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| Tuesday, February 17, 2009 Farhat Taj In her article on Jan 28 Shireen Mazari argues that the people of FATA support the militants because they see the Pakistani army as fighting America's war. This is the most absurd thing I keep hearing from people who clearly have little idea about the culture and people of FATA. My question to them is a simple one: if the Taliban militants are so popular, how does one explain the formation of so many anti-Taliban tribal armies all over FATA? The Taliban have target killed the leaders of those armies, which according to the popular Pakhtun perception, was with the tacit consent of the intelligence agencies. How could the people of FATA support those who have assassinated their entire tribal leadership and have massacred so many young men of the tribal armies? How come the people of FATA support the Taliban who have replaced their Pakhtunwali with a Taliban order? The residents of FATA are not ready to surrender their Pakhtun way of life and therefore are bearing the brunt of Taliban savagery. Under the code of Pakhtunwali, an outsider may go to FATA wearing an culture specific to his or her own culture without inviting any sanction from the tribes. This is because members of the tribes will understand that the outside is from a different culture and would hence respect the outsider for what he or she is. However, under the Taliban, the same person, especially a woman, venturing into FATA, without a burqa or similar attire would be liable to be punished with lashes. Also, it may come as a surprise to many readers that in FATA's culture the drum and dance have always played an important role. However, since the Taliban's occupation of the area, these two age-old traditions have been banned. Hence, only outsiders who are not well-informed would think that the local people would be supporting the occupiers who have replaced their melodious Pashto music with jihadi anthems that are played loudly throughout the region. The common perception among all Pakhtuns, including those in FATA, is that the Taliban are "strategic assets" of the military establishment and have been given a free hand by the establishment to eliminate all those Pakhtuns who dare to challenge them. Many Pakhtuns see what is happening between the military and the Taliban in FATA as instances of "friendly fire." The belief is that, by doing so, they both get what they want – the Taliban, a terrorised population on whom they can implement their jihadi agenda and the establishment gets to play its power games vis-a-vis regional and international powers. From what one reads and hears, it seems that most analysts in the media are either not aware of this reality, or deliberately hide it from their readers/audience. People believe that the army is perfectly capable of crushing the Taliban but that the will is lacking. Many people in FATA and other parts of the NWFP I have met in recent weeks and months as part of my ongoing research have said that they don't see much difference between Baituallah Mehsud and Fazllulah on the one hand and the senior and retired leadership of the establishment. To go back to Ms Mizari's article, she criticises the US drone attacks, calling them a violation of our national dignity and sovereignty. However, the matter is far more complex and not as black-and-white an issue as she is making it out to be. Many people are of the view that many of the drone attacks have hit precise targets and have succeeded in eliminating foreign militants such as Arabs, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Afghans – as well as local Taliban. There have also been some civilian deaths but most people seem more concerned with the militants who die. In any case, if more terrorists are killed than civilians, then most people seem satisfied with the attacks. It may be very difficult for some people (read: our armchair analysts) to belief this, but the fact of the matter is that most people of FATA are fed up with the occupation of their homeland by the Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorists and they are actually happy to see them killed – even if that happens to be by US drones! In any case, many of the residents of the region do not exactly see the drone attacks as a violation of our national sovereignty. And their reasoning is quite straightforward; they say that long before the drones came, much of FATA had been ceded by the state to the militants. And they say that when this was happening – engineered or otherwise – why wasn't much fuss made about the loss of national sovereignty by anybody then? In this context, the people see, for instance, drone attacks by the US on South Waziristan as a matter not between Washington and Islamabad but between Washington and Baitullah Mehsud. For Pakistan to have a say in it, the territory must be retaken by it. Thus, the question of violation of the national dignity and sovereignty of Pakistan does not even come up, as long as the area is under the occupation of the Taliban. (The News) The writer is a research fellow at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Gender Research, University of Oslo, and a member of Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy. Email: bergen34@yahoo.com |
Also read:
2 comments:
Shireen Mazari support Musharraf and Military Junta on Kargil Fiasco but her CHIEF IMRAN KAHN WANTS A TRIAL OF GENERAL MUSHARRAF. Quite a diverse position of Tehreek-e-Insaf Chief and an important Tehreek-e-Insaf Lady Leader Shireen Mazari [appointed by Musharraf as a Director General of a Key Think Tank of Pakistan]
Criticism and harsh comment are aimed at Born Again Pakistan First Type Shireen M Mazari [appointed as Director General Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) during a Pro American Military Regime of Pakistan i.e. 2002 - 2007]
I wonder what Ms Shireen M Mazari she was doing while in the Establishment if not reaping the benefits from the largees mentioned below. Where was the National Interest, National Conscience and Integrity. She must check her pay/salary cheque to ascertain from where the money came?
Where has US aid to Pakistan gone? Mariana Baabar
http://forum.atimes.com/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=12077
http://thenews.jang.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=58748
ISLAMABAD: The billions of dollars in US military aid to Pakistan since September 11, 2001, without any accountability, has now been billed as a “tsunami of new funding”.
Washington’s Centre for Public Integrity, in its report, says that today human rights activists, critics of the Pakistani government and members of Congress want to know, where most of the money — totalling in the billions — coming through a Defence Department programme, subject to virtually no Congressional oversight, has disappeared to.
The Centre says that this is a major finding of more than a year of investigation by the Centre for Public Integrity’s International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ). US military aid to Pakistan since September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks includes almost $5 billion in coalition support funds, a programme controlled by the Defence Department to reimburse key allies in the global war on terror. Pentagon reports that the ICIJ obtained through the Freedom of Information Act requests show that Pakistan is the No 1 recipient of these funds — receiving more than 10 times the amount that went to the No 2 recipient, Poland — and that there is scant documentation of how the money was used.
“The American-supplied military arsenal has been used against Baloch nationalists,” Senator Baloch told ICIJ. He said he and others have gone to the State Department, “and the State Department says [the US has] given military hardware with no conditions.”
A former US official, previously based in Pakistan, acknowledged to the ICIJ that in Balochistan “the [Pakistani] army stepped in with a pretty heavy hand last year.”
U.S. Payments To Pakistan Face New Scrutiny Little Accounting for Costs To Support Ally's Troops By Robin Wright Washington Post Staff Writer Thursday, February 21, 2008; Page A01
Once a month, Pakistan's Defense Ministry delivers 15 to 20 pages of spreadsheets to the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. They list costs for feeding, clothing, billeting and maintaining 80,000 to 100,000 Pakistani troops in the volatile tribal area along the Afghan border, in support of U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
No receipts are attached.
In response, the Defense Department has disbursed about $80 million monthly, or roughly $1 billion a year for the past six years, in one of the most generous U.S. military support programs worldwide. The U.S. aim has been to ensure that Pakistan remains the leading ally in combating extremism in South Asia.
But vague accounting, disputed expenses and suspicions about overbilling have recently made these payments to Pakistan highly controversial -- even within the U.S. government.
The poor showing in Monday's parliamentary election by the party of President Pervez Musharraf, whose government has overseen local disbursement of the money, may make Congress look closer at all U.S. financial assistance to the country. Questions have already been raised about where the money went and what the Bush administration got in return, given that pro-American sentiment in Pakistan is extremely low and al-Qaeda's presence is growing steadily stronger.
In perhaps the most disputed series of payments, Pakistan received about $80 million a month in 2006 and 2007 for military operations during cease-fires with pro-Taliban tribal elders along the border, including a 10-month truce in which troops returned to their barracks.
The Bush administration has acknowledged some problems, but still says that the program -- part of a costly military effort known as the Coalition Support Fund -- is worth every penny. "Yes, we may have overpaid, but it's still a good deal," said a senior administration official involved in Pakistan policy, noting that more than 1,000 Pakistani troops have been killed while assisting Operation Enduring Freedom.
"Padding? Sure. Let's be honest, we're talking about Pakistan, which has a legacy of corruption," added another U.S. official familiar with past U.S. payments. "But if they're billing us $5 billion and it's worth only $4 billion, the question is whether it's worth nickel-and-diming it if it's such a top national security objective. If it's in the ballpark, does the bigger picture call for continuing on with a process that does generate significant progress on the war on terror? They do get their hands on people we can't."
U.S. officials say the payments to Pakistan -- which over the past six years have totaled $5.7 billion -- were cheap compared with expenditures on Iraq, where the United States now spends at least $1 billion a week on military operations alone.
"My sense is that the Pakistani military would not be out on the border if not for the Coalition Support Funds. That's the baseline cost of getting them out on a mission that is really our mission," said Craig Cohen, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the author of a recent study on U.S.-Pakistan relations.
Yet the Bush administration has recently begun to scrutinize Pakistan's bills more closely. Washington delayed payment of about $78 million of $360 million for the March-June 2007 quarter now working its way through the reimbursement process. Pakistan will receive only $282 million later this month, U.S. officials said, with additional payment once it provides more detailed accounting.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/02/20/ST2008022002819.html?hpid=topnews
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/20/AR2008022002741_2.html?hpid=topnews&sid=ST2008022002819
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Gang-of-Four Planned Kargil, Keeping Pakistan in the Dark
Special SAT Report
WASHINGTON, July 22: Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was not aware of the Kargil Operation when he received Indian PM Vajpayee in Lahore on Feb 20, 1999, a new book written by a senior former police officer from Pakistan, and published by a New York Publishing house, has revealed. The book, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror, is authored by Mr Hassan Abbas, who is currently a Research Fellow at the Harvard Law School and a PhD. candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He has served in the administrations of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1994-95) and General Musharraf (1999-2000).
The book examines the rise of religious extremism in Pakistan, and analyzes its connections to Pakistan Army's policies and the fluctuating US-Pakistan relations. It includes profiles of leading Pakistani Jihadi groups with details of their origins, development, and capabilities based on interviews with Pakistani intelligence officials, and operators of the militant groups. The book contains new historical materials on Operation Gibraltar (1965 War with India), conspiracy behind General Zia-ul-Haq’s plane crash in 1988, a botched military coup by fundamentalists in army in 1993-4, the story of National Accountability Bureau (from an insider’s perspective) and lastly about how General Musharraf handled the volatile situation after the 9/11 attacks.
Besides General Musharraf’s detailed profile, the book evaluates the India-Pakistan relations vis-à-vis the Kashmir conflict, and Dr AQ Khan’s nuclear proliferation crisis. The book offers predictions for Pakistan's domestic and regional prospects. Author Hassan Abbas gives a graphic description of how the Kargil disaster was planned and managed by the Army led by General Musharraf who led a “Gang of Four” and quotes Pakistan High Commissioner to UK, Maleeha Lodhi as saying: “Even corps commanders and other service chiefs were excluded from the decision-making process.” “So much so that even the very able DGMO, Lieutenant General Tauqir Zia, was initiated into the secret after the gang of four had already taken the irrevocable decision of going ahead with the operation,” the book says. The chapter on the Kargil Episode asks “Who is to be Blamed” and gives a detailed account of what happened based on author’s interviews with many serving and retired army officers. It says:
“In May 1999, just three months after the frozen road to Indo-Pak dialogue had thawed enough to get a promise for more going, Pakistan launched its operation against the Kargil Heights in the far north of Indian-held Kashmir, just across the LOC. These heights dominated the main Indian supply route to Leh, where India had a small cantonment to house one brigade. It was the Indian routine at Kargil to descend the heights at the start of the winter snows and reoccupy them the following spring. With these heights in Pakistani hands, it meant that supplies to Leh could not be maintained.
And though India did have an alternate route, it was not an all-weather, all-season road. India would therefore have no option but to recover the heights and open the road to Leh or allow its garrison to perish. Though, of course, even if India had any number of alternative roads, its pride alone would have sufficed for them to mount an operation for the relief of Kargil. This operation had been discussed at least twice before in earlier years and turned down both times. General Zia-ul-Haq was the first army chief invited by the Military Operations (MO) directorate to see a presentation on this operation. After sitting through it, he resorted in his most chaste Urdu, which he would normally do only when he wanted to take someone to task. His ensuing conversation with the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO), as narrated by a senior army officer, went somewhat like this:
Zia: When we take Kargil, what do you expect the Indians to do? . . . I mean, don’t you think they will try and recapture it?
DGMO: Yes sir, but we think that the position is impregnable and we can hold it against far superior forces.
Zia: Now that’s very good, but in that case, don’t you think the Indians will go for a limited offensive elsewhere along the line of control, take some of our territory, and use it as a bargaining chip?
DGMO: Yes sir, this is possible, but . . .
Zia: And if they are beaten back there also, don’t you think they will attack across the international frontier, which may lead to a full-scale war?
DGMO: That’s possible, sir.
Zia: So in other words, you have prepared a plan to lead us into a full-scale war with India!
This sardonic observation by Zia ul-Haq caused the demise of the first Kargil proposal. The second time the plan was mooted, it was shot down on the same grounds, that is, it was an easy tactical operation that was untenable in the long run unless Pakistan were prepared to go into a full-scale war with India, in which Kargil would be a secondary objective.
The third and final operational plan for Kargil was put forward by its inspirational father, Lieutenant General Mohammad Aziz Khan, chief of the general staff (CGS). Himself a Kashmiri, he was fully committed to the cause of Kashmiri freedom, and not the sort of man who held any commitment lightly. He is very religious and not known to be a hypocrite. The tactical parents of the Kargil plan were two. The first was Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmad, the commander of 10th Corps, in whose area of operations the objective lay. He was a comparatively weaker personality than Aziz, with a romance about history. It is believed that he was convinced by the conviction of Aziz, which, combined with his own historical dream, made him a hostage to the Kargil idea.
The second parent of the plan was Major General Javed Hassan, commander of the Pakistani troops in the Northern Areas (Force Command Northern Areas, FCNA) who would actually have to carry out the operation. He had one of the best minds in the army and even more ambition. He gave his unstinting support to the operation, less through any sense of conviction and more because of the promise that such a position held of bringing him into General Pervez Musharraf’s charmed inner circle. Musharraf was taken in by the enthusiasm of two of his closest generals, and, being eternally levitated by an irrepressible streak of unreal optimism, he became the strongest advocate of the operation. The absolute secrecy that was one of the preconditions of the success of the operation, to secure it against any possibility of leaks, also made it proof against any possibility of a second opinion, and thus against any collusion with a sense of reality.
According to Maleeha Lodhi, “Even corps commanders and other service chiefs were excluded” from the decision-making process. So much so that even the very able DGMO, Lieutenant General Tauqir Zia, was initiated into the secret after the gang of four had already taken the irrevocable decision of going ahead with the operation. The next task was to bring the prime minister on board. For this, a presentation was organized. The exact date of this presentation is a million-dollar question, as this may consequently decide how history will judge both Musharraf and Nawaz.
According to Niaz A. Naik’s narration of the events to Prof. Robert Wirsing, Nawaz Sharif was given a briefing by the army on the Kashmir issue on March 27 or 28, 1999, which probably was the one where the Kargil Plan was discussed.
Similarly, according to Owen Bennett Jones, the army contends that a specific briefing on the Kargil Plan was given in the second week of March 1999, where Nawaz granted formal approval of the plan. Most probably, both Naik and Jones are referring to the same meeting, and it certifies that at the time of Nawaz’s meeting with Vajpayee on February 20, 1999, he was not aware of the Kargil operation. Anyhow, Nawaz came to hear the Kargil presentation accompanied by the recently retired CGS of the army, Lieutenant General Iftikhar Ali Khan, who was Nawaz’s secretary of defense. Iftikhar knew Musharraf, Mahmood, and Aziz well and should have used his rank and influence to abort the operation, but he did not, though he certainly showed his reservations. Nawaz’s other adviser was Majid Malik, a minister in the cabinet and a retired lieutenant general who had served as DGMO and CGS during his military career a generation earlier. He had a sharp mind and asked all the right questions of the assembled generals, and pointed out all the weaknesses in their overall plan, and its immediate and larger implications.
This should have educated Nawaz Sharif adequately to put the operation on hold pending a detailed reexamination of the project, but it did not. Sharif agreed with the plan, though the operation was already in its final stages and Nawaz was not aware of that. Probably in his reverie, he was looking to the glory that would come his way when the fruits promised by operation were harvested. However, close associates of Nawaz contend that the said briefing never mentioned that regular troops would be involved in the operation, and the discussion was framed entirely in terms of “increasing the heat in Kashmir.”
Interestingly, in the latest book on the Kargil issue, Shireen Mazari, a Pakistani academic known for her pro-military stance, asserts that the Kargil operation was in fact planned to counter similar moves expected by the Indians in the area, and this military move was in reality a defensive action finalized after credible intelligence reports confirmed Indian designs for incursions across the LOC! This theory is not corroborated by any other source. In reality, the Kargil plan was for Pakistan to send in a mixture of Kashmiri fighters and regular/paramilitary troops (the Northern Light Infantry Regiment) to occupy the heights above Kargil before the Indian Army moved in to reoccupy them at the end of the snow season and cut off the supply route to Leh.
The operation was to be projected as a solely Kashmiri mujahideen operation, denying absolutely any Pakistani involvement in it or that Pakistan had any control or influence over these elements. It is worth noting that until the occupation of the heights became an accomplished fact, neither any of the other service chiefs nor the rest of the corps commanders or Musharraf’s personal staff officers knew anything about the operation.
The result was that, when the Indian Air Force joined the action, the Pakistan Air Force was in no position to respond while the army’s quartermaster general and master general of ordnance, both of whose support was vital for any army operation, were also left totally in the dark. Thus if Kargil had led to general war, the army would have learned that its newest fleet of tanks, of which it was so proud, had no APDSFS antitank ammunition! The other effect of the secrecy surrounding Kargil was that no one in the Pakistani diplomatic corps was equipped to deal with the questions arising in the wake of the operation, while it also split the generals into two groups, that is, those who were “in” and those who were left “out.”
The masterminds of the operation were driven by the belief that their nuclear capability provided a protective shield to Pakistan, and that India would acquiesce to this capture just like Pakistan was compelled to swallow India’s seizure of the Siachen peaks in 1984. All the four generals involved in the Kargil project had remained instructors in different military training institutions during their careers, teaching young officers how vital it is to weigh the pros and cons of a military offensive in terms of understanding the possible ramifications and enemy reactions. It is strange that these generals forgot such a basic military lesson and seriously miscalculated Indian capabilities both in terms of military strength and political influence in the international arena.
The Indians reacted in an outburst of justifiable rage, citing Pakistan’s bad faith for having welcomed their prime minister to Lahore while concurrent preparations for the Kargil operation were already under way. In Pakistan there was no widespread feeling of regret, though few knew what had really happened.
Within the army the general feeling about India was that had made its nuclear tests in the belief that this would force Pakistan to show its hand, and that if this came short, Pakistan would be pushed into the status of an Indian satellite; but when this did not happen, Vajpayee came to Lahore to restart a long suspended dialogue merely to lull a nuclear Pakistan to sleep while cooking up some other perfidious scheme against it, and any measure against such an enemy was entirely justified.
Pakistan’s explanation of the events at Kargil, though, had a skeptical reception in international circles to begin with, and later their version was entirely discredited. For India, the exposure of their neighbor’s duplicity must have been satisfying, but surely not enough. After India’s first abortive attacks to reclaim the heights, it started a large military buildup by moving all its 130mm artillery regiments to the target area and picking up a substantial amount of smart munitions around the world. It is an amazing commentary on the coordination between the “mujahideen” occupying Kargil heights and those fighting inside held Kashmir that when the Indian reinforcements were snaking up the winding roads in endless convoys, there was no reported attempt at an ambush by the latter to disrupt this operation.
When the buildup was complete, India subjected the objective to air strikes and massive artillery barrages day after day, followed by determined and courageous infantry attacks in very difficult conditions. The Pakistan Army top brass had confided to various friends who had their trust that their men on the heights were adequately provisioned and well dug in to withstand the rigors of a long campaign. The truth, as it later transpired, was that the digging in was minimal because the rocky soil just did not allow this. The result was not only that the troops were exposed to harsh weather and the shrapnel of exploding shells, but also to the splinters of rocks that followed the explosions. For most, their only safety was to scramble to the comparative security of the reverse slopes during the bombardment, and then get back to the other side of the hill to meet the infantry attacks that normally followed the artillery barrages.
Pakistani reserves of supplies and ammunition were woefully inadequate to begin with, and became alarmingly low as the operation progressed, with many having to survive by eating the pitiful vegetation that braved the rocky slopes. Under these circumstances, the resistance they put up was both heroic and magnificent, and the quality of junior leadership again proved admirable. But Pakistani generals again failed miserably—as the plan and preparations were defective. Kargil left an already friendless Pakistan in almost total diplomatic isolation. Even China, whose president had counseled Pakistan as recently as late 1996 to go slow on Kashmir and concentrate instead on the economic viability of the country, felt constrained to distance itself from Islamabad’s latest adventure. Major General Javed Hassan, the commander on the spot, was being threatened by words and gestures of subordinates that could only be described as mutinous. Lieutenant General Mahmood, on whom reality started to dawn fatefully late in the day, saw his adequate jaw falling at an alarming rate.
And though the conviction and inner reserves of Lieutenant General Aziz, helped by blissful ignorance, kept him as gung-ho as ever and also helped keep Musharraf’s optimism afloat, the prime minister had become a case stricken by fright. Under these circumstance, Nawaz was left to plead desperately for a meeting with President Clinton, who found that his schedule allowed him a few free hours on July 4, 1999.
It is widely believed that at this meeting Nawaz swore complete ignorance about the Kargil operation till everything terrible hit the fan. Blaming everything on his generals, he just begged to be bailed out. Clinton told him quite unequivocally that whether the “mujahideen” occupying the Kargil heights listened to Pakistan or not, the immediate step it would have to take was to evacuate Kargil. As a sop he promised the Pakistani prime minister that following this evacuation, he would treat the issue of Kashmir with active interest. In the midst of this crisis in June 1999, General Zinni, then commander in chief of the US Centcom (Central Command), had visited Pakistan accompanied by G. Lanpher, deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asia, to impress upon Pakistan’s military commanders the need for de-escalation. This team also visited India during the tour. However, according to Shireen Mazari, some senior Pakistani army officers are of the view that the United States prevented India from coming to the negotiating table with Pakistan, and in this context she also mentions the visit of Henry Kissinger to India in early June, who was “apparently carrying a message from the US government not to negotiate with Pakistan.” It is a moot point whether such was the case, but it was obvious that US sympathies were with India in this conflict. To any neutral observer of the international political scene, this was a predictable outcome as US interests were increasingly being linked with those of India in the region, but Pakistan’s military hierarchy was apparently oblivious of what was so clearly written on the wall.
The evacuation of Kargil was followed by a hum of resentment all over Pakistan. The loved ones of those who had given their lives on the desolate and remote slopes there wanted to know that if unilateral withdrawal was to be the end of the whole exercise, what the point was of sacrificing the lives of their sons and brothers? The people of Pakistan had been subjected to the largest whispering campaign in history to expect a great victory. When the operation fizzled out like a wet firecracker, they were a nation left speechless in anger and disbelief. Musharraf and the planners could not give any excuses in public, but privately they let it be known that the blame for the scuttling of a brilliant operation lay on a panic-prone prime minister, who could not stand up to the US president. Nawaz Sharif too could not say anything in his defense publicly, but privately he let it be known that his generals had taken him for a ride, and that he had to bend over backward to get the US president to help Pakistan out of a very sticky situation."
http://antisystemic.org/satribune/www.satribune.com/archives/july04/P1_book.htm
Intellectual Dishonesty in Pakistan.
As per a website:
A Simple Guide To Pakistan’s Friends And Enemies by SAFDAR ALI Wednesday, 1 April 2009. http://www.ahmedquraishi.com/
http://www.ahmedquraishi.com/article_detail.php?id=642
A famous and an honest Pakistani bureaucrat, QUDRATUALLAH SHAHAB, wrote the following in his autobiography, SHAHAB NAMA, in page 778. I
have translated this from Urdu to English: 'Although Russia and America are enemies but on some issues they become friends.’ I was surprised and asked, ‘For example?’ He said, ‘For example, PAKISTAN.’
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Reply is in two parts:
1 - Ayub Khan, US Spy Plane U2 Flights:
2 - More on so-called honest Pakistani bureaucrat, QUDRATUALLAH SHAHAB.
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1 - Ayub Khan, US Spy Plane U2 Flights
One of the wonders of Internet and IT that you cannot hide truth anymore because nowadays a simple google click can take you back to the Past History. By the way Late. Qudratullah Shahab, was Fraud and Cheater to the core and these plus points [Cheating and Fraud] become more detrimental, fatal, critical and aggravated when one is a Retired ICS/CSP Officer [always write a book after enjoying every perk and benefits to hoodwink the unsuspecting Pakistanis] and Sufi [Habitual, Pathological and Rampant Liars to the core read in the paragraphs below, why?] as well which Qudratullah Shahab was. By the way Qudratullah Shahab was Information Secretary for Filed Martial [without fighting any war and I wonder why Jinnah reprimanded Ayub Khan when Ayub was GOC in Dhaka - East Pakistan now Bangladesh] Ayub Khan, and Shahab served him very well. Please type U2 Spy Plane and US Spy Gary Powers in the search option of The National Security Archive [www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ -
Declassified US Government Document] and you will know the following [which happened under the very nose of the so-called honest Pakistani bureaucrat, QUDRATUALLAH SHAHAB:
General Ayub allowed US Spy Plane U2 Flights from A BASE IN BADABEER - NWFP to spy on USSR. I wonder why this crucial information was kept hidden from Pakistani people and by the way the so-called honest Pakistani bureaucrat, QUDRATUALLAH SHAHAB was very much in confidence of General Ayub. Now read
"QUOTE"
Ayub Khan frustrated with slow pace of negotiations with US during his visit to Washington went to Henry Byroad’s office and told him, ‘I didn’t come here to look at barracks. Our army can be your army if you want us. But let’s make a decision’. Once US decided about Pakistan’s role in the defence of the region and containment of Communism, it was the armed forces of Pakistan and not the political leadership, which was seen as potential partners. Ayub Khan obsessed with modernization of the armed forces in shortest possible time saw the relationship with US the only way to achieve his organizational and personal objectives. In meeting with US officials during his April 1958 visit, Ayub stressed that armed forces are the strongest element. He was of the view that if elections were held in the prevailing circumstances, the left wing politicians will come to power which will not only destabilize Pakistan but will affect US strategic
interests.Pakistan was seen by US in military terms which was quite natural as US national interest was related to security. In 1953, Pakistan was described as a country with many qualities, which were, “... a volunteer army of 3,000,000... it is not neutral but anti-communist... As a possible ally for US, Pakistan displays a tempting picture of power — potential and actual”.Pakistan army was seen as ‘a disciplined, well trained army whose morale and bravery are unquestionable’.Some events in Washington regarding Pakistan became comical. In 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles while arguing for wheat aid to Pakistan told sub-committee on Agriculture and Forestry during hearings that, ‘the people of Pakistan had a splendid military tradition and that in Karachi he had been met by a guard of honour which was the ‘finest’ he had ever seen’.Apparently, he did not tell the agriculture department what on earth the wheat aid has to do
with the military. After the signing of first mutual defence treaty in May 1954, large-scale interaction between US and Pakistani military started. Pakistan became one of the seven members (other members included Thailand, South Vietnam, Taiwan, Philippines, Laos and Cambodia) of elite ‘Defence Support Countries” in South East Asia. A US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) was established in Army Headquarters in Rawalpindi. A Military Assistance Programme (MAP) was started. Pakistan army was divided into MAP and Non-MAP units depending on their role. MAP units were oriented towards safeguarding US interests and non-MAP units along Indian border.
The objectives of US and Pakistan were different in this military alliance. For US the arrangement was to safeguard US interests in southwest Asia and Middle East and not against India. Pakistani military establishment saw the relationship as a short cut to modernization of its armed forces but failed to comprehend long-term strategic interest of Pakistan. One frequently hears the complaints of Pakistani officers from top to bottom about ‘betrayal’ and ‘abandoning’ by America. The fact that US was following her national interest while mediocre Pakistani military leadership were more in wishful thinking rather than planning for safeguarding their national interest. There was nothing secret about US policy. In several public statements and documents, US objectives have been clearly stated, if Pakistani generals could not see them, this was their own folly. The general principles of these security agreements were that United States will enter a
security agreement when:
- There is a genuine threat to US interests.
- The mutual security pact will significantly contribute to preserve these interests.
- The final judgment of US troop commitment will be made by elected representatives.
- Allies will contribute their fair share in terms of personnel, weapons, resources and government support.
As early as 1962, Colonel Jordan wrote about US position as far as Pakistan was concerned, “... because of their deployment, the Pakistani forces in Eastern Pakistan and Kashmir (Non-MAP supported) are the ones most likely to become entangled with the Indian Army should an incident arise. US responsibility for such non-MAP Pakistani forces is no greater than for Indian Army units, which have indirectly benefited by the massive US economic aid given to India”. While Colonel Jordan wrote with precision and clarity, Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan was baffled. Muqeem wrote, “It would be interesting to know why the United States did not take over the responsibility of supporting the entire standing army at the time of the agreement. Those parts of the army, which are now in Kashmir and East Pakistan, and some other units, do not have military assistance. Similarly, no training establishments or static installations are supported”.These few words
speak a volume about the intellectual level of senior leadership.
In July 1959, Pakistan agreed for establishment of US base near Peshawar to be operated by US officials. General Khalid M. Arif while commenting on U-2 incident (U-2 was a US spy plane operating from Badaber base near Peshawar. It was shot down by Soviet SA-2 missile and its pilot Gary Powers was captured. The incident severely compromised Pakistan security and brought the Soviet ire on Pakistan. Soviets paid back Pakistan within a decade during East Pakistan crisis) states that, ‘Pakistan felt deceived because the US had kept her in the dark about such clandestine spy operations launched from Pakistan’s territory’.Statements like these from such highly placed officers don’t speak well for Pakistan. As early as 1959, when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, as acting foreign minister wished to visit the facility, the American base commander replied that, ‘the minister would be welcome to visit the cafeteria where he would be served coffee and sandwiches’.An
American air force base located in the border area of Pakistan near Soviet territory where spy planes were parked, run by Americans where even the highest Pakistani officials could not enter was not suppose to bake cookies or train pilots for aerial aerobatics. Ayub Khan was fully aware of the operations. He was in London at the time of U-2 incident. When the CIA station chief gave Ayub the news, he shrugged his shoulders and said that he had expected this would happen at some point.In 50s there was increasing number of Pakistani officers who got training in United States. The military doctrine shifted from British to American. Fazal Muqeem points to the change of thought process of officer corps. “Such healthy and friendly contacts were bound to have a decisive influence on the ideas of the officer corps. They soon made their impact on the thinking of Pakistani commanders and staff. In the re-organization of the army, American ideas influenced the
planners in a number of ways”.The influence was not limited to the knowledge of new weaponry and defence strategy and tactics. According to Colonel Jordan, the purpose of training of officers in US was not only to train them in particular fields but also to groom them for non-military activities (leadership, management and economics). In addition, MAAG officers were in agreement that the off-shore trained officer is more receptive to continued military advice and suggestions than his colleagues”.It is interesting to note that officers from different countries (Asia, Africa, Latin and South America) trained in US quite confident of their newly acquired skills took power in their own countries.
Tale of a love affair that never was: United States-Pakistan Defence Relations Columnist Hamid Hussain analyses an ON and OFF affair.
http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/june/loveaffair.htm
"UNQUOTE"
2 - More on so-called honest Pakistani bureaucrat, QUDRATUALLAH SHAHAB:
Qudratullah Sahab (later became Sufis and used to tell as to how he witness the separation of his soul from his body [while alive in a Chapter of his biography Shahabnama)- but he was the very persons who is the reason of the Collapse of Independent and Vibran Print Media and Journalism in Pakistan way back in 60s.
The Press and Publications Ordinance, 1960, was promulgated when Qudratullah Shahab, a super-bureaucrat, was Ayub’s Information Secretary. During his tenure as the Secretary, Ministry of Information, the Progressive Papers Limited had been taken over. The day these papers “turned a new leaf”, the editorial was written by himself claiming that “distant orbits and alien horizons- far from territorial and ideological boundaries of Pakistan- exercised a progressively increasing charm on the tone and policies of this newspaper (Pakistan Times). Which gradually began to look like a stranger in the house….”.
The decision to establish the National Press Trust had been taken, which was implemented by his successor. Shahab’s masterstroke was the creation of the Writers’ Guild. He himself was its first Secretary-General, while another Intellectual- Bureaucrat, Jamiluddin Aali (another Darbari Gawayya, not in the book my words) was appointed the Secretary. Three leading business houses of Karachi- Adamjees, Dawoods and Habibs-were marshalled to award “cash prizes” to “deserving writers” in order to “buy and corrupt their loyalties”.
Good old days of General Ayub: [The Press in Chains by late. Zamir Niazi]:
On April 22, 1968, Chattan and its editor were once again in trouble. The paper was closed down under the Defence of Pakistan Rules, his press confiscated and Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri sent to jail. During the trial, the two High Court judges, Justice Bashiruddin and Justice Shaukat Ali, were under constant pressure. Both the judges were informed of the West Pakistan Governor, General Muhammad Musa’s strong reaction over the acceptance of Begum Shorish’s petition. They were told that “the Government was quite strong and could harass the judges.” Justice Shaukat Ali was informed that the Chief Secretary, Sheikh Ikramul Haque, was in rage, and “used harsh language” against him. According to Justice Shaukat Ali, Haque was “giving direction to the Bench at the instance of the Provincial Government”. Justice Shaukat Ali made representations to the Law Secretary, Government of Pakistan, Justice Muhammad Gul, and the Chief Justice of the
West Pakistan High Court stating:
“Never before in the history of the judiciary – not ever during foreign domination judges were shabbily treated as was done in the case of the Bench entrusted with the hearing of the writ petition challenging the detention of Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri under the DPR. There were visible attempts from the very outset of the hearing of the petition to influence the Bench. When the members of the bench did not succumb to such influences then there were threats communicated to the effect that the judges could also be harassed? When threats had gone unheeded investigations was held into the assets of the members of the Bench. [The Press in Chains by Late. Zamir Niazi published by Royal Book Company, Karachi.]
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