Waziristan operation: "Name the names"; and the "mullah military alliance"

Two great articles on the situation in Waziristan. The first article by Farhat Taj requests the educated people of Waziristan to give a strong rebuttal to disinformed writers in the west and in Pakistan. The second article (in Urdu) by Abdul Haye Kakar of BBC Urdu which reveals that a dangerous link between Taliban and Pakistan Army may still be in operation in that region.



Waziristan: name the names

Saturday, November 07, 2009 (The News)
Farhat Taj

The points that Ayaz Wazir (Oct 30) raised in response to my article (Oct 26) endorsed some of the arguments that I have been making in these pages -- i.e., the previous military operations in Waziristan were not targeted and the leadership of the Taliban terrorists was tacitly given safe passages to escape. The operations ended with suspicious "peace deals" with the terrorists in complete disregard to the people of Waziristan, who wished complete elimination of the Taliban. All this has been stage-managed in pursuit of foreign-policy goals in Afghanistan.

I have a comment on Ayaz Wazir's article, and an explanation. The comment is about the questions he raised. Who was responsible for the collapse of the three institutions around which the tribal system revolved? Was it done by the tribesmen themselves? Was it done by a foreign power or non-state actors within the country? Who elevated Nek Mohammad overnight to heights of popularity by entering into a deal with him? Who was threatening Waziristan's Yargulkhail tribe of dire consequences? It certainly was not the tribesmen to be blamed for the collapse of the system.

The time to pose these questions is gone. I would request the educated people of Waziristan to name those who engineered creation of the Taliban and imposed them on Waziristan. Privately, the people of Waziristan (and Pakhtuns in general) hold state elements responsible for that. Publicly, they do not speak out.

Coming to the explanation regarding my comparison between the educated people of Swat and Waziristan, the latter may not be as integrated in the state structure of Pakistan as Swat, but most educated people of Waziristan are just as integrated in the state and society of Pakistan as those of Swat. It is unlikely that lack of integration of Waziristan might have prevented them from doing what the educated people of Swat did: use of modern technological tools and interaction with the media to highlight the brutal Taliban occupation of Swat.

When the crisis started in Swat, many Swatis created blogs and constantly informed the world about Taliban atrocities in their area. Many composed poetry and songs about the human sufferings there, and put them on YouTube. Countless Swatis were in constant contact with media people and op-ed writers, including myself. They sent us information which they wished to be presented in the media. They were complete strangers. I often cross-checked their information with my sources in Swat and mostly, their information was correct. This is something that I have not seen coming from the educated people of Waziristan.

The Swatis made a world impact in a shorter time than Waziristanis: many people around the world came to know that the people of Swat were suffering Taliban atrocities. Many Swatis worked with fake names and identities, since there was no need to show bravado, given the security situation.

Because the educated people of Waziristan are silent, people around the world and in Pakistan have provided their own answers to questions like those raised by Ayaz Wazir. The answers are not only baseless but also ridiculous. Bizarre ideas have been attributed to the people of Waziristan by writers in western countries, who, in the words of a cynical Pakhtun, are engaged in "Google scholarship" to understand Waziristan. This means they Google Waziristan and write a whole book or research papers on the area. They hardly care to crosscheck their Google knowledge with the ground realities of Waziristan, an area not accessible for independent scholarly and journalistic investigation due to the security situation. The "Google scholars" hardly pay any attention to research ethics when attributing notions to people and culture of Waziristan. They could never assign such bizarre ideas to people in western countries with the same ease with which they do in the case of the people of Waziristan, because in the west research ethics applies to researchers. Who cares about research ethics when it comes to the people and culture of Waziristan.

The other group of people who spread lies about Waziristan are armchair analysts, and pro-establishment and right-wing journalists and writers in Pakistan. The lies and the Google-scholarly notions are: the tribes of Waziristan back the Taliban, actually the tribes are the Taliban, the tribes have given refuge to Al Qaeda terrorists under the tribal code of Pakhtunwali, Talibanisation in Waziristan is a reaction to US drone attacks in the area, the Taliban are Pakhtun nationalists, Talibanisation is an indigenous movement for social justice, the people of Waziristan are attacking Pakistan because the state is seen as siding with the US, the people of Waziristan are fiercely autonomous and abhor integration in a modern state structure, etc. Most books, research and news reports about Waziristan perpetuate such hilarious and baseless nations about the people and culture there.

Both Google scholars in the western countries and pro-establishment right-wingers of Pakistan have misinformed and misled the public about Waziristan in Pakistan and abroad. They both promote their careers by writing such literature and attending conferences about Waziristan and thus make money out of the sufferings of the people of this tortured land. Whose responsibility is it challenge this all? I have not seen educated people of Waziristan questioning this situation with facts of history and the current realities of the area.

The educated people of Waziristan should give a strong rebuttal to such writers in the west and in Pakistan. I wish to remind them that freedom is never given for free. One has to fight for it. They too have to fight for the freedom of their native land from not just the Taliban but also from the Google scholars and Pakistani right-wingers.


The writer is a research fellow at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Gender Research, University of Oslo, and a member of Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy. Email: bergen34@ yahoo.com

The Mullah-Military Alliance at Work in Waziristan?

فوجی آپریشن یا فوجی مشقیں؟

عبدالحئی کاکڑ

بی بی سی اردو ڈاٹ کام، پشاور

طالبان اپنے زیر کنٹرول علاقوں سے ایک ایک کر کے پسپائی اختیار کر رہے ہیں

پانچ سال تک’ نو گو ایریا‘ رہنے کے بعد طالبان کے زیر کنٹرول جنوبی وزیرستان نے بالاخر اپنی یہ حیثیت گنوادی اور محض تین ہفتوں میں پاکستانی فوج نے قدرے آسانی کے ساتھ طالبان سے نوے فیصد سے زیادہ علاقہ واپس لے لیا۔

یہ سمجھا جاتا رہا تھا کہ جنوبی وزیرستان کی فوجی کاروائی اب تک ہونے والی کاروائیوں میں ہر لحاظ سے مشکل ترین ہوگی لیکن کارروائی کے آغاز کے ساتھ ہی طالبان کی ’طاقت‘ جھاگ کی طرح بیٹھتی ہوئی نظر آئی۔

اب تک ہونے والے آپریشن کے دوران مزاحمت نہ ہونے کے برابر ہے اور سکیورٹی فورسز بلا کسی رکاوٹ کے طالبان کے گڑھ سمجھے جانے والے علاقوں کی طرف کچھ اسی رفتار سے آگے بڑھ رہی ہیں جس رفتار سے کوئی انسان فطری طور پر آگے بڑھ سکتا ہے۔ بعض اوقات تو یوں لگتا ہے کہ جنوبی وزیرستان میں فوجی کاروائی نہیں بلکہ فوجی مشقیں جاری ہیں۔ایسا کیوں؟

اس کیوں کے کئی جوابات ہوسکتے ہیں۔پہلی بات تو یہ ہے کہ جنوبی وزیرستان میں فوجی کارروائی کا اعلان اس سال مئی میں ہوا تھا اور آپریشن شروع سترہ اکتوبر کو ہوا یعنی طالبان اور غیر ملکی جنگجوؤں کو تقریباً پانچ ماہ کا وقت دے دیا گیا کہ وہ یا تو بھر پور مزاحمت کے لیے تیار ہو جائیں یا پھر اپنا بوریا بستر گول کر کے کہیں اور منتقل ہوجائیں۔

طالبان نے پسپائی سے تین فائدے حاصل کیے۔ ایک تو انہوں نے اپنا اسلحہ محفوظ کر دیا دوسری اپنی افرادی قوت میں کمی نہیں آنے دی اور تیسرا یہ کہ ان کی قیادت بڑے آرام سے’کہیں اور‘ منتقل ہوگئی۔

ہوا ایسا ہی۔ اس بار تو یہ بات طے تھی حکومت کارروائی کو اپنی منطقی انجام تک پہنچائے گی لہذا شدت پسندوں کے لیے مزاحمت کی حکمت عملی خودکشی کے مترادف معلوم ہورہی تھی۔ لہذا انہوں نے علاقے خالی کرنے کی حکمت عملی کو ترجیح دی جس کے فوائد ان کی نظر میں کم جبکہ نقصانات زیادہ تھے۔ ماضی میں جنوبی وزیرستان میں جب بھی کوئی کارروائی ہوئی ہے اس وقت جنگجوؤں کے پاس’ مرو یا مارو‘ کے علاوہ کوئی اور راستہ نہیں تھا لیکن اس بار صورتحال بہت مختلف تھی۔

وزیرستان کے محسود جنگجوؤں نےگزشتہ دو سالوں میں اپنے علاقوں سے نکل کر دیگر قبائلی علاقوں میں اپنی جڑیں اتنی مضبوط کر لی ہیں کہ مصیبت کے وقت انہیں کوئی اکھاڑ کر اتنی آسانی سے زمین پر پٹخ نہیں سکتا۔ خیبر، باجوڑ، مہمند، کرم اور اورکزئی ایجنسی میں محسود طالبان نے مقامی طالبان کے ساتھ مل کر اپنی قوت میں اضافہ کیا ہے اور فیصلوں کا اختیار بھی اپنے پاس رکھا۔ فوجی کارروائی سے قبل ان پانچ مہینوں میں وزیرستان کے طالبان نے اپنے زیر کنٹرول دیگر علاقوں کی طرف اپنے اہل خانہ کو منتقل کردیا جبکہ خود جنوبی وزیرستان میں ہی رہ گئے تاکہ وقت آنے پر وہاں سے نکل سکیں۔

آپریشن کے دوران اب تک کی کارروائی کو دیکھ کر ان شکوک و شبہات کو تقویت ملتی دکھائی دیتی ہے کہ کارروائی سے قبل ہی فریقین کے درمیان ایک خفیہ مفاہمت ہوچکی تھی تاکہ فریقین ’لوز لوز‘ کی پوزیشن میں نہ رہیں اور جہاں حکومت کو طالبان کے زیر کنٹرول اپنی زمین واپس مل جائے وہیں طالبان کی افرادی قوت، تنظیمی ساخت اور اسلحہ اپنی جگہ محفوظ رہے۔

تین ہفتوں کی فوجی کارروائی میں طالبان اپنے زیر کنٹرول علاقوں سے ایک ایک کر کے پسپائی اختیار کر رہے ہیں۔ بعض مقامات پر انہوں نے علامتی مزاحمت کا مظاہرہ بھی کیا جس میں انہیں جانی نقصان بھی پہنچا مگر اتنا بھی نہیں جتنا حکومت کی طرف سے دعوی کیا جا رہا ہے۔

طالبان نے پسپائی سے تین فائدے حاصل کیے۔ ایک تو انہوں نے اپنا اسلحہ محفوظ کر دیا دوسری اپنی افرادی قوت میں کمی نہیں آنے دی اور تیسرا یہ کہ ان کی قیادت بڑے آرام سے’کہیں اور‘ منتقل ہوگئی۔ طالبان کے کمزور نہ ہونے کی ایک دلیل یہ بھی ہے کہ جنوبی وزیرستان کے نوے فیصد سے زیادہ علاقوں پر کنٹرول حاصل کرنے کے بعد بھی ملک کے دیگر بڑے شہروں پشاور، راولپنڈی اور اسلام آباد میں خودکش حملوں، بم دھماکوں اور ٹارگٹ کلنگ کا سلسلہ نہیں رکا۔

آپریشن کے دوران اب تک کی کارروائی کو دیکھ کر ان شکوک و شبہات کو تقویت ملتی دکھائی دیتی ہے کہ کارروائی سے قبل ہی فریقین کے درمیان ایک خفیہ مفاہمت ہوچکی تھی تاکہ فریقین ’لوز لوز‘ کی پوزیشن میں نہ رہیں اور جہاں حکومت کو طالبان کے زیر کنٹرول اپنی زمین واپس مل جائے وہیں طالبان کی افرادی قوت، تنظیمی ساخت اور اسلحہ اپنی جگہ محفوظ رہے

Taliban leadership survives Waziristan operation

* First phase of Waziristan operation complete
* Taliban dislodged from major strongholds, but fears of terrorists’ re-grouping persist

By Sajjad Malik

ISLAMABAD: The first phase of Operation Rah-e-Nijat in South Waziristan Agency is almost complete with the major towns cleared of the Taliban, defence sources said on Saturday, but feared that the top Taliban leadership might have survived the offensive by slipping into neighbouring regions.

The operation ended the Taliban rule in South Waziristan, where the group ran a parallel government and used the territory to launch attacks on the security forces and civilians across the country.

“Not only have their major bastions been captured but also their ammunition depots, training centres, command and control systems and hideouts have also been destroyed in the operation,” the sources said.

But the Taliban’s defeat in South Waziristan might not ensure peace in the area, as the officials believe the terrorists have only retreated to their hideouts in neighbouring tribal agencies, where they could easily regroup to launch terror more attacks across the country.

The sources also ruled out an immediate operation in North Waziristan, saying the government had an agreement with the militants in the north, which was still intact.

The sources also warned that the Taliban might return after the winter to launch guerrilla warfare and terrorise the people, as the Taliban leadership had apparently survived the onslaught by moving out of the area.

The sources said the military offensive was not a permanent solution, as the army could only ensure ground clearance, not peace.

“For peace, the government should invest in developing the Tribal Areas,” they said.

They said the government would have to take the local people into confidence and reach an “understanding” with the Taliban to ensure long-term peace. (Daily Times)



Read more...

The need for an urgent army action against the Taliban in southern Punjab

NWFP for army action in southern Punjab

Bureau Report
Sunday, 11 Oct, 2009

PESHAWAR, Oct 10: The NWFP government has called for an early “Swat-like” military operation in South Waziristan and southern Punjab, where it believes “terrorists are trained and sent to other parts of the country”.

The provincial information minister said at a press conference on Saturday that the bomb blast in Peshawar the previous day was aimed at forcing the government to call off the South Waziristan operation.

“How can we stop terrorist activities in settled areas when the supply chain is intact,” Mr Iftikhar Hussain wondered.

“Elimination of terrorists requires dismantling their organised networks in Waziristan and southern Punjab.”

He said that after the Peshawar bomb blast and the terror attack on the GHQ on Saturday the time had come for a decisive action against militants.

Asked if the Peshawar bomb blast was a riposte to the suicide attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul, the minister said “this factor cannot be ruled out”. (Dawn)

Editorial: Non-state actors in South Punjab

A report published in London’s The Telegraph alleges that the outlawed terrorist organisation Jaish-e-Muhammad has acquired a 4.5-acre compound outside the city of Bahawalpur in addition to the madrassa named Usman-o-Ali inside the city. While the local authorities acknowledge that Jaish has spread out of the city, they deny that the new acquisition is anything more than a cattle farm to supply milk to the Jaish seminarians.

Interior Minister Rehman Malik has repeatedly pointed to the growing menace of terrorist activity in South Punjab. A number of acts of terrorism carried out on behalf of the Taliban have been traced to militants coming north to Lahore from the south. Individuals with large caches of explosives and weapons have been arrested in the region. And reports about variously designated jihadi groups owing allegiance to Al Qaeda have featured in the national media.

It is going to be difficult to dismiss various reports in the media after what one has heard from a number of MNAs and MPAs about the danger of terrorist insurgency in South Punjab. A majority of the “non-state actors” now operating in the region and also targeting the state of Pakistan have come from South Punjab, with Bahawalpur as epicentre, simply because first Sipah Sahaba and then Jaish-e-Muhammad have found the backwardness of the region suitable for recruiting terrorists. In 1998, Sipah boys were part of the Taliban force that took Mazar-e-Sharif and killed Iranian Revolutinary Guards personnel stationed in the city under diplomatic cover and assisting the Northern Alliance which the Taliban were fighting. Later, Jaish emerged as the organisation that fought Indian occupation forces in Occupied Kashmir but also feasted itself bloodily by attacking Shias inside Pakistan.

Pakistan and India have fought overtly and covertly and while they may be making noises to normalise relations, the covert battles carry on. India is said to be fishing in Balochistan and there are allegations that Pakistan continues to look at the extremist elements in terms of “good” and “bad”. The problem with such a policy, if it exists, is that these elements cannot be controlled effectively; they have their own agenda which goes against the security and sovereignty of Pakistan. Jaish is linked to Al Qaeda and cannot be said to advance Pakistan’s interests. The report says that the new compound acquired 5 km outside Bahawalpur has wall graffiti issuing dire threats to “Hindus and Jews” along with a picture of Delhi’s historic Red Fort. This is nothing more than a ruse because Jaish is more concerned right now about fighting Pakistani security forces than taking on any external “enemies”. Moreover, it is not permissible that the local administration should tamely accept the expansion of one madrassa while the city already has an estimated 1,000 of them, all presumably teaching a brand of Islam that never suited the state of Pakistan.

Pakistan has reason to be worried about Jaish and South Punjab because there are 3,000 to 8,000 youths from this region fighting on the side of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. The Punjab government and its law enforcement agencies should look into this and other such reports to ensure that this seminary is not up to any mischief.

The leader of Jaish, Maulana Masood Azhar was once very close to Osama bin Laden and went with him to Sudan when Al Qaeda relocated there after the jihad against the Soviet Union. He was an important fund-raiser for Al Qaeda and was caught in India after he landed there allegedly on a false passport. He was sprung from an Indian jail through a plane hijack in 1999 by elements linked to Al Qaeda.

What is most worrisome about the dominance of Jaish and other terrorist organisations in South Punjab is the fact that the local centres of power in the region are likely to succumb to it in the same way that the people did in Swat after warlord Fazlullah was allowed by the MMA government in the NWFP to establish his satrapy there. The Seraiki movement in South Punjab is against the political dominance of North Punjab but carefully skirts the real issue of the dominance of non-state actors there. This is not a good trend. Pakistan must re-evaluate its options in regard to regional security and review the policy which gave rise to the phenomenon of non-state actors. Our internal security demands that. * (Daily Times)

ملک میں پھیلتے شدت پسند نیا خطرہ

اورلا گورین

بی بی سی نیوز

وزیر داخلہ رحمان ملک نے بھی جنوبی پنجاب میں شدت پسندوں کی سرگرمیوں پر تحفظات کا اظہار کیا ہے

پاکستان میں ان خدشات میں اضافہ ہو رہا ہے کہ شدت پسند پاک افغان سرحدی علاقے سے نکل کرملک کے اندر تک پھیل رہے ہیں۔ القاعدہ سے تعلق رکھنے والی شدت پسند تنظیمیں پاکستان میں آبادی کے لحاظ سے سب سے بڑے صوبہ پنجاب میں اپنی جڑیں پکڑتی جا رہی ہیں۔

جنوبی پنجاب میں رواں سال تیرہ جولائی کو عبدالرزاق کےگاؤں میں دھماکہ خیز مواد پھٹنے سے ان کے جسم کا بیشتر حصہ ضائع ہو گیا۔ دھماکے میں سترہ افراد ہلاک ہوئے۔ رزاق کے گھر میں واحد بچنے والی چیز ایک لکڑی کی کرسی تھی۔

دھماکے کے بعد جب عبدالرزاق کے حواس بحال ہوئے تو انہوں نے اپنے بچوں کو تلاش شروع کی جو دھماکے کے وقت گھر کے صحن میں کھیل رہے تھے، لیکن ان کی لاشیں وہاں سے کوئی تین گھر دور سے ملیں۔

انہوں نے بتایا کہ ’میں نے اپنے ایک بیٹے کی لاش دیکھی جس کا سر دھماکے کی وجہ سے دھڑ سے جدا ہو چکا تھا۔ اس کے بعد دوسرے بیٹے پر نظر پڑی جو ان کے سامنے کچھ دیر بعد ہی موت کےمنہ میں چلا گیا۔پھر سب نے مل کر ملبے سے بیٹی کی لاش نکالی۔‘

عبدالرزاق کے تینوں بچوں کی بے نام قبریں کپاس کے ایک کھیت میں موجود ہیں۔ انہوں نے بتایا کہ ان کا ایک بیٹا جو بم دھماکے میں زخمی ہو گیا تھا اپنے ہلاک ہونے والے بہن بھائیوں کے بارے میں اکثر پوچھتا رہتا ہے۔

’میرا دل گھبراتا ہے، میں سکون سے نہیں بیٹھ سکتا، گاؤں میں ایک جگہ سے دوسری جگہ گھومتا رہتا ہوں۔‘

عبدالرزاق کے دور دراز گاؤں میں ہونے والا یہ دھماکہ جنوبی پنجاب میں بڑھتی ہوئی شدت پسندی کے حوالے سے ایک چونکا دینے والی خبر تھی۔

ایک رپورٹ کے مطابق جنوبی پنجاب میں غربت، مضبوط جاگیردارانہ نظام اور تعلیم کی کمی جیسے مسائل کی وجہ سے علاقے کو جہادی تنظیمیں اور طالبان اپنی پناہ گاہیں بنا سکتے ہیں۔ اس کے علاوہ اس بات کا بھی خدشہ ہے کہ یہ علاقہ شدت پسندوں کی بھرتی کے لیے ایک بڑا مرکز یا نرسری بن سکتا ہے۔ کچھ ماہرین کے مطابق یہاں حالات اب اس نہج پر پہنچ چکے ہیں۔

مختلف سینیئر پولیس افسران، غیر جانبدار تجزیہ کاروں اور زیر حراست شدت پسندوں سے حاصل ہونے والی معلومات سے یہ نتیجہ اخذ کیا جا سکتا ہے کہ جنوبی پنجاب پاکستان کا اگلا میدان جنگ بن سکتا ہے۔

ایک رپورٹ کے مطابق جنوبی پنجاب میں غربت، مضبوط جاگیردارانہ نظام اور تعلیم کی کمی جیسے مسائل کی وجہ سے علاقے کو جہادی تنظیمیں اور طالبان اپنی پناہ گاہیں بنا سکتے ہیں۔ اس کے علاوہ خدشہ ہے کہ یہ علاقہ شدت پسندوں کی بھرتی کے لیے ایک بڑا مرکز بن سکتا ہے۔

پولیس کے مطابق القاعدہ کالعدم مذہبی تنظیموں مثلاً سپاہ صحابہ کی مدد سے اس علاقے سے کارکن بھرتی کر سکتی ہے۔

پاکستان میں شدت پسندی کے رجحان پر نظر رکھنے والے ایک ماہرعظمت عباس کے مطابق القاعدہ علاقے میں کمزور شدت پسند تنظیموں کے ساتھ ہمددرانہ تعلقات رکھتے ہوئے بعد میں ان کو اپنے اندر ضم کرسکتا ہے۔

عظمت عباس کا کہنا ہے کہ ’پاکستان کا اس خطرے پر ردعمل پریشان کن ہے جو دوسرے علاقوں تک پھیل رہا ہے۔‘ ہمیں سب سے پہلے اس مسئلے کا احاطہ کرنا ہوگا کیونکہ شدت پسندوں کی توجہ صرف پنجاب تک محدود نہیں اور ان کے خلاف بیک وقت متعدد محاذ کھولنا ہونگے۔‘

پاکستان کا اس خطرے پر ردعمل پریشان کن ہے اور اب یہ اثر دوسرے علاقوں تک پھیل رہا ہے۔ہمیں سب سے پہلے اس مسئلے کا احاطہ کرنا ہو گا کیونہ شدت پسندوں کی نظریں صرف پنجاب تک محدور نہیں اور اس کے لیے ہمیں ان کے خلاف بیک وقت متعدد محاذ کھولنا ہونگے

عظمت عباس

پنجاب کے شہر سرگودھا میں پولیس نے اس بات کی تصدیق کی ہے کہ پنجاب میں القاعدہ کالعدم تحریک طالبان کے زیر سایہ سرگرم ہے اور یہ ہی سب سے بڑا خطرہ ہے جس کا ہمیں سامنا ہو سکتا ہے۔

پولیس نے رواں سال کارروائی کرتے ہوئے شدت پسندوں کے متعدد ٹھکانوں کو ختم کرتے ہوئے تیس کے قریب مشتبہ شدت پسند، ان کے ماسٹر مائنڈ اور مالی امداد فراہم کرنے والوں کو گرفتار کیا ہے۔

ضلعی پولیس افسر عثمان انور کے مطابق حالیہ کارروائی سے شدت پسندوں کو نقصان پہنچا ہے اور اب وہ بھاگ رہے ہیں اور محفوظ ٹھکانوں کی تلاش میں ہیں۔ ’ہماری کارروائی کی وجہ سے مستقبل کے لیے شدت پسندوں کی بھرتی رک گئی ہے اور جن ہیروز کی پوجا کی جاتی تھی وہ اب جیلوں میں ہیں۔‘

عثمان انور کے مطابق کارروائی ابھی جاری ہے اور اس میں کامیابی کے امکانات اسی فیصد تک ہیں۔ انہوں نے بتایاکہ جن لوگوں کو گرفتار کیا گیا ہے ان میں سے متعدد پولیس کو مطلوب نہیں تھے۔ مثال کے طور پر جس شخص کی وجہ سے عبدالرزاق کا گاؤں دھماکہ خیز مواد سے تباہ ہوا تھا وہ علاقے میں ایک معزز سکول ٹیچر سمجھا جاتاتھا۔

حالیہ کارروائی سے شدت پسندوں کو نقصان پہنچا ہے اور اب وہ بھاگ رہے ہیں اور محفوظ ٹھکانوں کی تلاش میں ہیں۔ہماری کارروائی کی وجہ سے مستقبل میں شدت پسندوں کی بھرتی رک گی ہے اور جن ہیروز کی پوجا کی جاتی تھی وہ اب جیلوں میں ہیں

عثمان انور

علاقے کے لوگوں کے مطابق سکول ٹیچر کبھی مشکوک سرگرمیوں میں ملوث نہیں رہا اور جس وقت ان کے گھر میں دھماکہ خیز مواد پھٹا تھا تو ملبے پر کھڑے مرد اور عورتیں انہیں ایک نیک دل اور شریف شخص کہہ رہے تھے۔

ایک مقامی دیہاتی کے مطابق سکول ٹیچر ان کے گاؤں میں پیدا اور جوان ہوئے۔ اس طرح ہمیں کیا معلوم ہو سکتا ہے کہ وہ اپنے گھر میں کیا کر رہے تھے۔

سکول ٹیچر جنہوں نے تسلیم کیا ہے کہ عبدالرزاق کے گاؤں میں ہونے والے دھماکے کے ذمہ دار وہ ہیں۔( انٹرویو کے دوران ان کا چہرہ ڈھانپا ہوا تھا اور وہ ہتھکڑی پہنے ہوئے تھے)۔

انہوں نے بتایا کہ ان کے رابطے افغانستان میں سرگرم عمل شدت پسندوں سے تھے اور ان کے لیے دھماکہ خیز مواد جمع کر رہے تھے۔ جب ان سے سوال پوچھا گیا کہ کیا کبھی انہوں نے سوچا تھا کہ دھماکہ خیز مواد سے ان کے دوست اور ہمسائے ہلاک ہو جائیں گے تو اس پر انہوں نے روتے ہوئے کہا کہ ’میں گھٹنوں کے بل جھک کر متاثرین سے معافی مانگنے کے لیے تیار ہوں۔‘

لیکن انہوں نے کہا کہ وہ اس بات پر لازمی خوش ہوتے اگر دھماکہ خیز مواد سے افغانستان میں تعینات امریکی اور برطانوی فوجی مارے جاتے۔‘

شدت پسند پاکستان فوج کے لیے ایک معمولی سپاہی تھے جنہیں حکومتی ایجنسیوں کی پشت پناہی حاصل تھی لیکن نائن الیون کے واقعے کے بعد حکومت نے ان کی مالی وسائل، حمایت اور تربیت کے لیے جگہ فراہم کرنا چھوڑا دیا جس کے بعد یہ ریاست کے خلاف ہو گئے

پولیس افسر

اگر مجھے مستقبل میں خدا نے دوبارہ موقع دیا تو میں لازمی افغانستان میں امریکی اور برطانوی فوج کے خلاف لڑوں گا۔

سکول ٹیچر نے مزید بتایا کہ انہوں نے انیس سو چھیاسی میں افغانستان میں عسکری تربیت حاصل کی تھی لیکن وہاں کسی کارروائی میں حصہ نہیں لیا تھا۔ انہوں نے بتایا کہ اس وقت جہادیوں کو حکومت کی حمایت حاصل ہوتی تھی۔

شدت پسند گروہوں کو ماضی میں حکومت کی حمایت حاصل ہوتی تھی۔ اور وہ حکومت کی کشمیراور افغان پالیسی کا آلہ کار ہوا کرتے تھے۔ اور اب بھی پاکستان کی خفیہ ایجنسی آئی ایس آئی میں ان کے ہمددر موجود ہیں لیکن حالیہ دنوں میں ان کا رویہ تبدیل ہوا ہے۔

شدت پسندوں کے خلاف کارروائی کرنے والے ایک پولیس افسر کے مطابق’ شدت پسند پاکستان فوج کے لیے ایک معمولی سپاہی تھے جنہیں حکومتی ایجنسیوں کی پشت پناہی حاصل تھی لیکن نائن الیون کے واقعے کے بعد حکومت نے ان کو مالی وسائل، حمایت اور تربیت کے لیے جگہ فراہم کرنا چھوڑ دی جس کے بعد یہ ریاست کے خلاف ہوگئے۔‘

Terror’s Training Ground

By Ayesha Siddiqa 9 SEPTEMBER 2009

A few years ago, I met some young boys from my village near Bahawalpur who were preparing to go on jihad. They smirked politely when I asked them to close their eyes and imagine their future. “We can tell you without closing our eyes that we don’t see anything.”

It was not entirely surprising. South Punjab is a region mired in poverty and underdevelopment. There are few job prospects for the youth. While the government has built airports and a few hospitals, these projects are symbolic and barely meet the needs of the area. It’s in areas like this, amid economic stagnation and hopelessness, that religious extremists find fertile ground to plant and spread their ideology.

The first step is recruitment – and the methodology is straightforward. Young children, or even men, are taken to madrassas in nearby towns. They are fed well and kept in living conditions considerably better than what they are used to. This is a simple psychological strategy meant to help them compare their homes with the alternatives offered by militant organisations. The returning children, like the boys I met, then undergo ideological indoctrination in a madrassa. Those who are indoctrinated always bring more friends and family with them. It is a swelling cycle.

Madrassas nurturing armies of young Islamic militants ready to embrace martyrdom have been on the rise for years in the Punjab. In fact, South Punjab has become the hub of jihadism. Yet, somehow, there are still many people in Pakistan who refuse to acknowledge this threat.

Four major militant outfits, the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), are all comfortably ensconced in South Punjab (see article “Brothers in Arms”). Sources claim that there are about 5,000 to 9,000 youth from South Punjab fighting in Afghanistan and Waziristan. A renowned Pakistani researcher, Hassan Abbas cites a figure of 2,000 youth engaged in Waziristan. The area has become critical to planning, recruitment and logistical support for terrorist attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In fact, in his study on the Punjabi Taliban, Abbas has quoted Tariq Pervez, the chief of a new government outfit named the National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NCTA), as saying that the jihad veterans in South Punjab are instrumental in providing the foot soldiers and implementing terror plans conceived and funded mainly by Al-Qaeda operatives. This shouldn’t come as a surprise considering that the force that conquered Khost in 1988-89 comprised numerous South Punjabi commanders who fought for the armies of various Afghan warlords such as Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani. Even now, all the four major organisations are involved in Afghanistan.

The above facts are not unknown to the provincial and federal governments or the army. It was not too long ago that the federal Interior Minister Rehman Malik equated South Punjab with Swat. The statement was negated by the IG Punjab. Perhaps, the senior police officer was not refuting his superior but challenging the story by Sabrina Tavernese of The New York Times (NYT). The story had highlighted jihadism in South Punjab, especially in Dera Ghazi Khan. The NYT story even drew a reaction from media outlets across the country. No one understood that South Punjab is being rightly equated with Swat, not because of violence but due to the presence of elements that aim at taking the society and state in another direction.

An English-language daily newspaper reacted to the NYT story by dispatching a journalist to South Punjab who wrote a series of articles that attempted to analyse the existing problem. One of the stories highlighted comments by the Bahawalpur Regional Police Officer (RPO) Mushtaq Sukhera, in which he denied that there was a threat of Talibanisation in South Punjab. He said that all such reports pertaining to South Punjab were nothing more than a figment of the western press’s imagination. Many others express a similar opinion. There are five explanations for this.

Firstly, opinion makers and policy makers are in a state of denial regarding the gravity of the problem. Additionally, they believe an overemphasis on this region might draw excessive US attention to South Punjab – an area epitomising mainstream Pakistan. Thus, it is difficult even to find anecdotal evidence regarding the activities of jihadis in this sub-region. We only gain some knowledge about the happenings from coincidental accidents like the blast that took place in a madrassa in Mian Chunoon, exposing the stockpile of arms its owner had stored on the premises.

Nothing is off limits: Militants attack the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore in March 2009.

Secondly, officer Sukhera and others like him do not see any threat because the Punjab-based outfits are “home-grown” and are not seen as directly connected to the war in Afghanistan. This is contestable on two counts: South Punjabi jihadists have been connected with the Afghan jihad since the 1980s and the majority is still engaged in fighting in Afghanistan.

Thirdly, since all these outfits were created by the ISI to support General Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamisation process, in essence to fight a proxy war for Saudi Arabia against Iran by targeting the Shia community, and later the Kashmir war, the officials feel comfortable that they will never spin out of control. Those that become uncontrollable, such as Al-Furqan, are then abandoned. This outfit was involved in the second assassination attempt on Musharraf and had initially broken away from the JeM after the leadership developed differences over assets, power and ideology. Thus, the district officials and intelligence agencies turned a blind eye to the killing of the district amir of Al-Furqan in Bahawalpur in May 2009. As far as the JeM is concerned, it continues its engagement with the establishment. In any case, groups that are partly committed to the Kashmir cause and confrontation with India continue to survive. This is certainly the perception about the LeT. But in reality, the Wahhabi outfit has also been engaged in other regions, such as the Afghan provinces of Kunar and Badakhshan since 2004.

Fourthly, there is confusion at the operational level in the government regarding the definition of Talibanisation, which is then reflected in the larger debate on the issue. Many, including the RPO, define the process as an effort by an armed group to use force to change the social conditioning in an area. Ostensibly, the militant outfits in the Punjab continue to coexist with the pirs, prostitutes and the drug mafia, and there is no reason that they will follow in the footsteps of Sufi Mohammad and Maulana Fazlullah, or Baitullah Mehsud. Since the authorities only recognise the pattern followed by the Afghan warlords or those in Pakistan’s tribal areas, they tend not to understand that what is happening in the Punjab may not be Talibanisation but could eventually prove to be as lethal as what they call Talibanisation.

Finally, many believe that Talibanisation cannot take place in a region known for practicing the Sufi version of Islam. There are many, besides the Bahawalpur RPO, who subscribe to the above theory. A year ago in an interview with an American channel, Farahnaz Ispahani, an MNA and wife of Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington, Husain Haqqani, stated that extremism couldn’t flourish in South Punjab because it was a land of Sufi shrines. This is partially true. The Sufi influence would work as a bulwark against this Talibanisation of society. However, Sufi Islam cannot fight poverty, underdevelopment and poor governance – all key factors that encourage Talibanisation.

South Punjab boasts names such as the Mazaris, Legharis and Gilanis, most of whom are not just politicians and big landowners but also belong to significant pir families. But they have done little to alleviate the sufferings of their constituents. A visit to Dera Ghazi Khan is depressing. Despite the fact that the division produced a president, Farooq Khan Leghari, the state of underdevelopment there is shocking. Reportedly, people living in the area in the immediate vicinity of the Leghari tribe could not sell their land without permission from the head of the tribe, the former president, who has been the tribal chief for many years. Under the circumstances, the poor and the dispossessed became attractive targets for militant outfits offering money. The country’s current economic downturn could raise the popularity of militant outfits.

In recent history, the gap created due to the non-performance of Sufi shrines and Barelvi Islam, or the exploitative nature of these institutions, has been filled partly by the Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith madrassa conversion teams and groups, such as the Tableeghi Jamaat, and militant outfits. This alternative, unfortunately, is equally exploitative in nature. Sadly, today the shrines and Barelvi Islam have little to offer in terms of “marketing” to counter the package deal offered by the Salafists for the life hereafter, especially to a shaheed: 70 hoors (virgins), a queen hoor (virgin queen), a crown of jewels and forgiveness for 70 additional people. This promise means a lot for the poor youth who cannot hope for any change in a pre-capitalist socio-economic and political environment, where power is hard to re-negotiate. Furthermore, as stated by the former information minister Mohammad Ali Durrani, who had been a jihadi from 1984-90, a poor youth suddenly turning into a jihadi commander is a tremendous story of social mobility and recognition that he would never get in his existing socio-economic system. More importantly, the Deobandis and Ahl-e-Hadith offer a textual basis for their package, which is difficult for the pirs to refute due to the lack of an internal religious discourse in the Islamic world. The modern generation of pirs has not engaged in an internal discourse to counter this ideological onslaught by the Salafis. The main belief of Salafism is that all Muslims should practice Islam as it was during the time of Prophet Muhammad. The religion at that time, according to them, was perfect. Salafism – which pre-dates Wahhabism – is often used interchangeably with Wahhabism, which is actually an extension of Salafism.

* * *

Punjab offers a different pattern of extremism and jihadism. The pattern is closer to what one saw in Swat, where Sufi Mohammad and his TNSM spent quite a few years indoctrinating the society and building up a social movement before they got embroiled in a conflict with the state. South Punjab’s story is, in a sense, like Swat’s in that there is a gradual strengthening of Salafism and a build-up of militancy in the area. The procedure of conversion though, dates back to pre-1947. Still, the 1980s were clearly a watershed, when both rabid ideology and jihad were introduced to the area. Zia-ul-Haq encouraged the opening up of religious seminaries that, unlike the more traditional madrassas that were usually attached with Sufi shrines, subscribed to Salafi ideology. In later years, South Punjab became critical to inducting people for the Kashmir jihad. The ascendancy of the Tableeghi Jamaat and such madrassas that presented a more rabid version of religion gradually prepared the ground for later invasion by the militant groups. Two reports prepared around 1994, firstly by the district collector Bahawalpur and later by the Punjab government, highlighted the exponential rise in the number of madrassas and how these fanned sectarian and ideological hatred in the province. These reports also stated that all of these seminaries were provided funding by the government through the zakat fund.

The number of seminaries had increased during and after the 1980s. According to a 1996 report, there were 883 madrassas in Bahawalpur, 361 in Dera Ghazi Khan, 325 in Multan and 149 in Sargodha district. The madrassas in Bahawalpur outnumbered all other cities, including Lahore. These numbers relate to Deobandi madrassas only and do not include the Ahl-e-Hadith, Barelvi and other sects. Newer estimates from the intelligence bureau for 2008 show approximately 1,383 madrassas in the Bahawalpur division that house 84,000 students. Although the highest number of madrassas is in Rahim Yar Khan district (559) followed by Bahawalpur (481) and Bahawalnagar (310), it is Bahawalpur in which the highest number of students (36,000) is enlisted. The total number of madrassa students in Pakistan has reached about one million.

Visions of paradise: JeM supporters walk by a banner of jihadi art. Photo: Tariq Mahmood, AFP.

Everyone has been so focused on FATA and the NWFP that they failed to notice the huge increase in religious seminaries in these districts of South Punjab. According to a study conducted by historian Tahir Kamran, the total number of madrassas in the Punjab rose from 1,320 in 1988 to 3,153 in 2000, an increase of almost 140%. These madrassas were meant to provide a rapid supply of jihadis to the Afghan war of the 1980s. At the time of 9/11, the Bahawalpur division alone could boast of approximately 15,000-20,000 trained militants, some of whom had resettled in their areas during the period that Musharraf claimed to have clamped down on the jihad industry. Many went into the education sector, opened private schools and even joined the media.

These madrassas play three essential roles. First, they convert people to Salafism and neutralise resistance to a more rabid interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah in society. Consequently, the majority of the Barelvis cannot present a logical resistance to the opposing ideology. In many instances, the Barelvis themselves get converted to the idea of jihad. Secondly, these madrassas are used to train youth, who are then inducted into jihad. Most of the foot soldiers come from the religious seminaries. One of the principles taught to the students pertains to the concept of jihad as being a sacred duty that has to continue until the end of a Muslim’s life or the end of the world. Lastly, madrassas are an essential transit point for the youth, who are recruited from government schools. They are usually put through the conversion process after they have attended a 21-day initial training programme in the Frontier province or Kashmir (see box “A Different Breed”).

State support, which follows two distinct tracks, is also instrumental in the growth of jihadism in this region. On the one hand, there has generally been a link or understanding between political parties and militant groups. Since political parties are unable to eliminate militants or most politicians are sympathetic towards the militants, they tend to curb their activities through political deal-making. The understanding between the SSP and Benazir Bhutto after the 1993 elections, or the alleged deal between the PML-N and the SSP during the 2008 elections, denote the relationship between major political parties and the jihadis. Currently, the SSP in South Punjab is more supportive of the PML-N.

The second track involves operational links between the outfits and the state’s intelligence apparatus. As mentioned earlier, some of the outfits claim to have received training from the country’s intelligence agencies. Even now, local people talk of truckloads of weapons arriving at the doorstep of the JeM headquarters and other sites in the middle of the night. While official sources continue to claim that the outfit was banned and does not exist, or that Masood Azhar is on the run from his hometown of Bahawalpur, the facts prove otherwise. For instance, the outfit continues to acquire real estate in the area, such as a new site near Chowk Azam in Bahawalpur, which many believe is being used as a training site. Although the new police chief has put restraints on the JeM and disallowed it from constructing on the site, the outfit continues to appropriate more land around the area. Junior police officials even claim seeing tunnels being dug inside the premises. The new facility is on the bank of the Lahore-Karachi national highway, which means that in the event of a crisis, the JeM could block the road as has happened in Kohat and elsewhere. Furthermore, the outfit’s main headquarters in the city is guarded by AK-47-armed men who harass any journalist trying to take a photograph of the building. In one instance, even a police official was shooed away and later intimidated by spooks of an intelligence agency for spying on the outfit. Despite the claim that the SSP, the LeJ and the JeM have broken ties with intelligence agencies and are now fighting the army in Waziristan, the fact remains that their presence in the towns of South Punjab continues unhindered.

Is it naivety and inefficiency on the part of officialdom or a deliberate effort to withhold information? The government claims that Maulana Masood Azhar has not visited his hometown in the last three years. But he held a massive book launch of his new publication Fatah-ul-Jawad: Quranic Verses on Jihad, on April 28, 2008, in Bahawalpur. Moreover, JeM’s armed men manned all entrances and exits to the city that day – and there was no police force in sight. The ISI is said to have severed its links with the JeM for assisting the Pashtoon Taliban in inciting violence in the country. Sources from FATA claim, however, that the JeM, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and LeT are suspected by the Taliban for their links with state agencies.

In addition, intelligence agencies reportedly ward off anyone attempting to probe into the affairs of these outfits. In one case, a local in Bahawalpur city invoked daily visits from a certain agency after he assisted a foreign journalist. Similarly, only six months back, a BBC team was chased out of the area by agency officials. In fact, intelligence officials, who had forgotten about my existence since my last book was published, revisited my village in South Punjab soon after I began writing on militancy in the area and have gone to the extent of planting a story in one of the Urdu newspapers to malign me in my own area. In any case, no serious operation was conducted against these outfits after the Mumbai attacks and the recent spate of violence in the country. Hence, all of them continue to survive.

The Deobandi outfits are not the only ones popular in South Punjab. Ahl-e-Hadith/Wahhabi organisations such as the Tehreek-ul-Mujahidden (TuM) and the LeT also have a following in the region. While TuM, which is relatively a smaller organisation, has support in Dera Ghazi Khan, the LeT is popular in Bahawalpur, Multan and the areas bordering Central Punjab. Headquartered in Muridke, the LeT is popular among the Punjabi and Urdu-speaking Mohajir settlers.

There are obvious sociological reasons for LeT’s relative popularity among these people. The majority of this population represents either the lower-middle-class farmers or middle-class trader-merchants. The middle class is instrumental in providing funding to these outfits. And the support is not confined to South Punjab alone. In fact, middle-class trader-merchants from other parts of the Punjab also feed jihad through their funding. This does not mean that there are no Seraiki speakers in Wahhabi organisations but just that the dominant influence is that of the Punjabis and Mohajirs. The Seraiki-speaking population is mostly associated with the SSP, LeJ and JeM, not to mention the freelancing jihadis that have direct links with the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP).

The LeT’s presence in South Punjab is far more obvious than others courtesy of the wall chalkings and social work by its sister outfit, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa. Despite the rumours of friction between the LeT and the JuD leadership, the two segments operate in unison in South Punjab. Three of the favourite areas of recruitment in South Punjab for all outfits are Cholistan in Bahawalpur, the Rekh in Dera Ghazi Khan, and the Kacha area in Rajanpur. The first two are desert areas known for their poverty and underdevelopment, while the third is known for dacoits. However, another known feature of Kacha in Rajanpur is that the clerics of the Lal Masjid come from this area and have partly managed to push back the dacoits. Local sources claim that the influence of the clerics has increased since they started receiving cooperation from the police to jointly fight the dacoits.
Organisations such as the LeT have even begun to recruit women in the Punjab. These women undergo 21 days of ideological and military training. The goal is to ensure that these women will be able to fight if their menfolk are out on jihad and an enemy attacks Pakistan.

The militant outfits are rich, both ideologically and materially. They have ample financial resources that flow from four distinct sources: official sources (in some cases); Middle Eastern and Gulf states (not necessarily official channels); donations; and the Punjabi middle class, which is predominantly engaged in funding both madrassas and jihad for social, moral and political ends. With regard to donations, the militant outfits are extremely responsive to the changing environment and have adapted their money-collection tactics. Gone are the days of money-collection boxes. Now, especially in villages, followers are asked to raise money by selling harvested crops. And in terms of the Punjabi middle class, there are traders in Islamabad and other smaller urban centres that contribute regularly to the cause. These trader-merchants and upcoming entrepreneurs see donations to these outfits as a source of atonement for their sins. In Tahir Kamran’s study “Deobandiism in the Punjab,” Deobandiism (and Wahhabiism) is an urban phenomenon. If so, then the existence of these militant outfits in rural Punjab indicates a new social trend. Perhaps, due to greater access to technology (mobiles, television sets, satellite receivers, etc), the landscape (and rustic lifestyles) of Punjab’s rural areas has changed. There is an unplanned urbanisation of the rural areas due to the emergence of small towns with no social development, health and education infrastructure. Socially and politically, there is a gap that is filled by these militant outfits or related ideological institutions.

Fortunately, they have not succeeded in changing the lifestyles of the ordinary people. This is perhaps because there are multiple cultural strands that do not allow the jihadis to impose their norms the way they have in the tribal areas or the Frontier province. This is not to say that there is no threat from them in South Punjab: the liberalism and multi-polarity of society is certainly at risk. The threat is posed by the religious seminaries and the new recruits for jihad, who change social norms slowly and gradually. Sadly nothing, including the powerful political system of the area, which in any case is extremely warped, helps ward off the threat of extremism and jihadism. Ultimately, South Punjab could fall prey to the myopia of its ruling elite.

* * *

So how does the state and society deal with this issue?

Deploying the military is not an option. In the Punjab this will create a division within the powerful army because of regional loyalty. The foremost task is to examine the nature of the state’s relationship with the militants as strategic partners: should this relationship continue to exist to the detriment of the state? Once this mystifying question is resolved, all militant forces can be dealt with through an integrated police-intelligence operation.

This, however, amounts to winning only half the battle. The other half deals with the basic problems faced by the likes of those young jihadis-in-training from Bahawalpur who said, “We don’t see anything” in our futures. Presently, there is hardly any industrialisation in South Punjab and the mainstay of the area, agriculture, is faltering. The region requires economic strengthening: new ideas in agriculture, capital investment and new, relevant industries. This is the time that the government must plan beyond the usual textile and sugar industries that have arguably turned into huge mafias that are draining the local economy rather than feeding it.

Investment in social development is desperately needed. A larger social infrastructure that provides jobs and an educational system that is responsive to the needs of the population can contribute to filling the gaps. The message of militancy is quite potent, especially in terms of the dreams it sells to the youth, such as those disillusioned boys from my village. Jihad elevates youngsters from a state of being dispossessed to an imagined exalted status. They visualise themselves taking their places among great historical figures such as Mohammad bin Qasim and Khalid bin Waleed. It is these dreams for which the state must provide an alternative.

http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2009/09/terror’s-training-ground/2/

Also read:

http://letusbuildpakistan.blogspot.com/2009/10/president-obama-please-send-one-drone.html

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The knives are out -- Kamran Shafi

By Kamran Shafi
Tuesday, 15 Sep, 2009 (Dawn)

One has noticed with alarm the tenor of most TV anchors, and some analysts too, when they heap praise only upon the army for doing a good job in Swat with no mention of the civilian leadership across the political spectrum. —APP/File Photo

IF every wrong is to be placed at the politician’s door, in the instant case at Asif Zardari’s, then the good that has come with his government and with democracy must also go to his account and to those of other politicians.

Here I refer to the Swat operation which is gradually showing signs of success with the army doing yeoman service for the country.

Each day brings news of more successes, the latest being the arrest of the cruel and heartless yahoo, Muslim Khan, along with another yahoo; and the imminent capture of the Mother of All Yahoos, Fazlullah. The point to remember is that this is the same army that prevaricated during all the years of the Commando’s absolute rule while the savages went about digging their tunnels and bunkers and furnishing them with carpets and tiled bathrooms and all; and cutting off people’s heads with blunt knives, and all.

The very same army, under the very same commanders, has now shown the grit and the determination which one always knew it had, under a civil administration headed, whether anyone likes it or not, by Asif Ali Zardari.

It has shown that it is trained to do what is asked of it and that the old and fallacious refrain that it was not trained to fight insurgencies was poppycock of the worst kind, trotted out by the apologists of the brass hats who could not make up their minds whether the marauding yahoos were friends of our venal state or its people’s worst enemies.

The ranks of the army, the young officers and the unit commanders were never suspect; its generalship was. And rightly so. We must also remember that the Commando was then the lord and master of all he surveyed under his very own dictum of ‘unity of command’.

If things are going well, why the frightening title of this piece? Here goes: one has noticed with alarm the tenor of most TV anchors, and some analysts too, when they heap praise only upon the army for doing a good job in Swat with no mention of the civilian leadership across the political spectrum (with the sole exception of the double-dealing and very slippery JUI-F) that has stood behind the army solidly by shouldering the political responsibility for the fallout of the military action.

One has also noticed with utmost concern, the savage attacks on politicians let loose by former senior army and intelligence officers well known for their criminal and anti-democratic acts. It is again to be noted that discredited and reviled former spooks like Brigadier Billa would never have crawled back into their respective gutters without a definitive go-ahead by their former outfits.

Whilst these attacks have clearly redounded on the security establishment (reinforcing the widespread belief that our brass hats are not much endowed with good sense!), they point clearly to the objective: to remove the elected democratic dispensation by hook or by crook, mostly the latter, and to replace it with a government of ‘technocrats’, whatever that means, under a caretaker civilian Quisling.

That the establishment is not alone in this enterprise is also clear; certain names of known unsavoury characters scurrying back into their respective gutters to do their assigned dirty work have already surfaced in the press.

As I have said before, the proof is the recent (ongoing indeed) spate of ugly stories first about one political leader, and then the other, doing the rounds of the plush drawing rooms of Islamabad the Beautiful, the TV channels and the front pages of newspapers. This is only the beginning: the country should be ready for far worse in the immediate future.

It is as part of this enterprise that the old story of Osama Bin Laden meeting Nawaz Sharif X or Y times and egging him on to destabilise Benazir’s government of the time has resurfaced, as has the Midnight Jackal story.

The patrons of the enterprise do not seem to remember that by signing the Charter of Democracy, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif buried the past, allegations and all, and resolved to take Pakistan to a better future through civilised politics by eschewing the rancour and blind hate of the past.

Which is why I must repeat myself. President Asif Zardari would be well advised to order his party to stop its delaying tactics with regard to the repeal of the 17th Amendment, and the tabling of the 18th without the draconian articles of the former. He must also remove any doubts there might be as to his cool relationship with Nawaz Sharif, to present a unified stand to those that would plot against them.

Both must also rein in the hawks in their parties, for many times even the swiftest hawk can lose its prey to other, lesser, raptors such as the carrion-eating kite.

A short word on the most recent Top Secret (surely!?) letter of the bestest diplomat in the whole wide world Master Hussain Haqqani, and the FO and ISI, in which he has bemoaned the fact that many American media people and the head of the Asia Foundation have been barred from getting Pakistan visas.

Who, may I ask, has leaked this most confidential letter so that it is now the subject of headline news and editorials? The government must carry out an indepth investigation into the leak and severely punish the guilty for it may very well be part of the ongoing conspiracy against democracy.

Also, might I one more time demand an inquiry into the granting of not one, not two, but three Pakistani visas to the disreputable Richard Reid aka Abdul Raheem aka Tariq Raja aka the ‘Shoe Bomber’, who had spent most of his life in prisons in the UK and who is now undergoing life imprisonment in the US? Who on earth was his sponsor in the Land of the Pure?

kshafi1@yahoo.co.uk

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