Architect of infamous “Operation Midnight Jackal” Major Amir joins PPP ???

Return of the ‘Midnight Jackal’?
By Shahzad Raza
Wednesday, 08 Apr, 2009


ISLAMABAD, April 7: Major Amir, who allegedly conspired and collaborated with others to topple the first Benazir Bhutto government, is said to have developed close relations with the Pakistan People’s Party top leadership.Party sources told Dawn that Major Amir, a former Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) operative, had held a few meetings with President Asif Ali Zardari. However, what was discussed in the meetings remains unclear.
The sources said that Major Amir was part of the president’s entourage that accompanied him on his visit to Saudi Arabia in November 2008.They added that some PPP leaders were quite surprised to see him around.
Major Amir confirmed the recent thaw in relationship between himself and the PPP top leadership.“Let it be no surprise that I have had a cordial relationship with the PPP leadership for the past few years,” he asserted.Asked what he discussed during his meetings with the president, he said, obliquely, that they had exchanged views on the issues of mutual interest.However, the presidential spokesman, Farhatullah Babar, denied reports of meetings between Major Amir and President Zardari.“I have never seen Major Amir in the Presidency during my stay. Moreover, I have not seen his name in any of the scheduled meetings of the president,” he said. But Mr Babar could not explain why Major Amir had been included in President Zardari’s entourage to Saudi Arabia.
Major Amir and Brigadier Imtiaz were the two main characters of “Operation Midnight Jackal” that was reportedly launched to topple the first Benazir Bhutto government in 1989.The ISI had reportedly launched the operation to make Pakistan People’s Party MNAs support a no-confidence motion against their own prime minister.According to the then director-general of the Intelligence Bureau, Masood Sharif Khattak, Major Amir and Brigadier Imtiaz were caught on video and audiotapes influencing some PPP parliamentarians.
But in an earlier interview with DawnNews, Major Amir and Brig Imtiaz had contradicted the reports of their involvement in the conspiracy.Major Amir claimed he was acting on the specific directives of the then ISI director-general, Shamsur Rehman Kallue, who was an appointee of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto.He claimed that he was acting to identify the black sheep within the ranks of the PPP. He offered the same version of events to the board in the GHQ which heard his case during court martial proceedings. The former ISI operative conceded that he kept a watchful eye on the treasury MNAs who were expected to support the no-confidence motion against the then prime minister, Benazir Bhutto.
Sources said Major Amir would never have been able to find a place close to Benazir Bhutto. They added that some close aides of President Zardari helped Major Amir make his acquaintance.The former ISI operative used to be a special adviser to former NWFP chief minister Sardar Mehtab Abbasi, a close aide of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif. By then, Major Amir was said to be in the good books of the PML-N top leader. But this is not what the PML-N spokesman thought.“He was just an adviser to Sardar Mehtab. But he did not have any close contact with Mian Nawaz Sharif,” PML-N spokesman Siddiqul Farooq claimed.
A political pundit, who has access to some important drawing rooms in Islamabad, did not rule out the possibility of the former ISI operative being given an important political assignment to deal with right-wing media or fundos or both.

http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/return-of-the-midnight-jackal

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Major Amir liked Nawaz Sharif as Political Leader and was part of his Political Camp !!

Daily Times' report of 22nd April, 2007


Establishment doesn’t like public-backed leaders’

Daily Times MonitorLAHORE:

Major Amir, the alleged architect of the notorious Operation Midnight Jackal, says Pakistani establishment likes the leaders who are not backed by the public.In an interview with the Geo television on Saturday, Amir said the establishment was against every leader who had people’s mandate behind them. “Pakistani establishment likes leaders like Malik Maraj Khalid, Moeen Qureshi, Sardar Balakh Sher Mazari and current Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz,” he said.
Amir said he liked Sharif as a political leader and was a part of his political camp. He said Sharif was more acceptable to the army than Benazir Bhutto.
The former Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) officer said the ISI principally acted on the orders of the prime minister. But, he said, in case of lack of coordination between the prime minister and the army chief the agency preferred to seek directives from the army chief. Amir said he acted on the orders of the then ISI chief in the Operation Midnight Jackal, adding that the objective behind this operation was not to remove the Bhutto’s government. “I was court-martialled and removed from the army even though I proved my innocence before the inquiry committee,” he said.He said Jonejo’s government was removed because the US was against it. “The US thought that Jonejo had failed to deliver on Iran,” he said, adding that Mullah Omar was loyal to Pakistan compared to Hamid Karzai.

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C04%5C22%5Cstory_22-4-2007_pg7_19

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How the ISI Subverts the Political System

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 marked the beginning ofa new period of intense political activity for the Pakistani intelligence agencies.Both the MI and the ISI worked hard to implement the military’s political agenda, and they have played an active role in every general election since. They have been used to support, oppose, or eventually suppress particular political groups and to aid domestic adversaries of civilian governments with which the military had grown dissatisfied.
Intelligence quickly became and remains central for senior commanders pursuing behind-the-scenes political interventions.The army chief brings information collected by the agencies to the president and the prime minister in a discretionary manner. The president has in the past relied on political intelligence gathered by the agenciesto formulate the charges against governments he wanted to dismiss.
The army chief therefore controls a very powerful instrument—an instrument that can be used indirectly through the president when civilians are in power, or directly when the military is in power.
The latter was the case under Musharraf, to whom the army chief reported.

Funding political parties.

The military ultimately managed to have Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto dismissed in 1990, and the ISI again became active in the general elections, during which it supported a number of her political opponents. Allegations of the ISI’s interference in domestic politics went public on March 24, 1994, when Mehran Bank president Yunus Habib was arrestedfor siphoning money from the bank. On April 20, the issue was brought tothe floor of the National Assembly by Interior Minister Nasrullah Babar.

In 1997, retired air marshal Asghar Khan, former chief of the Pakistan AirForce, filed a Supreme Court petition challenging the legality of a “donation”by the Mehran Bank, a nationalized institution, of some approximately $6.5 million to the then-COAS, General Mirza Aslam Beg, in 1990. The chief justice, Sajjad Ali Shah, called a hearing on ISI’s role in domestic politics. General Aslam Beg, who admitted he had put the money at the disposal of the ISI and MI through a secret service account, had earlier declared that “it was a practice with the ISI to support candidates during the elections under the direction of the chief executive.” The money was then used by the MI and ISI for “duly authorized purposes.” It was used in particular to fund the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), which received a little less than half the total sum. Beneficiaries also included the future prime minister, Nawaz Sharif. A substantial part of the money was also used as “special funds,” destined to finance covert operations.

The 1990 election was not the first instance of ISI involvement in Pakistani politics. Manipulation of elections has been the norm since the creation of the country, particularly under military regimes trying to compensate for their lack of legitimacy. Millions of rupees were embezzled from secret funds for that purpose in 1970 by General Umar, a close associateof Ayub Khan, and N. A. Rizvi, who directed the IB at that time.

Besides the PPP, the only victim of the scandal was the banker, YunusHabib, who was arrested and jailed. The COAS suffered no judicial consequencesand went on the offensive, demanding that legal action be takenagainst the former chief of the Pakistan Air Force and General NasrullahBabar for violating the provision of the Official Secrets Act and bringing thearmed forces into disrepute.

Although technically still pending before the Supreme Court, the case was de facto suspended by the October 1999 coup d’état of PervezMusharraf. Almost eight years later, in February 2007, Asghar Khan, one of the main protagonists of the scandal, was still asking the SupremeCourt to “determine the role of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in national politics.”

Support for particular political groups or parties is not primarily the result of ideological sympathies. Like all individuals, intelligence agents have their own ideological inclinations and political preferences, but these pale in comparison with the military’s institutional interest in its own domination of the political landscape. Therefore, support or opposition to any given organization varies over time, the latter being eventually as viciousas the former can be generous.

Setting up alliances.

In 1988, the ISI, led by Lieutenant General HamidGul, set up the IJI, an alliance of right-wing and religious political parties,to prevent Benazir Bhutto’s PPP from sweeping the polls. The ISI arranged the reunification of Pakistan’s two Pakistan Muslim League factions, which were then joined by smaller organizations, and helped them campaign against the PPP.
Imtiaz Ahmed, who was then additional director general of national security at the ISI and as such was involved in all ISI political dealings, launched a campaign to discredit Benazir Bhutto for allegedly working against Punjabi interests. The military opposition failed to prevent a PPP victory in the elections, but ISI manipulations led to greater electoral success for the religious parties, which obtained, collectively,12 percent of the vote in the 1988 national election, a score they never again reached, including in 2002.
The military high command did not even bother denying its own involvement,nor that of the intelligence agencies, in the process, cynically describing it as “helping to restore democracy.” When asked what would have happened if Benazir Bhutto had won the 1988 elections with a greater majority, former COAS General Aslam Beg declared:[T]he army perhaps would not have allowed the transfer of power to Benazir Bhutto. There is a strong feeling in the army that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was responsible for the East Pakistan debacle and that he maligned the army.... So, to ensure that power was smoothly transferred to Benazir Bhutto and democracy restored, the IJI was formed by the ISI.This was done with the clear knowledge that that it would not stop thePPP from forming the government.... I set up a fake competition by creating the IJI to ensure that a democratic government would be formed....Let me categorically state that the decision to hold on to or relinquish power rests squarely with the army."
Nonetheless, after the PPP’s victory, the ISI never ceased trying to unseat Benazir Bhutto. In October 1989, at the instigation of Hamid Guland in an operation named Midnight Jackals, the ISI tried to sway PPP members of the National Assembly to back a no-confidence vote against Bhutto and managed to convince the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM; itsname was changed later to Muttahida Quami Movement) to switch its supportfrom the PPP to the opposition.

Source: Reforming theIntelligence Agencies in Pakistan’s Transitional Democracy
By: Frédéric Grare
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pakistan_intelligence_transitional_democracy.pdf
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How do ISI officials view the Shariat peace deal in Swat and other aspects of the Talibanisation....

Nizam-e-adl: what next for the Taliban?

Tuesday, February 17, 2009 Asad Munir Only time will tell whether the peace deal signed in Swat bears fruit and brings lasting peace to the valley. In this regard, however, it may be worthwhile to give readers a background into the origins of the Taliban in Pakistan. Also, it will be seen that the nizam-e-adl regulation agreed to now is similar to what Sufi Mohammad's Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat Mohammadi (TNSM) had announced on its own way back in November 1994. Coincidentally – or perhaps not – that was also the month when the Taliban captured Kandahar. Mullah Omer started his Taliban movement with less than 50 madressah students and after the fall of Kandahar, thousands from Pakistani madressahs rushed to join the new force and by December 1994 he had a force of 12,000. A new phenomenon had been created in Pashtun society – that of madressah students and mullahs, with guns in their hands, ruling the Pashtuns. In Pashtun society no clear role is defined for religious functionaries in the social system. Government officials posted in these areas and the Maliks/Khans are considered leaders, who get legitimacy from the authority they exercise on behalf of the state, with religious functionaries given a limited role of dealing with rituals. Throughout the region's history, the religious leaders had wanted a greater role for themselves in decision-making and that is why the area often saw uprisings led by religious personalities. The latter had hold of the leadership as long as the war/jihad was on but once the conflict was over, it reverted to the Maliks and Khans. The present Talibanisation is not just a movement for enforcement of Sharia; the mullahs want power, authority and a defined role in decision making in the social system of Pashtun society. Events and political happenings in Afghanistan have always had some impact on NWFP in general and FATA in particular. The Durand line divided many tribes, and out of the seven tribal agencies, six have tribes on either side of the Durand line. As for Swat, it is neither a tribal area and nor does it border Afghanistan – so the question arises that why has it become a stronghold of extremists. Being a fertile area it always attracted invaders. Till the 10th century most of the population were followers of Buddhism and were very peaceful and docile people. In the 16th century the Yousafzai tribe captured the valley. The area was divided between various sub-tribes. There was no central system of administration and the tribes resolved their disputes themselves. Except for a few years of central rule, this system continued till 1917, after which different tribes elected a central leader and Swat emerged as an independent state. In 1926, the British accepted the state of Swat and the ruler was offered the title of Wali-e-Swat. He formed his own central administrative system with two types of courts functioning in the State. Courts headed by the religious scholars, known as qazi courts, and judicial courts headed by the area tehsildars. The qazi courts dealt with cases of divorce, inheritance and some other minor cases involving Sharia while all other disputes were referred to the tehsildar court. The appellate forum was that of a hakim, and a final appeal could be made to the wali. All this process took only one month. In those times the social problems were also not very complex so generally, the population was getting free and speedy justice. Dir and Bajaur were annexed by Pakistan in 1960 while Swat was merged in Pakistan in 1969. In 1975, these former independent states were declared as Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). These areas were then conferred the status of districts which meant that they also got district administration and police force. The judicial system, however, was based on jirgas and the executive authority of district magistrates. In 1992, on a petition of lawyers, the PATA regulations were abolished by the courts. However, surprisingly no alternative system was put as a replacement and this created a judicial void which created unrest in the general public. And it was this void which then created the seeds for the Nov 1994 uprising by the TNSM. This led to violence and the TNSM took control of six districts. New rules for traffic were introduced and all kinds of transport were forced to move on the right side of the road, the left being deemed un-Islamic. This resulted in numerous road accidents. Men were made to wear watches on the right hand. A sitting MPA of the PPP, the then ruling party, was killed. It took the law-enforcement agencies more than a month to dislodge the militants and to regain control of these areas. As for the TNSM, it was formed by Sufi Mohammad in 1988. He himself is a simple and peaceful man who does not preach violence except in the way of jihad against non- Muslims. However, he does not have the leadership qualities and capabilities to control large movements. In the 1994 movement, besides the TNSM, many other elements also joined in and they included gangs of car-lifters, the timber mafia, farmers who had disputes with Khans, loan defaulters, smugglers and many other anti-social elements. Because of the violence, the then provincial government introduced the Nizam-e-Adal regulation in Malakand division in December 1994 and established qazi courts thereafter in 1995. Besides the TNSM factor, there are other actors in Swat. In the aftermath of 9/11, many of the foreigners who fled Afghanistan crossed over to Pakistan and took refuge in many parts of the country. Quite a few landed up in Swat and they were joined by others more recently after the recent military operation in Bajaur agency. Another factor that may have contributed is the landless farmers who, during Bhutto's era, took possession of lands which belonged to the Khans of the area -- Matta tehsil of Swat was the most affected in this regard. In case a focused strategy is evolved and pursued to a logical conclusion, the situation in both, FATA and Swat can be brought to normalcy if the following steps are taken: To develop consensus of civil society, all political parties, the media and all segments of society and the general public need to be educated that Talibanisation is a real and serious threat to the country and that if nothing is done to stop its advance then the anarchy will spread across the length and breadth of the country. As for Sufi Mohammad's demand for the establishment of an appellate court, this has already been done now. It should be noted however that the Adal act was already in place and so the establishment of an appellate court is not exactly a major milestone. One effect that the government will be hoping for is that Fazlullah may be sidelined or isolated to some extent because the people will see Sufi Mohammad as being the motivating force for the new system. At the same time, however, the governments should continue with targeted operations which should be conducted against the real terrorists through accurate intelligence. Once an area is cleared of militants, troops should remain stationed in it, so as to re-take control over all troubled areas in the district. The office of the DC/district magistrate should be restored with its original powers. This will allow the return of local administration. Compensation should be paid immediately for damage caused to public and private property. Special funds should be provided by the federal government for reconstructing all damaged and/or destroyed schools. An army garrison should be established in Swat and should have the size of a brigade. The headquarters of the Swat Scouts should be shifted from Warsak to Kanju. The scouts should be reorganized into five wings corps and also FC posts should be set up in all suitable areas. The strength of the police force should be increased and the Frontier Constabulary should be deployed wherever required. The local people who are against the present violence should be provided security. Their resistance against the militants can be maintained only if they believe that the government is serious in eliminating the Taliban. Also, the judicial system should be made more effective by taking suitable steps for making provision of justice both speedy and affordable. Negotiations with terrorists should be held on a two-point agenda: that they surrender and lay down their arms and that their leaders give an undertaking that they will not run a parallel administration and not interfere in the state's domain. If these conditions are accepted, and a monitoring system put in place confirms that they are being adhered to then a general amnesty to those not involved in heinous crimes could be considered. (The News) The writer is a former brigadier who served as chief of military intelligence and of the ISI for NWFP, FATA and the Northern Areas. He also commanded the Dir Scouts and raised and commanded the Swat Scouts. Email: asadmunir38@yahoo.com

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Saleem Safi offers his views on the role of Panjpiris, Major Amir (of the ISI) and the MMA government in the situation in Swat


Also read:

Swat — towards a Wahhabi state?

Swat and the Mullah Military Alliance: Two pictures and a column - Abbas Ather

Swat: the other view; a tale of how 'those in power' facilitated Taliban in spreading their tentacles in the peacefull valley of Swat....

Read more...