Blackwater, bloody civilians and our holy cows in uniform: A tale of two stories

While the pro-Taliban and anti-democracy anchors and journalists want the Pakistani nation to believe that the democratic government (President Zardari et al) are responsible for the alleged Blackwater rule in Pakistan, Cyril Almeida offers an alternative, critical perspective highlighting the connection between ISI, MI and Blackwater.

A tale of two stories
By Cyril Almeida
Friday, 27 Nov, 2009 (Dawn)

‘In real terms, there is virtually nothing that can be done to stop Blackwater and its ilk from operating here. Secret military operations are the blackest of black holes, and if the media and the public kick up a fuss over Blackwater, the army will quietly switch to some other opaque tactic.’

Military men have been up to some very bad things, we’ve learned this week. But the very different reactions to two seemingly unrelated stories in the media tell us at least one thing: things aren’t going to get better any time soon.

First, over to Jeremy Scahill, writing in The Nation, US: ‘At a covert forward operating base run by the US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in the Pakistani port city of Karachi, members of an elite division of Blackwater are at the centre of a secret programme in which they plan targeted assassinations of suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives, ‘snatch and grabs’ of high-value targets and other sensitive action inside and outside Pakistan.’

Before you reach for your pitchfork to skewer evil Americans up to no good inside Pakistan without our leadership’s knowledge — military or civilian — consider what else Scahill has reported: ‘He [a former senior Blackwater executive] said that Blackwater is also working for the Pakistani government on a subcontract with an Islamabad-based security firm that puts US Blackwater operatives on the ground with Pakistani forces in counter-terrorism operations, including house raids and border interdictions, in the North West Frontier Province and elsewhere in Pakistan.’

‘Government’ can be misleading since it implies the civilian side of the state, but the story makes it clear elsewhere who inside Pakistan is really working with Blackwater: ‘According to the executive, Blackwater works on a subcontract for Kestral Logistics, a powerful Pakistani firm, which specialises in military logistical support, private security and intelligence consulting. It is staffed with former high-ranking Pakistani army and government officials.’

The reaction to these revelations should be severe; we don’t need America’s version of non-state actors, mercenaries, really, running around our country, whatever their purpose or utility. The fact that the Pakistan Army — that so-called bastion of professionalism and custodian of our national security — has acquiesced in or enabled the activities of these non-state actors as opposed to elected representatives — the so-called ‘bloody civilians’, aka politicians — doesn’t make it any better or well-thought-out an idea.

But here’s the problem: the selective outrage of the media and the public enables military men to remain immune from accountability.

On Tuesday, a front-page headline in Dawn proclaimed: ‘Intelligence agencies looking into oil, gas deals’. The accompanying article goes on to report: ‘According to sources, a team of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence (MI) has collected record of the proposed transactions and interviewed the managing director of the Pakistan State Oil (PSO) and some senior officials of the petroleum ministry.’

Who authorised agencies run by the military to investigate commercial affairs? To whom is the ISI/MI team going to present its findings? To what purpose will the findings be applied? None of these questions have appeared to worry many here.

Fixated as the media and the public are on the corruption allegations that are churning the political waters at the moment, it seems to matter little who is probing corruption and why — just as long as someone is, there’s hope that the ‘dirty’ politicians can be drained from the swamp. It’s a simple, visceral reaction in a messy place where there are few good options: corruption, bad; those fighting corruption, good.

But bad as corruption may be, the revelation of the ISI/MI probe is, or ought to be, equally, if not more, unsettling. It is yet another piece of evidence that the transition to democracy, already shaky because of the political sins of the politicians, is headed in the wrong direction, and that the military is perhaps quietly working to nudge it in that wrong direction.

A bold pronouncement? Consider this. It is an open secret by now that President Zardari and the army high command have rocky relations. Neither really likes the other and some of that dislike is personal and some policy-driven. But the publicly known disagreements so far have been about policy issues: who controls the ISI, what is our declared nuclear posture, what conditions attached to US aid are acceptable.

Inserting the ISI and MI into the civilian domain to probe corruption, however, is not about policy, it is about politics. Only the incorrigibly naïve would believe that the intelligence team was sent over to fight corruption in the system.

But the point here is larger than the fate of Zardari or the government. The point is this: a law unto itself, the army’s actions remain frighteningly immune from accountability — and the lack of public and media opposition to its ‘good’ but possibly illegal actions (such as sending its intelligence operatives to investigate a very narrow, specific case of alleged corruption that could affect the presidential camp) means that there is absolutely no chance that the army’s bad and possibly illegal actions can ever be stopped.

In real terms, there is virtually nothing that can be done to stop Blackwater and its ilk from operating here. Secret military operations are the blackest of black holes, and if the media and the public kick up a fuss over Blackwater, the army will quietly switch to some other opaque tactic. And if that is subsequently exposed, too, the army will switch to a third.

Meaningful civilian oversight of the army is obviously a distant goal, but it will remain a chimera — an impossible idea — if the public and the media and the politicians never push back against the army on the smallest of issues.

That’s exactly what the corruption probe by the ISI/MI team should be: a relatively small matter on which there should be no ambiguity in denouncing it and demanding it be shut down at once.

There is, of course, no straight line between the army’s corruption probe and its murky arrangements with Blackwater. But the two stories fit into a bigger picture of the army setting and playing by its own rules. And unless the army gets its knuckles rapped for minor misdemeanours, why should it ever worry about being held accountable for its major sins?

cyril.a@gmail.com



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"Plus Talibanization" in the Guise of "Minus Zardari"

How has Zardari managed to turn such relative, emphasis on relative, successes into a situation where everyone is reaching for their keyboards to write his political obituary? —Reuters/File Photo

Zardari was never one of the good guys, but here’s the vexing thing about him: from a policy perspective, his government has got at least three major things right. On militancy, the economy and Pak-US relations – three foundational issues on which the medium-term future, at the very least, of the country itself rests – Zardari has made the right choices. Read analyses by Cyril Almeida, Ayaz Amir, Asadullah Ghalib and BBC Urdu dot com.

Can they ever make it work?

By Cyril Almeida
Friday, 06 Nov, 2009 (Dawn)

MINUS one lives. Pakistan’s favourite human pinata, Asif Ali Zardari, has been battered to within an inch of his presidential life; all that remains is for the end to be pencilled in and the orgy of ecstatic punditry to explode on your TV.

No? It ain’t over until it’s over? He may yet salvage his lame-duck presidency? Miracles do happen? Who are we kidding. President Zardari will either be plain ol’ Asif Zardari long before his term is officially set to end or he will be President Zardari sans the powers that attracted him to the office in the first place.

That the president’s free fall is largely of his own making is doubly satisfying to his enemies. But the rise and all-but-certain fall of Zardari raises the same troubling question that haunted the country in the ‘90s, the ‘70s and the ‘50s: can our politicians ever make it work?

There are so many cautionary tales, so few uplifting stories in this wretched place with its wretched politics and its wretched history. Zardari was never one of the good guys, but here’s the vexing thing about him: from a policy perspective, his government has got at least three major things right. On militancy, the economy and Pak-US relations – three foundational issues on which the medium-term future, at the very least, of the country itself rests – Zardari has made the right choices.

That a politician could pick the right course on major policy issues is reassuring to those who cling to the hope that democracy can, some day, one day, work here; that the same politician would also wantonly destroy his political capital overwhelms that tiny sliver of hope. One step forward, two steps back.

Not convinced of Zardari’s relative successes? It’s no coincidence that the internal consensus on the need to fight against militancy has come on the Zardari watch. Yes, his government has been ham-handed and inconsistent at times and has benefited from the rantings of Sufi Mohammad, the flogging video, the TTP’s foray into new areas and its relentless campaign of violence. But no one really doubts that Zardari would like to see the militants defeated. Unlike the dithering PML-N and the opposition of parties like the JI and Tehrik-i-Insaf, the government’s position is well known and it has nudged the country towards backing the fight against the militants.

On the economy, Zardari’s team has done no worse than many of its predecessors, and certainly better than the last phase of the Musharraf era. We can quibble over the details, but for a country that has for long been a ward of the IFIs, dependent on handouts from foreign governments and locked in a cycle of boom and bust, the Zardari era doesn’t look especially bad from a historical perspective.

On US-Pak relations, step back from the noise for a minute and ask yourself this: can we afford to have anything but friendly relations with a superpower that is billeted in our backyard? Again, Zardari has not calibrated the government’s policy towards the US as well as it could be, seemingly giving too much or voicing too little opposition when it is merited, but the general thrust of the policy has been correct.

So how has Zardari managed to turn such relative, emphasis on relative, successes into a situation where everyone is reaching for their keyboards to write his political obituary? In other words, what has he done wrong?

The facile answer is, the president should have avoided the mistakes he’s made. He should have restored the judges while he still could take credit for it. He shouldn’t have blundered into imposing governor’s rule in Punjab and trying to take over the government there when the numbers were against him. He should have realised the NRO was a ball chained to his ankle that his opponents, as well as some of his allies, could easily exploit.

But Zardari’s original sin, as it were, is something else: wanting to rule from the presidency. The bid to grab the presidency and lord it over the country and its politicians was a gamble that was never going to pay off. The irony is that Zardari regards it as his smartest move.

The presidency has historically been a poisoned chalice and Zardari grabbed it just as it had become the focal point of opposition. After Musharraf’s disastrous exit, the presidency needed to be aired out, cleared of the smoke and debris of intrigue and power games. Smart politics demanded that attention be deflected to other quarters, the prime minister’s seat, the cabinet, parliament.

Even for a people with a short collective memory, the Musharraf shadow was always going to cast a pall over the presidency for some time. By insisting on keeping it as a focal point, Zardari took the unnecessary risk of the people asking, how is this really different from the Musharraf days? And Zardari was always going to get nowhere in that debate.

Most, if not all, of Zardari’s problems flow from the fateful choice to become president. We can only guess at the reasons he opted to try and rule from there. Perhaps it was the presidential immunity from prosecution. Perhaps it was the physical security that the presidential palace offers. Perhaps the low level of public interaction expected of the occupant as compared to, say, the prime minister attracted a frightened Zardari. Perhaps it was just the irresistibility of absolute power and lording it over both the provinces and the centre thanks to the Musharrafian powers arrogated to the office.

We will never know for sure what Zardari’s reasons were, but we can see how bad an idea it was. A year into a five-year term, the death watch is on.

Some have bemoaned how on a day dozens of people were killed in Rawalpindi, the country was transfixed by Altaf Hussain cutting the president off at the knees over the NRO. But it wasn’t a case of misplaced priorities. Without political stability, it is difficult to have policies, let alone fight a war against a shadowy internal enemy.

And Monday showed us once again how political stability can be a chimera, vanishing in an instant and leaving the country rudderless. Tempting though it may be, there’s no point in blaming Zardari really. He’s only done what others have done before him and others will do after him.

Sixty-two years since its creation, the country still doesn’t have the answer to the question, can our politicians ever make it work?

cyril.a@gmail.com

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زرداری کے لیے آخری موقع

اعجاز مہر

بی بی سی اردو ڈاٹ کام، اسلام آباد

صدر زرداری کو یہ ڈر کہ سترہویں ترمیم کے خاتمے کے بعد میاں نواز شریف کے وزیراعظم بننے کی راہ ہموار ہوگی اور وہ انہیں چاروں شانوں چت کرنے میں دیر نہیں کریں گے، اب ختم کرنا ہوگا اور ان پر بھروسہ کرنا پڑے گا

پاکستان پیپلز پارٹی اور سکیورٹی اسٹیبلشمینٹ کی لڑائی کی کہانی تقریباً تین عشروں پر محیط ہے اور اس لڑائی میں تاحال نقصان پیپلز پارٹی کو ہی اٹھانا پڑا ہے۔ چاہے وہ ذوالفقار علی بھٹو کا عدالتی قتل ہو یا ان کے دو بیٹوں مرتضیٰ اور شاہنواز یا پھر ان کی بیٹی بینظیر بھٹو کی ’سٹیٹ آف دی آرٹ‘ منصوبہ سازی سے قتل کی کہانیاں۔

لیکن تاحال ایک بات ضرور ہوئی ہے کہ اس ملک کی ’غریب، بھوکی اور ان پڑھ‘ عوام نے پیپلز پارٹی کا ساتھ نہیں چھوڑا اور پانچ مرتبہ اس جماعت کو اقتدار کے ایوانوں میں اپنے کندھوں پر بٹھا کر پہنچایا۔

گلگت سے گوادر اور کشمیر سے کراچی تک ملک کے کونے کونے میں اس جماعت کے حامی آج بھی نمایاں طور پر پائے جاتے ہیں اور ایسی سیاسی حمایت آج تک کسی جماعت کو نصیب نہیں ہوسکی۔

ویسے تو پیپلز پارٹی کی قیادت پر بھی الزام لگتا ہے کہ وہ بھی سٹیبلشمینٹ کے گھوڑے پر سوار ہوکر اقتداری ایوانوں میں پہنچے۔ لیکن یہ بھی حقیقت ہے کہ ان کے ساتھ ان کا نبھاؤ زیادہ دیر تک نہیں ہوسکا اور جیسے ہی پیپلز پارٹی ایک عوامی جماعت بنی تو اس کا مقابلہ کرنے کے لیے ہمیشہ سے سکیورٹی اسٹیبلشمنٹ کو سیاسی اتحاد بنا کر اس جماعت کا راستہ روکنا پڑا اور اس عمل میں انہیں ایم کیو ایم اور مسلم لیگ جیسے گروہوں کو بھی تخلیق کرنا پڑا۔

عین وقت پر متحدہ قومی موومنٹ کی جانب سے ’این آر او‘ کے معاملے پر جس طرح صدر آصف علی زرداری کو جھٹکا دیا گیا ہے اس سے ان کی آنکھیں کھل جانی چاہیں اور ان کے ساتھ کوئی مہنگا سودا کرنے کے بجائے مسلم لیگ (ن) کے ساتھ اپنی مرحومہ لیڈر کے وعدے وفا کرنا زیادہ سود مند ثابت ہوگا۔ کیونکہ اسٹیبلشمنٹ کے جن کو بوتل میں بند کرنے کا اگر یہ موقع گنوایا گیا تو شاید ہی انہیں مستقبل میں ایسا موقع نصیب ہو

جب وقت کے ساتھ ساتھ ایم کیو ایم اور مسلم لیگ (ن) سیاسی قوتیں بنیں تو انہوں نے اسٹیبلشمنٹ کو ’بلینک چیک’ دینا بند کیا تو ان کے خالق نے انہیں توڑنے کی کوشش کی لیکن دونوں جماعتوں کی قیادت کی بالغ نظری کی وجہ سے یہ جماعتیں ٹوٹ پھوٹ کے تمام مراحل طے کرنے کے بعد بھی ملک کی قابل ذکر سیاسی قوتیں بنیں۔ جس کے بعد سکیورٹی اسٹیبلشمنٹ کو مسلم لیگ (ق) کو اپنے بدن سے جنم دینا پڑا۔

دو بڑی عوامی حمایت رکھنے والی جماعتیں پیپلز پارٹی اور مسلم لیگ (ن) کے رہنما بینظیر بھٹو اور میاں نواز شریف جلاوطن ہو گئے اور جلا وطنی میں بیٹھ کر اُن دونوں زیرک سیاستدانوں نے اپنی غلطیوں کا اعتراف کرتے ہوئے میثاق جمہوریت پر دستخط کیے۔ میثاق جمہوریت سے پاکستان میں ایک نئے سیاسی کلچر پنپنے کی امید پیدا ہوئی کیونکہ دونوں نے محسوس کیا کہ انہیں پاکستان کی اسٹیبلشمینٹ نے ’لڑاؤ اور حکومت کرو‘ کے اصول کے تحت استعمال کیا ہے۔

میثاق جمہوریت پر دونوں بڑی جماعتوں کے اتفاق نے اسٹیبلشمینٹ کی بنیادیں ہلا کر رکھ دیں کیونکہ اس دستاویز کی بنیادی روح یہ ہے کہ پاکستان میں پارلیمان کو بالادست ادارہ بنانا ہے اور دنیا کے مہذب ممالک کی طرح فوج سمیت تمام اداروں کو پارلیمان کا ماتحت بنانا ہے۔ ساٹھ سال سے پاکستان میں سیاہ و سفید کی مالک اسٹیبلشمینٹ یہ کیسے قبول کرتی اور انہوں نے اپنی چالیں چلنا شروع کیں۔

اس دوران بینظیر بھٹو کا قتل ہوگیا جس کا الزام پرویز مشرف کی حکومت نے بیت اللہ محسود پر عائد کیا۔ جس کے بعد انتخابات ہوئے اور اس کے نتیجے میں پیپلز پارٹی اور مسلم لیگ (ن) نے اکٹھے حکومت بنائی اور میثاق جمہوریت کے جذبے کے تحت مسلم لیگ (ن) کے وزراء نے پرویز مشرف کے ہاتھوں حلف اٹھایا۔ دونوں جماعتوں نے مل کر پرویز مشرف کو مستعفی ہونے پر مجبور کیا اور راستہ صاف ہوتے ہی آصف علی زرداری کے صدر بننے کی خواہش اور پرویز مشرف کے برطرف کردہ ججوں کو بحال نہ کرنے پر دونوں جماعتوں میں اختلافات شروع ہوگئے۔

دونوں میں اختلافات کی چنگاری کو اسٹیبلشمینٹ نے پھونکیں مار مار کر اس نہج پر پہنچایا کہ فروری میں اقتدار کے نشے میں چُور صدر آصف علی زرداری نے میاں برادران کو نا اہل قرار دلوا کر پنجاب میں گورنر راج نافذ کر دیا۔ ایسے میں اسٹیبلشمینٹ کو یقین ہوچلا ہے کہ اب دونوں میں دوبارہ رفاقت ممکن نہیں۔

اب کی بار کچھ تجزیہ کاروں کا خیال ہے کہ صدر زرداری کے لیے یہ آخری موقع ہے کہ وہ کوئی چال چلنے کے بجائے سترہویں ترمیم کے خاتمے اور میثاق جمہوریت پر اس کی روح کے مطابق فوری عمل کریں تو وہ ایوان صدر کی مسند پر آئندہ بھی بیٹھے رہیں گے

اس دوران کچھ تجزیہ کاروں کا خیال ہے کہ اسٹیبلشمینٹ کو پارلیمان کے طابع کرنے کے لیے صدر آصف علی زرداری نے ملک کی ایک مقبول جماعت مسلم لیگ (ن) کو چھوڑ کر امریکہ پر انحصار کیا۔

جس سے اسٹیبلشمنٹ اور مسلم لیگ (ن) میں قربت کی راہ ہموار ہوئی۔ لیکن تاحال مسلم لیگ (ن) نے اپنے پتے بڑی سمجھداری سے کھیلے ہیں اور کیری لوگر بل کی مخالفت سمیت کچھ معاملات میں محدود پیمانے پر اسٹیبلشمنٹ کے ہاتھوں استعمال ہوتے ہوئے بھی اپنا بھرم برقرار رکھا ہے اور ججوں کی بحالی سمیت بعض معاملات میں اسٹیبلشمنٹ کو استعمال سے فائدہ زیادہ حاصل کیا ہے۔

بینظیر بھٹو کے قتل کی جانچ اقوام متحدہ سے کرانے پر پیپلز پارٹی کے اسٹیبلشمنٹ سے اب کی بار شروع ہونے والے اختلافات اب اس نہج پر پہنچے ہیں جہاں آئین کے مطابق جمہوری انداز سے منتخب ہونے والے صدر کو ایک سال میں نکالنے کی راہ ہموار کی جا رہی ہے۔ اگر دیکھا جائے تو اسٹیبلشمنٹ سے لڑائی میں فریق تو مسلم لیگ (ن) بھی تھی جسے صدر آصف علی زرداری نے خود ہی دور کردیا۔ لیکن آج انہیں اس بات کا احساس یقین ہوا ہوگا کہ یہ لڑائی پیپلز پارٹی ہو یا مسلم لیگ (ن) دونوں اکیلے طور پر شاید ہی لڑ سکیں۔

اس بات کا اداراک مسلم لیگ (ن) کی قیادت کو بھی بخوبی ہے اور وہ نا اہلی کے گھاؤ کے بعد بھی بظاہر ان کے ساتھ تعاون کے لیے تیار ہیں۔ جس کی ایک اہم وجہ بعض مبصرین کی نظر میں تیسری بار وزیراعظم بننے پر پابندی ختم کرانا بھی ہوسکتا ہے۔

لیکن صدر زرداری کو جو یہ ڈر ہے کہ سترہویں ترمیم کے خاتمے سے جیسے ہی میاں نواز شریف کے وزیراعظم بننے کی راہ ہموار ہوگی تو وہ انہیں چاروں شانوں چت کرنے میں دیر نہیں کریں گے، وہ اب ختم کرنا ہوگا اور ان پر بھروسہ کرنا پڑے گا۔ کیونکہ ان کے پاس اور کوئی پائیدار ’آپشن‘ بھی نہیں بچا۔

صدر آصف علی زرداری نے اپنے ’نجومیوں‘ کے کہنے پر اب تک جو بھی تِرک تالیاں کی ہیں اس سے وقتی طور پر تو وہ مستفید ہوئے ہیں لیکن اب کی بار کچھ تجزیہ کاروں کا خیال ہے کہ ان کے لیے یہ آخری موقع ہے کہ وہ کوئی چال چلنے کے بجائے سترہویں ترمیم کے خاتمے اور میثاق جمہوریت پر اس کی روح کے مطابق فوری عمل کریں تو وہ ایوان صدر کی مسند پر آئندہ بھی بیٹھے رہیں گے۔ کیونکہ اب ان کے گرد گھیرا تنگ ہوچکا ہے، وقت بہت کم ہے اور غلطی کی کوئی گنجائش نہیں ہے۔ ملٹری، مُلا، مسلم لیگیں اور میڈیا کے بعض مجاہدین ان کے خلاف متحد ہوچکے ہیں۔

بعض تجزیہ کاروں کا یہ بھی کہنا ہے کہ عین وقت پر متحدہ قومی موومنٹ کی جانب سے ’این آر او‘ کے معاملے پر جس طرح صدر آصف علی زرداری کو جھٹکا دیا گیا ہے اس سے ان کی آنکھیں کھل جانی چاہیں اور ان کے ساتھ کوئی مہنگا سودا کرنے کے بجائے مسلم لیگ (ن) کے ساتھ اپنی مرحومہ لیڈر کے وعدے وفا کرنا زیادہ سود مند ثابت ہوگا۔ کیونکہ اسٹیبلشمنٹ کے جن کو بوتل میں بند کرنے کا اگر یہ موقع گنوایا گیا تو شاید ہی انہیں مستقبل میں ایسا موقع نصیب ہو

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What further trials for a sorely-tried nation?

Islamabad diary Friday, November 06, 2009 Ayaz Amir President Zardari was not a secret sprung upon an unsuspecting nation. We knew all about him: that he was no graduate of any academy of higher management sciences; that his talents lay in the murkier aspects of high finance; that the only thing on his calling card which compelled attention was his marital connection to Benazir Bhutto. So it was wholly predictable that when, out of the blue, he aspired to become the president of this ailing republic, we (its hapless citizens) were taken by surprise. We were glad to be rid of Musharraf. No doubts on that score. Our cup of patience was full and we could take no more of him or his shenanigans. But Mr Zardari taking over from where Musharraf had left off? This went beyond our worst nightmares. But inured to the malevolence of fate, we gave Zardari the benefit of the doubt. We thought that his very ascension to the highest office in the land would have a chastening effect upon him. The awe of his position, and the fact that the people of Pakistan through their chosen representatives in parliament and the provincial assemblies were electing him, would transform him and make him if not someone worthy of our trust at least someone who would not go out of his way to abuse that trust. But over the year or so that he has been president, Zardari has made the nation undergo a very unsentimental education, stripping the nation of any illusions it may have nursed on his account. For he has surpassed the misgivings of his worst critics and turned out to be more inept than any of them could have predicted. Zardari could have kept his promises to Nawaz Sharif and earned himself some badly-needed credibility. But he made fun of his own pledges and said they were not decrees from heaven. He could have restored the judges and earned credit for himself. But such a step, to all appearances, lay beyond the confines of his narrow vision. Where he should have cast a critical eye over the Kerry-Lugar Bill (KLB), he became its loud champion, calling it a historic achievement. Any fool could have told him, and many did, that placing the NRO before the parliament would tempt the fury of the heavens. But disregarding all the omens -- or in his ignorance being simply unaware of them -- he stepped in where angels would have feared to tread. This parliament could have swallowed anything. After all, it had swallowed the Swat Nizam-e-Adl Regulation of unhappy memory. But even for its tough stomach, the NRO was a bit too much to take. So it revolted against the latter. Zardari was already a vulnerable figure before this debacle. Now it seems he is well and truly on the skids. For the first time in a year-and-a-half, the PPP benches in the National Assembly give a glum look, as they have every reason to do knowing that the knives are out for their Godfather -- who remains a godfather in more senses than one --and vultures are circling the skies. Even Fauzia Wahab looks depressed, and that's saying something. But has Zardari learnt anything? The Sage of North Edgeware (London), Altaf bhai, was the first person to publicly endorse his name for president. He is the first person to ask him to step down. But Zardari is still hoping to keep the MQM on his side, for which purpose -- in keeping with our penchant for having our problems solved abroad -- talks are to be held in Dubai. The MQM fields some of the world's toughest negotiators who could give Shylock lessons in extracting their pound of flesh, modern science yet to discover a formula to satisfy the MQM's demands -- which, much like the universe, are forever expanding -- and keep it happy. In trying once again to placate the MQM, Zardari is reaching out for the unreachable. A simple truth eludes Zardari. The Sage of North Edgeware can subject him to a further round of Chinese torture (supping with the MQM being akin to that) but he can't rescue him. Nor can that ace of political gymnasts, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, another firm believer in the theory of extracted pounds of flesh, although on a lower scale than the maestros of the MQM. The only person standing between Zardari and imminent destruction is someone he has a disliking for the most, Nawaz Sharif. But for Nawaz Sharif and his adamant refusal, often in the face of much opposition from within his own party, to pay heed to the siren calls of a minus-one formula, the game would be up for Zardari. In Nawaz Sharif's breast, the memory of Zardari's broken promises rankle, but in today's charged political atmosphere, he remains the one person who is alive to the ramifications of Aabpara-driven political manoeuvres. On a flight to Karachi where he had to make a court appearance, Nawaz Sharif was handcuffed to his seat. The iron may have been on his wrist but it may have entered his soul. Who is the mortal without weaknesses? Nawaz Sharif has his share of them. But, to give credit where it is due, adversity has tempered him. Of all the lessons he may have taken to heart, none seems more abiding than the belief, born of his own experiences, that military intervention in politics is the road to hell paved with good intentions. Small wonder, all talk of minus this or that leaves him utterly cold. There are hawks in the PML-N's inner circle who chafe at the label of a 'friendly opposition', the gibe directed most frequently at the party nowadays. They would love nothing better than a call to arms. But Nawaz Sharif remains unmoved. Who would have thought ten years ago that he had an eye for the larger canvas? But that's what he is displaying now. Zardari may fall upon his sword himself, or circumstances otherwise may crush him, in the form of corruption cases being revived against his closest companions. That would be another matter. But being a party to any move emanating from the hidden corners of Pakistan's political tapestry is certainly not something Nawaz Sharif appears to be for. At the time of his election as president, Zardari, in an expansive moment, boasted that he would continue to teach politics to Nawaz Sharif. Is he still riding that high horse? What options does he have now? He can fall upon his sword and quit of his own accord. This, given his tough streak -- and there is no denying he has one -- is unlikely. So the danger is that if the pressure is piled on him he may choose to dig in his heels and, like Samson, wish to bring the temple down with him. But there is a way out of the hole he is in. He wins himself a reprieve if he takes two steps: accelerates the process of undoing the 17th Amendment, transferring his substantive powers to the prime minister; and gets rid of that deadly circle of cronies whose presence near the helm of power is an affront to the nation. The nation may have its faults but it surely deserves better than these faces out of a rogue's gallery. The anger of the gods will be appeased with nothing less than this double sacrifice. But acceleration is the key word here. There is only a very tiny window of opportunity to exploit. Zardari takes these steps and he perhaps saves himself and Pakistan's fledgling democracy. But if he remains true to himself, a prisoner of his limitations, the doors begin to shut and the sky becomes more overcast than it already is. Email: winlust@yahoo.com (The News) Some comments: qaisanwar said:ذندہ باد ۔ الطاف بھ ءی ۔ زرادری کو یقینی طور پر ا نصاف کا سامنا کرنا چاہیے ۔ اس لیے کہ اس ملک میں عدالتیں صرف بھٹوز کے لیے بنی ہیں ۔ ZAB کی حکومت گءی اس نے عدالت کا سامنا کیا اور پھانسی چڑھ گیا۔ ںواز شریف کی حکومت گءی اور انہیں عزت کے ساتھ جدہ بھیج دیا گیا۔ بی بی سپریم کورٹ میں گءی تو حکومت بحال نہیں ہوءی؛ نواز شریف حکومت عدالت میں گءے تو حکومت بحال ہو گءی۔ نواز شریف کے کیس مشرف کی سفارش پر تاڑڑ نے ختم کیے تو قانونی؛ بی بی نے سالوں کے بعد این آر او کے ذریعے کیس ختم کرواءے تو غیر قانونی۔ عشرت العباد کے قتل کیس تک مشرف نے ختم کرواے تو قانونی لیکن پیپلز پارٹی والوں کو عدالت کا سامنا کرنا چاہہے۔ ںواز شریف ملک چھوڑ کر گءے تو یہ مدینے والے کی مہربانی تھی کہ اپنے قدموں میں بلا لیا۔ زرداری جیل میں رہا پھر بھی بزدل؛ اور اپنے الطاف بھاءی خود لندن میں بیٹھے ہیں اور زرداری سے کہتے ہیں عدالتوں کا سامنا کرو۔ زرداری آٹھ سال سے زیادہ جیل میں رہا اس لیے کہ ملک میں انصاف نہیں تھا اور افتخار چوہدری کے لیے زرداری کے کیس کے لیے وقت نہیں تھا۔ اب زرداری کو جیل میں جانا چاہیے کیونکہ عدالتیں آزاد ہیں ۔ واہ رے پاکستان کے انصاف اور انصاف کے دعوے دارو؛ اور واہ رے بھٹو خاندان والو؛ ملک ٹوٹ جاءے تو دو چار جرنیلوں کو پھانسی دینے کا مشورہ رد کرکے نوے ہزار قیدیوں کو چھڑانے کے لیے نکل پڑتے ہو؛ ضیاء ملک کو تباہ کر دے تو تعمیر کی ذمہ داری لے لیتے ہو؛ بے نظیر مر جاءے تو پاکستان کھپے کا نعرہ لگا دیتے ہو؛ کیا سمجھتے ہو کہ تمہاری قبریں بنانے والے گورکن کبھی تھکیں گے شاید نہیں بھاءیو تھوڑا سا انتظآر کر لو؛ اگلے ہفتے ڈاکٹر شاہد مسعود سے لاءین ملے گی ۔۔۔۔۔۔اب کیا ہو گا ۔۔۔۔عدالتیں کیا کریں گی؛ انصار عباسی اور کامران خان کچھ اور سکینڈل لاءیں گے ؛ شاہین صہباءی اندر کی باتیں لکھ دیں گے ؛ کیانی گیلانی ملاقاتیں ہوں گی۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔لیکن جس زرداری کے لیے یہ سب ہو رہا ہے وہ تو پہلے کہ چکا ہے کہ اگر قدرتی موت مروں تو نواب شاہ میں دفن کرنا ؛ مارا جاوں تو گڑھی خدا بخش میں ؛ بڑا ظالم آدمی ہے یہ زرداری۔ جیل میں تھا تو ہنسا کرتا تھا ؛ بڑی ٹیڑھی نسل کا آدمی ہے ہر مہرہ حرکت میں آچکا ہے لیکن یہ ڈرتا ہی نہیں ۔۔۔۔۔۔فیض کے لفظوں میں یہ وہ لوگ ہیں جو مر جاتے ہیں اور کہتے ہیں کرو کج جبین سے سر کفن میرے قاتلوں کو گماں نہ ہو کہ غرور عشق کا بانکپن پس مرگ ہم نے بھلا دیا کل کسی نے جام ساقی کا تبصرہ سنا؛ کہتا ہے یہ سب ہمارے ساتھ ہی کیوں ہوتا ہے دیکھتے ہیں کہ اس بار تابوت کو کیسے وصول کریں گے Shoaib Ghias said: Is there any necessary connection between NRO’s failure and Zardari’s removal? There is no constitutional impediment to Zardari’s presidency. He has been accused of many things but none of his convictions have ever been upheld. Therefore he was eligible to become the president last year. Now the only way in which Zardari can be removed is impeachment or resignation. In either case, the military-bureacuratic establishment will have play the decisive role. The NRO may be a procedurally or substantively unconstitutional ordinance, but Zardari is a constitutional president, with or without the NRO.

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Democracy under threat? Analyses by Cyril Almeida and Farhnaz Ispahani

Democracy under threat?

By Cyril Almeida
Friday, 16 Oct, 2009

President Asif Ali Zardari is the curator of the changeover to a democratic state and on his shoulders rests a very heavy burden. - Photo by Reuters

Is Project Democracy in trouble? Is the latest kerfuffle in civil-military relations, this time over the Kerry-Lugar bill, just another manifestation of the broken, chaotic decision-making process at the institutional level from which the system will soon move on?

Or is it another marker in deteriorating relations between the presidency and the army high command that are slowly edging towards the point of no return? When — if — the obituary of the Zardari presidency or government is written, it’s safe to say that the Kerry-Lugar fiasco will surely merit more than a footnote.

So which is it? Are we headed for bust and the derailment of the present phase in the transition to democracy, or even the transition itself, or is this what democracy in Pakistan is set to look like for the foreseeable future, a process characterised by brinkmanship without quite slipping too close to the edge of the cliff?

First things first: while the army high command is currently unlikely to bring a halt to the democratic process or unseat the present political dispensation, it would be foolish to think that it cannot or will not under any circumstances. Zardari and co clearly have some space to govern, but that space isn’t unlimited and its boundaries may be closer than imagined by the pro-democracy camp.

What’s particularly troubling about the Kerry-Lugar fiasco is how the army high command essentially came out and fired a warning shot across the government’s bow and then promptly retreated behind a wall of silence, leaving it to the government to clean up the mess with the Americans, the opposition and the public.

Since it’s difficult to imagine that the army was not aware of what was unfolding in the US Congress, the army’s tactics amount to a classic political ambush at home. The main cause for worry is not that the army would attempt a hatchet job at all — that our politics is often bare-knuckled is well known to our politicians — but that it would do so on an issue in which the government has invested so much and has little to no room to wriggle away or save face.

The bill was already passed by Congress by the time the army chose to pipe up and the government had already tried to drum up the aid package as its greatest foreign-policy success to date. Political opposition to the bill was always expected, but that’s the nature of our politics — automatically reject in opposition what you would likely do in government.

The army intervention, though, amounted to a kneecapping for the government; and without a doubt it will lead the most hawkish and paranoid in the government to wonder if a decapitation is next. The more reckless may even push for a strike-before-the-army-strikes counter-strategy.

Which brings me to the second point: Zardari must chart a new course from here. And that course must eschew confrontation with the army while at the same time reaching out to the political opposition more urgently.

When a grenade of the kind lobbed by the army lands in the court of someone as constitutionally powerful as Zardari, there is a mighty temptation to return the favour. Turning the other cheek does not come easily to anyone with the hubris to imagine they can run a country like Pakistan. Nor is turning the other cheek really advisable when your tormentor may in fact want to slap you into submission or worse.

But Zardari is not just another president in the country’s tawdry political history; he is the custodian of the transition to democracy and on his shoulders therefore rests a very heavy burden.

Like him or hate him — and it is apparent that there are many, many in the latter camp — focusing on Zardari the politician, president or person misses the larger point, that he is uniquely placed to give the country what it so desperately needs: democratic continuity.

Zardari’s democracy will necessarily be ugly, scandal-plagued, tawdry even. Part of the blame for that must lie with him, but there is also the fact that he is a creature of his environment, and the politicians in the Class of 2008 aren’t the most savoury of characters.

Yet, whatever the sins of this government, present and future, nothing will come close to the damage caused to the prospects for democracy if Zardari fails to ensure democratic continuity in the short term and a democratic transfer of power in the medium term.

The country will never, ever come close to addressing its fundamental problems if it does not settle on one framework of governance, one set of rules for how the state is to be organised and run.

To believe the army has the solutions is to believe in a fairytale. And to believe the army at least has the ability to ensure the security of the state and its people and therefore must influence the state’s policies or at least set its parameters is to ignore the fact that some of the greatest threats to national security in our history have been created and exacerbated by the army itself.

So what Zardari must do is stop the fresh incursions into political terrain by the army. Whether it is the army’s intention or not, the fact is that a year and change into the transition to democracy, army intervention in controversies such as the Kerry-Lugar bill and the restoration of the deposed judges is chipping away at the fragile wall that is keeping the army out at the moment. That wall needs to be strengthened, but in a shrewd way. Directly confronting the army while Zardari’s flanks are exposed by his personal unpopularity risks bringing the wall down altogether.

So what can Zardari do? Win back the PML-N. A unified political front would work to Zardari and his government’s advantage in two ways. One, it would reduce the intra-political pressure his government is under. Two, a stronger political front would mean the army would need to be more careful about its political forays.

Ah, but how can he trust the PML-N? Isn’t it not-so-secretly hoping for mid-term elections? Wasn’t Shahbaz Sharif caught powwowing with Kayani recently? All true, and Zardari probably can’t trust the Sharifs.

But Zardari also needs to quietly assess who poses the bigger threat to his party and its future. Between the PML-N and the army, the PML-N is from a structural point of view weaker while the army is only temporarily weakened by its tarnished political credentials. And in the democracy stakes, the PML-N cannot shut out the PPP, only the army can.

Again, it’s not clear if the army is interested in forcing change at the moment. But it is clear that the fragile wall against possible army intervention is being eroded. And in a place like Pakistan, a civilian leader ignores such a development at his peril.

cyril.a@gmail.com (Dawn)

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Shame on General Kayani for meddling into the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Leave politics to the politicians please.

Between the lines

By Cyril Almeida
Friday, 09 Oct, 2009 (Dawn)

Memo to the Pakistan Army: don’t wait for the revolution in military affairs to get a high-speed Internet connection. Actually, the army could have spared the country a fresh political crisis with even a dial-up connection.

Here’s what it had to do to give the government its ‘formal input’ — the ISPR’s terminology — on the Kerry-Lugar bill: run a search online, download the various iterations of the Biden-Lugar bill, study them and then forward its ‘formal input’ to the government.

If that sounds elementary and facetious, it is. Step back from the howling pack of critics for a minute and ask yourself, is it possible that the Pakistan Army was unaware of the broad contours, if not the specifics, of the Kerry-Lugar bill for all the months it wended its way through Congress?

To believe the army did not, or could not, know is to accuse the army of a staggering level of incompetence. Wednesday’s prickly ISPR statement also has this gem: ‘COAS reiterated that Pakistan is a sovereign state and has all the rights to analyse and respond to the threat in accordance with her own national interests.’ Given that the Kerry-Lugar bill has already been passed by Congress, the army’s interpretation of our ‘rights to analyse and respond’ would appear to be less a diagnosis and more a post-mortem.

Logic, then, suggests that the army was at least aware of what was unfolding in the US Congress. Which leads to the obvious question: what was the signal the army was sending on Wednesday and to whom?

Was it sending a signal to Zardari that it was putting him on notice, that he better shape up and pay obeisance to the army’s pre-eminence or else would be shipped out soon? By now, it’s clear the army doesn’t like Zardari’s way of doing business.

It quickly reversed his bid to put the ISI under civilian control, it slapped down his suggestion of a no-first-strike nuclear posture, it forced him to back off from precipitating a possibly bloody clash during the long march to restore the deposed judges in March — and now it has publicly contradicted the government and suggested the Kerry-Lugar bill impinges on national security. That’s already a long, ignominious list of reversals for a president who has been in office only 13 months. And those are only the differences that we know about publicly.

But like him or not, four factors limit the army’s ability to precipitate change in the civilian set-up headed by Zardari. One, the disastrous end to the Musharraf era has meant that the army’s political credentials are yet to recover. Two, the army has to stay focused on fighting the counter-insurgency. Three, there may be a pro-Gilani/anti-Zardari camp within the PPP, but historically the party has resisted following the dictates of the army. Four, the only other viable political alternative is Nawaz Sharif, but the army continues to eye him with mistrust.

So expect the status quo to hold for now. Indeed, Wednesday’s ISPR statement hints at this: ‘However, in the considered view of the forum, it is the parliament, that represents the will of the people of Pakistan, which would deliberate on the issue, enabling the government to develop a national response.’ Translation: we aren’t happy, but we’re not going to wind up the democratic project — for now. The emphasis still is on ‘shape up’ rather than ‘ship out.’

But the danger hasn’t passed yet. If there’s one thing that is clear from the country’s tattered, tawdry political history, it is that public jousting leaves fatal scars on the psyche of the players involved. A wounded ego can cause all sorts of rash decisions, and both Zardari and the army may yet try and slip a knife in the other’s back.

Other than Zardari, the army is also likely to have been sending a signal to the Americans. Roughly translated, it would read something like this: we’ve got business to do together, but don’t push us; we’re going to get it done as partners, not as clients.

Quetta, Muridke, the nuclear programme, civilian control over the army — there are enough red rags to the army in the Kerry-Lugar bill to make it very angry. But there are bigger issues at stake than just the bill in relations between the US and Pakistan at the moment, and the army’s response has to be seen in that context.

In all the debate and controversy surrounding the Obama administration’s re-evaluation of its own strategy on Afghanistan announced in March, little attention has been paid to the signals that the Pakistan Army has been quietly sending.

While opposing an American troop build-up in Afghanistan, the army is also not calling for a troop withdrawal. In fact, it has been pushing the ‘stability’ line with the Americans: shore up the Afghan government; give more space to our favourites, the Pakhtuns; negotiate with the amenable among the Afghan Taliban; neutralise, or reduce, the interests of players like India; and start thinking about an exit time frame.

In addition to this, it is quite clear that at the operational level, intelligence
cooperation to capture or eliminate the Al Qaeda types as well as the Pakistani
militants attacking the state from their bases in Fata is continuing.

So the army clearly realises the importance of working with the Americans to secure the state’s interests. But it also knows that there is a limited convergence of interests. From the Pakistani perspective, the Americans suffer from two chronic problems: one, they are clumsy and often create a bigger mess; and two, some of their interests in the region are at cross-purposes with Pakistan’s.

Enter the Kerry-Lugar bill into that wary, mutually suspicious relationship. On the one side, you have American officials like Vice President Joseph Biden, partner in the creation of the Kerry-Lugar bill, with his ‘Pakistan first’ theory that essentially portrays the country as a danger to the world and itself.

On the other side, you have the Pakistan Army, which realises the need to work with the Americans on certain issues but also suspects them of trying to undermine Pakistan’s genuine interests and pooh-poohing its security threat perceptions.

The likely result: those here in Pakistan demanding that we slam the door on the Americans after kicking them out will be disappointed; however, we will continue to carp and complain publicly while privately continuing a tightly calibrated, limited security-based alliance.

A method in the madness, then? Perhaps. But the army’s signalling won’t seem so clever if the brinkmanship on the domestic front ends in the collapse of the transition to democracy.

cyril.a@gmail.com

Politics and the army

Friday, October 09, 2009 Basil Nabi Without discipline the Army would just be a bunch of guys wearing the same- color clothing. -- Frank Burns In recent days, one cannot help but notice some extremely disturbing and perturbing indicators in the political arena of the country. At the onset of this democratic era, many of us who had fought alongside the lawyers and the politicians hoped that our efforts would result in the army renouncing all participation in politics. And that, if nothing else, the politicians would not give them the excuse to dabble in political matters in the future. Although I am delighted at the lawyers and civil society achieving their goal of securing a determined judiciary trying to correct its previous follies, I unfortunately am not as glad as to the army's current role in our political system. Ever since the democratic government came to power, there has seemed to be a power struggle of sorts going on between the GHQ and the PPP-led government. Unfortunately, at all crucial points, the army has shown its reluctance at the thought of being subservient to Parliament and the democratically elected government. This can be fathomed from various incidents which have taken place over this short democratic period. The first indicator was when the government sent out a notification bringing the intelligence authorities within the control of the ministry of interior, which the army clearly found totally unpalatable. Although a silly idea to begin with, the reasons for its revocation rather than the revocation itself are a cause of concern. The fact that the notification was taken back within hours rather than days indicates the influence the army held within the political circles, and the degree to which the political government was able to control the army. The rumoured intervention of the army chief in the reinstatement of the chief justice of Pakistan, via the much trumpeted "Kayani formula," is also an indicator of the army's continued involvement in politics even at this stage. Other than that, the fact that important foreign dignitaries or officials who grace Pakistan with their presence meet the army chief and discuss "various matters" in addition to talking to his political counterparts indicates the larger global role that the army has undertaken and retained despite the return of democracy. Much more recently, and extremely disturbing, is the meetings that the COAS has allegedly had with certain political leaders of the ruling and opposition parties, with the exclusion of the persons who make up the present government. And om addition to this, the press statement released by the ISPR which commented on the Kerry-Lugar Bill, despite its being a matter solely within the domain of the political arena, also has resulted in some eyebrows being raised. Now let's be clear. Clearly, in addition to the army's role in politics, there are certain persons in the media and political circles who, intentionally or inadvertently, bolster the image of the armed forces at the expense of the political leadership. The army should be praised where it has done something commendable, but in an appropriate manner, and not at the expense of any other institution or pillar of the state. For example, certain people tend to claim that the army is solely to praise for the success of the Swat offensive, despite the fact that similar operations that took place under the leadership of Musharraf resulted in utter failure. The one difference between those previous operations and the present one was the political shrewdness of the ANP and other political parties which enabled the army to arise victorious by successfully cutting off all local support to the Taliban via the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation episode. But this element of the debate is usually overlooked. All this does not bode well for this nascent democracy which has barely completed a year! The political government, despite its immense shortcomings and incompetent handling of administrative matters, must be given a fair chance. After all, if we can give dictators years on end, why can't we allow the democratic dispensation to complete its term? The people elected them for five years, and that is the time that it should be given. Perhaps people will then realise the true worth of their votes, and will cast them with a bit less reckless abandon, and much more caution. Side Note: On a related matter, I find it astonishing how the ISPR so brazenly commented on the Kerry-Lugar Bill and its contents before the Parliament even had a chance to go over it! Clearly, this bill comes within the purview of the political leadership, which must conduct foreign affairs, among other things. An argument is made that the document deals with "national security" and hence can be analysed by the army but, then again, one wonders where was this argument when Musharraf was selling Pakistani citizens to America for some "well deserved" bounty, or when the first drone attacks took place in FATA, or when Musharraf started a full-fledged operation in Balochistan bringing the federation to its knees. The writer is a graduate of Columbia University who is currently working as a lawyer in Karachi. Email: basil.nabi@ gmail.com Army stance puts govt on the back foot By Iftikhar A. Khan and Syed Irfan Raza Friday, 09 Oct, 2009 ISLAMABAD, Oct 8: The fissures created by the top army command’s objections over some of the conditionalities attached to the Kerry-Lugar aid package continued to have a direct impact on the functioning of the government, with ripples created during the day as sources said that the Prime Minister’s Secretariat had received the detailed version of the objections raised by General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani and his fellow commanders a day earlier. There was a near paralysis in government circles as most ministers, parliamentarians and officials remained locked in debates at various forums on the consequences of the army’s objections, and the manner in which public mood was being influenced by some opposition leaders and a section of the media. A few were furious over what was described as army’s over-intrusive action, but were not prepared to go on record. Sources in the government said the communication by the army chief sent directly to Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani was based on army’s interpretation of various clauses or conditions attached to the American legislation, which the military commanders believe are highly intrusive in nature and will have serious implications on national security. There was no immediate comment either by the army spokesman or government’s media managers on the detailed report sent by the army to the prime minister. However, official sources said brainstorming sessions were held at Aiwan-e-Sadr and Prime Minister’s House during the day where ways of dealing with the situation were discussed. Though Prime Minister Gilani had said in his National Assembly speech on Wednesday that the concerns of the army over the bill would be addressed, official sources said the word from President Asif Zardari was that the government and party would defend what they believe was a ‘pro-democracy legislation’. The presidential camp was further encouraged in the evening when US Ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson met Mr Zardari, mainly to discuss the fallout of the Kerry-Lugar bill controversy. Presidential Spokesman Farhatullah Babar confirmed the meeting, but did not provide its details. According to him, “it was just a routine meeting”. However, a private TV channel which interviewed Ms Patterson quoted her as saying that there were a few drafting errors in the legislation, and that the US embassy would convey to Washington the views and objections being raised by concerned quarters in Pakistan. She was also quoted as saying that the Pakistani military would also be consulted on the matter. Another TV channel had earlier quoted her as saying that the legislation was supportive of the people of Pakistan. Even otherwise, during the day the presidency remained over-active in finding ways of encouraging PPP politicians and government allies to take on the critics of the aid package. But despite a clear message from Mr. Zardari to adopt a pro-active approach, most ministers and senior party leaders during the day avoided taking up the issue, either in the parliament or on the electronic media. A senior PPP politician told Dawn that most of them were not willing to stick their neck out at a time when uncertainty prevailed after the army’s strong reaction against the US legislation. Even most of the media managers were reluctant to go on record, and instead were busy distributing prepared material among journalists and analysts in support of the legislation, but desiring to remain anonymous. In the end it was once again the selfless Farhatullah Babar who decided to spearhead the president’s team with a forceful defence of the government’s position on the US bill. “There is not a single thing in the bill that is against the interest of the people of Pakistan”, he said during a debate on Dawn News TV. Mr. Babar appeared with a host of documents in support of his argument, including copies of the aid deals the former military ruler President Pervez Musharraf had struck with the US government, and in which conditions mentioned were as ‘strict’ or ‘controversial’ as they were in the Kerry-Lugar bill. The main thrust of his argument was that it was a bill approved by the Congress with the conditions addressed to the US State Department, and neither the agreement was with Pakistan, nor the Pakistani president or prime minister were its signatory. The argument was presented as former ministers Faisal Saleh Hayat and Aftab Sherpao, who were once strong defenders of Gen Musharraf and his actions spoke in the National Assembly, criticising the conditions attached to the aid package, calling it an insult to the honour of Pakistani people. Some of the more sober elements in the main opposition party like writer-politician Ayaz Amir were seriously concerned about the language used in the bill, and thought it was too humiliating for the people to accept it. He, however, declared in a televised debate that the parliament through a democratic process would be able to find an honourable solution to the crisis. Although the criticism of the Kerry-Lugar bill has been going on in the media for a few weeks, it acquired an entirely new dimension when the army command, instead of communicating its reservations to the government through a formal channel like the Defence Committee of the Cabinet decided to go public. However, the formal communication sent to the prime minister on Thursday was not made public. However, sources in the government said the main areas where army had expressed its reservations to the prime minister on the inclusion of a clause under which an assessment was required on whether assistance provided to Pakistan was going directly or indirectly to aid the expansion of its nuclear weapons’ programme. The army in its communication has said that the language used in the bill would amount to the capping of the nuclear programme. Concern has also been expressed over the requirement of certification that Pakistan has made progress in preventing cross-border attacks and whether it has dismantled the alleged terrorist basses in Quetta and Muridke. And another serious reservation was on the clause related to civilian control of the military’s promotions and other related matters that were totally unacceptable to the military commanders.As the belated debate continues over the finer points of Kerry-Lugar, the prophets of doom who have never been in short supply in Islamabad, have already started predicting that unless the government succumbs to the army’s pressure, its days will be numbered. And the presidential camp believes that the real objective is to isolate President Zardari, and hopes that it will once again be thwarted with the active support of the prime minister. (Dawn)

Deep breath, count to ten, exhale

Friday, October 09, 2009 Chris Cork It is difficult to determine just how much 'outrage' the Kerry-Lugar Bill is generating outside the media, blathering politicians, the armed forces and the chattering classes generally. A canter through the TV channels would suggest that we teeter on the verge of revolution, such is the public dismay at the contents of a bill that is American in origin, has not yet been signed into law by the US President, and whose contents remain a mystery to the majority of the population who are illiterate anyway. How many of us have read the Kerry-Lugar Bill in its entirety? (I have; worthy but dull like most legislation.) And why have we got ourselves in such a lather about it anyway…is our sovereignty – and anybody care to give me a definition of 'sovereignty' – so compromised by it, are Blackwater (…or Xe or Xi or Pi) poised to take over the country, why does the President smile so much and is there anywhere that I can buy sugar for Rs40 a kilo? To the ordinary mortal such as myself the principal problem with the Kerry-Lugar Bill seems to be that it puts in writing what had previously been a tacit understanding, and that the nod-wink-handshake way of doing business with Pakistan is now a thing of the past. It also seems to signal a sea-change in the way that America does business with us in a far wider sense. It is still a transactional document and there is very much the sense that we are having a finger wagged at us, but there are some subtle shifts. The American financial relationship with us hitherto has largely been focused on the military at the expense of development and infrastructure. The US has supported assorted unsavoury military dictatorships around the world – including ours – over the last 50 years in support of its own global hegemony, but the world is changing and America has to change with it. The priorities and preoccupations of the Bush years are not all the same as those of Obama. After 9/11, the American foreign policy, not only in Pakistan but in many other countries as well, has become hugely unpopular. The Obama presidency is seeking to change the course of the American ship of state -- change course, not turn around, please note. America needs to re-brand itself, restore some of the confidence and popularity it once enjoyed, create 'signature' projects that polish its image and mollify its critics. In the case of the Kerry-Lugar Bill that means a marked shift in priorities, towards civilian projects and with an emphasis on bolstering governance and the democratic institutions. Understandably, the military are less than delighted with this turn of events. They have enjoyed a pre-eminence for the entire life of the nation, have directly governed it for more than half that life and indirectly governed it for the rest. There is no sense that the military is or ever has been accountable to civilian bodies as it is in other democratic states, the military budgets are never published and are minimally discussed in the legislature. The Defence Ministry is little more than a front-of-house billboard and the armed forces conduct their business out of sight of civilian bureaucrats. All of the avenues of accountability have been closed off. Once again this is a state of affairs arrived at by the consistent failure of civilian governments and the civil service to deliver the goods to the population – the most recent evidence for this being the yet-unresolved 'sugar crisis' that was the product of a cabal of mill-owners who were also politicians fixing the markets to their own advantage – hardly the stuff of emerging democracy and unlikely to impress the military establishment as an example of what the civilians can do if left to their own devices. The military has, over the years, colonised parts of civil space – banking and housing to name but two – and has a very different relationship with the nation than does the military elsewhere. It is because of the weakness of civilian governance that it has been able to do this; and if America now seeks to back a civilian dispensation against the long-established trend of backing the military then tension is inevitable at every point of contact between the two – a tension now exploited to the full by the polarised political parties who themselves are now busy with backchannel negotiations to ensure their own place at the front of the queue if the military decide to move the pieces around on the board again. What the Kerry-Lugar Bill begins to do is redefine and reshape the relationship between the military and civil institutions, and military and civil-political reaction to it has generated more heat than it has light. It is not difficult to see such a move as a direct challenge to our sovereignty, a Trojan horse within which is hidden the seeds and agents of yet more micro-management of Pakistan by an external player. It is not difficult to interpret the wording of the bill in such a way as to see that there is a desire to influence, however indirectly, the internal dynamics of our governance and the civil/military relationship; and the bill will have been drafted in a detailed knowledge built up over many years of the personalities and institutions on which it will impact. It presents difficulties to the 'establishment' and the military like in that it may be a challenge to the status quo that has prevailed whatever the government in power – khaki or feudal. At the end of the day as a past senior law officer said on a private TV channel on Wednesday night that "beggars can't be choosers". If we go cap-in-hand anywhere in the world seeking money with a track-record for corruption and lack of transparency such as ours then there are going to be conditionalities. We are always going to have that kind of transactional relationship with any donor no matter how 'friendly' – and a past ambassador to both London and Washington Maleeha Lodhi has said several times that there are no permanent friends in international political relationships. We are not friends with America, nor they with us. We are not friends with any of the countries making up the Friends of Democratic Pakistan group. We have a relationship with them that is determined by mutual interest, not by whether we like one-another or not. The Americans may dislike and despise us as we dislike and despise them, but being true friends is not the way to do diplomatic business. America has an interest in sustaining us not because it wants to see happy smiling Pakistani faces painted with American flags across CNN and Fox News, but because it suits their wider geopolitical agenda and regional interests. $1.7 billion a year for the next few years is, frankly, peanuts. Loose change. We may not like picking it up but we don't have much choice in the matter – short of walking away from it completely. The Kerry-Lugar Bill is not yet signed, and we need to take a deep breath, count to ten and gently exhale before we paint ourselves into a corner. Again. The writer is a British social worker settled in Pakistan. Email: manticore73@ gmail.com (The News)

Abbas Athar ki tobah:

Asadullah Ghalib analyses the Kerry-Lugar bill in a historical context:

Some relevant comments:

Source: pkpolitics. pak defence forum

Sarah said:

President of Pakistan is the commander-in-chief of Pakistan Army. By making public their concerns, instead of using appropriate forums such as through Secretary of Defence, General Kayani and his corps commanders have breached the discipline. All of them must be court-martialled.

hasankhan said:

army should stay under the limmit.president of pakistan should chair the meetings of core commanders.enough is enough,it should be decided who will rule pakistan, army or the politicians.

Kashif said: (Off the Record, 8 Oct 09)

Hats off to Asma Jhangir. This is first time some one showed Hamid Gul mirror.

“Hum ne foj ke kartoot dekh leye they ‘71 mein”

“Foj ko kiss ne ejazut de ke beach mein phuduk ke aa jai”

Shame on all those who prefer GHQ over parliment. Zardari is very unpopular and I don’t give a damn about him. He is the most possible corrupt person who can possibly lead Pakistan. I don’t mind if he is kicked out. He doesn’t have any roots in public anyway.

If Zardari is replaced by Nawaz Sharif or IK or Qazi …. we will have same power struggle between Rawalpindi and Islamabad. Why Musharaaf and GHQ kicked NS out. He was fairly popular and had 2/3 rd majority. Shame on PMLN for getting everything and getting in bed with GHQ again in sheer violation of CoD.

Last but not the least I back every word that Kashif Abbasi read from Hussain Hiqani’s book. US (mostly republicans) have strengthend Army over civlian institutions. They should reverse the course. They should use their influence (aid $$$) to bring GHQ under civilian regime. Hussain Hiqani is my hero. I do not endorse everything that he did to date but these days he is serving Pakistan tremendously. He is the best possible spokesman Pakistan can have at this time. I salute him.

pejamistri said:

@kashif,
You are right. I think Corps commander’s conference declaration, Mian sb. meeting with Kiyani , and of course the KL perceived impact on the army needs to be discussed. It seems to me that the battle between establishment (read army) and democratic forces is now again in the open. I would have thought that AZ could immediately dismissed Kiyani , he may do so even now? However I may be wishful. Though unlike you I still believe that AZ and NS are together in this battle , the meeting between NS and Kiyani may have been on the request of Kiyani , who might have feared his dismissal. I am sure NS would not have offered him anything except a cunning smile and kind hearing.
I am still hopeful that Kiyani (and perhaps couple of his associate corps commanders) should be immediately dismissed by AZ, it could happen after Parliament passes resolution in KL bill and pass comments against the corps commanders uncalled for comments.

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Is Nawaz Sharif willing to apply Article 6 to General Kayani and also some of his cronies within PML-N?

Article 6 can’t just apply to one man: Gilani

* PM says those who supported Musharraf are in cabinet and some of them have also joined PML-N
* Musharraf not given indemnity, convicted or pardoned, no question of deal

By Zulfiqar Ghuman

ISLAMABAD: Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani said on Wednesday that Article 6 could not be applied to only one person, as there were several politicians in parliament who also supported former president Pervez Musharraf by voting for the 17th Amendment.

“I have no love lost for Musharraf ... if parliament decides to try him, I will be with parliament. Article 6 cannot be applied to one individual ... those who supported him are today in my cabinet and some of them have also joined the PML-N ... the MMA, the MQM and the PML-Q supported him ... this is why I have said that it is not doable,” said the prime minister while informally talking to editors and also replying to questions by journalists at an Iftar-dinner he had hosted for them.

On President Asif Zardari’s disclosure about a “negotiated settlement”, he said, “Parliament has so far not given indemnity to Musharraf, nor has he been convicted or pardoned, so there is no question of any deal.”

About the balance of power between the offices of president and prime minister, Gilani said, “If you refer to Article 58(2b), let me tell you that this article has become redundant ... a parliamentary committee is working on the constitutional package.” (Daily Times)

Nazir Naji's Analysis:

Abbas Ather's Analysis:

Defence, not deterrence

By Cyril Almeida
Friday, 18 Sep, 2009

Dictators have arrived on the scene when the politicians have discredited themselves and the people left searching for saviours. —File Photo

HAS the PML-N jumped the shark in its purported quest to have Musharraf tried for treason? The plot has definitely taken a turn towards the ridiculous this week.

We, the people, are expected to believe that the PML-N is shocked, shocked that a ‘deal’ was struck with outside powers to guarantee Musharraf a safe exit. Snow White, aka the PML-N, can’t imagine a deal could be struck to, say, bail a prime minister out of jail, fly him across to luxurious exile in Saudi Arabia and then engineer his return to our ‘sovereign’ nation. Oh wait, isn’t that what happened to Nawaz Sharif, leader of Snow White?

Right, that was different. Different why, you ask? Because, y’know, that was Nawaz Sharif, leader of the people, a democratic would-be amirul momineen, heir to the throne of the Mughal emperors of yore, the greatest ruler since sliced bread, and did I mention, leader of the people? So it’s OK, gosh darn necessary even, for outside powers to ride to the rescue of Sharif because he’s different.

The only thing that is different though are the circumstances. The hunted has become the hunter and in the jungle of Pakistani politics he thinks he can smell blood. But in the smoke-and-mirrors game that is our politics, don’t be so sure that the victim is who you think it is. For some, the PML-N’s ‘try Musharraf’ cry sounds awfully like ‘get Zardari’.

With astonishing speed, Zardari’s indiscretion has ricocheted and become about him. Nothing less than the ‘independence and sovereignty’ of parliament has been undermined by Zardari, according to the PML-N. But don’t expect the PML-N to fire off angry missives about the ‘violation’ to the other parties involved. Perhaps to the Americans and the British, but definitely not the Saudis. Sharif knows what’s good for him, and invoking the ire of the Saudi king definitely isn’t.

Keeping Zardari under pressure though is good for Sharif, hence the PML-N’s alacrity in tabling a motion against him in the National Assembly. For those keeping track of the tit-for-tat game, we’re now in round three. Round one was the minus-one formula that rattled Zardari, round two was the raking up of Sharif’s past and now round three is about doing the dirty on Zardari and embarrassing him.

That doesn’t mean Sharif wouldn’t like to see Musharraf hanged, drawn and quartered. The bitterness is palpable despite Sharif’s denials; he isn’t one to forgive or forget the humiliation of being handcuffed and thrown into a dingy cell. But that is neither remarkable nor unprecedented.

Legend has it that Zia and his generals decided to hang ZAB because that proud, disdainful prime minister had made it clear he would hang them if he ever got the chance. And the bitterness between Leghari and the PPP lives on to this day, 13 years since BB’s man in the presidency dismissed her government. That’s just how politics is and we can’t do anything about personal enmities.

But what the rest of us on the outside and at the mercy of the politicians and their vendettas can do is at least understand when acting on those enmities is a good idea from a systemic perspective and when it isn’t.

If trying Musharraf and throwing him in jail – I personally am squeamish about the death penalty – can yield some good that outstrips the risk of damage to the democratic project, I’m all for it.

I never was a fan of Musharraf because a dictatorship isn’t the answer to the problems of our polity. Well-intentioned or ill-intentioned is beside the point for me. The fact is, our polity is diverse and fractious and for historical, social and political reasons a one-man show is bound to exacerbate the tensions in the federation. Ergo, a dictator is a bad idea in the long term.

(Arguably, in the short term, a dictatorship may help reset the balance to keep the country in a low-level equilibrium rather than keel over from the depredations of the civilian political class, but that is a separate issue and, in any case, should the point not be to break out of a low-level political, economic and social equilibrium?)

But I just can’t see how prosecuting Musharraf will set a good precedent and buttress the democratic project in its present phase. Judging Musharraf guilty of treason in a court of law would be a precedent, absolutely, but what exactly would it achieve?

Deter the next dictator? Dictators have arrived on the scene when the politicians have discredited themselves and the people left searching for saviours. Ayub, Zia, Musharraf, each arrived when cynicism was at a peak.

It can be debated whether the public truly wanted a dictator at those points in time or whether the army had a hand in creating the political trouble in the first place, but the point is that deterrence – in the sense of threatening unacceptable costs to a would-be dictator – is not what is needed; a stronger defence is.

The deterrence, defence dichotomy is not mere word play, it is at the root of our present misguided national debate. There simply is no nuclear option to deter would-be dictators. Threaten to hang him and his cohorts? Right. The next adventurist general may just decide to hang all the politicians first and drag the country into a dark place we don’t even want to think about. Zia is the worst of the dictators we have had, but he isn’t the worst of all dictators we could have had.

A better bet, then, is to shore up the civilian political defences against a dictator. Build on the present transition to democracy. Incrementally push the army out of the governance and policy space. If there are 10 things a democratic government must have to be truly in charge and the army only allows it, say, two or three issues (education, health, the economy, whatever), then do those two or three things right and use the leverage to prise away more subjects from the army’s control.

And if the politicians must fight, fine. But do it within bounds. Zardari’s bid for power in Punjab was bad because of the way he attempted it by pouncing on Shahbaz Sharif’s disqualification and imposing governor’s rule. He could have tried to win a straight vote in the Punjab Assembly instead. And if Sharif wants to push for mid-term elections or defang Zardari, fine. But don’t do it in a roundabout way and flirt with invoking the army’s wrath at this delicate juncture in the transition to democracy.

A post-politics phase in which politicians on both sides of the aisle agree on everything and hug and kiss and hold each other’s hands is neither desirable nor beneficial to the democratic project.

What is needed though to build a solid defence against adventurist generals is selective cooperation. Zoom out and in the bigger picture politicians need to cooperate to defend the system against threats from rival institutions. Zoom in and they need to present alternatives on policies and different approaches to governance.

It’s not rocket science. But neither is it schoolboy stuff. And at the moment all we seem to have is a PML-N bent on throwing tantrums and chucking toys out of its pram and a PPP led by rank amateurs.

cyril.a@gmail.com (Dawn)

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