Parliament passes 14-point resolution on national security
Updated at: 1025 PST, Wednesday, October 22, 2008
ISLAMABAD: The Parliament on Wednesday unanimously endorsed a 14-point resolution on national policy regarding internal security and war against terrorism.
Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani tabled the resolution in the joint in-camera session of parliament chaired by speaker Dr. Fehmida Mirza. Members of parliament unanimously passed the resolution.
Earlier, joint parliamentary draft committee discussed and finalized the 14-point recommendations on national security in a meeting presided over by Federal Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Sherry Rehman at the Parliament House today.
According to sources, the resolution asks government to hold dialogue only with militants who lay down arms and compensate all soldiers and civilians who embraced martyrdom in fight against terror. It also asks government to defend the territorial integrity of the country and retaliate any attempt of foreign misadventure. Lastly, the resolution urges government to flush foreign militants out of the tribal areas.
Prime Minister Gilani was consulted to finalise the draft of the resolution, sources added. (The News)
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It is a bad day for Taliban and their supporters in Pakistani media, e.g. Ansar Abbasi, Kashif Abbasi, Mushtaq Minhas and Hamid Mir.
Well done, Zardari. Well done, PPP, PML-N, ANP, MQM, JUI and other parties which have expressed their unanimous support for the war on terror.
Here is the link to BBC dot com article:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/story/2008/10/081022_parliament_res_adopted_rh.shtml
Historic 14-point anti-terrorism resolution adopted unanimously :
Nation united against terrorism: parliament
* Dialogue will be primary instrument of conflict resolution
* Redistribution of resources to resolve Balochistan violence
* Civil agencies will replace military in troubled areas
* Compensation for violence victims, rehabilitation for the displaced
By Irfan Ghauri and Muhammad Bilal
ISLAMABAD: In a historic resolution on Wednesday, the parliament said the Pakistani nation was united against terrorism and sectarian violence and would tackle the problem by addressing its root causes.
The 14-point resolution, drafted after two days of rigorous negotiations, was passed unanimously. Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani moved the resolution, which he said would serve as policy guideline to the government in framing a national security strategy.
“Extremism, militancy and terrorism in all forms and manifestations pose a grave danger to the stability and integrity of the country,” the resolution said. “Dictatorial regimes in the past pursued policies aimed at perpetuating their own power at the cost of national interest. “We need an urgent review of our national security strategy and revisiting the methodology of combating terrorism in order to restore peace and stability to Pakistan and the region through an independent foreign policy.”
Dialogue: The parliament decided that “dialogue must now be the highest priority, as a principal instrument of conflict management and resolution”, but also said talks would only “be encouraged with all those elements willing to abide by the constitution of Pakistan and rule of law”.
The legislators decided that all foreign fighters, “if found, shall be expelled from Pakistan’s soil”.
The parliament vowed that Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity would be safeguarded. “The nation stands united against any incursions and invasions of the homeland, and calls upon the government to deal with it effectively,” the resolution said, but added: “Pakistan’s territory shall not be used for any kind of attacks on other countries.”
They also decided that “the development of troubled zones, particularly the Tribal Areas, and the NWFP must also be pursued through all possible ways and legitimate means to create genuine stakeholders in peace. New economic opportunities shall be created in order to bring the less privileged areas at par with the rest of Pakistan”.
Balochistan: On the problem in Balochistan, the resolution called for “a political dialogue with the people, addressing of their grievances and redistribution of resources shall be enhanced and accelerated”.
It said the federation must be strengthened “through the process of democratic pluralism, social justice, religious values and tolerance, and equitable resource sharing between the provinces as enshrined in the Constitution of 1973”.
Military: The state must ensure rule of law, the unanimous resolution said, and “when it has to intervene to protect the lives of its citizens, caution must be exercised to avoid casualties of non-combatants in conflict zones”. The legislators demanded that military be replaced with civilian law enforcement agencies in the conflict zones as early as possible, “with enhanced capacity and a sustainable political system achieved through a consultative process”.
The state must establish its writ, they demanded, but through “confidence building mechanisms by using customary and local [jirgas]”. Pakistan’s strategic interests must be protected “by developing stakes in regional peace and trade, both on the western and eastern borders”.
Compensation and rehabilitation: The parliament decided that the “mechanisms for internal security be institutionalised by paying compensation to victims of violence; and rehabilitate those displaced”.
The parliament also decided to form a committee to periodically review “the implementation of the principles framed and roadmap given in the resolution”. The committee will frame its own rules when it meets.(Daily Times)
.........
Consensus resolution
THE MPs have finally come up with a consensus resolution and this in itself is an achievement. Beyond that, one would be hard put to discover substance in the 14-point resolution read out to parliament by the prime minister on Wednesday. Between the opposition and the government, which side has given more is a matter of opinion. Keen to get a parliamentary endorsement of its policies, the government seems to have conceded more than the opposition. There is no reference to the war against terrorism in the resolution hammered out after a 15-day in-camera session of the two houses. The Taliban and Al Qaeda have not been named; instead the MNAs and senators confine themselves to noting “with great concern” that “extremism, militancy and terrorism” pose a threat to Pakistan’s stability and integrity. How to combat this menace has not been spelled out in specific terms, even though the resolution calls for “an urgent review” of the national security strategy. While the demand for “an independent foreign policy” could be considered a dig at the Musharraf government’s take on events, the resolution does not recommend what aberrations in Pakistan’s external relations need to be removed.
The resolution places emphasis on dialogue and calls it the “principal instrument of conflict management”. To that extent it breaks no new ground, for the PPP-led government too stands pledged to talks — an idea that is gaining ground in American and European capitals as well. However, the PPP government says it will talk to those militants who lay down arms. The resolution only indirectly concedes the government’s right to use force by pleading that collateral damage be avoided when the security forces “intervene” to ensure the government’s writ. On the question of sovereignty, it has maintained a fine balance. While the resolution asks the government to “deal” with incursions into Pakistan, it says the country should not be allowed to be used for acts of terrorism against other states, and that foreign militants be expelled.
Let us count our blessings: at one stage it appeared the opposition would walk away. That it did not do so and that finally the MPs managed to hammer out a consensus resolution is a matter of thanksgiving. Apparently our boys are growing. For the first time since the unity shown at the time of Musharraf’s exit, all parties have once again come together, even if the diluted resolution disappoints the nation, which had expected something more concrete from the people’s representatives. Nawaz Sharif had spoken a lot and made no secret of his reservations about the government’s war on terror, but his party too finally went along. Perhaps the resolution is a first step towards evolving what eventually could become a forceful, result-oriented national consensus. (Dawn)
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Showing posts with label National Consensus. Show all posts
Showing posts with label National Consensus. Show all posts
Wednesday, 22 October 2008
Pakistan is united against terrorists of Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Sipah-e-Sahaba & other jihadi & sectarian organizations. Parliament passes resolution.
Pakistan's war on terror, the discussion in the parliament and the political point scoring by PML-N and PML-Q - Nasim Zehra
Parliament's role in fighting terror
Wednesday, October 22, 2008
Nasim Zehra
The writer is an Islamabad-based security analyst
Almost two weeks into the in-camera session on the security situation, and especially the tribal areas, many questions regarding its usefulness are being raised. For example, are we closer to having evolved a better policy response to Pakistan's security problem? Are we closer to having evolved a policy for the tribal areas that is any different from what the government has hitherto been pursuing? Are we headed towards greater and broader political ownership of policy? Is there a greater national consensus behind ownership of the policy?
There are no straightforward answers to these questions, simply because the in-camera session is only one of the many elements within the broader policy formulation and policy implementation context in which there are many other elements influencing policy and its implementation.
For example, the briefing has been taking place against the backdrop of significant actions. These have ranged from major military operations in Bajaur and Swat to a peace agreement between the warring groups in the Kurram agency; from high-level engagement with the United States government on operational-level cooperation, including training and equipment, to ongoing negotiations within the Tripartite Commission framework on Pakistan-Afghanistan border issues; from ongoing dialogue with Kabul to the convening of the Pakistani-Afghan mini-jirga; from the emergence in the tribal areas of the local lashkars now disenchanted by the militant leadership they had earlier supported to the Oct 14 fatwa by the Muttahida Ulema Council in Lahore declaring that suicide bombing is un-Islamic and only the State has the right to declare jihad.
All these factors underscore the important reality that under discussion in Parliament is an ongoing situation. The challenge and the policy under discussion is one that Pakistan has been confronted with for over half-a-decade. Consequently, there is also a response dynamic, however flawed and inadequate, that is already at work. This is a major limiting factor in a situation if the political demand, as in this case, of a section of politicians would be to go back to the drawing board and draw a fresh policy. Such a demand and expectation would be inherently flawed; one that fails to appreciate the dynamics of policy formulation and implementation. However, what would be more practical if the critics of the existing policy would recommend potentially more effective policy alternatives. Such an undertaking would require a coherent and logical presentation, backed by facts and experiential wisdom, of recommended policy alternatives.
The response of the politicians from the non-ruling parties, especially the PML-N and PML-Q, has combined political point-scoring with some serious engagement with the process issues related to the briefing. Meanwhile, the diminishing interest of the PPP parliamentarians prompted the Speaker to urge them to take greater interest.
On the process issue, the PML-N made a major contribution towards making the present session into a genuinely parliamentary discussion session. Originally the government had planned it to be a limited purpose session in which the Parliament would be presented the ground situation by the Director General of Military Operations to be followed by two questions each from all present political parties. The government responded positively to the PML-N's recommendations. These included that the Q&A be spread over a day and be followed by another presentation by a government representative presenting the government's present and mid-term threat perception and its broader impact on the country, the contents of the Pakistan-US cooperation agreement and recommended policy options to deal with the situation. As a consequence the briefing has extended into a two-week plus session. That the session was extended on the opposition's demand and all representatives are getting an opportunity to participate in the discussion means that a democratic exercise in underway. The process of debate and dialogue is intrinsic and crucial to genuine democracy. To that extent the session is a plus.
However, how valuable this session is for policy formulation and, indeed, for public good and overall national security will depend on its final outcome. And that depends largely on the non-ruling parties. The government has conceded to their process recommendations and these non-ruling parties must demonstrate to the public that they have practical wisdom to a policy that is already in operation. It is a policy that now seems to be showing some mixed results but criticisms too are aplenty.
Policymakers and parliamentarians, however, do not have the luxury to indulge constantly in rhetoric and points-scoring. For the positions that they acquire through public vote, the parliamentarians opt for a constitutional undertaking to be responsible for competent management of state and society through appropriate laws, structures and processes. This is what the public now expects from the parliamentarians as they debate the security problem in the Parliament.
Some of the point-scoring is almost inevitable. The PML-Q, PML-N and others from the non-ruling parties have been repeating their criticism of the tribal area policy and also of the in-camera briefings. They mostly insist that "this is not our war" and demand that Pakistan discontinue its close cooperation with the US on this war on terrorism which is now being fought on Pakistani territory. They demand dialogue with the militants and argue that because of pro-US policies Pakistani security forces have launched military operations in the tribal areas against Pakistani citizens and killing many innocent civilians.
The parliamentarians' criticism of the briefing has been that the information regarding the ground situation and policy content provided to them has already been available in the public arena. For example, they complain that they have not been provided any new facts regarding the government's commitments made to the US about Pakistan's clearance to US operations in the tribal areas and support to US operations in Afghanistan. The PML-N and PML-Q may not be entirely wrong. Yet this criticism alone will only signal poverty of serious and responsible politics. There are enough information and facts available to the non-ruling parties to make detailed, viable and concrete suggestions for improving the existing security policy especially dealing with the tribal areas. The PML-N will soon be suggesting to the prime minister to set up a smaller all-parliamentary committee which must get a more detailed briefing on the security situation and the committee should make concrete recommendations for policy improvement.
To the extent that this will keep all the parties involved in a dialogue process over the question of security this would be a positive move. However, as concrete recommendations for substantive policy improvement those have not been forthcoming from any political party. It is time that Pakistan's political parties get more serious about what it takes to run the business of state and society. It certainly takes more serious and competent mind work. Rhetoric and good intentions alone won't do it. (The News)
Email: nasimzehra@hotmail.com
Read more...
Wednesday, October 22, 2008
Nasim Zehra
The writer is an Islamabad-based security analyst
Almost two weeks into the in-camera session on the security situation, and especially the tribal areas, many questions regarding its usefulness are being raised. For example, are we closer to having evolved a better policy response to Pakistan's security problem? Are we closer to having evolved a policy for the tribal areas that is any different from what the government has hitherto been pursuing? Are we headed towards greater and broader political ownership of policy? Is there a greater national consensus behind ownership of the policy?
There are no straightforward answers to these questions, simply because the in-camera session is only one of the many elements within the broader policy formulation and policy implementation context in which there are many other elements influencing policy and its implementation.
For example, the briefing has been taking place against the backdrop of significant actions. These have ranged from major military operations in Bajaur and Swat to a peace agreement between the warring groups in the Kurram agency; from high-level engagement with the United States government on operational-level cooperation, including training and equipment, to ongoing negotiations within the Tripartite Commission framework on Pakistan-Afghanistan border issues; from ongoing dialogue with Kabul to the convening of the Pakistani-Afghan mini-jirga; from the emergence in the tribal areas of the local lashkars now disenchanted by the militant leadership they had earlier supported to the Oct 14 fatwa by the Muttahida Ulema Council in Lahore declaring that suicide bombing is un-Islamic and only the State has the right to declare jihad.
All these factors underscore the important reality that under discussion in Parliament is an ongoing situation. The challenge and the policy under discussion is one that Pakistan has been confronted with for over half-a-decade. Consequently, there is also a response dynamic, however flawed and inadequate, that is already at work. This is a major limiting factor in a situation if the political demand, as in this case, of a section of politicians would be to go back to the drawing board and draw a fresh policy. Such a demand and expectation would be inherently flawed; one that fails to appreciate the dynamics of policy formulation and implementation. However, what would be more practical if the critics of the existing policy would recommend potentially more effective policy alternatives. Such an undertaking would require a coherent and logical presentation, backed by facts and experiential wisdom, of recommended policy alternatives.
The response of the politicians from the non-ruling parties, especially the PML-N and PML-Q, has combined political point-scoring with some serious engagement with the process issues related to the briefing. Meanwhile, the diminishing interest of the PPP parliamentarians prompted the Speaker to urge them to take greater interest.
On the process issue, the PML-N made a major contribution towards making the present session into a genuinely parliamentary discussion session. Originally the government had planned it to be a limited purpose session in which the Parliament would be presented the ground situation by the Director General of Military Operations to be followed by two questions each from all present political parties. The government responded positively to the PML-N's recommendations. These included that the Q&A be spread over a day and be followed by another presentation by a government representative presenting the government's present and mid-term threat perception and its broader impact on the country, the contents of the Pakistan-US cooperation agreement and recommended policy options to deal with the situation. As a consequence the briefing has extended into a two-week plus session. That the session was extended on the opposition's demand and all representatives are getting an opportunity to participate in the discussion means that a democratic exercise in underway. The process of debate and dialogue is intrinsic and crucial to genuine democracy. To that extent the session is a plus.
However, how valuable this session is for policy formulation and, indeed, for public good and overall national security will depend on its final outcome. And that depends largely on the non-ruling parties. The government has conceded to their process recommendations and these non-ruling parties must demonstrate to the public that they have practical wisdom to a policy that is already in operation. It is a policy that now seems to be showing some mixed results but criticisms too are aplenty.
Policymakers and parliamentarians, however, do not have the luxury to indulge constantly in rhetoric and points-scoring. For the positions that they acquire through public vote, the parliamentarians opt for a constitutional undertaking to be responsible for competent management of state and society through appropriate laws, structures and processes. This is what the public now expects from the parliamentarians as they debate the security problem in the Parliament.
Some of the point-scoring is almost inevitable. The PML-Q, PML-N and others from the non-ruling parties have been repeating their criticism of the tribal area policy and also of the in-camera briefings. They mostly insist that "this is not our war" and demand that Pakistan discontinue its close cooperation with the US on this war on terrorism which is now being fought on Pakistani territory. They demand dialogue with the militants and argue that because of pro-US policies Pakistani security forces have launched military operations in the tribal areas against Pakistani citizens and killing many innocent civilians.
The parliamentarians' criticism of the briefing has been that the information regarding the ground situation and policy content provided to them has already been available in the public arena. For example, they complain that they have not been provided any new facts regarding the government's commitments made to the US about Pakistan's clearance to US operations in the tribal areas and support to US operations in Afghanistan. The PML-N and PML-Q may not be entirely wrong. Yet this criticism alone will only signal poverty of serious and responsible politics. There are enough information and facts available to the non-ruling parties to make detailed, viable and concrete suggestions for improving the existing security policy especially dealing with the tribal areas. The PML-N will soon be suggesting to the prime minister to set up a smaller all-parliamentary committee which must get a more detailed briefing on the security situation and the committee should make concrete recommendations for policy improvement.
To the extent that this will keep all the parties involved in a dialogue process over the question of security this would be a positive move. However, as concrete recommendations for substantive policy improvement those have not been forthcoming from any political party. It is time that Pakistan's political parties get more serious about what it takes to run the business of state and society. It certainly takes more serious and competent mind work. Rhetoric and good intentions alone won't do it. (The News)
Email: nasimzehra@hotmail.com
Read more...
Friday, 10 October 2008
We must back Army against terrorists!
The Pakistan Parliament's In Camera Session
It is time to distinguish political opportunists from those who are willing to root out the menace of terrorism from Pakistan. It is time to be united to wage an all out war against sectarian and Jihadi terrorists and their supporters. It is time to support the Pakistan Government and Pakistan Army in its action against terrorists.
We must back Army against terrorists!
A joint session of parliament in Islamabad has heard, in camera, the newly-appointed ISI Director General Lt Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha — who was Director General Military Operations (DGMO) before he got the job — on the terrorist threat facing Pakistan and the army’s operations to thwart the terrorists. The briefing has made it clear that to succeed against the militancy in the Tribal Areas the army would need full political backing from the parliament and the people of Pakistan.
The briefing was graphic. There were slides, charts and films which could have left no doubt in anybody’s mind what Pakistan was up against. One can surmise that beheadings, torture and forcible induction of teenagers into suicide-bombing were noted and explained. The operations in Bajaur and Swat were explained too, according to the statements made by the parliamentarians after the briefing. In Bajaur, a level of success has been achieved, with the local population supporting the army; in Swat, things are still difficult because of the control exercised over territory by the militants.
Pakistan has lost 1,368 troops in the fight since 2001, and the military has killed 2,825 Taliban and terrorists, including 581 foreigners. One report about the session says the joint house listened to the shocking details in silence. There will be sessions following the briefing in which the representatives of the people will ask questions and give their views on the subject. The joint session is expected to last a week, if not more, given the gravity of the subject and the urgency of national support to the military operations.
Although the opposition politicians have been negative in their initial remarks, we hope that they will set aside their partisan positions and agree on the task of clearing out the terrorists from Pakistani territory. There are foreigners among the local militants and there are foreign powers involved in trying to harm Pakistan. Weapons and explosives are flowing into the Tribal Areas — and the rest of the country — and dead militants have been found carrying Afghan currency and American dollars. There is no force in Pakistan other than the army that can save us from this invasion.
The message from the army is that it needs public support as it goes in to fight the intruders. This means that it will need parliament to endorse its operations, but it also means restraint in public utterances that undermine the morale of the troops willing to lay down their lives for the country. In fact this aspect of the war against terrorism is most important of all. If statements opposed to military operations are publicised and discussions on TV are held to denigrate the policy of military response, it is bound to make our soldiers wonder if they are fighting the right war.
The crux of the problem is expressed in the slogan popularised by some elements in the media: “this is not Pakistan’s war”. Most critics want to ignore the situation on the ground and judge it on the basis of some strategic decision made by General Musharraf in 2001 after the 9/11 incidents. They think it is America’s war and Pakistan should stop fighting it because it is tantamount to going to war against Pakistan’s own people. This stance requires a stubborn and irrational denial of much of what has been shown to the parliamentarians in the in camera session.
Unfortunately, this militates against the use of the army in any national cause. Why should the army fight a war which is not Pakistan’s war? Also, by what yardstick should the army say that it is the war to fight if those who formulate policy and agree on its general direction are not united in their judgement? At the most, it can report on the consequences of the earlier policies followed by the government in power. As the joint session proceeds, the consequences of the policy of seeking dialogue with the militants and negotiating terms of peace with them will be described by the army.
Statements made by the opposition foreshadow a rejection of the in-camera briefing. But we hope that there will be “objections” that can be met and not an outright “rejection”. As far as the majority in the joint session is concerned, the ruling coalition will be able to secure it once again. One good sign is that even those who oppose military operations predict that the parliament will decide in favour of fighting this war because it is Pakistan’s war now and not only America’s. Pakistan is in bad economic shape and needs to avoid international isolation. And the army will need more than just a majority vote. It will need a “national consensus” and a complete backing from the free media.
Incidentally, top elements of the media have already received three excellent briefings from Gen Pasha in the last six months. It is time to put reason and national interest above tribal notions of personal honour and pique. (Daily Times)
Read more...
It is time to distinguish political opportunists from those who are willing to root out the menace of terrorism from Pakistan. It is time to be united to wage an all out war against sectarian and Jihadi terrorists and their supporters. It is time to support the Pakistan Government and Pakistan Army in its action against terrorists.
We must back Army against terrorists!
A joint session of parliament in Islamabad has heard, in camera, the newly-appointed ISI Director General Lt Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha — who was Director General Military Operations (DGMO) before he got the job — on the terrorist threat facing Pakistan and the army’s operations to thwart the terrorists. The briefing has made it clear that to succeed against the militancy in the Tribal Areas the army would need full political backing from the parliament and the people of Pakistan.
The briefing was graphic. There were slides, charts and films which could have left no doubt in anybody’s mind what Pakistan was up against. One can surmise that beheadings, torture and forcible induction of teenagers into suicide-bombing were noted and explained. The operations in Bajaur and Swat were explained too, according to the statements made by the parliamentarians after the briefing. In Bajaur, a level of success has been achieved, with the local population supporting the army; in Swat, things are still difficult because of the control exercised over territory by the militants.
Pakistan has lost 1,368 troops in the fight since 2001, and the military has killed 2,825 Taliban and terrorists, including 581 foreigners. One report about the session says the joint house listened to the shocking details in silence. There will be sessions following the briefing in which the representatives of the people will ask questions and give their views on the subject. The joint session is expected to last a week, if not more, given the gravity of the subject and the urgency of national support to the military operations.
Although the opposition politicians have been negative in their initial remarks, we hope that they will set aside their partisan positions and agree on the task of clearing out the terrorists from Pakistani territory. There are foreigners among the local militants and there are foreign powers involved in trying to harm Pakistan. Weapons and explosives are flowing into the Tribal Areas — and the rest of the country — and dead militants have been found carrying Afghan currency and American dollars. There is no force in Pakistan other than the army that can save us from this invasion.
The message from the army is that it needs public support as it goes in to fight the intruders. This means that it will need parliament to endorse its operations, but it also means restraint in public utterances that undermine the morale of the troops willing to lay down their lives for the country. In fact this aspect of the war against terrorism is most important of all. If statements opposed to military operations are publicised and discussions on TV are held to denigrate the policy of military response, it is bound to make our soldiers wonder if they are fighting the right war.
The crux of the problem is expressed in the slogan popularised by some elements in the media: “this is not Pakistan’s war”. Most critics want to ignore the situation on the ground and judge it on the basis of some strategic decision made by General Musharraf in 2001 after the 9/11 incidents. They think it is America’s war and Pakistan should stop fighting it because it is tantamount to going to war against Pakistan’s own people. This stance requires a stubborn and irrational denial of much of what has been shown to the parliamentarians in the in camera session.
Unfortunately, this militates against the use of the army in any national cause. Why should the army fight a war which is not Pakistan’s war? Also, by what yardstick should the army say that it is the war to fight if those who formulate policy and agree on its general direction are not united in their judgement? At the most, it can report on the consequences of the earlier policies followed by the government in power. As the joint session proceeds, the consequences of the policy of seeking dialogue with the militants and negotiating terms of peace with them will be described by the army.
Statements made by the opposition foreshadow a rejection of the in-camera briefing. But we hope that there will be “objections” that can be met and not an outright “rejection”. As far as the majority in the joint session is concerned, the ruling coalition will be able to secure it once again. One good sign is that even those who oppose military operations predict that the parliament will decide in favour of fighting this war because it is Pakistan’s war now and not only America’s. Pakistan is in bad economic shape and needs to avoid international isolation. And the army will need more than just a majority vote. It will need a “national consensus” and a complete backing from the free media.
Incidentally, top elements of the media have already received three excellent briefings from Gen Pasha in the last six months. It is time to put reason and national interest above tribal notions of personal honour and pique. (Daily Times)
Read more...
Wednesday, 8 October 2008
War on terror is Pakistan's own war —Ijaz Hussain
Is this our war? —Ijaz Hussain
The mere ownership of the war by the government is not enough to fight it effectively. It is imperative that the people own it too
Ever since Pakistan joined the US-led war on terror in 2001, controversy has raged on whether it is our war or America’s. When Pervez Musharraf ruled the roost, his government owned it while most political parties, including his own PMLQ, refused to. Despite this divide, the debate on the ownership of the war remained low-key.
The devastating Marriott bomb blast has, among other things, revived this debate as never before. Whereas the Pakistan government has reaffirmed its ownership, opposition political parties and the public at large do not seem convinced. Given the shrill, passionate debate that has taken place on the issue in the media following the Marriott tragedy, the divide seems to have widened. Further, it has raised the question: why, if it is our war, has the government failed to sell it to the public?
There is little doubt that when we joined the war, it was not ours. The Musharraf government owned it because the Bush administration imposed it on us as testified by the reported infamous threat by Richard Armitage to bomb Pakistan back to the Stone Age if we did not join the effort.
As a consequence, we abandoned the Taliban and helped the US capture Kabul. Musharraf justified the volte-face on the ground of protecting Pakistan’s vital national interests such as the nuclear assets, the Kashmir cause, etc. However, he failed to mention his own survival as president, which must have factored in this decision.
The war started becoming ours too when Al Qaeda and Taliban escapees from the American bombing started pouring into our tribal areas. With the passage of time they consolidated their positions and as the resistance against foreign forces in Afghanistan picked up, they, along with the Pakistani Taliban, started using these sanctuaries for operations across the Durand Line.
To stop them from doing so, the Musharraf government introduced Pakistani troops in the tribal areas. It did so because in addition to American pressure, international law (chapter on international state responsibility) obligated it to stop elements from using its territory against Afghanistan. Besides, the UNSC resolution on terrorism also required it to fight against them, failing which sanctions could be imposed. It is undeniable that the Pakistani tribals feel free to mount military operations across the border as they do not recognise the Durand Line. However, international law takes no cognisance of this argument.
The war also became ours when the terrorists decided to cause mayhem not only in the tribal areas but also across the length and breadth of Pakistan. They are doing so with the objective of pressurising the government to abandon support for the Bush administration in its war on terror and letting them use Pakistani territory for military operations in Afghanistan. The terrorists also seek to incrementally take over the whole or part of the state of Pakistan and run it according to their ideology. One has sporadic glimpses of this strategy in areas where the Pakistan government has lost its writ in favour of the Taliban.
This is also our war in another sense. The Taliban ideology at present being practiced in parts of Pakistan is nothing but evil incarnate. Even its milder version, practiced when they were in power in Kabul during 1996-2001, was no less evil because it struck at the roots of the progressive and moderate worldview of Islam that we cherish.
If tomorrow the Taliban succeed in militarily chasing foreign forces out of Afghanistan and establish their own government there, they would pose a threat to Pakistan’s polity. Those who reject it as an alarmist view and believe that the Taliban government in Afghanistan would be as benign towards Pakistan as the one that flourished there during the late 1990s are sadly mistaken. Flushed with victory in Afghanistan, this time the Taliban may not rest until they overpower nuclear Pakistan.
Had Musharraf not committed the ‘original sin’ of joining the Bush’s war on terror, could we have been spared the agony of owning it? Our answer is in the negative because even if Pakistan had refused to join it, the terrorists would have forced it on us.
This is so because they would have mounted operations against foreign forces across the Durand Line, which we would not have been able to stop. That in turn would have invited American attacks on the Pakistani territory, as is the case at the moment.
If it is our war as shown above, why has the Pakistani government failed to sell it to the people? There are four main reasons.
First, as is well known, it has failed because of the American dimension of the issue. The US is highly unpopular in the Muslim world for a host of reasons, which includes not only its occupation of two Muslim lands but also the blind support that it extends to Israel against the Palestinians. Besides, the way the Bush Administration has conducted the so-called war on terror has given rise to a common perception in the Muslim world that the US is waging a crusade against Islam instead of fighting terrorism.
Resultantly, Muslims generally hate the US, which in turn has made them lose sight of the fact that American and the Muslim interests could coincide as is the case at present, though the two differ, inter alia, on the methodology to deal with it.
Second, the government has failed to market this war because of the gullibility of our people. The latter are generally so driven by religion they can be easily duped by any clever operator. Taking advantage of this weakness, the Pakistani clerics who have their own axe to grind have taken a line that encourages sympathy rather than revulsion against Taliban.
For example, they believe that the Taliban government that ruled Afghanistan during 1996-2001 was the closest ever to the Khulfa-e-Rashidin. Similarly, though they denounce suicide bombings as un-Islamic, they consistently refuse to support the government against the Taliban unless it disassociates itself from the US and/or enforces sharia in the country.
Third, there is constant propaganda that the government is guilty of genocide against its own people. This argument has lot of appeal for the common man though it is utterly fallacious because if the terrorists are bent upon forcing their views upon the people through suicide bombings and other acts of violence, should the government treat them with kid glove methods simply because they are our own people?
Fortunately, Asfandyar Wali Khan, who until recently was one of the principal protagonists of this viewpoint (which he often combined with the lethal plea that military operations in FATA and Swat were a conspiracy against Pukhtuns), has abandoned it with the ascent to power of his ANP. However, notwithstanding this development, the argument continues to have wide appeal, which stops people from owning this war.
Fourth, the government lacks credibility. For example, many believe that suicide bombings and other acts of violence are the handiwork of secret agencies, and that the Taliban living in caves are incapable of mounting sophisticated operations like the Marriott bombing. A variant of this line is the plea by Islamist parties that these atrocious acts are perpetrated by foreign agencies like RAW and Mossad, and that no Muslim can ever imagine to kill another Muslim. Though both arguments are nothing but rubbish, many people believe them. The Taliban are the net beneficiaries of this situation.
It is clear that the mere ownership of the war by the government is not enough to fight it effectively. It is imperative that the people own it too. This can only come about if the government conducts a systematic analysis of the factors that make the people shun the war, and then makes concerted efforts to shape public opinion to its viewpoint. It seems to have done neither. Unless it is prepared to undertake this gargantuan task, it may not win this war.
The writer is a former dean of social sciences at the Quaid-i-Azam University. He can be reached at hussain_ijaz@hotmail.com (Daily Times)
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The mere ownership of the war by the government is not enough to fight it effectively. It is imperative that the people own it too
Ever since Pakistan joined the US-led war on terror in 2001, controversy has raged on whether it is our war or America’s. When Pervez Musharraf ruled the roost, his government owned it while most political parties, including his own PMLQ, refused to. Despite this divide, the debate on the ownership of the war remained low-key.
The devastating Marriott bomb blast has, among other things, revived this debate as never before. Whereas the Pakistan government has reaffirmed its ownership, opposition political parties and the public at large do not seem convinced. Given the shrill, passionate debate that has taken place on the issue in the media following the Marriott tragedy, the divide seems to have widened. Further, it has raised the question: why, if it is our war, has the government failed to sell it to the public?
There is little doubt that when we joined the war, it was not ours. The Musharraf government owned it because the Bush administration imposed it on us as testified by the reported infamous threat by Richard Armitage to bomb Pakistan back to the Stone Age if we did not join the effort.
As a consequence, we abandoned the Taliban and helped the US capture Kabul. Musharraf justified the volte-face on the ground of protecting Pakistan’s vital national interests such as the nuclear assets, the Kashmir cause, etc. However, he failed to mention his own survival as president, which must have factored in this decision.
The war started becoming ours too when Al Qaeda and Taliban escapees from the American bombing started pouring into our tribal areas. With the passage of time they consolidated their positions and as the resistance against foreign forces in Afghanistan picked up, they, along with the Pakistani Taliban, started using these sanctuaries for operations across the Durand Line.
To stop them from doing so, the Musharraf government introduced Pakistani troops in the tribal areas. It did so because in addition to American pressure, international law (chapter on international state responsibility) obligated it to stop elements from using its territory against Afghanistan. Besides, the UNSC resolution on terrorism also required it to fight against them, failing which sanctions could be imposed. It is undeniable that the Pakistani tribals feel free to mount military operations across the border as they do not recognise the Durand Line. However, international law takes no cognisance of this argument.
The war also became ours when the terrorists decided to cause mayhem not only in the tribal areas but also across the length and breadth of Pakistan. They are doing so with the objective of pressurising the government to abandon support for the Bush administration in its war on terror and letting them use Pakistani territory for military operations in Afghanistan. The terrorists also seek to incrementally take over the whole or part of the state of Pakistan and run it according to their ideology. One has sporadic glimpses of this strategy in areas where the Pakistan government has lost its writ in favour of the Taliban.
This is also our war in another sense. The Taliban ideology at present being practiced in parts of Pakistan is nothing but evil incarnate. Even its milder version, practiced when they were in power in Kabul during 1996-2001, was no less evil because it struck at the roots of the progressive and moderate worldview of Islam that we cherish.
If tomorrow the Taliban succeed in militarily chasing foreign forces out of Afghanistan and establish their own government there, they would pose a threat to Pakistan’s polity. Those who reject it as an alarmist view and believe that the Taliban government in Afghanistan would be as benign towards Pakistan as the one that flourished there during the late 1990s are sadly mistaken. Flushed with victory in Afghanistan, this time the Taliban may not rest until they overpower nuclear Pakistan.
Had Musharraf not committed the ‘original sin’ of joining the Bush’s war on terror, could we have been spared the agony of owning it? Our answer is in the negative because even if Pakistan had refused to join it, the terrorists would have forced it on us.
This is so because they would have mounted operations against foreign forces across the Durand Line, which we would not have been able to stop. That in turn would have invited American attacks on the Pakistani territory, as is the case at the moment.
If it is our war as shown above, why has the Pakistani government failed to sell it to the people? There are four main reasons.
First, as is well known, it has failed because of the American dimension of the issue. The US is highly unpopular in the Muslim world for a host of reasons, which includes not only its occupation of two Muslim lands but also the blind support that it extends to Israel against the Palestinians. Besides, the way the Bush Administration has conducted the so-called war on terror has given rise to a common perception in the Muslim world that the US is waging a crusade against Islam instead of fighting terrorism.
Resultantly, Muslims generally hate the US, which in turn has made them lose sight of the fact that American and the Muslim interests could coincide as is the case at present, though the two differ, inter alia, on the methodology to deal with it.
Second, the government has failed to market this war because of the gullibility of our people. The latter are generally so driven by religion they can be easily duped by any clever operator. Taking advantage of this weakness, the Pakistani clerics who have their own axe to grind have taken a line that encourages sympathy rather than revulsion against Taliban.
For example, they believe that the Taliban government that ruled Afghanistan during 1996-2001 was the closest ever to the Khulfa-e-Rashidin. Similarly, though they denounce suicide bombings as un-Islamic, they consistently refuse to support the government against the Taliban unless it disassociates itself from the US and/or enforces sharia in the country.
Third, there is constant propaganda that the government is guilty of genocide against its own people. This argument has lot of appeal for the common man though it is utterly fallacious because if the terrorists are bent upon forcing their views upon the people through suicide bombings and other acts of violence, should the government treat them with kid glove methods simply because they are our own people?
Fortunately, Asfandyar Wali Khan, who until recently was one of the principal protagonists of this viewpoint (which he often combined with the lethal plea that military operations in FATA and Swat were a conspiracy against Pukhtuns), has abandoned it with the ascent to power of his ANP. However, notwithstanding this development, the argument continues to have wide appeal, which stops people from owning this war.
Fourth, the government lacks credibility. For example, many believe that suicide bombings and other acts of violence are the handiwork of secret agencies, and that the Taliban living in caves are incapable of mounting sophisticated operations like the Marriott bombing. A variant of this line is the plea by Islamist parties that these atrocious acts are perpetrated by foreign agencies like RAW and Mossad, and that no Muslim can ever imagine to kill another Muslim. Though both arguments are nothing but rubbish, many people believe them. The Taliban are the net beneficiaries of this situation.
It is clear that the mere ownership of the war by the government is not enough to fight it effectively. It is imperative that the people own it too. This can only come about if the government conducts a systematic analysis of the factors that make the people shun the war, and then makes concerted efforts to shape public opinion to its viewpoint. It seems to have done neither. Unless it is prepared to undertake this gargantuan task, it may not win this war.
The writer is a former dean of social sciences at the Quaid-i-Azam University. He can be reached at hussain_ijaz@hotmail.com (Daily Times)
Read more...
Tuesday, 7 October 2008
What would be the fate of Jamaat Islami, Imran Khan's PTI, PML(N) and other parties which have a dubious stance on the issue of terrorism in Pakistan?
What would be the fate of Jamaat Islami, Imran Khan's PTI, PML(N) and all other parties which have a dubious stance on the issue of terrorism in Pakistan?
In his recent comparative analysis at BBC Urdu Service, Wusatuallah Khan suggests that in the end there may be only two forces left in Pakistan, i.e. religious extremists and secular parties. Khan suggests that those parties which are today showing a dubious or lenient approach to religious extremists will be eliminated by the extremists themselves. Two prime examples are the elimination/massacre of the Tamil United Liberation Front by the LTTE in Sri Lanka and the elimination/massacre of FIS by GIA in Algeria. Khan suggests that the fate of Jamaat Islami, JUI and other right wing parties in Pakistan might not be much different, who are criminally silent on the terrorist activities of sectarian and Jihadi groups in Pakistan including Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Sipah Sahaba.
Here is the link to the article:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/story/2008/10/081007_religious_parties_as.shtml
Read more...
In his recent comparative analysis at BBC Urdu Service, Wusatuallah Khan suggests that in the end there may be only two forces left in Pakistan, i.e. religious extremists and secular parties. Khan suggests that those parties which are today showing a dubious or lenient approach to religious extremists will be eliminated by the extremists themselves. Two prime examples are the elimination/massacre of the Tamil United Liberation Front by the LTTE in Sri Lanka and the elimination/massacre of FIS by GIA in Algeria. Khan suggests that the fate of Jamaat Islami, JUI and other right wing parties in Pakistan might not be much different, who are criminally silent on the terrorist activities of sectarian and Jihadi groups in Pakistan including Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Sipah Sahaba.
Here is the link to the article:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/story/2008/10/081007_religious_parties_as.shtml
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Fixing the tribal areas - Rustam Shah Mohmand
In the following column, Rustam Sham Mohmand suggests that Pakistan must ensure that there should be no training camps of any sort, by any group, in the tribal areas, (as well as in other parts of the country?).
The question is: Will the all powerful ISI be willing to abolish such terrorist training centers, i.e. the so called Jihadi camps?
.........
Tuesday, October 07, 2008
Rustam Shah Mohmand
Never before in Pakistan's history or in the British period have the tribal areas been so devastated by conflict. If we take into account the loss of lives among government forces and tribesmen in the past five years, the figure will cross 10,000. This exceeds the number of Pakistani casualties in the 1971.
A favourite theme propounded by most people articulating their views is that the government must intervene to establish its writ and use force to achieve this objective. While this is a view that no one would disagree with, it camouflages the stark reality of the blunders that were committed before the start of the rebellion.
With no rule of law and no checks and balances that only viable institutions can impose, people can get away with deception, motivated errors or gross and wilful miscalculations or sheer incompetence. These indeed were the hallmarks of Gen Pervez Musharraf's policies and the governors he chose to appoint in the NWFP.
The writ of the government must be established. But this writ is best established by strengthening the institutions, by taking people on board, by isolating militants. And why is there such obsession with the authorities in the tribal areas?
When more than 60 innocent people were killed in broadday light in Karachi on May 12, 2007, and scores wounded, what did the government do to enforce its writ? Gen Musharraf declared there would be no enquiry. And when on April 9 2008, five people were burnt alive with onlookers watching, what was done to enforce the writ of the government?
And can the writ be established by incessant bombing from jet aircraft and helicopter gunships? Is it fair to cause destruction to villages and property, forcing hundreds of thousands of people to become refugees in their own country, all in the name of establishing the government's writ.
Was it fair to continue bombing villages in the month of Ramazan and on Eid? We seem to be overtaken by events all the time: there is no time for retrospection. That is why it is not realised that these ongoing operations would cause a built-in distortion in the socio-tribal fabric of society on our borderland. It amounts to sowing the seeds of permanent destabilisation of the border areas. And that would spill over into the settled areas. What would ensue as a consequence is disharmony, discord, despondency- potentially disrupting ingredients for any civil society.
There is no disagreeing with the fact that such brute use of force would deliver temporary peace. But such peace would rest on fragile foundations. A whole population would have been alienated. The essential prerequisites to the making of a state would have been discarded as far as the border areas are concerned.
Can Pakistan afford to have a hostile population on its borders? Can it maintain such a state of constant vigilance on the border, having to contend with people who feel grieved or let down?
The answer is no. And that makes it incumbent on the government to examine the situation in perspective.
How best to retrieve the situation in as far as the tribesmen are concerned? If the following three conditions are met, the government can safely make a fundamental change in the policy on the war on terror:
a) There should be no training camps of any sort, by any group, in the tribal areas.
b) Foreign nationals should either leave, be expelled to leave or provide guarantees for good behaviour, as laid down in "riwaj."
c) Block, to the extent possible, any infiltration across the border.
Having announced these measures and policy, the government would engage with the tribes and seek their assistance in the fulfilment of the objectives.
Having done that the government would begin to withdraw the military from the tribal areas, restore the institutions of political agent and elders, invoke the system of territorial responsibility and advise the coalition forces to seek and find other transportation routes for supply of fuel and ration.
Such policy would;
a) bring the insurgency in the tribal areas and the rest of the country to an end.
b) Would unite the country.
c) Would strengthen the federation and the government.
d) Would be easy to sell to the world once it has parliamentary endorsement.
e) Would have a long lasting impact.
f) The government can than move in vigorously to launch an ambitious infrastructure development project to bring economic stability and prosperity to the region.
We must not lose sight of the fact that 95 percent of the insurgency in Afghanistan is indigenous and not attributable to cross-border movement. The bogey of cross-border raids is raised in order to put pressure on Pakistan not to relent in its policy of use of brute force in handling the militancy. After all how many militants crossing over from the tribal areas into Afghanistan have been nabbed, captured or killed in the last two or three years. None. That belies the oft-repeated assertions that the cross-border movement constitutes a major factor in the insurgency inside Afghanistan.
Pakistan must put its house in order. It will derive strength from peace in the area. That can come about by making the needed adjustments and restoring the institutions. Afghanistan is a big stakes game. Its handling should be left to the powers that are operating in that country.
The writer is a former chief secretary of NWFP and a former ambassador. (The News)
Read more...
The question is: Will the all powerful ISI be willing to abolish such terrorist training centers, i.e. the so called Jihadi camps?
.........
Tuesday, October 07, 2008
Rustam Shah Mohmand
Never before in Pakistan's history or in the British period have the tribal areas been so devastated by conflict. If we take into account the loss of lives among government forces and tribesmen in the past five years, the figure will cross 10,000. This exceeds the number of Pakistani casualties in the 1971.
A favourite theme propounded by most people articulating their views is that the government must intervene to establish its writ and use force to achieve this objective. While this is a view that no one would disagree with, it camouflages the stark reality of the blunders that were committed before the start of the rebellion.
With no rule of law and no checks and balances that only viable institutions can impose, people can get away with deception, motivated errors or gross and wilful miscalculations or sheer incompetence. These indeed were the hallmarks of Gen Pervez Musharraf's policies and the governors he chose to appoint in the NWFP.
The writ of the government must be established. But this writ is best established by strengthening the institutions, by taking people on board, by isolating militants. And why is there such obsession with the authorities in the tribal areas?
When more than 60 innocent people were killed in broadday light in Karachi on May 12, 2007, and scores wounded, what did the government do to enforce its writ? Gen Musharraf declared there would be no enquiry. And when on April 9 2008, five people were burnt alive with onlookers watching, what was done to enforce the writ of the government?
And can the writ be established by incessant bombing from jet aircraft and helicopter gunships? Is it fair to cause destruction to villages and property, forcing hundreds of thousands of people to become refugees in their own country, all in the name of establishing the government's writ.
Was it fair to continue bombing villages in the month of Ramazan and on Eid? We seem to be overtaken by events all the time: there is no time for retrospection. That is why it is not realised that these ongoing operations would cause a built-in distortion in the socio-tribal fabric of society on our borderland. It amounts to sowing the seeds of permanent destabilisation of the border areas. And that would spill over into the settled areas. What would ensue as a consequence is disharmony, discord, despondency- potentially disrupting ingredients for any civil society.
There is no disagreeing with the fact that such brute use of force would deliver temporary peace. But such peace would rest on fragile foundations. A whole population would have been alienated. The essential prerequisites to the making of a state would have been discarded as far as the border areas are concerned.
Can Pakistan afford to have a hostile population on its borders? Can it maintain such a state of constant vigilance on the border, having to contend with people who feel grieved or let down?
The answer is no. And that makes it incumbent on the government to examine the situation in perspective.
How best to retrieve the situation in as far as the tribesmen are concerned? If the following three conditions are met, the government can safely make a fundamental change in the policy on the war on terror:
a) There should be no training camps of any sort, by any group, in the tribal areas.
b) Foreign nationals should either leave, be expelled to leave or provide guarantees for good behaviour, as laid down in "riwaj."
c) Block, to the extent possible, any infiltration across the border.
Having announced these measures and policy, the government would engage with the tribes and seek their assistance in the fulfilment of the objectives.
Having done that the government would begin to withdraw the military from the tribal areas, restore the institutions of political agent and elders, invoke the system of territorial responsibility and advise the coalition forces to seek and find other transportation routes for supply of fuel and ration.
Such policy would;
a) bring the insurgency in the tribal areas and the rest of the country to an end.
b) Would unite the country.
c) Would strengthen the federation and the government.
d) Would be easy to sell to the world once it has parliamentary endorsement.
e) Would have a long lasting impact.
f) The government can than move in vigorously to launch an ambitious infrastructure development project to bring economic stability and prosperity to the region.
We must not lose sight of the fact that 95 percent of the insurgency in Afghanistan is indigenous and not attributable to cross-border movement. The bogey of cross-border raids is raised in order to put pressure on Pakistan not to relent in its policy of use of brute force in handling the militancy. After all how many militants crossing over from the tribal areas into Afghanistan have been nabbed, captured or killed in the last two or three years. None. That belies the oft-repeated assertions that the cross-border movement constitutes a major factor in the insurgency inside Afghanistan.
Pakistan must put its house in order. It will derive strength from peace in the area. That can come about by making the needed adjustments and restoring the institutions. Afghanistan is a big stakes game. Its handling should be left to the powers that are operating in that country.
The writer is a former chief secretary of NWFP and a former ambassador. (The News)
Read more...
Friday, 3 October 2008
Imran Khan = Taliban Khan
From ladies man to the Taliban Khan
Imran Khan, the man who sparked the Newsweek riots: Islamist politician by day, London playboy by night.
by James Forsyth and Jai Singh
05/31/2005
WITH 17 PEOPLE DEAD and anti-American sentiment even higher than usual in the Muslim world, people are looking for someone to blame for the riots that flowed from Newsweek's Koran story. So far, it has been pinned on everyone from Mark Whitaker to the U.S. military. But the real villain is Pakistani politician Imran Khan.
On Friday, May 6 Khan catapulted the 300-word Newsweek story about a Koran being flushed down the toilet into headline news across the Muslim world by brandishing the article at a press conference and demanding that Pakistani president Gen. Pervez Musharraf secure an apology from George W. Bush for the incident. It is unlikely Khan chanced upon the item. Just days before, Khan had tried to spark a similar firestorm over a Washington Times cartoon depicting the Pakistani government as America's lapdog. Clearly in search of grist for the anti-American mill, Khan's demagoguery speaks to his own two-facedness and to a downside of military rule in Pakistan.
KHAN EMBODIES THE HYPOCRISY of Muslim elites who inveigh against the West by day and enjoy its pleasures by night. His fame in Pakistan comes from cricket not politics: Khan is the best cricketer Pakistan has ever produced. But in London many remember him as an even greater playboy. Throughout the 1980s Khan was linked to a string of beautiful women. In 1988 he told Australia's Sunday Mail, "Pakistan society encourages marriage. There, I lead a very steady, comfortable life. Here, it is more exciting. The pace is faster. Because of the nightclubs and parties, it is a very good place to be single."
But as his cricket career wound down and he began to develop political ambitions, Khan became more reticent about his lifestyle. In 1992 when a London Evening Standard reporter asked him if he found his conquests fulfilling he turned bashful: "Er, by answering that question I put myself in a difficult position because this will get quoted in Pakistan. And in Pakistan, the mere fact that you admit you're having affairs upsets a lot of people's sensitivities. I respect my own culture and a lot of young people look up to me. It's a big responsibility for me not to make these admissions in public. Everyone knows I'm a single man and a normal man. But there's no need to stick it down their throats." His ex-girlfriends were less discreet, though. One observed to the Times, that same year, that Imran "juggled his girlfriends extremely elegantly . . . and he likes mangoes."
After his playing career ended in 1992, Khan entered politics under the tutelage of Lt.-Gen. Hamid Gul, the former Pakistani intelligence chief famous for fueling the Taliban's rise in Afghanistan. (Gul believes that September 11 was a U.S. conspiracy.) Khan, a man who once captained the Oxford University cricket team and was a feature at London's trendiest places, now turned against the culture he had previously enjoyed.
In 1995 he denounced the West with its "fat women in miniskirts" (presumably the skinny ones in miniskirts Khan had dated were okay) and proclaimed that the "West is falling because of their addiction to sex and obscenity." He also chastised Pakistanis who looked to the West for ideas, saying "I hate it when our leaders or elite feel that by licking the soles of the feet of foreign countries we will somehow be given aid and we will progress."
So it came as something of a surprise that year when he married an English society beauty, Jemima Goldsmith, who was half his age and far worse--for the Islamists he was courting politically--half-Jewish. The reaction to the marriage in Pakistan was hostile and put a rapid stop to Khan's political momentum. In a Pakistani newspaper column defending his marriage Khan mused that, "I suppose if my marriage proves one point, it is that I am not a politician."
Khan initially won liberal and Western hearts by building a cancer hospital and fashioning himself as a reformer, but he has turned increasingly to hard-line Islamist politics. After Khan cast a vote in favor of the Islamist candidate for prime minister in 2002, a leader in his party told a Pakistani monthly, "Khan has more than a soft corner for the ousted Afghan Taliban. He thinks that the orthodox religious militia did a great service to Afghanistan and Islam before they became a target of the Americans." However, Khan could never become the standard-bearer of Pakistan's Islamists while married to a Western girl--even if she had converted to Islam. Unsurprisingly, in 2004 he and Goldsmith divorced, each citing cultural differences.
Khan's ambition burns brightly but he is the only member of his party in parliament, and enjoys little popular support. His strategy for getting to the top is to climb on the anti-Musharraf bandwagon. "By the time we have the next general elections," said Khan recently, "we would see two broad-based political alliances in the country, pro-Musharraf and anti-Musharraf." The easiest way to attack Musharraf, of course, is to attack his American protectors. Unfortunately, Musharraf has decided he will stay in power beyond 2007, keeping Khan's incentive to bash America intact. The rise of men like Imran Khan is the price America pays for backing a Muslim dictator--no matter how progressive--in the name of stability.
NOT THAT KHAN scorns America entirely: He likes its money. On May 15, just days after the riots killed 17 people and injured dozens of others, Khan was in Washington, D.C. raising $175,000 for his cancer hospital. His fundraising tour also took him to Denver, Los Angeles, and New York. But don't expect him to mention back in Lahore that American generosity is keeping his hospital going.
Even his political allies find Khan's duplicity hard to take. In 2002 one of his party leaders remarked: "Even we are finding it difficult to figure out the real Imran. He dons the shalwar-kameez and preaches desi and religious values while in Pakistan, but transforms himself completely while rubbing shoulders with the elite in Britain and elsewhere in the West." Khan claims that his marriage proved he wasn't a politician but his divorce and his recent demagoguery show that he now is one, albeit one of the worst sort.
James Forsyth is an assistant editor and Jai Singh is research editor at Foreign Policy.
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/658vhcpk.asp
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