddidi government after the Soviets left Afghanistan. He was kicked out of the Mujaddidi government by the Tajiks, but later he fell foul of Mullah Umar too by not going along with his extremist sharia. In 1999 Mr Karzai took his dead father’s body to Kandahar to reclaim headship of the Popalzai branch of the Durranis. In 2000, Al Qaeda backed the Taliban against the Northern Alliance with its Brigade 555 culled from North African Arab fighters, IMU from Uzbekistan, Filipino Moros, jihadi militias from Pakistan and groups from Chechnya and Xinjiang. Mr Karzai was on the wrong side and after a period of eclipse came centre stage in 2001 when Afghanistan was finally attacked under the UN Charter. Today, the vendetta remains unrequited and there are no holds barred between Mr Karzai and Mullah Umar.
Is the Karzai-NATO combination growing weak? Not likely on the eve of a change of government in the United States that is promising a bi-partisan consensus on an enhanced role of the NATO-ISAF forces in Afghanistan. In Pakistan, however, there is growing sense that Afghanistan can normalise only after the Americans leave there. Meanwhile, “official” Pakistan is worried about the Indian presence in Afghanistan and is probably piqued by the fact that it went into Afghanistan seeking “strategic depth” against India and has ended up with India breathing down its neck across the Durand Line. The region needs a three-way political arrangement which puts Kabul, Islamabad and New Delhi at ease, bound as the three countries are geographically and strategically. Any new American effort must keep this in mind. The only way America can disengage from Afghanistan is by finding that delicate balance. (Daily Times)
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What was the intent of the Karzai statement? On the face of it the appeal looks like a non-starter, but becomes meaningful because General David McKiernan, the commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) supports it with the observation that “the solution in Afghanistan will ultimately be a political one”. Has he supported the Karzai initiative because he senses some tribal opposition in Afghanistan and Pakistan to the attacks mounted by the Taliban elements? He has also pointedly sent for more troops for what he said is an increasingly “tough fight” in eastern and southern Afghanistan.
Has the war against terrorism reached the “tipping point” in Afghanistan? Not at all, if you look at the casualty figures on the NATO-ISAF side. In fact the year 2008 has been declared “the bloodiest so far in Afghanistan for the NATO and US since the Taliban were removed from government in 2001”. Senior defence officials in the UK admit that “the Taliban are proving more resilient than expected”. As far as the British troops are concerned, “British forces are now being killed in Afghanistan at a faster rate than during the invasion of Iraq”. Britain has 7,800 troops, stationed mainly in Helmand Province, while the US has some 33,000 troops in Afghanistan in total, with 13,000 of those serving as part of the NATO-led coalition.
The only encouraging sign for President Karzai would be the casualty rate of the Taliban in Bajaur where the Pakistan army is executing a successful operation to win back territory lost to foreign and local terrorists. Mullah Umar seemed to be under some pressure when he appealed recently to the Taliban that they should not destroy schools and not target women and children. Is the Karzai message telling Mullah Umar: “Look, you are getting a drubbing in Pakistan, why not come home and be my partner in bringing peace to Afghanistan?”
On the other hand, there are reasons why Mullah Umar and President Karzai are an explosive mix and will not sup together on anything. In fact, there is a vendetta between the two Pashtuns which will end only after one of them is killed. Mr Karzai lived in Quetta starting 1983 and fell foul of the Taliban in 1999 when Mullah Umar had his father assassinated in Quetta. Mr Karzai thinks the ISI had a hand in it. He was in the Mujaddidi government after the Soviets left Afghanistan. He was kicked out of the Mujaddidi government by the Tajiks, but later he fell foul of Mullah Umar too by not going along with his extremist sharia. In 1999 Mr Karzai took his dead father’s body to Kandahar to reclaim headship of the Popalzai branch of the Durranis. In 2000, Al Qaeda backed the Taliban against the Northern Alliance with its Brigade 555 culled from North African Arab fighters, IMU from Uzbekistan, Filipino Moros, jihadi militias from Pakistan and groups from Chechnya and Xinjiang. Mr Karzai was on the wrong side and after a period of eclipse came centre stage in 2001 when Afghanistan was finally attacked under the UN Charter. Today, the vendetta remains unrequited and there are no holds barred between Mr Karzai and Mullah Umar.
Is the Karzai-NATO combination growing weak? Not likely on the eve of a change of government in the United States that is promising a bi-partisan consensus on an enhanced role of the NATO-ISAF forces in Afghanistan. In Pakistan, however, there is growing sense that Afghanistan can normalise only after the Americans leave there. Meanwhile, “official” Pakistan is worried about the Indian presence in Afghanistan and is probably piqued by the fact that it went into Afghanistan seeking “strategic depth” against India and has ended up with India breathing down its neck across the Durand Line. The region needs a three-way political arrangement which puts Kabul, Islamabad and New Delhi at ease, bound as the three countries are geographically and strategically. Any new American effort must keep this in mind. The only way America can disengage from Afghanistan is by finding that delicate balance. (Daily Times)
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