"Goebbels Eleven", minus-one brigade and Nawaz Sharif

Here are three columns on this topic: The first one is by Ayaz Amir (a PML-N MNA) who terms the minus-one brigade (Shahid Masood, Ansar Abbasi, Shaheen Sehabi etc) as media galdiators. The second column is by Asadullah Ghalib in defence of democracy (President Asif Zardari and Opposition Leader Nawaz Sharif), and in defiance of the anti-democracy and pro-Taliban agenda of the Mullah Media Alliance also known as Pakistani Taliban Union of Journalists. Finally, the third column is by Abbas Ather who highlights the frustration of Goebbels Eleven because of Nawaz Sharif's refusal to be a part of the Establishment's game against democracy.

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The charge of the minus-one brigade

Friday, November 20, 2009
Ayaz Amir

A week is indeed a long time in politics. Just last week the get-Zardari campaign was in full swing. Media gladiators — now very much the media’s vanguard — and assorted weather prophets were convinced (they had certainly convinced themselves) that he had to go. Indeed, that his departure was inevitable. They only differed about the timing.

Their first self-imposed deadline was September. When that passed — President Zardari, spending most of that month on a never-ending series of foreign visits — the deadline shifted to October. Then it was November, then December, some optimists being so specific as to propose Dec 7 as D-Day. But just in a few days all this feverish speculation, some of it accompanied by near-foaming at the mouth, has suddenly died down, all because of two developments:

(1) The note of defiance struck by Zardari at a meeting of the PPP Central Executive at which he declared that no matter what his enemies said, the PPP would not succumb to pressure and would continue its “forward march”; and

(2) Nawaz Sharif’s clear affirmation, leaving nothing to doubt, that if there were any threats to the democratic system he would stand in the way.

Nothing has fundamentally changed. We could do with a more effective government at the centre, and it would be in everyone’s interests if fewer skeletons rattled in Mr Zardari’s many cupboards. But the dark clouds massed on the horizon have receded, revealing an open sky.

And media gladiators have gone silent. Which doesn’t mean their gloomy prognostications will cease: that’s hoping for too much. But having received a rude shock in the form of the two aforementioned developments, it will be some time before they can work up vitriolic anger to the levels we saw in recent days.

True, they can no more abide Zardari now than they did before. But their hopes have been dashed and before the outline of things becomes clearer, perforce they have to rein in their enthusiasm.

The PPP’s defiance has played its part in this process. But the man of the hour is Nawaz Sharif, whose clear stance against any extra-constitutional move has been the decisive factor in halting the headlong charge of the minus-one brigade.

Once upon a time his detractors — of whom there was never a shortage — dubbed him as the quintessential man of confrontation. And to think that now he is the principal bulwark of the present democratic order. Which I suppose only goes to show the extent to which his political outlook has matured.

Zardari alone would be vulnerable — was vulnerable — to the array of forces ranged against him. Much as he and his camp may hate the thought, it is Nawaz Sharif who is holding him up — not, it goes without saying, for Zardari’s person but for democracy’s sake. Having gone through the mill and learning from bitter experience, Nawaz Sharif, more than most politicians, is not only aware but feels it in his bones that once extra-constitutional moves are afoot there is no knowing how and where they will end.

Minus-one, then, remains confined to not one number but acquires wider and wider dimensions. So it has been always in our history, not once but four times, each successive intervention leaving behind a richer crop of disaster than the one before. Why should it be any different this time?

But we remain slow learners. Even though the memory of Musharraf remains alive and fresh, here we were seeing a fresh army of enthusiasts hoping for some kind of miracle that, in their eyes, would cleanse the presidential stables. How precisely this was to be achieved they weren’t quite sure, but they were convinced that it would somehow happen.

Would Triple One Brigade move? No, no, that wasn’t an option. So what, then? Oh, bereft of all support, Zardari just couldn’t go on. His position was untenable. It was in his best interest if he stepped down himself; otherwise, he would be made to quit. But how? Oh, it would happen. This was mumbo-jumbo, more an articulation of belief and faith than any attempt at political analysis.

But it had Islamabad in its grip even if there was something completely surrealistic about these angry mutterings. The party was solidly behind Zardari, all too aware that even if his name was mired in controversy, as the keeper of the Bhutto flame he was the unlikely cement holding the party together. It was all calm and peaceful in the National Assembly, with not the slightest hint of discord. So, coming down to the technicalities of it, how would the get-Zardari operation proceed?

One expected scenario, of course, was that the NRO would be the bomb to explode in Zardari’s face. But sensing the mood in the National Assembly — which would have erupted in revolt if there had been an attempt to force the law down its throat — the Presidency, for once, acted sensibly, choosing discretion over valour and withdrawing the bill. This had a double effect. It rescued Zardari from the pit into which he was walking and it seriously confounded his enemies, who were hoping he would hang himself with this rope.

In a sense, therefore, if the tabling of the NRO in the National Assembly was the high watermark of Zardari’s troubles, the decision to withdraw it — under pressure, let us not forget — may be the starting point from where the pressure on him begins to ease. We shouldn’t find this mystifying. Zardari’s fortunes had hit rock bottom. From there the only way forward was up.

I think the political class as a whole and the media need to go through a refresher course in politics after the debacle of the minus-one brigade. Do we believe in democracy or not? If we do, we must abide by democracy’s rules. Zardari is elected president of the Republic and if his transgressions are so great that they are considered a threat to the country, there is a procedure under the Constitution for presidential impeachment.

That is the only choice anyone has, and if there are objections to it, then the only alternatives are: (1) the Iskander Mirza formula, whereby a group of generals, pistols in holsters, tramp up to the Presidency and demand and obtain Zardari’s resignation; or (2) the march of the Triple One Brigade. In either event we will end up with another general on horseback riding the nation’s back. Haven’t we had enough of such experiments? Have we forgotten Musharraf so soon and the disasters he brought in his train?

The Republicans hated Clinton and tried to impeach him. When the numbers in Congress did not support them they had no choice but to put aside their hatchets. If Zardari is impeachable — meaning that Parliament turns against him — that’s another matter. Barring that, time and history should take their course.

But the nation won’t survive Zardari, anguished voices proclaim. Please, let us have done with this self-serving argument used time and again to justify coups and adventurism.

When Bhutto was in power, the rightwing parties up in arms against him said the same thing. Bhutto for them was evil personified and his elimination — not just political but physical — they considered more pressing than the survival of democracy. The same argument was deployed by Ghulam Ishaq Khan, first against Benazir Bhutto in 1990, then Nawaz Sharif in 1993. Farooq Leghari invoked it against Benazir Bhutto in 1996, Musharraf against Nawaz Sharif in 1999. High time we overcame this passion for listening to the same old broken records.

Which doesn’t mean things shouldn’t change. Zardari would be doing everyone a favour — it would also be in his enlightened self-interest — if he learnt to check his horses and exercise some control over his itching fingers. If the nation is to regard him with patience — and this will test all the nation’s fortitude — he should also learn to show some consideration to the nation’s feelings.

There are enough skeletons in his cupboard. Having risen to the Presidency — a dizzying ascent not even Macbeth’s witches could have foretold — there’s no need why he should be adding to this collection.

Email: winlust@yahoo.com (The News)

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"Plus Talibanization" in the Guise of "Minus Zardari"

How has Zardari managed to turn such relative, emphasis on relative, successes into a situation where everyone is reaching for their keyboards to write his political obituary? —Reuters/File Photo

Zardari was never one of the good guys, but here’s the vexing thing about him: from a policy perspective, his government has got at least three major things right. On militancy, the economy and Pak-US relations – three foundational issues on which the medium-term future, at the very least, of the country itself rests – Zardari has made the right choices. Read analyses by Cyril Almeida, Ayaz Amir, Asadullah Ghalib and BBC Urdu dot com.

Can they ever make it work?

By Cyril Almeida
Friday, 06 Nov, 2009 (Dawn)

MINUS one lives. Pakistan’s favourite human pinata, Asif Ali Zardari, has been battered to within an inch of his presidential life; all that remains is for the end to be pencilled in and the orgy of ecstatic punditry to explode on your TV.

No? It ain’t over until it’s over? He may yet salvage his lame-duck presidency? Miracles do happen? Who are we kidding. President Zardari will either be plain ol’ Asif Zardari long before his term is officially set to end or he will be President Zardari sans the powers that attracted him to the office in the first place.

That the president’s free fall is largely of his own making is doubly satisfying to his enemies. But the rise and all-but-certain fall of Zardari raises the same troubling question that haunted the country in the ‘90s, the ‘70s and the ‘50s: can our politicians ever make it work?

There are so many cautionary tales, so few uplifting stories in this wretched place with its wretched politics and its wretched history. Zardari was never one of the good guys, but here’s the vexing thing about him: from a policy perspective, his government has got at least three major things right. On militancy, the economy and Pak-US relations – three foundational issues on which the medium-term future, at the very least, of the country itself rests – Zardari has made the right choices.

That a politician could pick the right course on major policy issues is reassuring to those who cling to the hope that democracy can, some day, one day, work here; that the same politician would also wantonly destroy his political capital overwhelms that tiny sliver of hope. One step forward, two steps back.

Not convinced of Zardari’s relative successes? It’s no coincidence that the internal consensus on the need to fight against militancy has come on the Zardari watch. Yes, his government has been ham-handed and inconsistent at times and has benefited from the rantings of Sufi Mohammad, the flogging video, the TTP’s foray into new areas and its relentless campaign of violence. But no one really doubts that Zardari would like to see the militants defeated. Unlike the dithering PML-N and the opposition of parties like the JI and Tehrik-i-Insaf, the government’s position is well known and it has nudged the country towards backing the fight against the militants.

On the economy, Zardari’s team has done no worse than many of its predecessors, and certainly better than the last phase of the Musharraf era. We can quibble over the details, but for a country that has for long been a ward of the IFIs, dependent on handouts from foreign governments and locked in a cycle of boom and bust, the Zardari era doesn’t look especially bad from a historical perspective.

On US-Pak relations, step back from the noise for a minute and ask yourself this: can we afford to have anything but friendly relations with a superpower that is billeted in our backyard? Again, Zardari has not calibrated the government’s policy towards the US as well as it could be, seemingly giving too much or voicing too little opposition when it is merited, but the general thrust of the policy has been correct.

So how has Zardari managed to turn such relative, emphasis on relative, successes into a situation where everyone is reaching for their keyboards to write his political obituary? In other words, what has he done wrong?

The facile answer is, the president should have avoided the mistakes he’s made. He should have restored the judges while he still could take credit for it. He shouldn’t have blundered into imposing governor’s rule in Punjab and trying to take over the government there when the numbers were against him. He should have realised the NRO was a ball chained to his ankle that his opponents, as well as some of his allies, could easily exploit.

But Zardari’s original sin, as it were, is something else: wanting to rule from the presidency. The bid to grab the presidency and lord it over the country and its politicians was a gamble that was never going to pay off. The irony is that Zardari regards it as his smartest move.

The presidency has historically been a poisoned chalice and Zardari grabbed it just as it had become the focal point of opposition. After Musharraf’s disastrous exit, the presidency needed to be aired out, cleared of the smoke and debris of intrigue and power games. Smart politics demanded that attention be deflected to other quarters, the prime minister’s seat, the cabinet, parliament.

Even for a people with a short collective memory, the Musharraf shadow was always going to cast a pall over the presidency for some time. By insisting on keeping it as a focal point, Zardari took the unnecessary risk of the people asking, how is this really different from the Musharraf days? And Zardari was always going to get nowhere in that debate.

Most, if not all, of Zardari’s problems flow from the fateful choice to become president. We can only guess at the reasons he opted to try and rule from there. Perhaps it was the presidential immunity from prosecution. Perhaps it was the physical security that the presidential palace offers. Perhaps the low level of public interaction expected of the occupant as compared to, say, the prime minister attracted a frightened Zardari. Perhaps it was just the irresistibility of absolute power and lording it over both the provinces and the centre thanks to the Musharrafian powers arrogated to the office.

We will never know for sure what Zardari’s reasons were, but we can see how bad an idea it was. A year into a five-year term, the death watch is on.

Some have bemoaned how on a day dozens of people were killed in Rawalpindi, the country was transfixed by Altaf Hussain cutting the president off at the knees over the NRO. But it wasn’t a case of misplaced priorities. Without political stability, it is difficult to have policies, let alone fight a war against a shadowy internal enemy.

And Monday showed us once again how political stability can be a chimera, vanishing in an instant and leaving the country rudderless. Tempting though it may be, there’s no point in blaming Zardari really. He’s only done what others have done before him and others will do after him.

Sixty-two years since its creation, the country still doesn’t have the answer to the question, can our politicians ever make it work?

cyril.a@gmail.com

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زرداری کے لیے آخری موقع

اعجاز مہر

بی بی سی اردو ڈاٹ کام، اسلام آباد

صدر زرداری کو یہ ڈر کہ سترہویں ترمیم کے خاتمے کے بعد میاں نواز شریف کے وزیراعظم بننے کی راہ ہموار ہوگی اور وہ انہیں چاروں شانوں چت کرنے میں دیر نہیں کریں گے، اب ختم کرنا ہوگا اور ان پر بھروسہ کرنا پڑے گا

پاکستان پیپلز پارٹی اور سکیورٹی اسٹیبلشمینٹ کی لڑائی کی کہانی تقریباً تین عشروں پر محیط ہے اور اس لڑائی میں تاحال نقصان پیپلز پارٹی کو ہی اٹھانا پڑا ہے۔ چاہے وہ ذوالفقار علی بھٹو کا عدالتی قتل ہو یا ان کے دو بیٹوں مرتضیٰ اور شاہنواز یا پھر ان کی بیٹی بینظیر بھٹو کی ’سٹیٹ آف دی آرٹ‘ منصوبہ سازی سے قتل کی کہانیاں۔

لیکن تاحال ایک بات ضرور ہوئی ہے کہ اس ملک کی ’غریب، بھوکی اور ان پڑھ‘ عوام نے پیپلز پارٹی کا ساتھ نہیں چھوڑا اور پانچ مرتبہ اس جماعت کو اقتدار کے ایوانوں میں اپنے کندھوں پر بٹھا کر پہنچایا۔

گلگت سے گوادر اور کشمیر سے کراچی تک ملک کے کونے کونے میں اس جماعت کے حامی آج بھی نمایاں طور پر پائے جاتے ہیں اور ایسی سیاسی حمایت آج تک کسی جماعت کو نصیب نہیں ہوسکی۔

ویسے تو پیپلز پارٹی کی قیادت پر بھی الزام لگتا ہے کہ وہ بھی سٹیبلشمینٹ کے گھوڑے پر سوار ہوکر اقتداری ایوانوں میں پہنچے۔ لیکن یہ بھی حقیقت ہے کہ ان کے ساتھ ان کا نبھاؤ زیادہ دیر تک نہیں ہوسکا اور جیسے ہی پیپلز پارٹی ایک عوامی جماعت بنی تو اس کا مقابلہ کرنے کے لیے ہمیشہ سے سکیورٹی اسٹیبلشمنٹ کو سیاسی اتحاد بنا کر اس جماعت کا راستہ روکنا پڑا اور اس عمل میں انہیں ایم کیو ایم اور مسلم لیگ جیسے گروہوں کو بھی تخلیق کرنا پڑا۔

عین وقت پر متحدہ قومی موومنٹ کی جانب سے ’این آر او‘ کے معاملے پر جس طرح صدر آصف علی زرداری کو جھٹکا دیا گیا ہے اس سے ان کی آنکھیں کھل جانی چاہیں اور ان کے ساتھ کوئی مہنگا سودا کرنے کے بجائے مسلم لیگ (ن) کے ساتھ اپنی مرحومہ لیڈر کے وعدے وفا کرنا زیادہ سود مند ثابت ہوگا۔ کیونکہ اسٹیبلشمنٹ کے جن کو بوتل میں بند کرنے کا اگر یہ موقع گنوایا گیا تو شاید ہی انہیں مستقبل میں ایسا موقع نصیب ہو

جب وقت کے ساتھ ساتھ ایم کیو ایم اور مسلم لیگ (ن) سیاسی قوتیں بنیں تو انہوں نے اسٹیبلشمنٹ کو ’بلینک چیک’ دینا بند کیا تو ان کے خالق نے انہیں توڑنے کی کوشش کی لیکن دونوں جماعتوں کی قیادت کی بالغ نظری کی وجہ سے یہ جماعتیں ٹوٹ پھوٹ کے تمام مراحل طے کرنے کے بعد بھی ملک کی قابل ذکر سیاسی قوتیں بنیں۔ جس کے بعد سکیورٹی اسٹیبلشمنٹ کو مسلم لیگ (ق) کو اپنے بدن سے جنم دینا پڑا۔

دو بڑی عوامی حمایت رکھنے والی جماعتیں پیپلز پارٹی اور مسلم لیگ (ن) کے رہنما بینظیر بھٹو اور میاں نواز شریف جلاوطن ہو گئے اور جلا وطنی میں بیٹھ کر اُن دونوں زیرک سیاستدانوں نے اپنی غلطیوں کا اعتراف کرتے ہوئے میثاق جمہوریت پر دستخط کیے۔ میثاق جمہوریت سے پاکستان میں ایک نئے سیاسی کلچر پنپنے کی امید پیدا ہوئی کیونکہ دونوں نے محسوس کیا کہ انہیں پاکستان کی اسٹیبلشمینٹ نے ’لڑاؤ اور حکومت کرو‘ کے اصول کے تحت استعمال کیا ہے۔

میثاق جمہوریت پر دونوں بڑی جماعتوں کے اتفاق نے اسٹیبلشمینٹ کی بنیادیں ہلا کر رکھ دیں کیونکہ اس دستاویز کی بنیادی روح یہ ہے کہ پاکستان میں پارلیمان کو بالادست ادارہ بنانا ہے اور دنیا کے مہذب ممالک کی طرح فوج سمیت تمام اداروں کو پارلیمان کا ماتحت بنانا ہے۔ ساٹھ سال سے پاکستان میں سیاہ و سفید کی مالک اسٹیبلشمینٹ یہ کیسے قبول کرتی اور انہوں نے اپنی چالیں چلنا شروع کیں۔

اس دوران بینظیر بھٹو کا قتل ہوگیا جس کا الزام پرویز مشرف کی حکومت نے بیت اللہ محسود پر عائد کیا۔ جس کے بعد انتخابات ہوئے اور اس کے نتیجے میں پیپلز پارٹی اور مسلم لیگ (ن) نے اکٹھے حکومت بنائی اور میثاق جمہوریت کے جذبے کے تحت مسلم لیگ (ن) کے وزراء نے پرویز مشرف کے ہاتھوں حلف اٹھایا۔ دونوں جماعتوں نے مل کر پرویز مشرف کو مستعفی ہونے پر مجبور کیا اور راستہ صاف ہوتے ہی آصف علی زرداری کے صدر بننے کی خواہش اور پرویز مشرف کے برطرف کردہ ججوں کو بحال نہ کرنے پر دونوں جماعتوں میں اختلافات شروع ہوگئے۔

دونوں میں اختلافات کی چنگاری کو اسٹیبلشمینٹ نے پھونکیں مار مار کر اس نہج پر پہنچایا کہ فروری میں اقتدار کے نشے میں چُور صدر آصف علی زرداری نے میاں برادران کو نا اہل قرار دلوا کر پنجاب میں گورنر راج نافذ کر دیا۔ ایسے میں اسٹیبلشمینٹ کو یقین ہوچلا ہے کہ اب دونوں میں دوبارہ رفاقت ممکن نہیں۔

اب کی بار کچھ تجزیہ کاروں کا خیال ہے کہ صدر زرداری کے لیے یہ آخری موقع ہے کہ وہ کوئی چال چلنے کے بجائے سترہویں ترمیم کے خاتمے اور میثاق جمہوریت پر اس کی روح کے مطابق فوری عمل کریں تو وہ ایوان صدر کی مسند پر آئندہ بھی بیٹھے رہیں گے

اس دوران کچھ تجزیہ کاروں کا خیال ہے کہ اسٹیبلشمینٹ کو پارلیمان کے طابع کرنے کے لیے صدر آصف علی زرداری نے ملک کی ایک مقبول جماعت مسلم لیگ (ن) کو چھوڑ کر امریکہ پر انحصار کیا۔

جس سے اسٹیبلشمنٹ اور مسلم لیگ (ن) میں قربت کی راہ ہموار ہوئی۔ لیکن تاحال مسلم لیگ (ن) نے اپنے پتے بڑی سمجھداری سے کھیلے ہیں اور کیری لوگر بل کی مخالفت سمیت کچھ معاملات میں محدود پیمانے پر اسٹیبلشمنٹ کے ہاتھوں استعمال ہوتے ہوئے بھی اپنا بھرم برقرار رکھا ہے اور ججوں کی بحالی سمیت بعض معاملات میں اسٹیبلشمنٹ کو استعمال سے فائدہ زیادہ حاصل کیا ہے۔

بینظیر بھٹو کے قتل کی جانچ اقوام متحدہ سے کرانے پر پیپلز پارٹی کے اسٹیبلشمنٹ سے اب کی بار شروع ہونے والے اختلافات اب اس نہج پر پہنچے ہیں جہاں آئین کے مطابق جمہوری انداز سے منتخب ہونے والے صدر کو ایک سال میں نکالنے کی راہ ہموار کی جا رہی ہے۔ اگر دیکھا جائے تو اسٹیبلشمنٹ سے لڑائی میں فریق تو مسلم لیگ (ن) بھی تھی جسے صدر آصف علی زرداری نے خود ہی دور کردیا۔ لیکن آج انہیں اس بات کا احساس یقین ہوا ہوگا کہ یہ لڑائی پیپلز پارٹی ہو یا مسلم لیگ (ن) دونوں اکیلے طور پر شاید ہی لڑ سکیں۔

اس بات کا اداراک مسلم لیگ (ن) کی قیادت کو بھی بخوبی ہے اور وہ نا اہلی کے گھاؤ کے بعد بھی بظاہر ان کے ساتھ تعاون کے لیے تیار ہیں۔ جس کی ایک اہم وجہ بعض مبصرین کی نظر میں تیسری بار وزیراعظم بننے پر پابندی ختم کرانا بھی ہوسکتا ہے۔

لیکن صدر زرداری کو جو یہ ڈر ہے کہ سترہویں ترمیم کے خاتمے سے جیسے ہی میاں نواز شریف کے وزیراعظم بننے کی راہ ہموار ہوگی تو وہ انہیں چاروں شانوں چت کرنے میں دیر نہیں کریں گے، وہ اب ختم کرنا ہوگا اور ان پر بھروسہ کرنا پڑے گا۔ کیونکہ ان کے پاس اور کوئی پائیدار ’آپشن‘ بھی نہیں بچا۔

صدر آصف علی زرداری نے اپنے ’نجومیوں‘ کے کہنے پر اب تک جو بھی تِرک تالیاں کی ہیں اس سے وقتی طور پر تو وہ مستفید ہوئے ہیں لیکن اب کی بار کچھ تجزیہ کاروں کا خیال ہے کہ ان کے لیے یہ آخری موقع ہے کہ وہ کوئی چال چلنے کے بجائے سترہویں ترمیم کے خاتمے اور میثاق جمہوریت پر اس کی روح کے مطابق فوری عمل کریں تو وہ ایوان صدر کی مسند پر آئندہ بھی بیٹھے رہیں گے۔ کیونکہ اب ان کے گرد گھیرا تنگ ہوچکا ہے، وقت بہت کم ہے اور غلطی کی کوئی گنجائش نہیں ہے۔ ملٹری، مُلا، مسلم لیگیں اور میڈیا کے بعض مجاہدین ان کے خلاف متحد ہوچکے ہیں۔

بعض تجزیہ کاروں کا یہ بھی کہنا ہے کہ عین وقت پر متحدہ قومی موومنٹ کی جانب سے ’این آر او‘ کے معاملے پر جس طرح صدر آصف علی زرداری کو جھٹکا دیا گیا ہے اس سے ان کی آنکھیں کھل جانی چاہیں اور ان کے ساتھ کوئی مہنگا سودا کرنے کے بجائے مسلم لیگ (ن) کے ساتھ اپنی مرحومہ لیڈر کے وعدے وفا کرنا زیادہ سود مند ثابت ہوگا۔ کیونکہ اسٹیبلشمنٹ کے جن کو بوتل میں بند کرنے کا اگر یہ موقع گنوایا گیا تو شاید ہی انہیں مستقبل میں ایسا موقع نصیب ہو

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What further trials for a sorely-tried nation?

Islamabad diary Friday, November 06, 2009 Ayaz Amir President Zardari was not a secret sprung upon an unsuspecting nation. We knew all about him: that he was no graduate of any academy of higher management sciences; that his talents lay in the murkier aspects of high finance; that the only thing on his calling card which compelled attention was his marital connection to Benazir Bhutto. So it was wholly predictable that when, out of the blue, he aspired to become the president of this ailing republic, we (its hapless citizens) were taken by surprise. We were glad to be rid of Musharraf. No doubts on that score. Our cup of patience was full and we could take no more of him or his shenanigans. But Mr Zardari taking over from where Musharraf had left off? This went beyond our worst nightmares. But inured to the malevolence of fate, we gave Zardari the benefit of the doubt. We thought that his very ascension to the highest office in the land would have a chastening effect upon him. The awe of his position, and the fact that the people of Pakistan through their chosen representatives in parliament and the provincial assemblies were electing him, would transform him and make him if not someone worthy of our trust at least someone who would not go out of his way to abuse that trust. But over the year or so that he has been president, Zardari has made the nation undergo a very unsentimental education, stripping the nation of any illusions it may have nursed on his account. For he has surpassed the misgivings of his worst critics and turned out to be more inept than any of them could have predicted. Zardari could have kept his promises to Nawaz Sharif and earned himself some badly-needed credibility. But he made fun of his own pledges and said they were not decrees from heaven. He could have restored the judges and earned credit for himself. But such a step, to all appearances, lay beyond the confines of his narrow vision. Where he should have cast a critical eye over the Kerry-Lugar Bill (KLB), he became its loud champion, calling it a historic achievement. Any fool could have told him, and many did, that placing the NRO before the parliament would tempt the fury of the heavens. But disregarding all the omens -- or in his ignorance being simply unaware of them -- he stepped in where angels would have feared to tread. This parliament could have swallowed anything. After all, it had swallowed the Swat Nizam-e-Adl Regulation of unhappy memory. But even for its tough stomach, the NRO was a bit too much to take. So it revolted against the latter. Zardari was already a vulnerable figure before this debacle. Now it seems he is well and truly on the skids. For the first time in a year-and-a-half, the PPP benches in the National Assembly give a glum look, as they have every reason to do knowing that the knives are out for their Godfather -- who remains a godfather in more senses than one --and vultures are circling the skies. Even Fauzia Wahab looks depressed, and that's saying something. But has Zardari learnt anything? The Sage of North Edgeware (London), Altaf bhai, was the first person to publicly endorse his name for president. He is the first person to ask him to step down. But Zardari is still hoping to keep the MQM on his side, for which purpose -- in keeping with our penchant for having our problems solved abroad -- talks are to be held in Dubai. The MQM fields some of the world's toughest negotiators who could give Shylock lessons in extracting their pound of flesh, modern science yet to discover a formula to satisfy the MQM's demands -- which, much like the universe, are forever expanding -- and keep it happy. In trying once again to placate the MQM, Zardari is reaching out for the unreachable. A simple truth eludes Zardari. The Sage of North Edgeware can subject him to a further round of Chinese torture (supping with the MQM being akin to that) but he can't rescue him. Nor can that ace of political gymnasts, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, another firm believer in the theory of extracted pounds of flesh, although on a lower scale than the maestros of the MQM. The only person standing between Zardari and imminent destruction is someone he has a disliking for the most, Nawaz Sharif. But for Nawaz Sharif and his adamant refusal, often in the face of much opposition from within his own party, to pay heed to the siren calls of a minus-one formula, the game would be up for Zardari. In Nawaz Sharif's breast, the memory of Zardari's broken promises rankle, but in today's charged political atmosphere, he remains the one person who is alive to the ramifications of Aabpara-driven political manoeuvres. On a flight to Karachi where he had to make a court appearance, Nawaz Sharif was handcuffed to his seat. The iron may have been on his wrist but it may have entered his soul. Who is the mortal without weaknesses? Nawaz Sharif has his share of them. But, to give credit where it is due, adversity has tempered him. Of all the lessons he may have taken to heart, none seems more abiding than the belief, born of his own experiences, that military intervention in politics is the road to hell paved with good intentions. Small wonder, all talk of minus this or that leaves him utterly cold. There are hawks in the PML-N's inner circle who chafe at the label of a 'friendly opposition', the gibe directed most frequently at the party nowadays. They would love nothing better than a call to arms. But Nawaz Sharif remains unmoved. Who would have thought ten years ago that he had an eye for the larger canvas? But that's what he is displaying now. Zardari may fall upon his sword himself, or circumstances otherwise may crush him, in the form of corruption cases being revived against his closest companions. That would be another matter. But being a party to any move emanating from the hidden corners of Pakistan's political tapestry is certainly not something Nawaz Sharif appears to be for. At the time of his election as president, Zardari, in an expansive moment, boasted that he would continue to teach politics to Nawaz Sharif. Is he still riding that high horse? What options does he have now? He can fall upon his sword and quit of his own accord. This, given his tough streak -- and there is no denying he has one -- is unlikely. So the danger is that if the pressure is piled on him he may choose to dig in his heels and, like Samson, wish to bring the temple down with him. But there is a way out of the hole he is in. He wins himself a reprieve if he takes two steps: accelerates the process of undoing the 17th Amendment, transferring his substantive powers to the prime minister; and gets rid of that deadly circle of cronies whose presence near the helm of power is an affront to the nation. The nation may have its faults but it surely deserves better than these faces out of a rogue's gallery. The anger of the gods will be appeased with nothing less than this double sacrifice. But acceleration is the key word here. There is only a very tiny window of opportunity to exploit. Zardari takes these steps and he perhaps saves himself and Pakistan's fledgling democracy. But if he remains true to himself, a prisoner of his limitations, the doors begin to shut and the sky becomes more overcast than it already is. Email: winlust@yahoo.com (The News) Some comments: qaisanwar said:ذندہ باد ۔ الطاف بھ ءی ۔ زرادری کو یقینی طور پر ا نصاف کا سامنا کرنا چاہیے ۔ اس لیے کہ اس ملک میں عدالتیں صرف بھٹوز کے لیے بنی ہیں ۔ ZAB کی حکومت گءی اس نے عدالت کا سامنا کیا اور پھانسی چڑھ گیا۔ ںواز شریف کی حکومت گءی اور انہیں عزت کے ساتھ جدہ بھیج دیا گیا۔ بی بی سپریم کورٹ میں گءی تو حکومت بحال نہیں ہوءی؛ نواز شریف حکومت عدالت میں گءے تو حکومت بحال ہو گءی۔ نواز شریف کے کیس مشرف کی سفارش پر تاڑڑ نے ختم کیے تو قانونی؛ بی بی نے سالوں کے بعد این آر او کے ذریعے کیس ختم کرواءے تو غیر قانونی۔ عشرت العباد کے قتل کیس تک مشرف نے ختم کرواے تو قانونی لیکن پیپلز پارٹی والوں کو عدالت کا سامنا کرنا چاہہے۔ ںواز شریف ملک چھوڑ کر گءے تو یہ مدینے والے کی مہربانی تھی کہ اپنے قدموں میں بلا لیا۔ زرداری جیل میں رہا پھر بھی بزدل؛ اور اپنے الطاف بھاءی خود لندن میں بیٹھے ہیں اور زرداری سے کہتے ہیں عدالتوں کا سامنا کرو۔ زرداری آٹھ سال سے زیادہ جیل میں رہا اس لیے کہ ملک میں انصاف نہیں تھا اور افتخار چوہدری کے لیے زرداری کے کیس کے لیے وقت نہیں تھا۔ اب زرداری کو جیل میں جانا چاہیے کیونکہ عدالتیں آزاد ہیں ۔ واہ رے پاکستان کے انصاف اور انصاف کے دعوے دارو؛ اور واہ رے بھٹو خاندان والو؛ ملک ٹوٹ جاءے تو دو چار جرنیلوں کو پھانسی دینے کا مشورہ رد کرکے نوے ہزار قیدیوں کو چھڑانے کے لیے نکل پڑتے ہو؛ ضیاء ملک کو تباہ کر دے تو تعمیر کی ذمہ داری لے لیتے ہو؛ بے نظیر مر جاءے تو پاکستان کھپے کا نعرہ لگا دیتے ہو؛ کیا سمجھتے ہو کہ تمہاری قبریں بنانے والے گورکن کبھی تھکیں گے شاید نہیں بھاءیو تھوڑا سا انتظآر کر لو؛ اگلے ہفتے ڈاکٹر شاہد مسعود سے لاءین ملے گی ۔۔۔۔۔۔اب کیا ہو گا ۔۔۔۔عدالتیں کیا کریں گی؛ انصار عباسی اور کامران خان کچھ اور سکینڈل لاءیں گے ؛ شاہین صہباءی اندر کی باتیں لکھ دیں گے ؛ کیانی گیلانی ملاقاتیں ہوں گی۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔لیکن جس زرداری کے لیے یہ سب ہو رہا ہے وہ تو پہلے کہ چکا ہے کہ اگر قدرتی موت مروں تو نواب شاہ میں دفن کرنا ؛ مارا جاوں تو گڑھی خدا بخش میں ؛ بڑا ظالم آدمی ہے یہ زرداری۔ جیل میں تھا تو ہنسا کرتا تھا ؛ بڑی ٹیڑھی نسل کا آدمی ہے ہر مہرہ حرکت میں آچکا ہے لیکن یہ ڈرتا ہی نہیں ۔۔۔۔۔۔فیض کے لفظوں میں یہ وہ لوگ ہیں جو مر جاتے ہیں اور کہتے ہیں کرو کج جبین سے سر کفن میرے قاتلوں کو گماں نہ ہو کہ غرور عشق کا بانکپن پس مرگ ہم نے بھلا دیا کل کسی نے جام ساقی کا تبصرہ سنا؛ کہتا ہے یہ سب ہمارے ساتھ ہی کیوں ہوتا ہے دیکھتے ہیں کہ اس بار تابوت کو کیسے وصول کریں گے Shoaib Ghias said: Is there any necessary connection between NRO’s failure and Zardari’s removal? There is no constitutional impediment to Zardari’s presidency. He has been accused of many things but none of his convictions have ever been upheld. Therefore he was eligible to become the president last year. Now the only way in which Zardari can be removed is impeachment or resignation. In either case, the military-bureacuratic establishment will have play the decisive role. The NRO may be a procedurally or substantively unconstitutional ordinance, but Zardari is a constitutional president, with or without the NRO.

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This is our war - An analysis by Ayaz Amir

A make-or-break moment for Pakistan

Islamabad diary

Friday, October 23, 2009
Ayaz Amir

Kashmir 1947-48 was the only necessary war we fought. It gave us the parts of Kashmir now in our possession. The 1965 war was a delusional general's supreme folly. The 1971 war was a strategic black hole created by our political failures. Kargil should never have happened. If Pervez Musharraf deserves to be put in the stocks it is for that misconceived adventure.

The war our army is now engaged in is more full of meaning than anything attempted in the past. It is not about territory but the soul and meaning of Pakistan. Iqbal and Jinnah would have been unable to make any sense of bin Laden, Mullah Omar or Ayman Al-Zawahiri. How on earth did Pakistan allow itself to become a playground for characters out of mediaeval history? Our paladins -- mostly in uniform -- told us we were pursuing strategic depth. What we harvested was strategic disaster.

But what is past is past. We must now come to terms with the present. That is why this war is so important. Winning it reclaims the idea of Pakistan and creates space for a better future. Losing it leads to possibilities too horrible to contemplate: among them the erosion of national morale and the death of the notion that the army was the first line of national defence.

The stakes being so high, there is no choice but to win, and win decisively. Of course it is not going to be easy. South Waziristan's fighters, including the foreign elements, are amongst the most battle-hardened on the planet. They have been fighting for decades -- in Afghanistan, disputed Kashmir, now FATA. Add to this the nature of the Waziristani terrain and it is clear that the army has a job on its hands.

3-5,000 Hezbollah fighters defeated the Israeli army in Lebanon in 2006. At the height of the Kashmir uprising (starting from 1989) there could not have been more than 5-10,000 guerrilla fighters in the Valley. But they tied down close to half a million Indian troops, the bulk of which remain in Kashmir. At a conservative guess the Taliban in South Waziristan would be having 10-15,000 fighters, which makes them a formidable foe.

But there is no way out. This is not a war the Pakistan army has chosen to fight. This is a war forced upon us and there is no running away from it.

But the army can only fight, and fight successfully, if the entire nation is behind it, without ifs and buts. The Taliban have amply demonstrated that the only peace talks which suit them are those conducted on their terms. For now, war is the only continuation of politics which matters. There will be time enough for other things when our arms are victorious.

Previous operations in South Waziristan, undertaken when Musharraf was lord and master of the wreckage he helped create, were half-baked affairs -- ill-prepared units thrown hurriedly into battle. The army suffered grievous losses and the Taliban were emboldened. This operation is different in that some thought and preparation have gone into it. Which doesn't make it a cakewalk but at least there is a sense that this time the army knows where it is going.

Musharraf played to American susceptibilities -- with an eye more on Centcom requirements than our own. For that dishonesty -- and it was that -- the army had to pay a heavy price. But as the Swat operation has shown, the army has emerged from the Musharraf mould. It is now marching to a different tune.

Still, the imperative holds that if we are to emerge from this test successfully, nation and army must acquire the not-easy habit of thinking for themselves rather than looking at things through American eyes. While American friendship is something to be cherished, American guidance and tutelage are afflictions to be avoided like the plague. The US has started wars it is having a hard time finishing. It is not doing too good a job of managing Afghanistan. On the question of whether or not to send more troops to Afghanistan, Washington presents a picture of dithering and irresolution. Contrast this with the steady resolve our army has shown from Swat onwards.

Which only means that while our army can do with the right kind of help -- helicopters and precision-guided munitions above all -- advice and lectures can be kept on hold for later.

In fact, given America's counter-insurgency record -- Vietnam comes to mind -- acting on American advice in such matters is a recipe for disaster and a sure shot guarantee of alienating domestic opinion. So it might help if during these days while our army is engaged in Waziristan there were fewer American high-ups visiting Islamabad. The greater the number of American visitors the more suspicions in Pakistani minds about American intentions.

Just to show America's capacity for rubbing so-called friends the wrong way: as if the Kerry-Lugar Bill wasn't enough, two American congressman have hit upon the bright idea of adding another rider to this year's American defence budget whereby the secretaries of state and defence would have to certify that military aid for Pakistan was actually used for its intended purpose -- fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda -- and that it would not affect "the balance of power in the region". We are up to our necks in the fight of our lives and our friends (friends?) in Washington still can't let go of their suspicions about us.

Anyway, the US Congress is entitled to do what it likes. We have our own problems and it is our soldiers and officers taking on a resolute enemy and putting their lives on the line in the killing fields of South Waziristan. In the first few days of fighting our casualties have been pretty high, a testimony both to the toughness of the Taliban and the courage of our soldiers. We have to think for ourselves.

But where is the sense of duty, and propriety, of President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani -- both accidents of history? Shouldn't they be venturing out of their bunkers and visiting the troops on the frontline? If Wana is too risky they could visit the adjoining districts. After all, piquant thought though it is, Zardari is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. It would be interesting to find out how many people actually think he looks like one.

But this is history in the making. We win and we will have reached the other shore. We lose and we could with profit study the history and geography of Sudan and Somalia. But there will be no point in defeating the Taliban if things remain the way they have always been in Pakistan. Victory would make sense only if we turn immediately thereafter to the reconstruction of Pakistani society.

The tide of fake religiosity which was Gen Zia's gift to the nation should gradually be rolled back, starting with the Hadood Ordinance which deserves to be swept for all time into the bin of discarded things. We are of the faith and were born into it. We never needed the services of self-appointed doctors of the faith and other charlatans to reconvert us to Islam.

Education has to be treated as our number one national problem. We must have a one-track system -- a uniform system of education for all: the same books, the same examinations for all students up to the intermediate level. Yes, our books can do with improvement as can our syllabi. But we won't learn how to swim unless we wade into the water.

Once the problem of English-medium and Urdu-medium is tackled, there must be a complete end, without equivocation, to madressah education. For the entire Pakistani nation -- from the northern mountains to the sea, from Waziristan to the eastern frontier --there must be one stream of education. For Islamic studies -- that is, for those who want to pursue them -- there must be centres of higher learning. But, please, no confusion for young and unformed minds.

For too long the rich have been pampered and protected in the Islamic Republic. There has to be a redistribution of resources by investing more in education, health and public transport. Population growth must be checked or we are doomed. And the army would be doing itself and the nation a favour by curbing the culture of commercialism and defence-society-plots which has done so much to ruin its image.

So the race won't end once Waziristan is over. It will have barely begun.

Email: winlust@yahoo.com (The News)

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Too much politics, too much hypocrisy -- Ayaz Amir

Islamabad diary Friday, September 18, 2009 Ayaz Amir How many doom-and-gloom stories can any reasonable person endure? More than a nation at war we are a nation in perpetual crisis, vaguely discontented if there is no real crisis at hand. In no other country of the world would a Brigadier Imtiaz Billa, a spook who put up his gloves years ago, be taken seriously. Yet in recent days the media almost succeeded in turning him into a TV celebrity, an outcome which must have taken him by surprise most of all. This is just by way of example to underline something obvious about Pakistan: there is too much politics in this country. Why is this so? Why is politics the staple of everyday conversation? Because -- and here's the paradox -- there is too much religion in this country. By which, Heaven forbid, I do not mean the genuine article but religious cant and hypocrisy. The way we go on about religion an alien could be forgiven for thinking that the very concept of religion began in Pakistan. This is General Ziaul Haq's revenge from the grave. Revile him as much as we may, there is no escaping the fact that a good deal of the fake piety on display in the official life of the Islamic Republic is a continuation of the legacy whose baleful seeds ---dragon's teeth?---he scattered. In art the counterweight to too much restraint, or too much order and discipline, is romanticism, a natural urge to reach for the opposite: freedom and perhaps even decadence. This also works the other way round. If there is too much freedom, too much artistic chaos, the desire arises to return to the comforts of order and discipline. This is how Hegel and Marx explained the universe: the combination, or clash, of opposites creating a synthesis or unity. But with us what is the Hegelian counterweight to too much false piety? Alas, nothing more creative than an obsession with politics. In any other climate excessive piety would have led to a loosening of restraint, something like the atmosphere of the Sixties in Britain and elsewhere, when the Beatles were all the rage and permissiveness became a common word. I was in school then and used to scratch my head trying to figure out what permissive behaviour and promiscuity meant. If we had experienced something like the Sixties it might have done us a world of good, perhaps saving us from such of our travails as the march to war with India in 1965 and, only six years later, war and defeat in East Pakistan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's period at the helm was only a brief interlude. He could have reinvented the idea of Pakistan and secured the country's future by making it safe for democracy. He had the opportunity but perhaps the times were hard or our good angels not sufficiently kind because events took a turn for the worse when Pakistan, not for the first time in its short existence, once more found itself under a military dictatorship. What is more, this one came with a sinister difference: it was steeped to its eyeballs in religious cant and hypocrisy. As a result, it was not just physical repression which Pakistan suffered under Zia but moral and social repression. Instead of marching into the future, we travelled back in time. Talibanism in the form now familiar to us was a later phenomenon, but the attitudes giving rise to it were forged in the crucible of those dark years. The army's thinking became more conservative, fertile soil for the 'jihadism' that was to shape its outlook first in Afghanistan and then Kashmir, something from which it has yet to fully recover. The richest irony of that period of course is that our American mentors, now so bent on culturally reconditioning the Pakistani mind, were at that time the loudest cheerleaders of what passed for the spirit of 'jihad'. In the 1980s Americans in Islamabad (and I say this with a sense of wonderment) were amongst the most bigoted souls on the planet. About every subject under the sun they could endure scepticism, even cynicism, but the one thing beyond any criticism was the Afghan 'jihad'. That was an article of faith, faith raised to the power of dogma. The demons they are now trying to exorcise in Afghanistan were born of that attitude. Anyway, if any country was ripe for a social revolution -- its Sixties and Beatle moment -- it was Pakistan after Zia's death. But instead of making a clean break with the past Pakistan slipped into a neo-Zia era, with the Establishment -- as personified by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Army Chief Gen Aslam Beg -- serving to put the brakes on any cultural revolution. No hundred flowers bloomed; no hundred schools of thought contended. The old dragons kept their vice-like grip on power. Pakistan remained imprisoned in the old strategic parameters -- Afghan depth, holding down the Indian army in Kashmir, the space for adventure provided by our nuke capability, etc. The Americans, ecstatic at the end of the Soviet empire, had walked on from Afghanistan, forgetting all about it (something which they now rue). But we did not march with the times. We kept holding on to the old certitudes. It was only a matter of time before the Mujahideen morphed into the Taliban and the Taliban provided a congenial setting for Al Qaeda to grow and prosper. We only have a two years' window. The Americans are not going to stay in Afghanistan forever. Support for the Afghan war is beginning to drop in the US. By the time Congressional elections come round next year, what is now a trickle could turn into something bigger. And by the time Obama's first term is about to end, and he is up for re-election, America's continued involvement in Afghanistan is likely to be one of the hottest topics of debate. We should be ready for that eventuality. Our army has done a superb job of cleaning up Swat. Fazlullah's Taliban are on the run. The FATA Taliban are also under pressure, the noose tightening around Waziristan and the army mounting operations at selected points. But for Pakistan to be fully cured of the mindset which drove it into the battlefields of 'jihad', the turning of the military tide is not enough. It must be matched by a lasting change of mind. We need a social revolution so that we jettison some of the spiritual baggage which has served to cloud our thinking. Pakistan will never be fully free in its mind unless the fake piety introduced by Gen Zia into our law books is completely erased. We have to go back not to where the nation stood on Oct 12, 1999, when Musharraf took over, but where it was on July 5, 1977, when Zia and his generals seized power. The aim should not be to hound anyone but to clear our spiritual decks. All the laws Zia introduced at the altar of a fake piety, including the Hadood Ordinance, need to be expunged. The historic task before this National Assembly, elected with such high hopes in Feb 2008, is this. Hopefully, as a consequence, our nation will learn to lighten up a bit and discover a higher combination of opposites than religion and politics. There is too much gloom in Pakistan, too much darkness. We are too moralistic, too judgmental, often too self-righteous. That is why we endlessly preach and endlessly worry about the future while not being able to live in the present and make the most of what it has to offer. Not surprisingly, therefore, Pakistanis at times give the impression of being forever on the cross. We have our problems but since when has the human race, from the dawn of history until today, been free of problems? When they walk the streets of their towns and cities, Pakistanis -- both men and women -- don't act as if they are wholly free. In a social sense -- and here I have to use my words carefully -- they act in a constrained manner, as if a strict censor is watching their backs. Is it any wonder if they have cultivated the habit of doing so many things by stealth? This is no prescription for a free people. Email: winlust@yahoo.com (The News)

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Ayaz Amir: The road to hell is indeed paved with the best intentions !

Their lordships overstep the mark

By Ayaz Amir

The Pakistani disease, if we have to choose one and place it above all others, is not to do what one is qualified to do but to do that which one is not meant to do. The political class has forgotten the art of leading (it dances to the tunes of others). The administrative class is no longer any good at administration. The military have a mixed record in defending the country. But when it comes to seizing power--in other words, stepping out of their lawful domain--their record is unrivalled.
As for their lordships of the higher judiciary, far from being bulwarks of the constitutional order they have been abettors of dictatorship. Mercifully, after Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry's defiance of Musharraf, and after the lawyers' movement which was spawned by Justice Chaudhry's defiance, this charge is no longer relevant. The higher judiciary has redeemed its past sins and is now set on a different course. But now another danger looms. From one extreme--abetting dictatorship--the higher judiciary is swinging to another extreme--intruding more and more into the spheres of the executive and the legislature.
For their own good their lordships should restrain themselves on this count. Justice Chaudhry and the other judges who stood up to Musharraf have earned great public respect because of their stand on principles. It would be a pity if this respect were in any way to be eroded if the public at large and other institutions of government came to see their lordships as doing things they were not meant to do.
In passing, may it be said that ridiculing the judiciary and maligning it in any way, or casting aspersions on the integrity of judges, constitutes contempt of court. Commenting on a judgment or any other decision of the courts is not the same thing. We should get this straight before proceeding any further.
A tax may be reasonable, bad or downright perverse. But the levying of it or the withdrawing of it is the prerogative of parliament and the executive authority. There can be a hundred opinions about the so-called carbon tax levied by the government in the present budget. But this was a tax approved by the National Assembly (unanimously or not is beside the point). Government and National Assembly can be pilloried for it. It can be denounced a hundred times over. But how does it become the business of the SC to pass any orders--interim or permanent--against it?
We must do what lies within our competence and not overshoot the mark of our constitutional responsibilities. And if we insist on overstepping our limits mark then we can have precious few objections to the 'constitutional' role 111 Brigade of 10 Corps arrogates to itself every now and then when its truck-mounted columns stream out of Westridge Cantonment in the direction of Islamabad, to unseat lawfully elected governments in the name of saving the country. The road to hell is indeed paved with the best intentions.
In its short order on the carbon tax issue the SC has allowed itself to be dragged into the complications of petroleum pricing. Whether the price of petrol, diesel and kerosene oil is reasonable or a burden on the public, this is for the government and the elected representatives of the people to decide. The elected representatives of the people may not be doing their job. The government may be shirking its responsibility to look after the interests of the public. But these are separate issues. The SC's business is to interpret the law and to stand guard over it. Petroleum pricing and taxation policy do not lie in its domain.
"…prima facie," says the SC, "we are of the view that there was no justification for imposition of carbon surcharge in place of PDL (Petroleum Development Levy) because such a tax could be imposed subject to certain conditions, such as provision of petroleum products free of lead or carbon dioxide and consequential pollution free atmosphere to all citizens." This is dangerous ground the SC is treading on for it implies the judicial laying down of conditions for the imposition of taxes. This is an infringement of parliamentary responsibility.
In its order the SC refers to the Preamble of the Constitution and the reference in it to "social justice". The implication is that this provision allows the SC to examine whether any act of government passes the test of social justice. To accept this interpretation is to make the SC's purview virtually limitless.
Power is best exercised when applied sparingly. Speech is most effective when brief and to the point. Similarly, the apex court is most effective when its interventions into public policy, under the cover of social justice, are few and far between.
Along the same lines, when the SC takes suo moto notice of anything it should cause a country-wide stir. People should sit up and take notice. But if their lordships start exercising their suo moto powers every day and in matters of relatively trivial importance, public interest will be lost and the SC's own authority in the public eye will be undermined. The over-use of anything may not in all cases breed contempt. But it does nurture indifference, the last thing most of us would want as far as the Iftikhar Chaudhry Supreme Court is concerned.
In Bacon's Essays (I can't help boasting I have an old, second-hand 1916 edition), in the one "Of Judicature" the very first words are, "Judges ought to remember that their Office is to Interpret Law, and not to Make Law or Give Law : else will it be like the authority claimed by the Church of Rome…"
We have had Supreme Courts in the past which have been like lambs before military shepherds. But now that we have a democracy in place--maybe an imperfect democracy and maybe a government with a thousand defects, but a constitutional government all the same--it would be a sad day if the SC were to assume the airs of a new Church of Rome.
There is so much for the courts to do. There is so much for the Supreme Court to do. The lower courts are riddled with inefficiency and corruption. The SC is already seized with the question of reducing the huge backlog of undecided cases. While Justice Chaudhry has set things in the right direction by stressing the need for the lower courts to improve their performance and be more active in disposing off cases, this task will not be achieved by mere pronouncements alone. It will need all of Justice Chaudhry's efforts before tangible improvements are felt in the lower courts. We are at a delicate moment in our history, facing internal strife and extraordinary external pressures. The fight against extremist elements, schooled in the ideology of misguided jihad, are straining our utmost capabilities. The American presence in Afghanistan imposes its own compulsions. Such a situation demands a higher degree of leadership on the part of all those in a position of authority and responsibility. This includes the government, the political class, the armed forces and the higher judiciary.
Ineffective and inept the higher workings of government may be, but let no one say that this is a continuation of the Musharraf order. This is one cliché we should now transcend. Musharraf and all he stood for are things of the past. We now have to pick up the pieces and reinvent a new Pakistan. Things went drastically wrong for Pakistan when General Zia seized power in the summer of 1977. Dismantling the legacy of the last 32 years is not an uneasy undertaking. But if we are at all to ensure that our future is better than the missteps of the past, this task has to be taken in hand.
The first thing we need is stability and the preservation of the present democratic order. If there is to be reform and change and better governance these must come from within the crucible of this order, not through another march of 111 Brigade. Rocking the boat is a luxury we can ill-afford at this juncture. As for social justice, that is a subject best left to the representatives of the people. They may not be up to this task but then it should be up to our democratic system, and the turning of the democratic wheel, to give us a better choice of leaders.

The News --- 10th July, 09
Email: winlust@yahoo.com

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Ayaz Amir: Swat: doctrine of necessity (in its purest form)

Swat: doctrine of necessity (in its purest form)

Islamabad diary Friday, February 20, 2009 by Ayaz Amir Those armchair warriors -- and there's no shortage of them out here -- who are wringing their hands over the Swat accord should ask themselves whether the government had any alternative. Necessity, and iron necessity at that, is the mother of this accord. The authorities were left with no other option because the Swat Taliban under the command of Maulana Fazlullah had fought the army to a standstill. In Pakistan, as indeed elsewhere, sending in the army is the option of last resort. We had tried this option in Swat and it hadn't worked. In fact the Taliban, far from being defeated, were in the ascendant, their grip on Swat tighter than before the operation began. The army was there, as it still is, taking distant artillery shots at the Taliban, and occasionally sending in helicopter gunships, but for all that confined largely to its bunkers. Guerrilla insurgencies are not defeated by such long-range or long-distance tactics. So what was the ANP government in Peshawar to do? It impressed upon the federal government and the army the need for declaring some kind of Sharia law for the Malakand division (of which Swat is a part) so as to take the wind out of the sails of the insurgency. This was the demand of Sufi Muhammad -- Fazlullah's father-in-law and the founder of the Tanzim Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (Movement for the imposition of Sharia) -- and if it was accepted Sufi Muhammad could be induced to call upon the Taliban to lay down their arms, something he is already trying to do. It needs little genius to figure out that the Americans would be upset by such a deal. President Asif Zardari, as the nation suspects only too well, is very much America's man, as Pervez Musharraf was before him. But even he has had to go along with this deal because the deteriorating situation in Swat left no other choice. This has everything to do with what was possible, very little with Islam, Sharia or speedy justice. Tired of all the killing, the people of Swat have welcomed this accord. Whether it survives or not -- my hunch is that it won't survive for long -- it already has had the effect of pitting Maulana Sufi Muhammad against his son-in-law. Sufi Muhammad's task is not easy, it being hard to persuade a victorious force to disarm voluntarily. Herein lie the seeds of discord between Sufi Muhammad and the Taliban. So this is hardly capitulation. It is more like sensible politics, more like strategy, the indirect approach. When you can't beat your opponent head-on, it is best to try a flanking manoeuvre, the continuation of war by other means, although I don't think anyone in the Frontier government would have quite put it this way. Maulana Fazlullah can't have been overjoyed by the reception received in Mingora by his father-in-law, Sufi Muhammad. So something that discountenances the Swat Taliban, something that puts them out of humour and plants suspicion in their minds, is it good or bad? The Swat accord is certainly proving more effective against the Swat Taliban than anything done by the army. Armchair warriors and critics in distant lands should therefore hold their fire until they see this latest saga playing itself out fully. The government should be extra careful not to give the Taliban any excuse to break the accord. If they do so nevertheless, the onus will be upon them to justify the return to arms. So whether Sharia law in the real sense is imposed in Malakand or not, it is in our interest to say that Islamic justice has come. Instead of sowing doubts about the accord, we should put the best face on it. The Americans of course are being stupid and sotto voce are muttering capitulation but for once we should ignore their signals of distress. This is not our war but it is our country and the Americans are not going to save it for us. We have to do this ourselves. Let the presidency and the army, the two key players from our side, resist American bullying and stick to the Swat accord. This is the only thing available on the table and minus it we go back to the pre-accord bloodletting. Indeed, this accord is defensive philosophy at its best: declaring victory and getting out, a line the Americans may have to follow in Afghanistan when all their other gambits fail. The situation there is already beyond the repair of American arms and no surge -- no fresh troop induction like the 17,000 troop increase just decreed by President Obama -- is going to fix it. This should be a time for introspection and the study of history, that of the Vietnam conflict and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan above all. At the height of their involvement in Vietnam the United States had half a million troops there. They threw more bombs on North and South Vietnam than the total tonnage of bombs thrown in the Second World War. They lost over 3,000 aircraft over the skies of Vietnam. Nothing worked because the population was against them, a people primed for resistance by the great Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese Communist Party. The Soviet army was a tough army. Their special forces, Spetznatz commandos, were second to none. They had more troops in Afghanistan than those presently fielded by the western allies. They had a more effective grip on the major cities of Afghanistan than anything the Americans can claim. Even when they withdrew in Feb 1989, their protégé, Najibullah, survived for another three years and only fell when Boris Yeltsin's Russia stopped gasoline supplies (and also because Abdul Rashid Dostum defected to the mujahideen). Nonetheless, through a deadly combination of Afghan geography, CIA and Saudi money, Pakistani help and Pakhtoon hardihood, the Soviets suffered defeat in Afghanistan. Let it be noted in passing that on his own terrain the Pakhtoon is amongst the toughest guerrilla fighters in the world. Two factors have changed in this equation. Firstly, CIA and Saudi money has been replaced by poppy money. Pakistan may be facing bankruptcy but the Taliban are in a position to finance their own jihad. Secondly, against the Soviets Pakistan as a state was a sponsor of jihad. Not any more. Pakistan is now tied to America's apron strings because in a crunch its elite, civil and military, will always be a pawn in America's hands, the ethos of this elite predisposing it to play this role. But the two other factors remain constant: Afghan geography and Pakhtoon hardihood. The Obama administration is welcome to try but all the signs suggest that in Afghanistan it is about to replicate the monumental failure in Vietnam. It will get tired -- of this we can be certain if Iraq is any guide, and before it Vietnam--but not before inflicting more punishment on Afghanistan. And more damage on Pakistan which is also caught up in this conflict. Al Qaeda will remain an abiding American concern but the question likely to come to the fore sooner rather that later is whether Al Qaeda is best fought covertly, using the tremendous array of resources at America's command, or by putting forty or fifty thousand boots on the ground. An empire best fights distant wars through indirect means. Getting bogged down on the ground is a troubling sign, evidence of blundering. So let us be careful in rushing to judgment over the Swat accord. It may fall apart tomorrow but it is still a model that the Pakistan army may have to follow in other parts of the tribal belt and which the Americans may have to follow when belated wisdom dawns about the futility of further conflict in Afghanistan. Tailpiece: Who killed Musa Khankhel, Geo's correspondent in Mingora, Swat, a brave and dedicated journalist by all accounts? His family blames the security forces and he himself when alive spoke of threats to his life from the security forces. But he was killed in an area under the tight control of the Taliban. Clearly, someone was trying to send a message. But what precisely? TV channels reported the scenes of jubilation witnessed in Mingora on Sufi Muhammad's arrival. In whose interest was it to cut short those expressions of joy? His death underscores the tragedy Pakistan is going through. This is a time to think for ourselves rather than dance to the tune of distant powers. (The News) Email: winlust@yahoo.com

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Ayaz Amir: Missing the essence of Talibanism - Talibanism is a form of radicalisation. The only way to fight it is through radical leadership.

Missing the essence of Talibanism

Islamabad diary Friday, February 13, 2009 by Ayaz Amir I think we are not getting it. Talibanism in Afghanistan is a revolt against the American occupation. Those who can't see this deserve an extended stay in a re-education camp. From this perspective the true godfather of the Afghan resistance is the United States of America. But Pakistani Talibanism, as represented by Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan and Maulana Fazlullah in Swat, is a slightly different phenomenon. It may have originated as a side-effect of the Afghan war but it has now mutated into something with a personality of its own. With all its primitive and even barbaric permutations — the bombing of schools, the insistence on what amounts to female segregation, the slitting of throats — it is a revolt against the Pakistani state. Or rather a revolt against the dysfunctional nature of this state. Far from being defeated, much less crushed, this revolt is spreading. Hitherto it was confined to the Frontier Province. But on February 7 we saw this revolt cross the River Indus for the first time when a police check post in Mianwali (Qudratabad near Wan Bachran) was attacked by Taliban fighters. On Feb 11 another police outpost near Essa Khail came under attack. Mianwali and Bhakkar along the River Indus are vulnerable districts, open to infiltration from the Frontier. If the Taliban acquire any kind of foothold here, God help us. My district of Chakwal is a short ride away, as are the districts of Sargodha and Khushab. From there to central Punjab is but a short haul. But why should anyone be attracted to the Taliban? Don't we know what they stand for? Why should Punjab, of all places, ever afford them a foothold? There's no simple answer to these questions. But an obvious fact should stare any observer in the face. There is a stratum of privileged people in Pakistan, a middle class which also lives comfortably or gets by reasonably well, and then an entire population of have-nots, with no stake in the existing order of things, whose existence may not be short but it is nasty and brutish all the same. Which are the elements flocking to Mahsud's banner in Waziristan and Fazlullah's in Swat? Not the big Khans or Maliks but the have-nots. Beware Punjab's huge under-class which will be fodder and recruiting ground for the Taliban if the revolt in the north-west, escaping the best ability of the Pakistan military establishment to suppress it, snakes its way into the adjoining districts of Punjab. Every Punjab town, large and small, has a mosque, if not more than one, sympathetic to the Taliban brand of Islam [no need to explain that most of these mosques belong to either Sipah-e-Sahaba or Wahhabi/Salafi ideology]. So at least there is a handy network — a Ho Chi Minh Trail, so to speak — down which the ideology of the Taliban can travel, whether we like this ideology or abhor it being a separate issue altogether. If this were Nepal this would be a Maoist uprising. If this were a Latin American country it would be a peasant or a Guevarist uprising. Since it is Pakistan, the revolt assaulting the bastions of the established order comes with an Islamic colouring, Islam reduced to its most literal and unimaginative interpretations at the hands of those leading the Taliban revolt. But then we know that with our Pakhtoon brothers there are no halfway measures. They are given to extremes. No wonder then if evangelicalism in their hands has descended to primitivism and barbarism. The ferment in Swat began with Maulana Sufi Muhammad when he called for the establishment of Sharia law. But what is now happening in Swat — under the leadership of Maulana Fazlullah, his son-in-law — has outgrown its origins. It is far bigger than anything old Sufi Muhammad could have envisioned. Similarly, the Afghan resistance and its fallout on Pakistan are now much bigger than Mullah Omar or Osama bin Laden. Al Qaeda may be a factor in the larger situation but the Taliban revolt in Pakistan has acquired an impetus of its own. Like a runaway plant it is rearing its head wherever it can — freebooters, buccaneers, committed Islamists, all drawn to its cause. There are people who don't have enough to eat, who don't have a job and no prospects in life. If they are wronged they have no redress. There are people tortured daily in our police stations, people caught up for years in the endless grind of court cases. There is endemic corruption all round. Every government department, without exception, serves itself, not anything as esoteric as the people. If this is not recruiting ground for Talibanism, what is? Let me give a few examples. Currently in Chakwal a Rupees18 crore project for the laying of sewerage lines is being carried out. The department responsible is Public Health Engineering. It is creating such a mess — drains clogged, streets blocked by dirty water —and the work is so sub-standard that it has triggered a public outcry. When I visited one of the sites officials came up with lame excuses but I told them they were inviting the wrath of the heavens. I asked them to fear the time when people took matters into their own hands and started administering Taliban-style justice. And Chakwal is the place subjected just a week ago to a visit by the Punjab chief secretary. His cavalcade as he tore from one place to another, police hooters screaming in front, was most impressive and also a trifle overdone. Did no one tell him about the mayhem caused by the Public Health Engineering Department? The central road through Chakwal is being rebuilt and wide drains are being laid on either side. The work is so shoddy that loose sand would be better than the material the contractors are using. Well, the chief secretary has come and gone but the work is as shoddy as before. What did his grand tour achieve? In police stations across the country money is king. Every incoming chief minister threatens to clean up thana culture. Nothing changes. Indeed, matters far from improving are sliding downhill faster than most of us realise. The Americans say they want aid to Pakistan to focus on development rather than military assistance. The Biden-Lugar bill, now dead, foresaw assistance of $15 billion over five years. The Obama administration is saying it will tie aid to Pakistan to its performance in fighting Taliban militancy. This thinking presupposes that American aid is what Pakistan needs and what can achieve victory over the Taliban. Experience tends to suggest otherwise. The Americans gave Pakistan money when Musharraf was president. Well, what did we do with that money and did it enhance our capacity to fight the Taliban? If anything, we have a bigger catastrophe on our hands now than when this aid started coming in. The Americans are pouring money into Afghanistan. Has it stabilized the situation there? Now they are accusing the Karzai administration of massive corruption. This is the way with third world countries on the dole, especially in a war zone. If dollars alone could do the trick the US would not have lost in Vietnam. Dollars alone cannot prove triumphant in Afghanistan or Pakistan. If history is any guide, the American effort in Afghanistan is doomed. Not for nothing is it called the graveyard of empires. The Americans will come to this realisation sooner or later but by that time it may be too late for us. Talibanism is a form of radicalisation. The only way to fight it is through radical leadership. But do we have anything of the kind? The PPP and PML-N are both wedded to the status quo. Both are pro-American, both terrified of getting on the wrong side of the Americans, both incapable of independent thinking. At a conference in Qatar in December 2003 — attended from Pakistan by Mushahid Hussain, Ejaz Haider of Daily Times and myself — Richard Holbrooke came up with the astounding statement that if the participants chose to speak about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict or the Iraq war they would be wasting their time. He spoke like one who was utterly sure of himself, someone who had all the answers. The impression he gave throughout the three-day conference was of being a stuck-up guy. And it's on him that our leadership, civil and military, has been fawning these last few days. Just goes to show the kind of stuff we have. But this is the best we have, the sum total of our collective political intelligence. And it is with this that we must fight the Taliban revolt. It is not going to be easy. (The News) Email: winlust@yahoo.com

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Ayaz Amir: The burden of history in 2009 is on the sholders of: PPP, PML-N and the army.

Country burns, political class fiddles
Friday, February 06, 2009

By by Ayaz Amir

.... At the centre the PPP government is rightly being accused of incompetence and dithering. But is leadership coming from any other direction?

The army, Pakistan’s option of last resort, seems lost, putting on a brave front but knowing inwardly that its operations in Swat and FATA have been unmitigated disasters. Nothing coming from the army suggests it has any idea of how to retrieve this situation. In Iraq, General David Petraeus, now Centcom chief, is being credited with turning the situation around in the most insurgency-hit regions of the country. A Pakistani Petraeus has yet to emerge in our local killing fields. Who are the commanding officers in FATA and Swat? Given the deliberately-induced fog surrounding military operations there, it is not surprising if the public at large has no idea who they might be.

Our troops in FATA and Swat face a tough challenge. They have lost the initiative and are on the defensive. They deserve popular support. But it would help if army headquarters were a bit more open about what is happening in those embattled areas and, more importantly, if the question of public anger caused by indiscriminate damage to public life and property during the course of military operations was suitably addressed. The battle for hearts and minds is clearly not being won.

At the same time the army should not get the feeling that it has been left on its own. President, prime minister, parliamentarians and those politicos given to issuing press statements should be visiting troops on the frontline. Needless to say, the same holds true for self-righteous pundits.

The PML-N is the alternative to the PPP, with a stake in the present dispensation because of its government in Punjab, the country’s largest province and the source of much of Pakistan’s anguish since the country’s birth. What is it up to?

Exile and the long night of the Musharraf era should have tempered the PML-N leadership, taught it a measure of wisdom and enabled it to see the larger canvas instead of just the trees. It is a moot point whether any of this has happened because the party or rather its leadership has not been able to get over the well-ingrained tendency of tilting at windmills — imagining them to be monsters on the horizon but which turn out to be windmills.

It has espoused the lawyers’ cause and the cause of the restoration of the judges deposed by Gen Pervez Musharraf. But espousing a cause is one thing, strangling oneself with it quite another. The PML-N has tightly tied the judges’ issue round its neck, to the extent where it seems that it only has a one-point agenda.

Impulsive as ever, the party has declared support for the lawyers’ long march and the sit-in in front of the Supreme Court on March 9. Several questions arise. Will the agitating lawyers be able to attract a large enough crowd to force the government’s hand? And is the government likely to capitulate — for the restoration of Iftikhar Chaudhry and the other deposed judges would amount to capitulation — before the lawyers? Failure on these counts would rub off on the PML-N. Its public standing would be diminished.

In Punjab we are seeing a somewhat curious phenomenon at work: the chief secretary assuming the role of overseeing politico, visiting divisions and districts, with a bevy of provincial secretaries in tow, inspecting line departments and ordering the establishment of new model schools, etc.

No doubt these tasks need to be performed. The only question is by whom: bureaucrats or elected officials? And if it is thought that bureaucrats can do this job better, why not carry the argument to its logical conclusion and call upon the chief secretary and his army of minions to mobilise people for the long march?

Pakistan as a whole got over its romance with the higher civil services in the 1970 elections, during which the deputy commissioner and the district superintendent of police were objects of popular hatred. For some reason yet to be adequately plumbed, this romance, long since buried elsewhere, comes alive whenever the redoubtable Shahbaz Sharif —in the eyes of some though, regretfully, not all, a super-administrator — comes to power in Punjab.

As a politician with popular backing, the sources of his power are the people and his party, the PML-N. But his heart seems to lie somewhere in the Punjab secretariat.

Pakistan’s failure is ultimately Punjab’s failure because Punjab — for reasons of size, strength and resources — must carry the burden of the country’s governance. If Pakistan fails in any sphere, the failure in large measure is Punjab’s. The party of Punjab is the PML-N but for Pakistan’s sake the PML-N’s vision must transcend Punjab and the narrow vision for which Punjab has been famous, and for which it has been justly blamed, since 1947.

The people of Punjab delivered a fractured mandate on Feb 18, 2008. The PML-N emerged as the largest party but the PPP too won a sizeable number of seats in the provincial assembly. Both together had a commanding majority. If that mandate is now to be hijacked by the likes of Salmaan Taseer (someone with deep pockets but no political standing) and Pervaiz Elahi and talented scion, Moonis Elahi (who were almost objects of popular ridicule in the Feb 2008 elections), then there is something seriously wrong with the political course pursued by the two major parties since the Feb 18 elections. Things should not have been allowed to come to such a pass.

But the future belongs to the PML-N, I can hear a hundred thousand PML-N activists say. The future belongs to no one. This at least is what Pakistan’s history tells us. Ayub, Bhutto, Zia, Musharraf, even Nawaz Sharif with his two-thirds majority in 1997, all thought they were politically immortal. What happened to them?

It is not wise to take too much for granted. The next elections are not about to take place tomorrow. In any event, who can safely predict the course of Pakistani politics?

Upon the shoulders of three forces fell the burden of history in 1970: the Awami League, the PPP and the army. All three were not up to the challenge they faced. All three failed Pakistan. In what must be taken as their personal tragedies, Mujib and Bhutto came to sorry ends. The army in the intervening years has also done not too well.

It is all too easy to brandish the phrase ‘existential threat’. But in Pakistan’s case it is not an empty cliché. Pakistan faced an existential threat in 1970. It faces a similar threat in 2009. On the shoulders of another troika falls the burden of history this time: PPP, PML-N and the army.

1970 was easier in that after defeat in East Pakistan the battered spirit and soul of the idea of Pakistan had somewhere to retreat to, a place where it could rest and lick its wounds after its tormented journey: West Pakistan. But if today the fire burning in our north and northwest were to spread, where would the battered soul of Pakistan go?

If the issues facing Pakistan are grave, far more serious than they have ever been before, the response coming from our political or governing class is puny by comparison, characterised by a poverty of will, imagination and intellect. What greater pity if at this juncture this is all that Pakistan’s collective leadership has to offer? (The News)

Email: winlust@yahoo.com
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