State and ethnic conflict in Pakistan --- Dr Rubina Saigol

State and ethnic conflict

Monday, September 28, 2009 Dr Rubina Saigol The writer is an independent researcher specialising in social development In a highly centralised and authoritarian state, the rights of the federating units tend to be undermined. The issue of provincial autonomy has acquired added urgency in the face of simmering discontent and alienation among the provinces against the monopolisation of power and resources by the centre. The state in Pakistan has engaged in prolonged and serious conflicts with four out of five of its original units because of the denial of provincial autonomy. When the state was initially imagined, a federal structure was envisaged. The Pakistan Resolution of 1940 declared that “areas in which the Muslims are numerically in majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.” Maximum autonomy and sovereign control were inherent in the very foundation of the new state. However, increasing centralisation led to the construction of a state that was severely distorted. Religious nationalism, which in the struggle for Pakistan was a unifying force, had outgrown its validity once Pakistan was created. As Hamza Alavi points out, “the moment that Pakistan was established, Muslim nationalism in India had fulfilled itself and outlived its purpose. Now there was a fresh equation of privilege and deprivation to be reckoned with in the new state. Virtually overnight there were ethnic redefinitions. Punjabis who were the most numerous could boast of a greater percentage of people with higher education and were most firmly entrenched in both the army (being 85 per cent of the armed forces) and the bureaucracy. They were the new bearers of privilege, the true ‘Muslim’ for whom Pakistan was created. The weaker ‘salariats’ of Bengal, Sindh, Sarhad and Balochistan did not share this and accordingly they redefined their identities as Bengalis, Sindhis, Pathans and Baloch who now demanded fairer shares for themselves.” The authoritarian state attempted national integration through the use of religion in an attempt to weaken language-based ethnic nationalism. For example, Ayub Khan declared in 1962 that “it is immaterial whether you are a Bengali or a Sindhi, a Balochi or a Pathan or a Punjabi – we are all knit together by the bond of Islam.” The sense of deprivation and anger among the federating units began as early as the 50s when the language conflict broke out over Urdu being declared the national language despite Bengali representing the language of the majority. Moreover, the foreign exchange earnings from East Pakistani jute went into the development of West Pakistan while the Eastern half was deprived of development. The economic disparities were such that when Ayub Khan seized power in 1958, the per capita income differential between the two wings was 30 per cent. By the end of the first five-year plan in 1965, this difference increased to 45 per cent and by the time of Ayub Khan’s removal in 1968, it had grown to 61 per cent. The West Pakistani rulers were unwilling to share power with East Pakistanis or recognise them as equals. When the Awami League won 151 out 153 national assembly seats in the 1970 elections, the military and civilian rulers of West Pakistan refused to transfer power to the legally elected party. A reign of terror was unleashed on East Pakistan, the leaders were declared traitors and conspirators, and finally the Punjab-dominated army committed untold atrocities upon the Bengalis leading to a resistance movement which culminated with the separation of East Pakistan from its exploitative western wing. In West Pakistan, the creation of one-unit in 1955 led to the fear of erasure of cultural and ethnic identities among the units. Balochistan, where the Shahi Jirga had voted to join Pakistan, was repeatedly denied its just share and rights in the new federation. There were resistance movements in the 40s, 50s, 60s and 70s. In the 70s, an armed movement began in which combat helicopters were used against 55,000 Baloch guerillas fighting 80,000 troops. Around 15,000 Baloch were killed in the army action. In 2004, the military built cantonments and resistance against militarisation by the centre led to the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti and seething resentment against the centre. The capture of Baloch resources such as gas, zinc, gold, copper and marble, and the failure to pay just royalty have led to alienation among Baloch youth who have joined liberation movements. The disparities are glaring: the per capita income of Balochis is 60 per cent of Punjabis and their representation in civil services is around one fourth compared to other provinces. The literacy rate is the lowest in Pakistan while its share of industrialisation in the 80s was 0.7 per cent. In recent times, the largest number of missing people was from Balochistan. The state was once again embroiled in violent conflicts in the decades of the 80s and 90s in Sindh. August-December 1983 saw a massive civil disobedience movement in Sindh, during which several activists courted arrest and risked imprisonment and state violence. Helicopter gunships were used by the military to suppress the revolt in which hundreds were killed and wounded. Selig Harrison reports that in this uprising, 45,000 Punjabi troops faced make-shift Sindhi guerilla outfits and the Sindhi death toll came to 300 people. According to Shahid Kardar, “the alleged death of 50 students at the Thori Railway crossing and the horror of the action taken to suppress the Sindhis in 1986 have left very deep wounds in Sindh.” Sindh contributes 67 per cent of the national revenue and receives roughly only 23 per cent as its share in the NFC award. The tail-end of the Indus receives so little water in the IRSA system that Sindh’s agriculture is threatened with extinction. The insistence of Punjab that the Kalabagh Dam should be constructed is yet another wound that threatens violence in this historically peaceful and tolerant land of Sufi saints. In the 90s, Karachi saw a prolonged conflict between the state and the Urdu-speaking Mohajirs with crimes committed by all sides in the conflict. Even though the Sindh Assembly was the first to vote to join Pakistan, Sindhis have not received their due share and rights as the province that feeds the country. The latest conflict is the military action in Pakhtoonkhwa to root out militants created and nurtured by the state itself. Scores of civilians have been killed by both the military and militants. Pakhtoonkhwa too has historical grievances. Its leaders were declared traitors for their commitment to peace and composite nationalism. It has not received just royalty for its water resources, and its objections to the Kalabagh Dam are ignored by Punjab. The intransigent attitude of Punjab in objecting to the change of name to Pakhtoonkhwa can have serious consequences for a state locked in struggles with its units. The ethnic and linguistic sharing of identities across the Durand Line can ultimately challenge the integrity of a state perpetually at war with itself. A highly centralised state has suppressed the unique and multiple identities of the federating units. There is a long concurrent legislative list that encroaches upon provincial rights. The only way for the state to survive is to recognise the rights of the sovereign and autonomous units and, with the exception of defence, foreign affairs, currency and communication all subjects should be in the provincial list only. The NFC award needs to be based on multiple criteria including under-development, population and revenue generation. The lower riparian should receive its just share of the waters of the Indus river. Until the state dismantles its colonial structure of exploiting the units as colonies, conflict and insecurity are likely to persist. Email: rubinasaigol@hotmail.com

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Religion, Politics and Minorities in Pakistan

Religion and politics

Rubina Saigol Monday, September 21, 2009 The writer is an independent researcher specialising in social development In the past few months, there has been a noticeable increase in religiously-motivated violence against minority communities, especially in Punjab. The most recent case is that of 20-year-old Robert Fanish Masih, whose mysterious death in the Sialkot district jail, where he was interned after accusations of defiling the Holy Quran, raises serious suspicions of foul play and murder. According to a press release by the Joint Action Committee, this incident is reminiscent of an earlier one in which Muhammad Yousaf, also accused of committing blasphemy, was found dead in jail and the authorities declared it to be a case of suicide. Cases of murderous attacks against Christians by frenzied mobs have risen at an alarming rate. In March, a Christian woman was killed in Gujranwala where a church was attacked. On June 30, a mob destroyed more than 50 Christian houses in Bahmaniwala in Kasur district and looted and plundered the village. And on July 30, seven people were brutally murdered in the Gojra carnage. The typical pattern in many of these cases is an accusation (usually false) of the commission of blasphemy by a rival. This is normally followed by announcements from mosques loudspeakers inciting people who then congregate and turn upon their own neighbours and erstwhile friends. As pointed out by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, the local administration and police often collude with the perpetrators or, at best, stand by and do nothing, themselves fearful of the mob. The state becomes an onlooker instead of intervening to protect its powerless citizens against the heinous crimes committed in broad daylight. As the large number of blasphemy cases in the past have demonstrated, the real motive for instigating the crowd often has nothing to do with blasphemy. Frequently, disputes over money, property or other pecuniary matters lead to false accusations of blasphemy. An accusation of blasphemy is invariably deployed as a weapon to browbeat others into submission. In the famous case of Salamat Masih, a 14-year-old accused of writing blasphemous words on a wall, the quarrel among children started over pigeon fights. Had human rights activists like Asma Jahangir not saved his life, our state was about to send an innocent person – a child – to the gallows. The horrific implications of law cannot be overstated. What has enabled religion to be used as a weapon to incite raw passions against fellow citizens to murder them with impunity? The immediate cause is the pernicious and widely abused blasphemy law as enunciated in Chapter XV of the Pakistan Penal Code. Sections 295 to 298 of the chapter refer to offences related to religion. Section 295 provides that, “Whoever destroys, damages or defiles any place of worship, or any object held sacred by any class of persons with the intention of thereby insulting the religion of any class of persons is likely to consider such destruction, damage or defilement as an insult to their religion, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both.” In 1927, the British government added 295-A which reads that “whoever with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of His Majesty’s subjects, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” In 1991, the imprisonment term was extended from two to 10 years. In 1982, at the peak of General Zia’s period, 295-B was added to include the desecration of the Holy Quran and to enhance punishment. This section reads as follows: “Whoever wilfully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Quran or of an extract therefrom, or uses it in any derogatory manner or for any unlawful purpose shall be punishable with imprisonment for life.” The Majlis-e-Shoora designed by Zia further added 295-C, which reads: “Whoever by word, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any imputation, innuendo or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.” In 1990, the Federal Shariat Court constituted by Zia hammered the last nail in the coffin of sanity and justice by declaring that Islam provides punishment for hadd which is mandatory, therefore the words “imprisonment for life” should be removed from Section 295-C. Now, the only punishment for blasphemy was death. Section 298 relates to the Ahmadiyya community and institutionalises systemic prejudice against their right to practice their faith. Before the Federal Shariat Court provided for the mandatory death penalty, no case of blasphemy was registered under Section 295-B or 295-C. This judgment paved the way for murder and created the environment in which vigilantism was encouraged and promoted. Manzoor Masih lost his life in a wanton act of murder outside the Lahore High Court. One of the court’s judges, Justice Arif Bhatti, who overturned the conviction of Salamat and Rehmat Masih by a lower court, was murdered by the purveyors of a grotesquely distorted religion. Niamat Ahmar, a poet and teacher, was butchered in Faisalabad by activists of the Sipah-e-Sahab-e-Pakistan; Bantu Masih and Mukhtar Masih were killed in police custody by fundamentalists while the authorities looked on. In 2008, two Ahmadis were murdered when a television anchor declared their community wajib-ul-qatl (deserving to be killed). How has the state enabled this travesty of justice, this steady descent into inhumanity? The blasphemy law is only a part of the story; the issue of religious inequality and discrimination is much deeper. The entire problem began with the Objectives Resolution of 1949 when the state began to move in the direction of a theocracy. Its passage, despite the objections of the non-Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly, became possible because Jinnah’s vision, as outlined on August 11, 1947, was overlooked. Subsequently, every Constitution of Pakistan (1956, 1962 and 1973) carried a section on Islamic provisions which mandated that all laws would be enacted in line with religion. Religious discrimination and inequality are institutionalised within the state structure. Article 2 of the Constitution declares that Islam is the state religion and Article 2-A makes the Objectives Resolution a substantive part of the Constitution. Non-Muslim citizens cannot hold two of the highest offices of the land and Islamic provisions of the Constitution (Articles 227-230) are designed to ensure that all laws conform to the Holy Quran and Sunnah. Citizens belonging to other faiths are systemically excluded and relegated to a secondary position. The increasingly religious character of the Constitution, with General Zia’s Eighth Amendment protecting his draconian vision and measures, violates the principle of equal citizenship on which the entire edifice of democracy rests. Every provision that reduces the citizenship status of groups of people contradicts Article 25 (1) of the fundamental rights chapter which pronounces that all citizens are equal before the law. Similarly, Article 8 (1) avers that any law, custom or usage that is inconsistent with the rights conferred by this chapter shall be null and void. It follows that all the provisions that create discrimination and inequality among citizens should be removed. As Pakistanis focus on the task of reformulating their basic law and re-imagining their state, it seems prudent to separate religion from politics, as their mixture debases both religion and politics – the former by associating it purely with the attainment of political power and militant activity, the latter by making some more equal than others. Merely repealing the blasphemy law is not sufficient; we need to transform the basic framework from which such laws flow. Email: rubinasaigol@hotmail.com (The News) Looking for justice —Syed Mansoor Hussain The ultimate conundrum is that if a Christian is asked the question, do you believe that the Prophet of Islam (pbuh) was a Prophet and the Quran is the word of God, the believing Christians must say no, and if they say that, under the law are they not guilty of blasphemy and have committed a capital offence Last week I had hinted that I might write about how Muslim Americans have become discriminated pariahs in the US after 9/11. But then something at home forced me to concentrate on what is happening to minorities in Pakistan. Indeed in comparison it almost made me feel better about how we as Muslims are being treated in the US. The Gojra carnage that has mysteriously disappeared from public perception and our news channels and newspapers is just one thing. More recently, a young Christian boy arrested for blasphemy died in jail, the ‘authorities’ insisting that it was a suicide. Sure! And then the story broke about the case of a ‘mentally retarded’ woman who has languished in custody for thirteen years after being accused of blasphemy but was never presented in court. This woman has been officially declared as somebody probably incapable of even understanding the meaning of blasphemy and yet remained incarcerated for all this time without judicial review. “You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan.” That is what Jinnah said sixty-two years ago to the people of Pakistan but today the very same people who shout the loudest about Jinnah and his legacy are the ones that ignore his words. Almost two decades ago when democracy had just returned to Pakistan after a rather egregious military dictatorship, Pakistani Americans had a series of seminars in New York City to discuss what needed to be done in Pakistan to strengthen democracy. Platitudes galore! However, one almost offhand remark about the state of minorities in Pakistan during one such ‘seminar’ remains stuck in my mind. Somebody brought up the fact that the Pakistani flag has a white part representing minorities and therefore minorities are an important and protected part of our national heritage. But then an obviously ‘liberal’ cynic pointed out that after all Pakistanis needed some part of the flag to drive the pole through. Of course what he said sounds a lot more ‘descriptive’ in Punjabi. As I sit here today thinking about how our minorities, especially the Christians are being treated in ‘modern’ Pakistan, that remark reverberates ever so much in my mind. However, historically the Pakistani establishment has never been kind to minorities. The Ahmadiyya community was targeted during the agitation in 1953 and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto the secularist declared them non-Muslims twenty years later under religious pressure. Even the Shia have been, and still are, under threat. Fortunately for the Shia they are much too large a community and too integrated to be easily separated and targeted except in discrete areas of the country. Perhaps some of my readers might even remember a time not too long ago when Shia doctors were being killed just because they were Shia. Interestingly, some of them were killed just because they had Shia-sounding names, so much so that Shia doctors and even some with Shia-sounding names began to leave Pakistan. Of the minorities, most of the Sikhs left Pakistan at the time of partition as did most Hindus with a few staying behind, mostly in Sindh. During the first few decades of Pakistan, the Christian community was an important and fully integrated part of the national fabric. There was a thriving ‘Anglo’ community in Lahore that I remember well and many Christians held important positions as educators, civil servants and members of the armed forces. But everything started to change after the “enlightened” days of Islamisation. Most, if not all, of those that could afford it among the Christians, the Ahmadis and even the Parsees left Pakistan for western countries. Sadly, of the Christians left behind the majority now belongs to the poorer classes and therefore is most vulnerable. The recent spate of violence against the Christian community is not entirely about religious extremism and an excess of ‘Islamist’ zeal. I personally believe that after the Taliban and their supporters became isolated and unpopular due to attacks on other Muslims, they have changed tactics. Any radical organisation needs to keep its base involved and fired up and since attacks that killed other Muslims became undesirable, the Christian community has become an easy and obvious target. Considering the political and bureaucratic indifference to these attacks, this strategy of attacking Christians seems to be paying off. It provides the Taliban types with enough ‘face time’ on TV and in newspapers and keeps their radical base involved and active. Unfortunately many in our bureaucracy, among the politicians as well as in our lower judiciary are either entirely intimidated by, or else agree with, the Islamist types and therefore do not pursue cases against them to bring them to justice. The ‘apologists’ for the Taliban types keep repeating the mantra that Islam is a tolerant religion and as such the violence aimed at Christians or even against Muslims could not possibly be the work of real Muslims. Who then were the people that burned houses and residents in Gojra or recently blew up a hotel in Kohat? Are they not Muslims and are they not doing whatever they are doing in the name of Islam? The ultimate conundrum is that if a Christian is asked the question, do you believe that the Prophet of Islam (pbuh) was a Prophet and the Quran is the word of God, the believing Christians must say no, and if they say that, under the law are they not guilty of blasphemy and have committed a capital offence? And that is my question to the powers that be. What is more important when it comes to the survival of the federation, the price of sugar or the legally sanctioned killing of non-Muslims just because they believe in their faith as we do in ours? Syed Mansoor Hussain has practised and taught medicine in the US. He can be reached at smhmbbs70@yahoo.com (Daily Times)

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Virginia synagogue serves as mosque during Ramazan

Thursday, 17 Sep, 2009

People participate in Ramazan prayers held at the Northern Virginia Hebrew Congregation in Reston, Va. The prayers are organized by the All Dulles Area Muslim Center, who rent the space in the synagogue for the month of Ramazan.— Photo by AP

RESTON: On Friday afternoons, the people coming to pray at this building take off their shoes, unfurl rugs to kneel on and pray in Arabic. The ones that come Friday evenings put on yarmulkes, light candles and pray in Hebrew.

The building is a synagogue on a tree-lined street in suburban Virginia, but for the past few weeks — during the Muslim holy month of Ramazan — it has also been doubling daily as a mosque. Synagogue members suggested their building after hearing the Muslim congregation was looking to rent a place for overflow crowds.

‘People look to the Jewish-Muslim relationship as conflict,’ said All Dulles Area Muslim Society Imam Mohamed Magid, saying it’s usually disputes between the two groups in the Middle East that make news.

‘Here is a story that shatters the stereotype.’

Magid, who grew up in Sudan, said he did not meet someone who was Jewish until after he had moved to the US in his 20s, and he never imagined having such a close relationship with a rabbi. But he said the relationship with the Northern Virginia Hebrew Congregation has affected him and his members. Beyond being tolerant, the synagogue and its members have been welcoming.

He said one member of the mosque told him, ‘Next time I see a Jewish person I will not look at them the same.’

Rabbi Robert Nosanchuk, who leads the Reform congregation of about 500 families, said the relationship works both ways.

‘You really only get to know someone when you invite them into your home ... you learn to recognize their faces. You learn the names of their children,’ Nosanchuk said.

The actual prayers are held in the building’s social hall, which is used by the synagogue for a range of activities from educational programs to dance classes and receptions.

Both the synagogue and the mosque have a history of sharing space with other religious groups. People coming to Friday night services at the synagogue sometimes park in an adjoining church’s parking lot; on Sundays, sometimes churchgoers park behind the synagogue.

And the mosque has rented space from others since it was founded in 1983.

Members have prayed in a recreation center, a high school, an office building and, for a long time, a church. As the mosque has grown, however, it has needed more space. In 2002 the community opened its own building in Sterling, Virginia. It holds 900 people for prayers, but the community has satellite locations to accommodate more people: a hotel, a banquet hall and even a second synagogue, Beth Chaverim Reform congregation, in Ashburn, Virginia.

The community began renting space at the two synagogues in 2008. They began holding daily prayers at the Ashburn synagogue and prayers on Friday afternoons, the week’s main prayer service, at the Northern Virginia Hebrew Congregation.

This is the first year, however, they have rented space at the synagogue for the daily prayers for Ramazan, which began at the end of August. More than 100 people come to the daily services, which are held from nine p.m. to 10:45 p.m. except for Friday, when the services are in the afternoon. The society pays the synagogue $300 a day.

The partnership isn’t entirely new. The two communities have held occasional events together going back a decade: dialogues and community service. Still, some members of both communities were unsure of how things would work at first.

‘When they rented the place, I was surprised, but then after that when I came here and saw how nicely everything is set up and how well done it is ... I am very happy with it,’ said mosque member Ambreen Ahmed.

Now, mosque members sometimes greet the rabbi with the Hebrew greeting ‘Shalom’; he’ll answer back with the Arabic equivalent, ‘Salaam.’ Nosanchuk spoke at Friday afternoon prayers recently. The imam spoke at Friday evening Shabbat services.

Both groups say the relationship won’t be over when Ramazan ends in North America over the weekend. The rabbi and imam are talking about possibly even making a joint trip to the Middle East, and Friday prayers will still be held at the synagogue.

Magid says some mosque members, in fact, have permanently moved from the mosque to the synagogue.

‘Where have you been?’ he asked one man who used to pray regularly at the mosque.

‘You saw me in the synagogue,’ the man replied.

‘All the time?’ the imam asked.

‘It’s cozy, it’s nice. Your parking lot is overcrowded ... and I like to be there,’ the man said.

The imam joked maybe the man should stay for the Sabbath service.

Said the imam: ‘That shows you how comfortable they have become.’ — AP (Dawn)

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Dr Charles Amjad-Ali on the victimisation of the minorities in Pakistan

Victimisation of the minorities

By Muhammad Badar Alam
Saturday, 12 Sep, 2009 (Dawn)

ctivists of Christian community shout slogans against burning of houses of Christian community in Gojra, during a demonstration outside Karachi Press Club.– APP Photo.

PAKISTAN

Mob sets church set on fire near Sialkot

Dr Charles Amjad-Ali is the Martin Luther King Jr Professor for Justice and Christian Community and the director of Islamic studies programme at the Luther Seminary in St Paul, the United States.

Ordained as a presbyter of the Church of Pakistan in 1987, he worked as the director of the Christian Study Center in Rawalpindi between 1985 and 1995 before joining the Aurat Foundation for a year. He is also one of the founders of many civil society organisations in Pakistan. These include the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), the Pakistan Institute of Labor Education and Research, Patan Foundation, and Sungi Rural Development Foundation.

Dr Charles Amjad-Ali has studied Islamic Law and History from Columbia University at the post-doctoral level after having done his PhD in contemporary philosophy at Frederich Wilhelm University in Bonn, Germany. His books include Islamophobia (2006), Liberation Ethics (1985) and Passion for Change (1989).

Dawn.com exchanged e-mails with him a few weeks after the recent deadly anti-Christian violence in Gojra, a town in central Punjab. In the wake of Friday's attack on another church, the following is a question and answer session with Dr Charles.

Q- How do you contextualise the anti-minority violence in Pakistan? How and why in socio-political and historical terms have religious minorities come to be so flagrantly victimised, so obviously marginslised and so openly discriminated against?

A- One has to contextualise the continuing violence, flagrant victimisation, marginalisation and discrimination against the minorities in Pakistan, through a critical look at its history. This is best expressed in the debate on the reasons for founding Pakistan. The gist of the conservative stance is that Pakistan was made for Islam. This resurfaced belligerently and with vehemence during the Zia period, ending up in the slogan Pakistan ka matlab kya? La illa ha illalah! This of course excluded the minorities completely. The ‘liberal’ side of Pakistan, or should I say the relatively more authentic side of the debate, argued that Pakistan was made for Muslims, not for Islam. The problem with this position is the high level of subtlety and differentiation which escapes the majority. Thus the sloganeers, playing on a common sentiment and simple clichés, are able to control the discourse.

I want to add a little more nuance to this debate by arguing that Pakistan was a nation exclusively created by and for a minority of India. For some 700 years the Muslims ruled large parts of the Indian subcontinent, which always had a Hindu majority. This rule ranged from being highly accepting of the plurality of religious communities (c.f. Akbar and the Din-e-Elahi) to being repressive (c.f. Aurangzeb and his ‘Islamisation’ policies). As the independence of India became certain, with its clear democratic ideals, the minorities were afraid that the guarantees provided by the British Empire, no matter how skewed, would not be upheld in the independent India. They had grounds for their apprehensions, and part of their fear was that the tyranny of the sheer majority of around 80 per cent Hindus would not allow any other group to have a place on a level playing field. These fears were accentuated by the Government of India Act of 1935, and the subsequent provincial elections held in the winter of 1936/37.

It is interesting to note that on October 15, 1946, in the political jockeying for power, the All India Muslim League nominated a Scheduled Caste Hindu (a Dalit), Jogindar Nath Mandal, to Lord Wavell’s Interim Government of India. He was among such Muslim League luminaries as Liaquat Ali Khan, I I Chundrigar, Abdur Rab Nishtar, Ghazanfar Ali Khan. This same Jogindar Nath was the chairman of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on August 11, 1947, when Jinnah was elected the Governor General of Pakistan and gave his oft quoted famous speech about the democratic, egalitarian and fully participatory nature and future of Pakistan. Mandal was also later the highest ranking minority member of the Cabinet that the Quaid put together; ironically he was the Minister of Law and Labour.

Furthermore, in 1947 three Christian members of the Punjab Assembly, S P Singha, C E Gibbon and Joshua Fazal Din, voted with the Muslim League and thus in favour of Pakistan, which is a clear indication of what they saw Pakistan to be. They were taking the words of the Quaid seriously. We all know about Jinnah’s speech of August 11, 1947, but what we forget is that on August 12, the Constituent Assembly appointed a special ‘Committee on Fundamental Rights of Citizens and Minorities of Pakistan,’ to look into and advise it on matters relating to the fundamental rights of the citizens, particularly the minorities.

One can expand these early democratic and rights oriented understandings of Pakistan. The first real undoing of all this early promise was the adoption of the Objectives Resolution on March 12, 1949, which played immediately into the hands of the more conservative Muslim leadership.

The pre-Independence orthodox, conservative, and newly emerging fundamentalist Islamic movements were all against the formation of Pakistan. For them, if a state was created in the name of Islam for the Muslim population of India, then Islam was being reduced to a nation-state rather than a pan-ethnic, pan-national ummah with Khilafat as its political order. This was seen fundamentally as a product of a western nationalism. Also, this nationalism, and its concurrent democratic ideals, was seen primarily as products of liberal bourgeois democratic republicanism with no basis in Islam. (It is no wonder that the Khilafat movement and the Independence movement had two distinct groups of Muslims supporting them). While it was perhaps a doctrinally accurate perception, it was based on an ossified understanding of Islam.

Contrary to these groups, the people who struggled for the foundation of Pakistan were much more familiar with western political and philosophical ideas and ideals than with the Islamic sources on these issues. These men were what has come to be called ‘Islamic modernists,’ who never envisioned, even when they gave lip service to Islam for the sake of republican democratisation policies, the kind of Islam that is dominant in Pakistan today.

The Islamic influence, however, begins primarily as a way for the conservative elements to try to influence and control the destiny of Pakistan, first by adopting the Objectives Resolution, then creating the Ahmedi Crisis of the early 1950s and then by naming the country the ‘Islamic Republic of Pakistan’ for the first time in the Constitution of 1956. This was a utilitarian and cynical shift in the position of the conservative Islamic groups. They were first against the formation of Pakistan on Islamic grounds, but once Pakistan came into existence, without any input from them and even after their active resistance, they decided to make Pakistan an ideal Muslim state on the basis of an ossified interpretation of the early Islamic state without seeing the sheer religious paradox of this position. The irony is that their kind of Islam now provides the grammar, and is stated as the raison d’etre of Pakistan. So the Islamic influence has progressively grown. Pakistan today sits in the international arena as the hotbed for the generation of Islamic fundamentalism, Jihadists, ‘terrorists,’ such as al-Qaeda, Taliban or whatever new nomenclature is given to them or a small group takes for itself.

Q- What role have religious laws such as those against blasphemy played in perpetuating these trends?

A- The Hudood Ordinance and the blasphemy laws, especially those covering blasphemy against the Quran and the Prophet of Islam, while playing on the emotions of these issues, were slid through as draconian laws to be used cynically against those groups which stood for democracy and rights, and were to be victimised by the state. That was the intention of a repressive state. Now, however, after the events of 9/11 where the same fundamentalist Muslims who were once an ally to the United States and Saudi Arabia and are now clearly the Frankenstein enemies, are either using these laws or aiding and abetting their use both to victimise the vulnerable minorities as well as to destabilise the progress in good governance and in the growth of participatory and just democracy.

So the state, which has been historically the producer of these draconian laws, now finds itself the victim of these laws, because of the regular events taking place at the grassroots levels. The state is clearly not strong enough to meet both the external threat of the Islamic forces in Afghanistan and the Tribal Area (and parts of NWFP) and the internal threat of the Islamic sentiments that keep erupting regularly to eat at the sinews of the current democratic dispensation.

Q- Do you believe the current global strategic situation charactrised by 9/11 and perceived by many as a clash between Islam and Christian West has something to do with the rising tide of violence against Christians in Pakistan?

A- It must be remembered that the Islamisation of the society, culture, polity and economics grew in fits and starts between 1956-1977. However, in 1977 things changed radically with the martial law of General Zia-ul-Haq and at this point Islam begins to dominate the state. Here the need for Zia to justify his regime on other than democratic grounds, coincided with the needs of the US and Saudi Arabia to refute the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, both in 1979. There was already a precursor of this confluence in the refutation of socialism, and even of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. So the Islamisation process was not just an endogenously produced element but was fully aided, abetted, and even engendered exogenously by the US and Saudi Arabia as well.

It is apparent that each time the Islamic identity is emphasized in the larger political and policy discourse, it threatens the minorities’ existence deeply; the more Islamic Pakistan becomes the less secure is the status of the minorities in it. Therefore the Christians remain under the closest scrutiny of these fundamentalist groups. The state is either not powerful enough or unwilling to protect these minorities in general and the Christian minority in particular, against these conservative elements. Any protection provided to these Christians is immediately classified as being based on the dictates of the West, and particularly at the behest of the hateful United States.

However, despite this picture, there still lies a deep-seated condescension towards the Pakistani Christians because a large majority of them comes from what the Hindus classified as the unclean and untouchable classes (dalit). The prejudice of untouchability of the caste-based Hindu ethos remains a very strong operational residue in Indian and Pakistani Islam. It is applied particularly towards Christians, not only because of their origins, but rather because quite a large number among them are in the cleaning industry, and belong to this untouchable class even today. The very conservative Muslims who want to follow the puritanical rules of Islam and want to live out their lives in imitation of the Prophet at this point become quite Hindu in their caste-based attitude towards the Christians.

So there is a fundamental paradox in Pakistani society vis-à-vis Christian-Muslim relations. One the one hand, the Christians are all seen as being dalits, and therefore totally irrelevant and of no consequence whatsoever. On the other hand, whenever something goes wrong between Islam and the West, the first people to feel the full brunt of reactions are the Christians who face the threat of mob violence against which the state is either unwilling or unable to protect them. What happens as an intermittent reality becomes an ever-present sword of Damocles and makes the Christians of Pakistan extremely insecure.

Q- What do you think should change to guarantee the security, religious freedom and protection of the religious minorities' rights in Pakistan?

A- The biggest problem is that the state does not show the spine or the willingness to fight for a full blown democracy and extension of rights which will be the only way to secure religious freedoms as well as protection for religious minorities and their rights. The state should go all out for educational policies from grassroots to undergraduate levels, including teachers training, to extend the concepts of democracy and rights into the very core of the society. It should ensure the madrassas have a curriculum which reflects the virtue of good citizenship and the virtue of being a good Muslim as a way to opening the society for the full participation of all. All the major institutions of the state such as the army, the bureaucracy, the civil servants, the police, etc., must undergo continuing education and formation with democracy and rights as the core value. The more this takes place and the more these issues become the soul of the society and the grammar of Pakistan, the more the most vulnerable elements of the society will be protected and secured. For, if everyone’s rights are central and protected, the minorities’ rights will also be automatically protected.

The intermittent lip service for the rights of the minorities, especially Christian minorities, acts only as a makeup to cover the huge non-democratic, non-participatory warts of Pakistan. Thus whenever this makeup begins to wear off, the warts manifest themselves in ever new pathologies, repressions and tyranny. The minorities, being the most vulnerable, are therefore also the most victimised under these circumstances.

Q- What do you think the minorities should do to get their rightful place as equal citizens of Pakistan?

A- It must be remembered that where there is true respect for democracy and rights, the minorities get a special privileged status and privileged protections as a continuing affirmative action. Therefore all the minorities should struggle, and continue to struggle very hard, for democracy and rights for all Pakistanis, rather than seeming or appearing to do it in a solipsistic manner only for themselves with every new discrimination, victimisation, and repression.

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Corporate advertising during Ramadan plays into the legacy of General Zia's Islamisation efforts. NFP's article.

Pious follies

Posted by Nadeem F. Paracha

Source

Islam is believed to be the basis of nationalism on which the Pakistani state was constituted, even though this notion continues to be hotly contested. Liberals hold the view that Pakistan was created for the Muslim community of India, which Muhammad Ali Jinnah treated as a separate ethnic and cultural community, rather than a strictly religious group demanding an Islamic theocracy. Either way Islam is accepted as the core social and political institution in Pakistan, giving it a special role in Pakistani society.

However, this was not always the case - especially between 1947 and 1970 - when the principal tenor of the state and society was largely secular and Islam largely remained a matter of personal faith. But the roots of what came to be known as ‘Islamisation’ of society stretch back to the 1950s.

A dichotomy is born

Islamisation as an official socio-political ideology was first introduced in public life in shape of the symbols of the state. For example, Quranic verses emblazoned on state buildings and constitutional debates about Islamic law started to emerge sometime after 1956.

During that period, the leadership of the Muslim League was overwhelmingly secular and steeped in English Common Law. The party leaned towards the creation of a liberal modern society that embraced Islam’s universal principals. On the other end of the debate, Islamic parties such as the Jamaat Islami (JI), and the now defunct Nizam-e-Islam party, argued for a state where shariah would rule.

The Islamic State vs. Moderate Muslim Republic discourse hung quietly in the background throughout the 1960s. It was brought forth by the politico-religious parties during the 1970 elections. But their argument and political instruments were soundly defeated at the polls.

Things started to change after the 1971 debacle in East Pakistan. Interestingly, this was also when the force of Islam was for the first time used by the Pakistan Army when it started to patronise combative Islamist youth groups, Al-Badar and Al-Shams, mainly consisting of young JI activists and members of its student wing, the Islami Jamiat Taleba (IJT). These groups assisted the West Pakistan Army in attacking Bengali nationalists. One can also describe the two groups as the earliest manifestations of militant Islam in Pakistan. Notably, this was the first systematic collaboration between the army and lslamists.

The burning debate that erupted after the East Pakistan catastrophe squarely revolved around the question: what would keep that which remained of Pakistan together?

Z A. Bhutto suggested populist democracy and ‘Islamic socialism.’ His offer was of an egalitarian and modern version of Islam that he paraded as the new model for the struggling, post-’71 Muslim nation. The second ideological response to the question came from the Islamists (JI, JUP, JUI, etc.). Blaming the failures of the republic on the ‘flouting of Islamic principals’ – both by the rulers and their subjects – they insisted that only shariahwould keep Pakistan together.

The two models went to war in the politics of labour unions, student unions and lawyers associations. Though the Islamists were successfully kept in check by the stronger progressive labour unions, things were tighter in student politics where Bhutto’s model was defended on campuses by organisations such as National Students Federation (NSF) and People’s Students Federation (PSF), whereas the Islamist model was propagated by the IJT, Anjuman Taliba Islam (ATI), and Muslim Students Federation (MSF).

Then in 1973, when the second major Ahmadia riots erupted, the Islamists tasted their first major victory in the country as the Bhutto regime agreed to declare the Ahmadi community non-Muslims. Their second victory arrived in 1976-77 when - with the help of industrialists, bankers, bazaar merchants, and small-town entrepreneurs – Islamic parties formed the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), and successfully agitated against Bhutto’s ‘un-Islamic regime,’ consequently paving the way for the Ziaul Haq coup.

With the arrival of Zia, the Islamists thought they had finally found state power. Their drive for Islamic order also meant changing culture and reorganising society. For this, Zia adopted the JI’s agenda: prohibitions on drinking, betting and dancing, and encouraging the usage of public flogging. Furthermore, Zia’s aids helped him exhibit ‘pious’ examples. Offices, schools, and factories were required to offer praying space; textbooks were revised; mosques and madrassahs multiplied; and conservative scholars became fixtures on television. These cultural shifts were all enforced through government edicts.

The worst aspect in this context was the demagogic reengineering of the country’s education curriculum. After the 1971 break-up of Pakistan and the war with India, educational discourse on nation-building in Pakistan became much more introverted. A violent, militaristic and negative nationalism, which saw enemies on every border, was reconstituted. And during General Zia’s dictatorship, religion as an instrument of homogenisation and control took centre-stage in educational policies.

This gradual Islamisation succeeded in creating an aura of religiosity in everyday life. In reality, there was no necessary improvement in justice, equality and morality. Indeed, the government’s edicts split society between a public life of Islamic pieties and a private life characterised by personal gain.

This dichotomy between public and private has become Zia’s legacy. Since 1971, the state, military and the politico-religious parties have insisted on enforcing a convoluted, myopic and singular ideological mindset – ‘Islamic state’ – in an otherwise multi-sectarian, multi-religious and multi-ethnic society. This insistence created, on the one hand, various sectarian and ethnic fissures, and, on the other, a psyche that is extremely vulnerable to paranoia along with an almost schizophrenic patriotism.

Religion for sale

Pakistan is going through testing, but interesting times. We seem to be caught in a rather dynamic form of social and political anarchy in which the absurd and the audacious – negative and positive, creative and destructive – have become casually plausible.

This anarchy has opened doors to forbidden rooms and fruits, as Pakistanis (especially in the country’s burgeoning electronic media), are now much more likely to question and debate the political role of Islam in Pakistan, and more so, whether the years of enforcing a singular ideology on a religiously and ethnically diverse mass of people was such a good idea.

In such a scenario, all sections of liberalism in the country are expected to take an active part. On intellectual and political levels liberals are doing that, but there are still sections of this liberalism that have failed miserably to comprehend the explosive zeitgeist taking shape. Take the example of large multinational corporations and advertising agencies, both of which have been the leading purveyors of openness and liberalism in the country’s cultural, economic and social milieu. But if one goes through the kind of advertising that emerges on our TV screens every Ramadan, it is a baffling sight to say the least.

Ever since Zia, Islam (as a myopic, all-purpose national ideology concocted by the state) has become a most lucrative asset not only for the country’s politico-religious parties, but for corporate capitalism as well. Take, for instance, a recent Umra package announced by a travel agency in which as a ‘prize’ it unabashedly offers the faithful a trip to the holy land with a highly controversial and demagogic Islamic televangelist, Aamir Liaqat, who was last year also embroiled in a controversy in which his show was accused of encouraging violenceagainst the Ahmadi community in Lahore.

At play here is exactly the kind of ethical duality that developed during the Zia regime. The more ‘liberal’ corporate multinationals are not any better. In fact, every Ramadan, the nature of their advertising become an all-too-obvious example of a classic meeting of capitalism and religion. Religion, rather the religious sentiment that sort of heightens during the holy month, is nonchalantly exploited to make that fast buck. All that is required are the right imagery and words.

Telecommunication companies and food brands do a roaring business by offering convoluted innovations (titled ‘Ramadan offers’) on the back of the kinds of televised sound bytes and imagery whose roots lie in the manipulative, dualistic and hypocritical cultural episodes during the Zia regime.

Models (male and female) in crisp shalwar-kameez with a holier-than-thou expression and tone of voice brandish assorted products to a soundtrack punctuated by the azaan or a naat and images of well-lit mosques; an open Qu’ran is illuminated by a light from the skies; and worn-out pious stereo-types that have little to do with reality but everything with the kind of sterilised and homogenised religious bourgeois mind-set that turns faith into a mechanised exhibition of what really is glorified and sanctified xenophobia. In other words, imagine the robotic characters in the infamous film, the Stepford Wives as pious Muslims!

It is distressing to see corporate advertising continuing to create the myopic and narrow imagery about Islam and Pakistan that is now being openly questioned after playing a destructive role in the social and political matters of Pakistan for many years. It is strange that corporate capitalism in Pakistan hasn’t yet swallowed the fact that more than ever, Pakistan today is trying to prove itself as a vibrant pluralistic and diverse society.

Advertising that continues to glorify and advocate a narrow and singular notion of Islamic nationhood - most recently seen in a glossy TV commercial of a popular milk brand – or turns faith into a mindless set of rituals and self-righteous sacred posturing (as seen in the Ramadan campaign of a large telecommunications company) must remember that that such imagery today will only be appealing to an introverted (read: deluded) branch of the country’s urban middle-class that has yet to comprehend the fact that Pakistan is not a collective milieu of homogenised Islamic ethics and sentiments, but rather a dynamic mass of people with assorted interpretations of Islam and Pakistan.

Unity in such a country has to come from a democratic recognition of its diversity, and not through the engineering of a single, wholesome notion of faith and nation.

Nadeem F. Paracha is a cultural critic and senior columnist for Dawn Newspaper and Dawn.com

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Guest Column: What unsung minorities have done for Pakistan

By Qudrat Ullah

The Gojra inferno has once again highlighted the need to reassess our treatment of Pakistan’s most potential asset- the non Muslim Pakistanis and decide the future strategy in the light of past mistakes. One positive aftermath of this sad frenzy is that the media has extensively discussed our policy (if there is any) of treating the non Muslims and pondered over the likely facets of future ideological direction.

Although, now both federal and Punjab governments have already taken various administrative measures to heal the wounds of the minorities in Gojra and also announced a total of Rs. 200 million grant, for the welfare of the Christian affectees, but the real question is that whether we have learnt any lesson from this sad repetitive frenzy and will we ever be taught how to behave with our minorities in future or not? There is no doubt that incidents of setting Churches on fire in different parts of the country including Shantinagar in Khanewal, Sangla Hill and others places has badly tarnished our national as well as Islamic image at the global level, therefore, it’s high time that we evenly remember that what minorities have given to this country.

Our 62 years chequered history proves that minorities have played very proactive role in the collective welfare of this homeland of today’s 170 million people where even 400 people have shown the courage to declare themselves as ‘Jews’ in the ‘religion column’ in the last national census. It would be a surprise for many of us that Pakistan’s biggest minority is Hindus and not Christians, as according to 1998’s census; Hindus’ number is more than the Christians who are 4000 less in total population. According to the Census, caste Hindus constitutes about 1.6 percent of the total population and about 6.6% in province of Sindh. The 1998 census recorded a total of 2,443,614 Hindus in Pakistan.

To begin with, the founding father, Quaid e Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, appointed two non Muslims-Sir Zafrula Khan as Foreign Minister and Jogindranath Mandal, a dalit Hindu leader hailing from East Pakistan, as Law and Labour Minister in the first federal cabinet of newly independent state of Pakistan in 1947. Today, very few could recall that it was Sir Zafrula Khan who drafted the Lahore resolution in 1940 and even a small number could tell that this dalit Hindu, Jogindranath Mandal presided over Pakistan’s first constituent assembly session in August 1947 and M.A.Jinnah took oath under his presidenship. Historians believe that without Mandal’s carrying of the significant scheduled caste Hindu votes in Bengal, in the 1946 elections, in favor of Muslims, it is unlikely that Pakistan would have come into being in the form that it did in 1947. But later on, he grew increasingly isolated and disillusioned with the post-Jinnah realpolitik, and when late Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan publicly supported a proposal to make Islam the official state religion, Mandal became more staggered, denounced it as ‘a rejection of Jinnah’s secular vision for Pakistan,’ and sent his letter of resignation in October 1950 from Kalkatta to the then Prime Minister of Pakistan. In his resignation letter, he openly assailed Pakistani politicians for disregarding the rights and future of minorities, as well as the vision of Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Foreign Minister Sir Zafrula Khan also played important role in Peoples Republic of China’s entry in the U.N. We have forgotten our only Nobel Prize Laureate, Dr. Abdus Salam because he belonged to a minority faith.

We are even unfamiliar of the fact that S.P Singha- last Speaker of the British era Punjab Assembly and M.P., Ralia Ram- both leaders of All India Christian Association, cast their precious votes in favor of Pakistan and thus Punjab became part of Pakistan.

Can we explain why the great Quaid asked a Hindu- Jagannath Azad, a doyen of Urdu poetry to write the first national anthem of Pakistan in 1947 which remained a national anthem for the 18 long months? Because he wanted a cosmopolitan society in Pakistan.


It had beautiful poetry like this,

Aé sarzameené paak

Zarray teray haéñ aaj sitaaroñ se taabnaak

Roshan haé kehkashaañ se kaheeñ aaj tayree khaak

Aé sarzameené paak

(Oh land of Pakistan, each particle of yours is being illuminated by stars. Even your dust has been brightened like a rainbow)

There is no doubt that non-Muslims are amongst the most talented and the patriotic Pakistanis. The efforts of our magnificent flying heroes like Eric Hall, Nazir Latif, Mervyn Middle coat, Cecil Chaudhry, William Harney and Peter Christy can never be forgotten in wars against India. Many of you might not know that out of a total of 70 Sitara-e-Jurats (SJ) awarded to PAF officers in both the Wars, six were won by Christian officers. Three illustrious Christian Officers of the PAF namely Eric Hall, Steve Joseph and M.J. O'Brien held the rank of Air Vice Marshal. O'Brien is the only PAF officer to serve as the Commandant of the National Defense College. Joshua Fazal Din is known as the first preacher in Punjabi Christians who preached by Punjabi literature. He was also the Punjab Minister of Law and Treasury in early 50s. At that time, the government appreciated Joshua Fazal Din, for his services, for promoting Punjabi language, in shape of ‘Tamgha-e- Imtiaz.’ Meanwhile, Justice® Rana Bhagwan Das is held to amongst the most honest judges who served the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Pakistan’s best fashion designer Deepak Parwani is a Hindu, and one of the best models is a Christian namely Sunita Marshall. The owners of the largest hotels chain (Avari Hotels) are Parsis. The best leg spinner in Pakistan’s cricket team was a Hindu. Pakistan’s best drummer is a Goan Christian (Gumby of Junoon and Noori fame); some of Pakistan’s leading musicians are also Christians including bands like Saraab and Aks. And, who can forget legendry actress Shabnam and singer A. Nayyar. Even our best novelist in English-Bapsi Sidhwa is a Parsi.

Minorities’ contribution in fields of health, education and nation-building is simply undeniable. Pakistan’s best institutions like Kinnaird College, F.C College in Lahore and Parsi educational institutions in Karachi, besides chain of educational institutions in most of the cities, is a clear proof that our minorities are a silent nation-builders. Similarly, health institutions like U.C.H in Lahore, Memorial Christian Hospital in Sialkot and free eye hospital in Taxila are also run by non-Muslims.

More recently, Christian Reformed World Relief Committee (CRWRC) and Baptist Global Response (BGR) worked with their local partners to distribute emergency care items among displaced Muslims in Malakand Division. The saga of minorities’ services is long and illustrious, the need is that the majority should learn from their minority brethren the lesson of selfless service and stop burning their properties. It would be better if we build a better Pakistan for all.

This will be the real contribution by us.
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What can we learn from The Madina Charter? A Multifaith and Mutlicultural Constitution for Peace and Conflict Resolution

Peace and Conflict Resolution Concepts in the Madina Charter

by Yetkin Yildirim

It is much easier to make contact with people from vastly different cultures and beliefs in the context of today’s world. Unfortunately, increased globalization has also broadened the scope of conflict throughout the world. Modern conflicts take place between societies with widely different cultural, religious, and philosophical backgrounds. In today’s globalized world, the Madina Charter can be a source for answers to many of today’s questions, presenting approaches to solving and preventing conflicts between groups based on differences in culture and belief.

The Madina Charter is a constitution that essentially established the Madina city-state. The Charter was the first written constitution in Islam and arguably the first constitutional law in society. Before Prophet Muhammad’s arrival from Makka, Yathrib (later known as Madina) had a population of 10,000 that was organized into approximately 22 tribes. Approximately half the population was Jewish and half was Arab. Regardless of religion, tribes sought power through military dominance over other tribes, with the numerous alliances forged between warring tribes greatly contributing to the aggression. Constant warfare was taking a toll on the tribes. While some sought external military assistance for the conflicts, many were making preparations for the enthronement of a leader from one of the tribes. However, it was unclear whether each tribe would acquiesce to the leadership of a single leader from one of the tribes and if such a leader would be able to establish political organization, create military defense for the city, reconcile tribal hostilities, and define local rights and obligations as well as address the issues of the growing immigrant refugee population from Makka.

God’s Messenger was requested by the tribes in Yathrib to act as a third-party mediator to try and help resolve the on-going conflict between them. He had a reputation for being an able mediator as he had helped to resolve conflicts in Makka and was able to fill the leadership void that existed in the area. It was also common practice of Arabs at that time to refer their conflict to outsiders, and the Prophet had already been given the title, “The Trustworthy” by the residents of Makka. Finally, while drafting the Charter, he consulted the leaders of each tribe, thereby demonstrating his willingness to listen to the needs of all tribes.

The methods God’s Messsenger made use of in the creation of the Charter are similar to trends that have emerged in modern conflict resolution techniques. These methods provide an important source for understanding the concepts of mediation and conflict resolution in Islam, and subsequently, can also offer effective means with which to approach dialogue with and within Islamic societies and among non-Islamic societies.

The Charter, which was the first declaration of the area of Madina as a city-state, established rules of government and addressed specific social issues of the community in an attempt to put to an end the chaos and conflict that had been plaguing the region for generations. The Charter outlined the rights and duties of its citizens, provided collective protection for all citizens of Madina, including Muslims and non-Muslims, and provided the first means of seeking justice through the law and community instead of via tribal military actions.

The Madina Charter, which contains 47 sections in total, addresses the power structures that contributed to the conflict in Yathrib. The Charter expressly identified the parties involved in the conflict; the first 23 sections of the Charter address the Muslim immigrants from Makka and the Muslims of Yathrib, while the second half of the document is directed towards the Jews of the community. Prophet Muhammad also identified immediate physical issues in Yathrib. In the second section, the people of Yathrib are defined as one community to the exclusion of all others. Prior to this proclamation, the boundaries of Yathrib were indistinct, each tribe occupying a certain territory, with the whole of the tribal territories in the area not being considered as one, united city. Once Yathrib was established as an integrated community, The Prophet addressed issues of community justice and protection. The Charter established the course of law for Yathrib. The right to seek justice was shifted from individuals to the central community. The Prophet’s arrangements for community justice and protection encouraged collective responsibility. The Madina Charter was also the first acknowledgement of religious divisions within the Yathrib tribal system. Though he did little to change the organization of inter-religious tribes, the Prophet called upon the deeply instilled values of Islam and Judaism to fortify the agreement. These stipulations enabled the participants of the agreement to look once again beyond tribal alliances, thus making tribal lines indistinct.

Along these same lines, the Charter focused on relationships rather than group dynamics: the Madina Charter eliminated tribal hostilities by realigning residents, shifting the focus from militaristic rivals to allied religious followers. In the event of religious dispute, the document continued to decree that the participants of the agreement must act in good faith with one another Finally, interaction goals, including specific desires to maintain one’s sense of self-identity, were left intact by shifting the alliance from tribes (which were hostile) to religion, enabling participants to abandon tribal hostility without loss of face.

Before the Charter, Yathrib was a community of constant tension between independent, hostile tribes. The Prophet addressed these power struggles by establishing common goals that would serve the whole community. The Charter specifically advises mutual influence with the declaration that the Muslims and Jews “must seek mutual advice and consultation, and loyalty is a protection against treachery.” The Charter binds the parties of the agreement to helping one another against any attack on Yathrib. It dictates behavior for a specific instance of mutual influence. If the Jews “are called to make peace and maintain it they must do so; and if they make a similar demand on the Muslims it must be carried out.” Also, reference to a higher authority was repeated in both sections. The Charter also explicitly pronounces that future disputes “must be referred to God and to Prophet Muhammad.” The participants had placed a power that was external to their group that they would be able to draw upon in the event of their own power being or seeming insufficient. The power of the agreement was uniquely balanced due to its direction towards God. The Madina Charter addressed potential power complications by focusing the participants on their interdependence. The Madina Charter prohibited independent contention by participant groups that claim God’s protection, and states that the peace of believers is as one. Once again, the idea of being one community was emphasized and the participants of the agreement were made to recognize their power as a unit.

The solutions presented in the Madina Charter can be applied to questions concerning dialogue and conflict of today’s world: the Charter was created to address problems present in and created by a pluralistic society, the main characteristic of today’s globalized system. The constitution of the Charter created a federal-type structure with an authority that was centralized in matters of state security, yet provided the tribes a certain level of autonomy in social and religious issues. Prophet Muhammad only made final decisions in cases where tribes could not resolve disputes between themselves, and these decisions were based on the laws laid out by the Charter. The Madina city-state, while granting every citizen equal rights, protection against oppression, and a voice in the government, declared itself a brotherhood of believers, extending financial help to its citizens. Laws were also enacted to punish criminals, such as prohibiting help being given to a murderer. Finally, as prescribed in the teaching of the Qur’an, freedom of religion was guaranteed for each member of the community.

For a peaceful world, individuals must live within the boundaries of the lawfully created universe. In this modern age of science and technology, the Madina Charter could be a source for answers to questions about how to live together and how to solve and prevent conflicts between groups based on differences in culture and belief. The Madina Charter represents the principles of law and good and right reason, which is higher than any individual man. On the charter, God’s name comes first, as God represents the highest good and the highest principle of right reason. Thus, the Madina Charter can be a good model of ways to create and sustain dialogue in a pluralistic society, and of ways to build and conduct political and social relationships among different groups.

http://www.interfaithathens.org/article/art10171.asp

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THE MEDINA CHARTER

622 C.E.

In the name of God the Compassionate, the Merciful.

(1) This is a document from Muhammad the prophet (governing the relations) between the believers and Muslims of Quraysh and Yathrib, and those who followed them and joined them and labored with them.

(2) They are one community (umma) to the exclusion of all men.

(3) The Quraysh emigrants according to their present custom shall pay the bloodwit within their number and shall redeem their prisoners with the kindness and justice common among believers.

(4-8) The B. ‘Auf according to their present custom shall pay the bloodwit they paid in heatheism; every section shall redeem its prisoners with the kindness and justice common among believers. The B. Sa ida, the B. ‘l-Harith, and the B. Jusham, and the B. al-Najjar likewise.

(9-11) The B. ‘Amr b. ‘Auf, the B. al-Nabit and the B. al-‘Aus likewise.

(12)(a) Believers shall not leave anyone destitute among them by not paying his redemption money or bloodwit in kindness.

(12)(b) A believer shall not take as an ally the freedman of another Muslim against him.

(13) The God-fearing believers shall be against the rebellious or him who seeks to spread injustice, or sin or animosity, or corruption between believers; the hand of every man shall be against him even if he be a son of one of them.

(14) A believer shall not slay a believer for the sake of an unbeliever, nor shall he aid an unbeliever against a believer.

(15) God’s protection is one, the least of them may give protection to a stranger on their behalf. Believers are friends one to the other to the exclusion of outsiders.

(16) To the Jew who follows us belong help and equality. He shall not be wronged nor shall his enemies be aided.

(17) The peace of the believers is indivisible. No separate peace shall be made when believers are fighting in the way of God. Conditions must be fair and equitable to all.

(18) In every foray a rider must take another behind him.

(19) The believers must avenge the blood of one another shed in the way of God.

(20)(a) The God-fearing believers enjoy the best and most upright guidance.

(20)(b) No polytheist shall take the property of person of Quraysh under his protection nor shall he intervene against a believer.

(21) Whoever is convicted of killing a believer without good reason shall be subject to retaliation unless the next of kin is satisfied (with blood-money), and the believers shall be against him as one man, and they are bound to take action against him.

(22) It shall not be lawful to a believer who holds by what is in this document and believes in God and the last day to help an evil-doer or to shelter him. The curse of God and His anger on the day of resurrection will be upon him if he does, and neither repentance nor ransom will be received from him.

(23) Whenever you differ about a matter it must be referred to God and to Muhammad.

(24) The Jews shall contribute to the cost of war so long as they are fighting alongside the believers.

(25) The Jews of the B. ‘Auf are one community with the believers (the Jews have their religion and the Muslims have theirs), their freedmen and their persons except those who behave unjustly and sinfully, for they hurt but themselves and their families.

(26-35) The same applies to the Jews of the B. al-Najjar, B. al-Harith, B. Sai ida, B. Jusham, B. al-Aus, B. Tha'laba, and the Jafna, a clan of the Tha‘laba and the B. al-Shutayba. Loyalty is a protection against treachery. The freedmen of Tha ‘laba are as themselves. The close friends of the Jews are as themselves.

(36) None of them shall go out to war save the permission of Muhammad, but he shall not be prevented from taking revenge for a wound. He who slays a man without warning slays himself and his household, unless it be one who has wronged him, for God will accept that.

(37) The Jews must bear their expenses and the Muslims their expenses. Each must help the other against anyone who attacks the people of this document. They must seek mutual advice and consultation, and loyalty is a protection against treachery. A man is not liable for his ally’s misdeeds. The wronged must be helped.

(38) The Jews must pay with the believers so long as war lasts.

(39) Yathrib shall be a sanctuary for the people of this document.

(40) A stranger under protection shall be as his host doing no harm and committing no crime.

(41) A woman shall only be given protection with the consent of her family.

(42) If any dispute or controversy likely to cause trouble should arise it must be referred to God and to Muhammad the apostle of God. God accepts what is nearest to piety and goodness in this document.

(43) Quraysh and their helpers shall not be given protection.

(44) The contracting parties are bound to help one another against any attack on Yathrib.

(45)(a) If they are called to make peace and maintain it they must do so; and if they make a similar demand on the Muslims it must be carried out except in the case of a holy war.

(45)(b) Every one shall have his portion from the side to which he belongs.

(46) The Jews of al-Aus, their freedmen and themselves have the same standing with the people of this document in purely loyalty from the people of this document. Loyalty is a protection against treachery. He who acquires ought acquires it for himself. God approves of this document.

(47) This deed will not protect the unjust and the sinner. The man who goes forth to fight and the man who stays at home in the city is safe unless he has been unjust and sinned. God is the protector of the good and God-fearing man and Muhammad is the apostle of God.

This text is taken from A. Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad — A Translation of Ishaq's Sirat Rasul Allah, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1955; pp. 231-233. Numbering added.

http://www.constitution.org/liberlib.htm
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New terrorists in an old context - by Mosharraf Zaidi

Tuesday, December 02, 2008

One of the clear invocations of the Bhagvad Gita is an invitation to human beings to explore and traverse the more difficult, but righteous path that Krishna articulates for an angst-ridden Arjuna. The Sangh Parivar’s profit machine, from the Deccan plains to the Kashmir valleys, has used the Mahabharata as a vehicle to advocate war. Hindu pacifists like Mahatama Ghandi on the other hand, have used the same Mahabharata, as an almost Sufic pronouncement of the struggle of the soul between good and evil.

In the ashes and blood that are strewn across Mumbai there is little doubt that Narendra Modi’s war-mongering manipulation of Krishna’s call to dharma will find more countenance than Ghandiji’s tranquil message of aspiring towards the unfettering moksha. Post-independence India has thus far miraculously survived the almost impossible struggle for equilibrium between these two ice-and-fire orientations within the core spiritual challenge of life. That survival has been predicated on two overarching and unspoken Nehruvian principles. The first is that the Indian establishment can never admit that Indian Muslims represent a unique social, political and economic challenge that must be dealt with in a unique manner. The second is that India’s internal conflicts are a product or manifestation of the troublesome neighbours that have emerged since 1947, Bangladesh to the east, and Pakistan to the west. For Indian politicians of all persuasions, it may be high time to revisit these principles. A fragile equilibrium may depend on it. For South Asian Muslims, however, Mumbai represents an entirely different kind of inflection point: yet another opportunity to introspect. As Mumbai’s archetypal Muslim gangster might say, if not now saala, then when?

First things first: it is true that Pakistanis (and Bangladeshis) have no business in taking sides within India’s internal cleavages. However all South Asian Muslims, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans and Indians not only have the right to think about and mourn what has happened in Mumbai, they have an anthropological duty or dharma to examine the carnage, to think about how it will affect them, and what they can and should do, to avoid it from happening again, anywhere.

Forget the accusations of Pakistani involvement. First, they are about as unique and unexpected as the presence of water during rain. Second, despite the potential plausibility of the accusations, there is an increasing stack of evidence that from New Delhi to Assam to Calcutta, India does have a domestic terrorism problem. Third, there is little argument against the fact that whatever involvement there might be, it is a product of non-state actors, not the Pakistani state.

Forget also that there is a domestic Muslim Indian terrorism problem. First, the problem is not unique to India, it is a problem that is common today to most countries with a substantial Muslim minority, from the United Kingdom to the Philippines, from Thailand to Nigeria. Second, domestic terrorism, as a problem is also not unique in India. India has had varying degrees of success in staring down secessionists and terrorists in Assam, Orrissa, Rajhastan, and Punjab among others. Third, as a democracy, India is better positioned to deal with the challenge of domestic terrorism than any country where democracy is a novelty. Democracy may be the tyranny of the majority, but the majority’s tyranny is self-contained. It eventually behaves in self-interested ways. By gun or with butter, democracies find ways that dictatorships cannot.

Finally, forget too the lethality of the reckless abandon with which the Indian media treats violence and its religious minorities (both separately, and in poisonous concoction). First, no reasonable connoisseur of post-modern Indian cinema would be able to miss the parallels between the tragic carnage in Mumbai and the hedonistic violence that is glorified and deified in “Shootout at Lokhandwala”, and “Rang De Basanti”. Second, the mainstream news media in India is even keener than India’s “partition-rage” establishment, to showcase rubber dinghy boats as proof positive of Pakistani involvement. Third, perhaps analysts need not reach for the Bollywood music videos that mix carnal pleasure with Muslim prayer chants like “SubhanAllah”, when both Gujarat and Ayodhya are freshly stamped into the global Muslim consciousness.

The real issue for South Asian Muslims of all stripes and nationalities is how their faith of peace and submission to the Most Merciful, Most Beneficent has come to signify such rabid and mindless violence as what has been inflicted on South Mumbai. No possible interpretation of the faith, no matter how informed by the real and perceived humiliations of Muslims, can rationalize the wantonness with which Mumbai’s attackers ravaged the Taj and the Oberoi. The spilling of blood at Nariman House is at a totally different level of debauch violence. The inhumanity of an attack on a place of worship alone should inspire deep remorse. But Ayodhya-grieving Muslims, more than any other religious group, should be outraged. Every living Muslim that has ever said a prayer for Abraham and his children should be utterly saddened by destruction and murder at Nariman House.

Most of all, South Asia Muslims need to reflect deep and long about how it is that the immediate, first, assumed and eventually established truth about the attack on Mumbai was that it involved Muslim extremists-domestic, or imported-Muslim extremists. Not Pakistani extremists, not unemployed and angry Indian extremists, but Muslim extremists. Self-professed South Asian Muslims that prefer other labels (liberals, seculars, progressives, enlightened moderates) all need to disavow themselves of their outrage at “these terrorists”. “These” pronouns are a balm that only soothes internal dissonance. It does not address the problem.

The diversity of South Asian Muslims of course, is legendary. We are not just the bipolar children of Sayyed Ahmed Khan and the House of Deoband. We are the children of Bin Qasim, Abdali, Akbar, Ghalib, Jinnah, Azad, Manto and Mujib. If bearded and ready for a fight, we are the children of Waliullah, Maududi, Golam Azam and Zia. If shaven and smelling Gucci-good, we’re the children of Shabana, Javed, Alamgir, Runa and Shah Rukh. And though we love to hate those we have loved most-from Khaleda, to Hasina, to Benazir, we cannot disown our most manifest confusion. Perhaps most of all, we are the children of Shah Bano.

Who is Shah Bano? Shah Bano was the 62 year old mother of five that was divorced, and awarded alimony beyond her period of iddat by the Supreme Court of India in 1985. The Indian mullahs went ballistic, prompting the safe-as-houses Rajiv Ghandi government of the time to pass a law that was meant to appease orthodox Muslim sentiment, and ostensibly protect Muslim women facing (or seeking) divorce proceedings. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 however not only made it more difficult for Muslim women to seek alimony beyond their period of iddat, it also provided the Sangh Parivar with the ammunition it required to launch a hyper-overdrive campaign convincing the Hindu mainstream of how Muslims were being appeased at the expense of the rights of Hindu families.

Where was Muslim outrage in the Shah Bano case? Mostly, it was busy trying to deny Shah Bano her alimony. In the meantime, not only has Islamic jurisprudence and practice continued to suffer from ostrich-interpretations of the faith, but the Hindu right-wing has successfully Trojan-Horsed Shah Bano into a permanent position as the most credible opposition to the Cong’s long-standing domination of the Indian centre.

The Muslim politics in South Asia meanwhile was playing tiddly winks with itself. Muslim women, children and men, have become more vulnerable to being victimised by violence, more vulnerable to becoming violent themselves, and more socially and economically vulnerable than they have ever been before.

If peaceful South Asian Muslims feel besieged-by the mindless and evil violence perpetrated in the name of their faith on the one hand, and by the mind numbingly jingoistic Indian media on the other-they should get over it. Muslim culpability in the attack on Mumbai is historic, not episodic. It is structural, not incidental. The history and structure of this culpability has failed to release Kashmir from the clutches of oppression, failed to address the systemic social exclusion of the Indian Muslim, failed to formulate a workable Muslim paradigm in either Pakistan, or Bangladesh. What has happened in Mumbai will do more than any other previous incident to weaken the Kashmir cause, weaken the Indian Muslim, and weaken the average citizen of India’s smaller and more vulnerable neighbours. That’s why, despite our fascination with their sophistication, the Mumbai terrorists represent nothing substantively new. They are the newest face of an old problem.

http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=150071
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